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المجلد من إعداد ج. أ. سالدانها [جبروم أنتوني سالدانها] وعنوانه ملخص شؤون الجزيرة العربية التركية. ١٨٠١-١٩٠٥ (شيملا: مطبعة ح. م. [مطبعة الحكومة المركزية]، ١٩٠٦).

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• الجزء I (الفصول I-III): الشؤون الداخلية القبلية وغيرها من الشؤون الأخرى والشؤون الخارجية المتعلقة ببلاد فارس والواهبيين ومسقط (الأوراق ١١-٥٦)؛

• الجزء II (الفصول IV-IX): الوكلاء البريطانيون وحقوقهم (الأوراق ٥٧-٩٣)؛


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
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
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PRÉCIS
OF
TURKISH ARABIA AFFAIRS.
1801—1905.

By J. A. Saldanha, B.A., LL.B.





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
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P R E F A C E .

This précis covers correspondence on our records about Turkish Arabia affairs from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the year 1905, with a retrospect into the previous history, for which we have partly drawn upon the Bombay Government *Précis in regard to the first connection of the Hon'ble East India Company with Turkish Arabia, 1646—1846* (called hereafter merely *Turkish Arabia Précis, 1646—1846*).

The Précis is divided into four parts :—

Part First.—Dealing with the internal tribal and other affairs of Turkish Arabia and its external affairs in relation to Persia, the Wahabis and Maskat.

Part Second.—Dealing with the British Agents and Consuls and their rights on Turkish Arabia.

Part Third.—Dealing with the British rights on the Turkish Arabia Rivers.

The British rights, arising out of treaties, engagements, firmans or usage on these Rivers comprise the following :—

- (i) The right to keep one, if not two, armed steamers on the Euphrates and Tigris.
- (ii) The right of British or British-owned mercantile vessels to navigate those rivers, and that without being liable to pay certain river dues exacted from Turkish vessels.
- (iii) The right of British Postal Service between Baghdad and Basrah.
- (iv) The right of British ships-of-war to visit Basrah, if not Kurna, situated at the confluence of the Euphrates and Tigris.
- (v) The right of British mercantile vessels to free passage on the Shat-el-Arab as far as Mohammerah without being detained by Turkish authorities for the purposes of quarantine, customs, etc., and this especially when the vessels are bound to Mohammerah, a Persian port.
- (vi) This right not to be menaced by any fortifications being built on either side of the last mentioned river.
- (vii) The right of protection of our traffic on the Shat-el-Arab from piracies and our right to take the necessary measures on default of Turkey and Persia.

The origin and history of these rights and the attempts made by the Turks and Arab tribes to disturb them are treated in the several Chapters of Part III.

Part Fourth.—Connected with the protection of British Indian subjects and their property.

The following subjects will, however, be treated in separate Précis :—


- (1) Consular jurisdiction and particular cases in connection with the exercise of Consular jurisdiction, protection of Christian subjects and Jews, etc.
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- (3) Sanitary matters.
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- (5) Trade.

8th December 1905.

J. A. SALDANHA.

N.B.—The numbers of the paragraphs do not run consecutively through all the four Parts, but begin with a fresh number with each Part.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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CHAPTER IIIA.

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CHAPTER I.

* History of Turkish Arabia: its external relations with Persia, Maskat and the Wahabis.

(i) Turco-Persian Wars and Relations.

Turkish Arabia, once holding the seat of the Abbaside Caliphs, Baghdad, the Rome of the Sunni Mussalmans, and still holding the most sacred of the shrines of the Shiah Mussalmans at Kerbella, Najaf and Kathimain, to them as sacred as the holy places in Palestene are to the Christians: such a province as this could not but be the coveted land both of the Sunni and of the Shiah Mussalmans. It was thus after the fall of the Abbaside Caliphs in A. D. 1258—a theatre of bloody wars between the Sunni Turks and Shiah Persians for several centuries.

2. We shall here briefly give a history of these wars and their connected events. The first important struggle for supremacy in these parts between the Turks and Persians took place during the reigns of Sultan Selim I of Turkey (1512-1520) and Shah Ismail of Persia.

Sultan Selim I (1520) a fanatical Sunnite caused a general slaughter of his Shiite subjects, in which 45,000 persons suffered death. This dreadful massacre only increased the animosity with which Shah Ismail of Persia already regarded the Ottoman Sultan and ultimately led for war. Selim marched into the Persian territory in 1516 and encountered the Persian force on the plain of Chaldiran in a fierce battle, in which the Persians were completely routed. The way was now open to Tabriz, the capital of Persia at the time; the Ottoman army continued to advance thither, and entered the city in triumph.

2-A. But the conqueror was obliged to retrace his steps after a halt of only eight days on account of the discontent of his troops and their eager desire to revisit their homes. As a result of this expedition, the provinces of Diarbeker and Kurdistan, through which Salim had marched against Shah Ismail, were completely conquered and annexed to the Ottoman Empire, and their government was thoroughly organized by Idris (the famous historian).

2-B. Sultan Selim next turned his attention to the conquest of Syria, Egypt and Hejaj, of which the Mameluks of Egypt were the recognized lords. This great chivalry of the east drawn from among the slaves, were subdued after a gallant resistance, and the three important provinces were added to the Ottoman Empire.

2-C. The result of this war were momentous and far reaching, besides in the acquisition of the vast territory to the Turkish Empire. The Sultan of Turkey now took the place of the Mameluk Sultans as the suzerains and protectors of the holy cities of Hejaj. "Another important dignity" writes Creasy in his *History of the Ottoman Turks*, "which the Sultan Selim and his successors obtained from the conquest of Egypt, was the succession to the Caliphate, and to the spiritual power and pre-eminence of the immediate Vicars of Mahomet himself. After the deaths of the four first Caliphs, who had been personal companions of the Prophet, the spiritual sovereignty of Islam passed successively to the Omniade Caliphs and to the Abbassides, whose temporal power was overthrown by Houlogou Khan, a grand son of Gingham Khan, in 1258. But though the substantial authority of the Caliphs as independent princes was then shattered, the name was perpetuated

* Bibliography—History of the Ottoman Turks by Creasy, History of Persia by Malcolm, History of Persia by Markham, *Precis on the East Indian Company's connection with Turkish Arabia, 1646-1846. Selections from the State Papers in regard to the Persia and Persian Gulf, 1690-1800.*

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three centuries longer in eighteen descendants of the House of Abbas, who dwelt in Egypt with titular pomp, but no real power, in the capital of the Mameluke rulers, like the descendants of the Great Mogul in British India. They gave their names to the edicts of the Mameluke Sultans when required; and we have seen in the case of the Ottoman Bajazet I, that Mahometan princes in other countries still regard the Egyptian Caliph as the fountain of honour, and sought from him the stamp and sanction of sovereignty. When Selim conquered Egypt, he found there Mohammed, the twelfth Caliph of the family of Abbas, and he induced him solemnly to transfer the Caliphate to the Ottoman Sultan and his successors. At the same time Selim took possession of the visible insignia of that high office, which the Abbassides had retained,—the sacred standard, the sword, and the mantle of the Prophet.

In a preceding chapter of this volume, attention has been drawn to the importance of the Turkish Sultan being at once the spiritual and the temporal chief of his Mahometan subjects,—of his being both Pope and Emperor. It will readily be imagined how much the Sultan's authority must have been augmented by his acquiring the sacred position of *Caliph, Vicar of the Prophet of God, Commander of the Faithful, and Supreme Imam of Islamism*. It gives the Turkish Sultan dignity and authority (and may possibly give him practical influence), not only over his own Mahometan subjects, but over all who profess the creed of Islam, whatever be their race, and whatever be their country,—except the Persians, and others who hold the Shiite tenets. But the great majority of Mahometans are Sunnite; and in the eyes of all Sunnites the sacred rights of the primitive Caliphs are vested in the House of Othman and Sultan Abdul Mejdîd is the supreme chief of the Mahometan world."

3. Soliman I (1520-1566) led his armies against the Persians in several campaigns (1533, 1534, 1535, 1548, 1553 and 1555), as a result of which there were added to the Ottoman Empire large territories in Armenia, Mesopotamia, and the strong cities of Erivan, Van, Mosul, and *above all of Baghdad*.

4. War broke out between Turkey and Persia soon after the accession of Murad or Amurath III (1574-1595) at Constantinople; and Georgia (which had been in alliance with Persia) and Azerbaijan were conquered by the Turks. A peace was concluded in 1590 between the two powers, by which the Ottomans obtained Georgia, the city of Tabriz and the adjacent parts of Azerbaijan, Schirivan, Luristan and Scherhezol.

5. In 1594 hostilities broke out again between Turkey and Persia. In 1599 a feudatory Chief of Asia Minor, named Abdul Hamid, aided by the Governor of Baghdad organized a revolt against the Porte and defeated the Ottoman forces in several engagements. In 1601 Shah Abbas the Persian monarch, taking advantage of these disorders made war upon Turkey and began rapidly to recover the provinces which had been lost recently. During the reign of Ottoman II (1618-22) a treaty was agreed to between Turkey and Persia, by which all the territories conquered since the days of Selim II (successor of Soliman I) were restored to the Shah. Soon after this Shah Abbas again declared war against Turkey and captured Baghdad and Basrah in 1622, at a time when the Ottoman rulers had reached the lowest depths of degradation.

6. Sultan Murad IV (1623-1640) revived the former grandeur of the Ottoman Empire, and during the confusion that reigned in Persia after the death of Shah Abbas in 1628, the Ottoman Sultan succeeded on setting back the Persian advance. Murad IV marched into his Asiatic provinces in 1635 with the avowed object of expelling the Persian heretics from the cities within the ancient limits of the Ottoman Empire which they still occupied. He conquered the city and district of Erivan. In 1638 he undertook a second campaign to re-conquer Baghdad, which had been in Persian occupation for some fifteen years and had been repeatedly besieged in vain by Turkish armies. After a long and gallant resistance on the part of the besieged, the city was

* As to the terms of this treaty see Consultation, taken by storm by the Turks. Peace* 26th October 1844, Nos. 55-56 (printed). was thereupon (in 1639) concluded between Persia and Turkey which delimited the frontiers of Azarbaigon and



Chapter I.

3

Baghdad, Persian ceding Djessan and Badrayi to Turkey and admitting the division of the Jaf tribe. By the provisions of this treaty Baghdad and Basrah also became Turkish Territory and the Arabs of the Kaab Tribe were declared to be independent. Baghdad and Basrah have remained in Turkish possession since then.

7. Nearly a century passed after the treaty of 1639, during which Persia and Turkey continued generally to be at peace; but the extreme weakness to which Persia was reduced by internal commotions, misgovernment and usurpation of Mahomed the Afghan, opened the way to Russian and Turkish intrigues to dismember the Persian Empire. Both Russia and Turkey invaded Persia about the year 1720, and in 1723 a partition treaty was signed by both these powers under which Russia was to take the territory adjoining the Caspian and Turkey the territory below the line drawn from the junction of the Kair and Araxes by way of Ardebil, Tabriz and Hamadan, as far as Kermanshah. Shah Tahmasp was to retain the rest of his paternal empire on condition that he recognized the Treaty.

8. The Porte was however very jealous of Russia, who had made rapid advances into Persian Territory, and was in 1729 on the point declaring war against its rival. In order to avoid the outbreak of hostilities, Russia agreed to the cession of certain Persian provinces to Turkey. In Persia the Afghan usurper Mahmud having died in 1725, his relation Ashraf succeeded him, and after a short war purchased peace* from Turkey in 1727 by ceding all the provinces she had conquered and acknowledging the Ottoman Sultan as Chief of the Moslems, in consideration of which Ashraf was recognized as Shah by the Porte.

9. But there arose soon a warrior in Persia, who was destined to raise the Suffavi dynasty from its wretched condition, put an end the Afghan usurpation and check the Turkish and Russian career of conquest. This hero was the famous Nadirshah.† Put in command of the Shah Tamasp's army in 1727, he compelled the whole of Khorasan to acknowledge Tamasp as the Shah of Persia, and by the close of the year 1738 expelled the Afghans from Persia.

He then met and overthrew the united forces of two Turkish Pashas on the plains of Hamadan, and marching northward captured Tabriz, Ardebil and other principal cities in that quarter. His further march was arrested by his having to hasten to Khorasan to quell a rebellion there, and the attempt made by Shah Tamasp to take Erivan ended in complete disaster, with the result that he agreed in 1732 to a peace with a Ahmed Shaw, the reigning Pasha of Baghdad, by which the Persians abandoned the whole of the country beyond the Araxes to the Turks and ceded five districts of the province of Kermanshah to the Pasha of Baghdad.

10. When Nadir Shah (now the practical ruler in Persia) heard of these disgraceful terms, he repudiated the whole treaty, deposed Shah Tamasp and placed his infant son on the throne, and marched with a large army to the attack of Baghdad, ably held by Ahmed Pasha. Topal Osmah, the Grand Vizier of the Sultan, marched to its rescue and defeated Nadir Shan in July 1733 in a fiercely fought battle near the village of Samarth, about 50 miles from Baghdad. The Persians were reported by the Resident‡ at Basrah to have lost 50,000 men while the troops Thomas Caun left to blockade Baghdad were almost all cut off by a sally from the town by Ahmed Pasha, a small party excepted; with their general Mahomed Khan Bullouch. The Persians were pursued towards Hamadan, where, however, the intrepid Nadir Shah re-assembled his forces and marched again against the Turks and defeated Topal Osman in a battle, in which the

* See appendix 1, Persia.
Volume X of *Aitchinson's Treaties* (1892).

†NOTE.—Originally called Imaun Kuli or Nadir Kuli, he styled himself Tamasp Khan (spelt also Thomas Caun in our old records) on his being raised to the dignity of Khan by Shah Tamasp, and Nadir Shah, when he was raised to the throne.



latter was killed. Nadir then proceeded to invest Baghdad; but as his presence was required urgently elsewhere, he agreed to the terms proposed by the Pasha of Baghdad, namely, that Turkey and Persia should repossess the countries that had belonged to them on the reign of Shah Sultan Hussain before the Afghan invasion. As these terms were not accepted by the Porte, Nadir hastened to occupy Armenia and Gorgia and defeated the Turks in the battle of Baghvand near Erivan. "This victory" writes Malcolm "was followed by the submission of the cities of Gunjah and Teflis; and those of Kars and Erivan, with all former possessions of the Persians in that quarter, were soon afterwards ceded to him by the policy of the Ottoman Court; who taught by misfortune, were glad to conclude a peace* on the basis, which had been before settled by the Pasha of Baghdad." This was in the year 1736.

* Appendix No. 2 (Persia) *Aitchison's Treaties* 1892, Volume X.

11. The East Indian Company's factories in Persia and at Basrah were at this time in great straits on account of the wars between Persia and Turkey. The Agency at Gombroon was in great danger of being embroiled on the war by being forced to assist Nadir with the Company's ships and the President and Council at Bombay was prepared, in order to avoid worse evils, to sell ships to him, though the Company's policy was to make every endeavour to prevent their being embroiled in the troubles, (Bombay Government's Resolution dated 22nd October 1735. *Selections*, No. XXXVIII).

12. Persia was soon again engaged in a war with Turkey and in 1744, ^{† Turkish Arabia Précis, 1646-1846, paragraph 57.} "The Persians laid † siege to Basrah with ^{Selection from State Papers 1600-1800, No XLV.} 12,000 men which continued from 28th August to 27th November, when it was raised by Shaw Nadir's orders, and the army with their artillery marched away the 5th December". Nadir Shah marched to the north and gained a great battle near Eriven. A peace was then (in 1746) concluded between Persia and Turkey. It was agreed that prisoners on both sides should be released; that the Persian pilgrims going to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina should be protected; and that the whole of the provinces of Irak and Azerbaijan should remain with Persia except an inconsiderable territory that had belonged to the Turkish Government on the time of Shah Ismail, the first of the Suffavin Kings. The treaty of 1746 is printed as Appendix No. 3 *Persia of Aitchinson's Treaties*, Volume X. In 1747 another treaty was concluded between the two powers, by which certain parts of Irak and Azerbaijan were ceded by Persia to Turkey. (See Appendix No. 4 *Persia* of the same book.)

13. We find from a letter† of the Agent at Gombroon, dated 7th June 1749, ^{† Turkish Arabia Précis, 1646-1846, paragraph 72.} that Ibrahim Shah, a nephew of Nadir Shah, who had proclaimed himself Shah, was then making preparations for a war with Turkey. Ibrahim Shah was, however, murdered soon after, and the projected war came to nothing.

14. The next great war (1775-79) with Turkey—was carried by Karim Khan. The principal causes alleged by him for declaring the war were (1) the levy of taxes by Omar, the Pasha of Baghdad, on Persian pilgrims to Kerbella and Najaf, and (2) Omar was also accused of having aided the Imam of Maskat, and thus prevented the Persians from subduing the province of Oman. The head of Omar was demanded by Karim Khan and refused by the Porte. Saduk Khan, Karim Khan's brother, was then despatched with a force of 50,000 to Basrah, which proceeded along the coast, while a fleet of 30 vessels sailed from Bushire and Bunder Rig to assist the land operations. The inefficient Turkish fleet offered weak resistance to the Persian ships, and the whole Persian Army was allowed to cross the river to the Basrah side with little opposition. Basrah was invested by the Persian Army on the 7th April 1775 and was surrendered by the Turks to the Persians on 16th April 1776. Saduk Khan treated the conquered city with great consideration and did everything to reconcile the inhabitants. Great preparations were made by the Turks to retake Basrah and invade Persia. But the war died a natural death on the death of Karim Khan in 1779, and Basrah was thereupon abandoned by Saduk Khan, (see



paragraphs 139 to 154 of the *Turkish Arabia Précis, 1646-1846*, and *Selections from State Papers, 1600-1800, Nos. CCVIII and CCXXV*, also paragraphs 47-51 below).

15. In 1821 war broke out between Persia and Turkey, arising from the insults offered to the Persian pilgrims at Mekka. Mahomed Ali Mirza invaded with a large Kurdish force the Pashalik of Baghdad, and when on the point taking the city of Baghdad was carried away by cholera. A subsequent expedition, led by his brother Abbas Mirza, ended abortively owing to the outbreak of cholera in the Persian Camp.

16. For years the border lands between Turkey and Persia commencing from the delta of the Karun and Euphrates to mount Ararat, were scenes of strife and disorder. The exact boundary line have never been determined, and there were constant complaints of passage of nomad tribes to and from the Pashalik of Baghdad and of the grant of asylum to marauders and refugees by the frontier authorities.

17. In the treaty* concluded at Erzeroum in 1823, articles were inserted providing for the remedy of these abuses. These provisions, however, proved ineffectual, and disputes between Turkey and Persia began afresh and their rapid accumulation threatened to involve them in a destructive war, which was averted through the good offices of England and Russia. By the mediation of the ministers of these powers, the troops and other military demonstrations collected on the frontier were withdrawn and an agreement was made that two Plenipotentiaries on the part of Turkey and Persia, with two mediative agents on the part of England and Russia, should meet at Erzeroum to investigate and discuss the claims of both parties. The commission was assembled at Erzeroum in 1843 in which England was represented by Colonel Williams, Major Farrant and Mr. Curzon. Major Rawlinson was appointed in place of Colonel Taylor, Resident in Turkish Arabia, especially with a view to preserve peace between Turkey and Persia. His two reports about the state of affairs on his arrival at Baghdad are printed below—

No. 19, dated the 28th December 1843.

From—MAJOR H. RAWLINSON, Political Agent, Turkish Arabia,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 6 to your address, under date November 30th, 1843, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India in Council, that I arrived at Baghdad on the 6th instant, and duly received charge of the Political Agency of Turkish Arabia from my Predecessor Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor.

2. The Right Hon'ble the Governor-General was not aware, I apprehend, when he issued his instructions† to me of the 16th of September, that Lieutenant-Colonel Farrant of the Bombay Army and attached to the Persian Mission, who was deputed in the first instance as a Special Commissioner to report upon the attack and capture of Kerbela, had been subsequently directed by His Excellency Sir S. Canning to remain at Baghdad during the progress of the negotiations at Erzeroum, and to retain in his own hands the management of affairs, relating to the frontier disputes between the Governments of Persia and Turkey. Such, however, being the case I have carefully avoided bringing my powers into collision with those of the Commissioner. Where my co-operation has been required, I have of course lent the full weight of my official influence to the support of the Lieutenant-Colonel's communications with the Pasha, but I have judged that during his temporary employment at Baghdad any active and unsolicited interference upon my part in the settlement of the frontier disputes, would rather embarrass than assist our common object of preserving general tranquility.

3. The annexed copy of a despatch which I have had the honour to address to the Hon'ble the Secret Committee will acquaint His Lordship with the present state of affairs in the Pashalik of Baghdad.

4. I have availed myself of every opportunity that has offered since my arrival in Turkish Arabia, to communicate with Her Majesty's Ministers at the Courts of Constantinople and Tehran, but I have not yet received answers to my despatches.

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No. 12, dated Baghdad, the 25th December 1843.

From—MAJOR H. RAWLINSON, Political Agent, Turkish Arabia,

To—The Hon'ble the Secret Committee of the Hon'ble the Court of Directors, East India House, London.

I do myself the honour to report for the information of Your Hon'ble Board, that I arrived at Baghdad upon the 6th instant, under instructions from the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India in Council, to assume charge of the office of Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, in succession to Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, whose services have been placed at the disposal of the Government of Bombay.

My appointment to Baghdad by the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General *had especial reference to the preservation of peace between Persia and Turkey*, and I was directed by His Lordship most zealously to devote all my exertions to the accomplishment of this object; but as I found on my arrival that Lieutenant-Colonel Farrant had been deputed to Baghdad on the same duty by His Excellency Sir S. Canning (who is entrusted I understand with the supreme authority, in the settlement of the Turco-Persian disputes), I judged that, during the Lieutenant-Colonel's temporary employment, any active interference upon my part in communicating with the Pasha upon these matters, would rather embarrass than assist our common object of preserving tranquility on the frontier.

As far as I have been able to judge of the present temper and the general character of His Highness the Pasha of Baghdad, *there is little danger, I should say, of the further interruption or derangement of the negotiations at Erzeroom*, from any untoward proceedings upon his part in this neighbourhood. His Highness has commanded the Mussalim of Bussorah, pending the result of the conference at Erzeroom, rigidly to abstain from any interference in the affairs of Chaab or Mahomera. He has displayed much sense and moderation in seeking redress for injuries sustained at the hands of Persia, in the protection of his rebellious subjects and in depredations committed on the Turkish lands, through the legitimate channel of a reference to Tehran, rather than through the more usual and direct means of retaliation or forcible recovery. The Persian pilgrims, who at this season flock to Baghdad on their way to the shrines of Kerbela and Najaff, are received with hospitality, their convenience is consulted, and they experience a far greater degree of protection and even respect in their religious observances, than was ever accorded to them in former years. In fact, although the tardy progress of the negotiations at Erzeroom has tended to create a general mistrust of an eventual amicable adjustment, and although His Highness the Pasha is aware that his own dismissal from office is still demanded by the Persian Government as the only due reparation that can be offered for the unfortunate catastrophe at Kerbela, his general demeanour to Persian subjects is kind and conciliatory and he evidently wishes to redeem the error of his former precipitate conduct.

In his *internal administration* Nejjib Pacha evinces the same energy and firmness which have ever been his distinguishing characteristic. The repression of robbery and disorder, the establishment of the authority of the Porte over the tribes subordinate to the Pashalic, the severe, but not extortionate, exaction of the dues of Government and the introduction of system and arrangement into the various branches of administration, appear to be the chief objects of his care, and it is only reasonable to suppose that, if these objects are carried out with the same vigour and constancy that have marked their first adoption, the increased prosperity of the province must be a necessary consequence.

I proceed to notice such items of local interest as appear to be worthy of record.

The *Shaikh of Chaab*,† believing or feigning to believe that the claim of Turkey to the allegiance of his tribe, has been received with favour at Erzeroom, has resisted the demands of the Persian Government for revenue and it is not impossible but that a collision may take place upon this subject between the troops of the Shaikh and those of the Persian Governor of Dezful, notwithstanding that, in a visit which I lately paid to the part of Mohammerah, I employed every effort of remonstrance and persuasion to prevent an outbreak, fearing lest the contumacy of the Arab Shaikh should be ascribed by Persia to the intrigues of Turkish agents. Since my arrival at Baghdad I have, also, persuaded His Highness the Pasha to reiterate his injunctions to the Governor of Bussorah to avoid all connection, either direct or indirect, with the tribe of Chaab; and as I feel confident that these orders will be rigidly observed, it follows that, should hostilities now ensue, the matter will resolve itself into a mere revenue quarrel between the Persian Government and its own subjects.

The dependency of the Arab tribe of *Beni-Lam* has also sometimes been questioned. At present an officer of the Turkish Government, supported by a small body of troops is quietly employed in the realization of the revenues, and Persian interference is suspended.

A division of the Kurdish tribe of *Jaaf* dependent upon the Turkish Pashalic of Sulimaniah, lately sought refuge within the Persian frontier. The Persian Government refused its restoration and unpleasant discussions might have ensued, had not the tribe within these few days voluntarily returned, in search of pasturage, to the Turkish territory. His Highness the Pasha has now taken the tribes under his own protection and will it is to be hoped, by conciliatory conduct prevent a recurrence of their appeal to Persia.

* See Sub-section (ii), paragraph 22 *et seq* below.

† See paragraph 25 *et seq* below.



Chapter I.

7

Petty acts of depredation continue to be committed by the *Kurdish tribes* upon the frontier but they do not appear to threaten any serious results. If the parties are not predisposed to take offence, redress may be mutually afforded to the sufferers by the local authorities on the frontier, without any sacrifice of dignity or injurious consequence to their respective Government.

The *Pashalic of Sulimaniah* subordinate to Baghdad next claims attention.

Nejib Pasha hardly considers the Government of Sulimaniah, as at present constituted, compatible with his own efficient exercise of supreme authority, and he would thus willingly see the hereditary succession in the Baban family to so extensive a province, exchanged for a nomination to the chiefship proceeding directly from Baghdad. I attribute to this feeling of impatience the honourable reception which His Highness is prepared to afford to Abdullah Beg, a refugee from his brother Ahmed Pasha of Sulimaniah; and I foresee that should Ahmad Pasha take alarm at the open encouragement thus given to his enemy, and display in consequence any signs of estrangement, advantage will at once be taken of his alleged disloyalty, to attempt the introduction of a more immediate and direct exercise of the power of Baghdad in the affairs of Sulimaniah. The Kurdish pride would certainly revolt against this measure and disturbances might thus ensue, but so bitter is the feeling of animosity entertained by the *Soonce Kuads* against their Persian enemies, that I hardly think under any circumstances of disaffection to Turkey, the tribes of Sulimaniah would be brought to encourage or invite the renewed interference of a Sheeah Government in the administration of their province.

Detachments of the Pasha's troops have been for sometime past in the field, employed with the Arabs tribes of *Khezail and Summar*. His Highness is desirous of substituting, as Sheikh of the former tribe, a more orderly individual than the chief hitherto in power and appearances promise the speedy accomplishment of this object without bloodshed or disorder. There is no recent intelligence from the detachment employed with the *Shamar*, but it is believed that the duties of repressing plunder and of strengthening the authority of the Chief, upon which they were deputed, are proceeding satisfactorily.

I have not heard of any fresh acts of outrage being perpetrated by the Pasha of Moosul against the *Nestorians* of the Mountains. His Highness Nejib Pasha is informed of the lively interest taken by the European powers in the fate of this unfortunate colony, and he lately ordered the release and delivery to her friends of a poor Nestorian girl, who was brought down as a slave from Moosul to Baghdad by a Mahomedan merchant of this place.

18. The elaborate investigations of the commission resulted in the Treaty*

*Appendix 17 of *Aitchison's Treaties*, (1892), Vol. X. of Erzeroum signed by Turkey and Persia in May 1847, Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty determine the boundary so far as it goes, and in article 3 provision is made for appointing Commissioners for fixing the boundary line. The remaining articles refer to other important matters, especially customs and the treatment of pilgrims.

19. In 1849 four Commissioners were appointed by England, Russia, Turkey and Persia for drawing the boundary line as determined in the Treaty of 1847. The Commissioners met at Baghdad in May 1849, and at Mohammerah in 1851. The survey was continued jointly by the Russians and English until 1853, when the Crimean War broke out. The country surveyed extends from Mount Ararat to the head of the Persian Gulf, and covers a width of 20 to 40 miles, within which the boundary was to be finally laid down.

20. This unsettled state of the boundary line, has led to constant friction between Turkey and Persia, of which a brief account is given in pages 24 and 25 of Vol. X of the *Aitchinson's Treaties*.

21. As the delta of the Karun and Euphrates with which portion of the border land only we are concerned, the *Memorandum of Major Rawlinson* of 1844 printed as appendix A. to this précis with the summary of the correspondence in our record paragraph 25 *et seq.* below, must be read, and the recent pretensions of Turkey to Mohammerah and the Shat-el-Arab are treated in chapter XIV below.

(ii) Massacre of Kerballa, 1843.

22. The Persians and other settlers at Kerballa and Najaf had for long enjoyed a sort of *Home Rule* at those places, and the Pasha of Baghdad exercised over them as little authority as he did over many of the Arab tribes.



The annual tribute had been in arrears for years, and two of the Turkish Governors, who tried to exact the arrears were put to death. At length Nejib Pasha took the matter in hand in earnest and determined to reduce the Persians to subjection. A Turkish force was despatched, and on refusal of the Persians to pay the tribute, Kerballa was taken by storm in January 1743, and some 5,000 Persians were massacred. The dreadful massacre led Persia to the brink of war with Turkey and threatened to break off the negotiations at Erzeroum, but by the intervention of the British and especially the tact of Major Rawlinson the differences were made up.

23. The following report dated 31st May 1843, sent by Colonel Taylor to the British Envoy at Tehran is the earliest connected account we have got in our records:—

See consultation, 31st May 1843, Nos. 53-55.

No. 2, dated the 31st May 1843.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL TAYLOR, Political Agent, Turkish Arabia,

To—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SHEIL, Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy, etc., etc., etc., Tehran.

I have had the honour to receive your despatch of 7th ultimo, relative to the projected attack of Kerbela and the intention attributed by the Governor of Kermanshah to Ahmed Pasha of Sooleimaniah of making an aggression on the Persian territory in the direction of Zohab, particularly as he was employed in collecting a large body of troops.

On the subject of Kerbela I had the honour to address you on the 26th ultimo, and I regret to say that my endeavours to delay or to avert the attack and capture were inefficient.

When your despatch, and that of Count Medem, to the Pacha reached me, the Pacha was still in camp, whither they were forwarded through the Kehyah; and now after his arrival in the city and subsequently, to two interviews with him I have to forward his own full replies, as well as my impression of his views derived from his conversation.

For many years past Kerbela has defied the authority of Baghdad; rejected and put to death its officers; managed the interior details of government for itself, and paid or refused an uncertain revenue, when and how it pleased.

The power of government was in the hands of a constantly renewed land of malefactors, ruined outlaws, and dishonest runaways, from every corner and tribe of the Pachalic, even the Turkish soldiers, and lower employes flying from the fear of merited punishment; debtors from their creditors, public delinquents from the just severity of the law; were all welcomed, protected, employed in arms, and denied to all the reclamations of the Turks.

These subsisted by exactions on the remaining population, which was composed of peaceable immigrants from other places, pilgrims settled there from Persia, India and other countries; a large proportion of the ancient inhabitants of the town Moolabs and officials attached to the shrines of Abbas and Hocssain, and a daily changing crowd of pilgrims.

All of these different bodies too have at various times complained to the Pachas of the acts of the league of outlaws. But those Governors were too weak or too careless to punish so that at length the factious rule became the established one, and each quiet member of the community compounded for the terms of residence in the best way he could.

The particular and legitimate interest felt by Persia in Kerbela arises chiefly from their peculiar and sectarian view of the sacred and holy character of the Imams interred there; for, as mere descendants of Mahomed, the Turks revere them with as pure an ardour as the Persians and to their tombs the Turkish sovereigns have in time past been munificent donors and patrons. The Pacha, too, had no wish to offend Persia by attacking Kerbela; he desired simply to remove a factious incubus pressing upon all and totally subversive of the just authority of his sovereign, which it was his bounden duty to establish and preserve.

On the arrival then at Baghdad of Najib Pacha he found Kerbela independent, it refused him all aid or tribute of any kind; it rejected his Government, the establishment of its troops or civil officers; it even refused him as it had done Alla Pacha before him admission to the shrines.

He felt that this state of affairs should not last, that the rights and supremacy of his sovereign called for vindication and re-establishment and that if he did not assert these he was open to a just and severe obloquy.

It was given out some weeks before he proceeded to Kerbela, that such was his intention. He invited the peaceable, and more numerous portion of the inhabitants to drive out the factious; he invited, and was apparently aided by the Persian Agent, the Moojtahids, the Persian Princes and people of rank to co-operate in this work; but all the exertions of these individuals, after numerous conferences and communications, failed in procuring more from the rebels, than the promise to receive into the town two or three hundred Nizam, themselves retaining the town to Government (*sic*), and all other powers as they had hitherto held them.



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There now remained, unless the Pacha desired to excite the fatal contempt of his people, only the appeal to arms in which the rebels did all they could to defeat the forces of their masters; in which, too, they were openly aided by the neighbouring tribes of Shiaa Arabs, as well as by a multitude of Persians, who appeared at all points upon the walls, and in the hostile ranks in their distinguishing national costume.

Derision, contemptuous defiance, opprobrious exclamations from the walls embittered by the gall of sectarian and malicious allusions, were all used to madden the Turkish assailants; and poisoned bullets employed to ensure a certain, though lingering, death to the wounded.

When under these circumstances, and the formation of the breach reported (*sic*), an assault was determined on, orders were given to spare the innocent, the unarmed, and unopposing, and to avoid plunder.

The possession of the breach was less difficult than the progress into the town; where on reaching the shrine of Abbas, within which a mass of people with their property had assembled themselves, the troops were fired upon and their advancing ranks swept down.

This edifice was forcibly carried, and a severe carnage took place, as also at several private houses from whence effective fire was opened. Plunder and carnage were at this moment of deep excitement with difficulty checked; the shrine of Hossein, however, which quietly admitted a party of Turkish troops, was protected from these evils, and order was gradually restored.

The accounts of Dr. Ross, the Medical Officer of the Residency, who visited Kerbela subsequent to the capture to give his aid to some Persian friends, as well as those of other English visitors concur in stating that, though much blood was spilt, and much of outrage and plunder occurred, as indeed must be the case in all captures by assault, yet that every exertion was made by the Turkish Officers to check and terminate those inflictions.

The amount of loss on the part of the town after balancing various apposing accounts may be stated at perhaps between four and five thousand souls.

From Kerbela the Pacha proceeded to Najaf, where no resistance having been offered, Turkish authority was established without my violence whatever.

24. The most exaggerated reports of the alleged atrocities committed by the Turks at Kerballa were circulated in Persia, which caused a terrible excitement among the masses. The Mullahs preached a crusade against the hated Turkey, and the Shah's Government was almost precipitated into a war, but saved from the catastrophe by the intervention of England. Lieutenant-Colonel Farrant of the Bombay Army and attached to the Persian Mission was specially deputed for investigating the facts by Sir Stratford Canning and Namik Pasha was sent as its Commissioner for the same purpose by the Porte. Both submitted their reports in May 1843. (See Lieutenant-Colonel Farrant's report in appendix B to this précis)

The whole matter was settled by a tender of apology payment of a suitable sum for the relief of the sufferer by the Porte to the Shah, which was, though after a good deal of disinclination, accepted (Major Rawlinson's L.

Consultation, dated 22nd July 1843 (Nos. 40-41) and dated 16th September 1843 (No. 19).

Consultation, 15th June 1844 (No. 10).




the Muhaisen Sheikh of Mohammerah became known as the chief of the Kaab and the Muhaisen became as it were the leading section of the Kaab tribe.

27-A. The following pedigrees of the chiefs of these tribes, are compiled from the Gulf Administration Report for 1899-90, Curzon's Persia (Volume II) and information derived from Proceedings Political A., September 1879, Nos. 74-86, and references in the old Bombay records:—


I.—SHEIKHS OF THE KAAB ARABS.

(Belonging to the Al-bu-Nasir family.)



II.—SHEIKHS OF THE MUHAISEN TRIBE.

(Formerly dependent on the Kaab Arabs, but now known by the same name)



28. The earliest connected account of the Kaab we have got is in a despatch* of the Agent and Council of Basrah to the Court of Directors, dated the 9th April 1767 and is quoted below:—

"We forward this address to Your Honors by the way of Aleppo to give cover to a packet received the 31st ultimo from the Presidency by the *Eagle*, and at the same time to enclose a duplicate letter from this factory bearing date the 23rd of the last month. In consequence of the orders received from the Presidency by the *Eagle*, we now transmit Your Honors the best accounts we can collect as to the rise of the troubles with the Sheikh Saliman. The Chaub is originally a subject of Turks, and has for many years possessed a considerable territory within their dominions bordering upon the Persian Empire for which he ought, and did for some years, annually to pay a large sum of money into the Treasury of this Pachaship. A few years after the death of Nadir Shah, and in the troubles that





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followed it, he also got possession of a territory in the Persian dominions: by this means, he became a subject of both powers. The territory of Gaban is the name of the districts that he possesses on the Turkish, and Durack, that in the Persian. By being in possession of such large territories, and not paying the usual tribute to either power, owing to the general decline of the Turks in these parts, and the troubles that then reigned throughout the Persian Empire, he grew in a manner independent of either, and soon became rich by possessing the whole revenue. Judging, however, that he should in time be called on by both powers for an account of the arrears due to them, he foresaw that a Marine force would be his greatest security, and accordingly by degrees raised is to the strength it is at present. Demands have been constantly made on him both by Turks and Persians for these arrears, and he as constantly has eluded the payment of them. This disobedience and several petty robberies his people were daily committing, both by sea and land, at length brought the arms of the Turks upon him. Soliman Pacca in the year 1761 ordered his Mussalim of this place out against them, who with a numerous army marched to Gaban from whence the Chaub fled to his fort at Durack, which is so situated as to render the coming at it a work of great time and trouble. By this he gained his ends, and by means of presents at Baghdad bought his peace with the Pacha, when his fort was near falling into the hands of Ali Aga, then General of the Turkish Army. On the commencement of this war with him in the year 1761, the Government requested of Alexander Douglas, Esquire, and Mr. Stewart, the assistance of the *Swallow*, then here, which was accordingly judged necessary to be complied with; but the Turkish forces withdrawing, the *Swallow* returned hither. In the latter end of the year 1763 Ali Pacha came down himself with a considerable army against him, but knowing they were not equal to the attempt by sea, as his Marine force was considerably increased since the last war, he requested William Andrew Prince, Esquire, then Agent, to assist him with two vessels of Your Honors' then here, the *Tartar* and *Swallow*, which it was judged necessary should be complied with, and was accordingly done. They had several encounters with the gallivats of the Chaub, but peace being again established, our vessels returned hither. In the year 1765 Currim Caun came against him, on which the Chaub fled with his gallivats to sea, and the Caun destroyed his fort at Durack; yet he was not able to overcome him as he had no Marine force, he therefore contented himself with what he had done and retired from thence. The Caun had in this war requested the assistance of the Turkish galleys and forces that he might utterly destroyed him, but the dilatoriness of this Government so chagrined the Caun, that after waiting a short time he retired in disgust. A very short time after the Caun was gone forces came from Baghdad, with orders to the Mussalim to go out against him. This he accordingly did with his forces and the Captain of the Pacha's galleys, but judging their own Marine force not equal to the Chaub's, the Pacha by letter and the Mussalim here applied to Mr. Wrench, their Agent, for the assistance of an English vessel (the only one then here) called the *Fanny Snow*, Captain Parkinson. And Captain Parkinson, in consequence of some stipulation with this Government made in his favour by Mr. Wrench, was prevailed on to go on this service; he accordingly went down the river and joined the Turkish galleys which were lying on this side the river with the camp of the Mussalim, while the Chaub's forces and gallivats were opposite to them, and a few shot were some times exchanged. Your Honors' sloop was also employed on this service for the assistance of the Government, but nothing material happened on either side, and a seeming accommodation soon took place: the Mussalim returned to town, and the Chaub retired. This was about the end of May 1765. On the 10th and 17th July, the Chaub took the "Sally" and "Fort William." Your Honors' affairs under the direction of this Agency have met with little or no alteration since the date of our last respects. Notwithstanding the endeavours of Agasy Caun, the Persian Ambassador, with the Chaub Sheikh Soliman to reconcile the disputes in which this country has lately been involved, the Chaub still continues the same evasive methods in hopes to amuse us for another season, concluding it the only means he has of escaping. Agasy Caun has had a conference with him, and, as the Caun informs us, received rather insult than anything satisfactory, either with respect to the Turks or us: we have been too long amused, and we are afraid Your Honors will think so. With the hopes of bringing this Chaub to proper terms, we would willingly embrace pacific measures; but consistent with your credit, they are not in our power, your interest is our only aim. It is with the greatest reluctance, we beg leave to assure Your Honors, that we find ourselves under the necessity of applying to Carim Caun for settling the tranquillity of this Gulf; it is certainly in his power to do it. The Turks are afraid to attempt the reduction of the Chaub without the Caun's permission, and this permission has not yet been granted."

29. The latter part of the above account anticipates some earlier entries in the records we possess in Bombay. The earliest record we can trace in the following entry on page 89 of the *Basrah Factory Diary* 163 of 1763-64:—

October 1763.

Wednesday 12.—The Chaub having landed a number of men in the Dawasha country and drawn away the inhabitants, the *Swallow* returned with Shaik Ali on board without having been able to procure any dates in part payment of Mr. Shaw's debt.*

Thursday 13.—Understanding that the Chaub as people have got possession of the dates at Dawasha, which they will probably carry off and thereby prevent Mr. Shaw's getting his

* See *Selections*, 1600—1800. No. CXXXIV.



interest therein, I notified to the Government my intention of sending down the *Swallow* to prevent it, but the Mussaleem and all the Ions begged I would not have recourse to violent measures and they would give me a letter to the Chaub, with a Mumbashee on their part. He was despatched this day with a suitable letter from me upon the occasion.

Saturday 15.—News arrived that the Bashaw's army was marched towards Hassira, where they defeated part of the Benaleem Arabs, and that the Bashaw was in person at a place called Uson, from whence he proposed coming to Bussorah and then proceed to attack Shaik Soliman the Chaub.

30. This move of the Pasha alarmed the Kaab Sheikh Salman and induced him to withdraw to his territory. But while the East India Company's Agent was congratulating himself on getting rid of their trouble, he received a phirmaun from the Pasha asking for the assistance of the Company's ships to make a war against the Kaab. The only vessel available was the *Tartar*, which was about to sail to the Presidency with a large cargo, and to avoid displeasing the Pasha, the ship was unloaded and placed at his disposal.

31. While the Kaab were a source of disturbance at the delta of the Karun and Euphrates, a little down the gulf at Bunderik, an Arab Sheikh of the Beni Saab tribe a man who had* murdered his father, mother and sisters and several other near relations and was one of the execrable tyrants that ever existed, was

*A good account of this Meer Mohana will be found in *Niebuhr's Travels*, chapter CIV, and Low's *History of the Indian Navy*, Volume I, pages 162—66.

carrying on a corsair's career off the Karak island, to the terror of the shipping in the gulf. He was the one chief on the Persian coast, whom Karim Khan had failed to subdue. The Vakil in permitting the establishment of the East Indian

†See Aitchinson's *Treaties* (1892). Volume X, page 33.

Company's factory at Bushire and making his grant of privilege†, asked on 1763 for English assistance with their ships to reduce Meer mohana. The Agent at Basrah Mr. Price, though anxious to comply with the Vakils' request, had no vessels to spare for the blockade of Bunder Ig, while the Persian army would attack

‡ See Basrah Factory Diary No. 1-123 of 1763-64, page 30. *Selections*, No. CXLIX.

the town by land.‡ The question of sending cruizers for this purpose was referred to the Presidency. The proposal ultimately took the shape of placing guard-ships in the gulf—the cost of which would have to be paid by the Persian Government.

32. During these negotiations, Karim Khan was preparing to march against Bunderik, and the fleet of the Sheikh of Bushire carried on operations against the

gallivats of Meer Mohana. In October 1764 the Persian fleet was reported to have been pursuing the Bunderik gallivats, and Meer Mohana plundering the villages near Bushire.

33. In April 1765, Karim Khan was about to cross the river near Howiza to attack the Kaab, and it was reported that Meer Mohana had purchased his peace from the Vakil by means of valuable presents and had placed his ship at the latter's disposal in order to prevent the Kaab Chief from escaping. In May several of Karim Khan's forces came in sight of minoe—numbering nearly 800, on the other side of the river. The Turkish gallivats were fitted to go against the Kaab, but at the best they made a miserable figure and seemed very little capable of action. The Kaab Sheikh seemed to have sheltered himself in an island below the river called Dorak and it was expected he would defend himself there till absolute necessity obliged him to fly, in which case it was said, he had already secured an asylum for himself and his people, where the Persian forces could not follow him.

34. On the 11th May 1765—as the Mussalim was proceeding down the river with his forces, he received letters from Karim Khan expressing dissatisfaction at the Turkish tardiness in joining Persian forces, for which reason he had determined to wait no longer. The Vakil marched back to Persia soon after.§

§ Note—Malcolm says that Salman alarmed at Karim Khan's superior numbers embarked in his boats and sought refuge in the neighbouring small islands, but he was glad to save from destruction his fields of grain and the large plantation of dates, in which the population of this part of Persia chiefly depend for subsistence, by the payment of a considerable sum and a promise of regularity in the future remittance of his tribute (History of Persia, Volume II, page 130).

But see Curzon's *Persia*, Volume II, page 332, where it is stated: "But it is more currently believed that by cutting the dykes, which everywhere regulated the ditches, canals and streams of a country rich in water-supply, and so converting the plains into a swamp, he reduced the invaders to impotence."



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35. On the 18th and 19th July 1765, the Kaab Sheikh with six gallivats ^{Basrah Factory Diary No. 3-195 of 1765-67. Selections, 1600-1800, No. CLL.} attacked the *Sally* and took her and the Company's Yacht as they were both coming up the river from Bushire. They then captured the *Fort William*. The Mussalim on being applied for assistance, despatched a messenger to the Kaab Sheikh with a strongly worded letter of remonstrance and demanding the release of the vessels. Two officers of the vessels—Captain Phillips and Holland were released. The Kaab Sheikh demanded a treaty of friendship with the English on the old footing (letter from the Agent to the Presidency, dated 14th August 1765).

36. The Government of Bombay thought that the capture of the ships by the Kaab, rendered it necessary, in the interests and to the credit of the Company, that the tribe should be reduced to obedience, and for this purpose

*Bombay, Grab.
Success, Ketch.
Dolphina and Tyger, Schooners.
Wolf, Gallivat.
Fame, Storeship.*

they despatched the ships mentioned in the margin, with 50 European infantry, 15 artillery men, 150 sepoy, 25 lascars, under the command of Captain Leslie

Baillie and Captain John Brewer. The Agent was instructed to obtain restitution of the vessels and cargoes taken, compensation for the charges of the expedition and the loss of the owners of the vessels for detention (letter from the Presidency, dated 5th January 1766, *Selection No. CLIII*).

37. Some of the English ships sailed up the Dorak river, but could effect nothing as the Turkish forces moved very slowly to assist them. The Agent at Basrah asked the Resident (Mr. Jervis) at Bushire to apply to the Sheikh of Bushire for sending his fleet and forces against the Kaab, but by no means to stipulate for English assistance to the Persians against Meer Mohana, as the policy of the Company was then, as the Agent supposed, to remain on terms of friendship with Meer Mohana, unless by his conduct he gave just cause to violate the friendship (letter from Basrah, dated 29th May 1766, *Selections No. CLVIII*).

38. The English ships waited in vain for the Turkish forces. At length ^{* This officer should apparently be distinguished from Captain Nesbit, who also took part in this expedition.} Lieutenants Nesbit and Brewer went up one of the creeks with armed boats to reconnoitre and destroy the Kaab boats. They succeeded in burning some boats, but failed in an attempt against a newly erected fort at a place called Mansure, for want of water and people to drag the guns. The party commenced to retreat at midnight but lost on the way Lieutenant Nesbit and an European gunner, while four others were only wounded. As the Turkish troops were never coming, Mr. Wrench (Agent) then warned the Mussalim that the fleet would not be detained longer than the 30th June 1766, unless the charges thereof were paid out of the Turkish treasury, to which condition the Pasha agreed by sanctioning 1,000 tomans a month for the maintenance of the English fleet. In July the Mussalim gave the Agent a note for 600 tomans in part payment of the cost on the customs, which sum was being quickly realised (*Selections Nos. CLVIII and CLIX*).

Karim Khan was asked by the Agent not to afford protection to the Kaab in case they fled to Persian territory, but he did not even reply to the Agent's letter—for he appears to have felt very much disappointed at the English not having assisted him against Meer Mohana (Agent's letter, dated 30th July 1766).

39. The English operations were mainly conducted on the Dorak river, as they had not a sufficient force to carry on operations by land. As there was little prospect of the Turks ever coming to their assistance by land or paying up the arrears of the charges of the fleet, the English kept up an appearance of concluding a treaty with the Kaab, which induced the Turks to accelerate their march towards the Dorak river. Mahomed Kia then engaged to pay up the arrears and to encamp the troops near the English ships in the Dorak river (Despatch from Basrah to the Court, dated 24th August 1766).

40. There was once a good prospect of inducing the Kaab Sheikh to come to terms, and Captain Nesbit was asked by Sheikh Ganum to meet him to discuss the terms. When Captain Nesbit went up the river Dorak to meet the Sheikh within a mile of the Kaab's lower fort, where the captured ships

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of the English *Sally* and *Fort William* Company had been anchored, he found that an attempt was being made to murder him and his party, where upon the English anticipated the Kaab by attacking them at once and wounding the Sheikh dangerously and killing several. On the English side only one European and one sepoy was killed. The English made an attempt to capture the *Fort William* and *Sally*, but the Kaab on seeing this set fire to the ships, which burnt to the water's edge. (Basrah letter to the Presidency, dated 23rd October 1766, *selection No. CLXII*.)

41. The operations against the elusive Kaabs were necessarily slow and desultory, and exposed the English to great risks from sudden attacks of the Kaab. On the 30th August 1766, Captain* Nesbit left Gaban with the Turkish galleys and boats under his charge, while Captain Brewer with his people disembarked and proceeded up the river with the artillery, ammunition, etc., together with a party of seaman under the command of Lieutenant Hall and Smith. Captain Brewer's party was on 23rd September attacked by the enemy's redoubts and in the fights that ensued, there were killed Captain Brewer and two other officers and 18 privates, and wounded 33, of whom several died afterwards.

The English were quite disgusted with this desultory fighting, which brought them so many losses, and almost welcomed Karim Khan's message to the Mussalim saying that neither the Turks nor the English had any business in territory which belonged to Persia, that the Kaab were Persian subjects and that it was for him to obtain redress from them for any losses suffered by the English (Agent's letter, dated 23rd October 1766, to the Presidency, *Selection No. CLXII*, and Despatch to the Court of Directors, dated 17th November 1766).

42. Agashy Caun, an Ambassador deputed by the Vakil, proceeded to meet the Kaab Sheikh and negotiate with him for the restitution claimed by the English, but he was given only evasive replies by the wily Sheikh and having been treated with scant courtesy, returned in disgust (Basrah letter, dated 16th April 1767). The Turks now refused to do anything against the Turks for fear of offending Karim Khan. As there was little to be gained from single handed operations against the Kaab, the Bombay Government determined to send an agent to the Court of the Vakil to negotiate a treaty with a view to obtain restitution from them, even on the condition of the English having to agree to assist him against Meer Mohana (which was against the policy expressly laid down by the Court of Directors in his despatch, dated 25th March 1765), Mr. Skipp was ordered to be deputed for this purpose to Shiraz (letter from the Presidency, dated 18th January 1767, *Selection No. CLXIII*).

43. The agency at Basrah (presided over by Mr. Moore) appears at this time to have conceived a unaccountable antipathy against Karim Khan, and to have aimed at withdrawing the Residency at Bushire and concentrate the trade at Basrah. Mr. Moore would have the East Indian Company enter into a treaty even with that execrable tyrant Meer Mohana, rather than Karim Khan. The essential conditions of any treaty with Karim Khan ought in Mr. Moore's opinion, be—

- (a) Military assistance of the Persians in a war to reduce the Kaab.
- (b) If not—Karim should deliver all Kaab gallivats to the English, get the Kaab to renounce all pretensions to the territory of Gaban (Mr. Moore's letter to Mr. Skipp at Shiraz, dated 14th April 1767, *Selections No. CLXV*).

44. Karim Khan was prepared to pay the Company 5 lacs of rupees as damages for the losses sustained by the English from the Kaab, and to guarantee that the Kaab gallivats remained inactive and gave no trouble to the trade on the Gulf. He would not object to any English operations against the Kaab, but not with the assistance of the Turks, nor would he assist them against the Kaab in any active manner. Of course the English had to assist Karim Khan with their fleet against Meer Mohana, the cost of the maintenance



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of the fleet being defrayed by the Vakil (Basrah despatch to the Court, dated 5th October 1767, *Selections*, No. CLXIX).

45. The Bombay Government considered the terms offered by Karim Khan reasonable and ordered that a treaty should be concluded accordingly and measures taken for the reduction of Meer Mohana (letter from the Presidency, dated 17th November 1767). An agreement was accordingly made by Karim Khan which provided for (1) an obligation on the Vakil's part to pay 15,000 tomans for the Kaab, after the capture of Karak, and grant of the island also to the East Indian Company, and responsibility for any losses that the Kaab might inflict on the English in future (Mr. Skipp's letter to Basrah, dated 16th April 1768).

Basrah Factory Diary No. 6-195 of 1768.

46. The East Indian Company's cruisers* made an attempt against Karrak but met with disastrous failure (letter from the commanders of the expedition, dated 21st May 1768). Kerim Khan despatched his army to Genowa after considerable delay, but when it reached the coast, the Agency had withdrawn the English cruisers, as

*See Low's History of the Indian Navy, Volume I, page 167.

Selections, No. CLXXVII.

Mr. Moore feared that there would be never a serious attempt made by the Persians to use the Company's ships (Basrah Despatch to the Court dated 24th October 1768). The Persians then attempted to reduce Karrak themselves, and while they were besieging the island Meer Mohona escaped to Grain, was thence taken to Basrah, where he was put to death by order of the Pasha of Baghdad. The Karakers thereupon surrendered the island to Karim Khan. The agency at Basrah wished to take possession of the effects of Meer Mohona, but in this the English were balked. In this situation the Resident Mr. Morley resolved upon withdrawing to Basrah. This was done in 1768.

47. In 1774 war commenced between Persia and Turkey. The Persians were defeated by the Pasha's troops in Kurdistan, and it was apprehended that Karim Khan would soon attack Basrah. While the inhabitants were in this suspense the Kaab people (in revenge for execution of an Arab of that tribe punished by the Mussalim for robbery in Basrah) for several nights together came up the river in small boats, entered the town in parties, robbed and plundered the houses and towards the morning retired with their booty. The guards who were sent against them were easily beaten back. It was feared by the Turks that these outrages of the Kaab would be soon followed by Persian attack on Basrah. The East Indian Company's agent was in these circumstances sounded as to the attitude the English would take in this contingency, but he informed the Turkish authorities that they would observe strict neutrality and leave Basrah when he thought it prudent, in case Basrah was besieged by the Persians.

48. The Persian Army, as was expected, soon after marched towards Basrah, and invested the place on 7th April 1775. While 15 of the gallivats of the Kaab moved up the Shat-el-Arab carrying seige guns for the besieging army. The following letter from Messrs. Henry Moore, Green, and Latouche to Mr. Beaumont at Bushire, received by him on 30th March 1775,

Persian Gulf Mission Diary No. 284 of 1775-76. *Selections*, No. CCXII.

Basrah Factory Diary No. 11-208 of 1775-76.

shows what action was taken by the East Indian Company's cruisers:—

"We despatch this letter by the way of Grain purposely to inform you that the Persian Army under Saddu (Saduk) Khan is advanced very near Basrah and that the part of it has already crossed the river, that the Chaub's gallivats the day before yesterday pushed part our vessels and joined the camp: that our ships burnt one, that another is taken and that the rest are very much shattered, and that had the wind continued favourable and the Eagle kept up with them, in all probability the whole would have been destroyed, which we hope however of having an opportunity of effecting.

We desire you will acquaint Sheikh Nasir of this circumstance, which we doubt not will be pleasing to him and that you will inform us as speedily and as secretly as possible, by the way of Grain or any other route, what conduct the Bushire or Bunderik people intend taking in the present disputes between the Turks and Persians."

49. The purpose of the Agent and Council was to embrace this favourable occasion to wreak vengeance against the Kaab for their old misdeeds,



which had remained unpunished. He proposed to Saduk Khan the desirability of delivering over the Kaab ships to the Agency and placing the Bunderik and other fleets at the disposal of Sheikh Nasir, in which case the English Residency would be re-established at Bushire. Saduk Khan could not of course be expected to do anything of the sort against his principal ally in his present campaign against Basrah.

50. In their letter, dated 22nd April 1775 (*Selections No. CCX*), the Agent and Council informed the Bombay Government that they left Basrah on 11th April and on their passage down the river, their cruisers, were attacked by the Persian fleet consisting of 22 large gallivats and dows, their scheme being to get the English cruisers between them and the Kaab fleet, in which attempt they did not succeed. No damage was suffered on either side. Sheikh Nasir alleged that the attack on his fleet was made by the English.

51. Matters were soon readjusted with Karim Khan by the re-establishment of the factory at Bushire. Basrah though ably defended by the Turks with the assistance of Arab tribes especially the Montefik tribe, was compelled to surrender to the Persians in 1776. The place was abandoned by the Persians on the death of Karim Khan in 1779. The Kaab Arabs were left alone.

52. Our records are then silent about the Kaab until the year 1791, when we are informed of the destruction of a portion of the Kaab fleet by the Turks, and of an attempt made by the Kaab to erect forts on the Basrah river with a view to intercept Turkish vessels. An engagement then took place between the Kaab and Turkish forces, in which either side gained no advantage and the Kaab retired to Dorak.

53. From Major Rawlinson's memorandum (appendix A), it appears that the Kaab Arabs after the events of 1775-79 constantly encroached on Turkish territory. Thus Sheikh Barakat (1770-82) seized from its Turkish proprietors the district of Bujidi between Tamar, and Hafar and bestowed it upon the Bawi Arabs into which tribe he had married. His son Ghathban (1782-92) took possession of the entire left bank of the Shat-el-Arab and even colonized the right bank with his people. He subsequently withdrew the colonists from the right bank and his successor Ghais (gheyth 1812-28) restored the ancient limits of Kaab territory as they were during Sheikh Saloman's time retaining only the district of Tamar higher up the Shat-el-Arab, but he also built a fort on either side of the Hafar and entrusted its defence to his confidential servant Meerdow, belonging to the Muhesin tribe whose son Haji Jabir raised it into a place of commercial importance.

54. This rising importance of Mohammerah as a rival of Basrah excited the jealousy of the Turks, and they* determined to destroy the town. Accordingly Ali Pasha attacked and captured it with a large force consisting mostly of Arabs in 1837. After plundering the place and destroying its houses and huts, the Turkish forces, returned to Basrah. The Muhesin Arabs, as we shall see below, soon after cleared the way for the Persians into the town of Mohammerah. The Sheikh of Mohammerah (Jabir) then openly declared himself a subject of Persia and was honored with the title of Governor by the Shah.

55. In his despatch No. 32, dated the 22nd October 1841, to the address of the Secret Committee, Colonel Taylor (Resident at Baghdad) reported:—

"Information in the city is current that Persian troops commanded by the Moatemad, Governor of Shuster, are again marching against the Sheikh of Chaab to take possession of that country, in which the disputed division of Mohammerah is situated."

As a result of this expedition † Sheikh Thamer was displaced by the Moate-mad, and was called upon to pay the arrears of revenue due on the Persian districts farmed out to himself and his ancestors. Thamer in response abandoned his capital Fellahieh, inundated the country and

Turkish Arabia Précis, Nos. 1646-1846, paragraph 165.

* Volume 792 of 1837-38, page 139.
Layard's *Early Adventures*, page 64.
Curzon's *Persia*, Vol. II, pages 32, 325 and 339.

† An interesting account of this expedition is given in Chapters XII and XIII of Layard's *Early Adventures*.



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retired to the Turkish ground at Mohammerah. Two other Sheikhs of the same family were set up by the Moatemad, while the expelled Governor was strengthening his party by the aid of the Arabs at the mouth of the Euphrates and was professing deep submission to the Turks and soliciting their countenance.

56. The Turks were not at first decided whom to support, important as the crisis was to their interests in this disputed and commanding portion of their country. Taking advantage of this indecision of the Turks, the Moatemad notified to the Governor of Basrah, that his troops would seek the ex-Sheikh at Mohammerah and request him to send the Turkish fleet to that point to prevent the flight of that chief and his followers (Colonel Taylor's despatch to the Secret Committee, No. 38, dated 24th November 1841).

57. In a subsequent letter, dated 24th December 1841, Colonel Taylor reported that Sheikh Thamer had fled to Grane, and that the Pasha of Baghdad had apparently acquiesced in the nominations made by the Moatemad to the Government of the Kaab district. The Moatemad took possession of the Turkish fort and town of Mohammerah, which had been abandoned by the Turks and threatened to advance to De Aijee on the left bank of the Shat-el-Arab, the limit of Kaab district towards Basrah, as claimed by the Persians. But the Montefik Arabs prevented the further movement of the Persians. The Turkish officers appear to have made a very tardy demonstration against the encroachments of the Persians (Resident's despatch No. 41, dated 24th December 1841). The pretenders were confirmed by the Persian Governor in their positions on their payment or promising to pay about £5,000 (Despatch No. 3, dated 27th January 1842).

58. The Moatemad met, however, with little success in getting a reliable Governor to replace Sheikh Thamer: the two pretenders fled upon being called upon to pay the sum agreed upon for their promotion to authority, and he was soon obliged to return to Shuster to quell disturbances in Kurdistan and the Bakhtiari country (Despatch No. 6, dated 24th February 1842).

59. The Pasha of Baghdad appears then to have given instructions to the Governor of Basrah to aid in replacing Sheikh Thamer, and to call upon the Persians to leave Mohammerah. The latter however were determined to stick to the place and even laid claim to the Khuzistan share of the Shah-el-Arab as far as Kurnah (Resident's despatch, dated 24th May 1842).

60. In a despatch dated 22nd August 1842, Colonel Taylor stated:—

"It is also added that Thamer, the Sheikh of the Chaab lately dispossessed by the Persians, is abandoned by this tribe and slighted by the Turkish Government, that Sheikh Faris, his nephew, has been nominated to the Chieftaincy by the Persian and his brother Isa given as hostage to the Governor of Shuster, the greater part of the tribe joining the nominee of Persia."

61. A report of the probable restoration of the Mohammerah district to the Turkish rule as a result of the negotiations at Erzeraum, appears to have induced Jabir, the Sheikh of Muhammerah, who had struggled hard against subjection to the Persian authorities placed over that dependency, to offer the Turks terms, which would enable him to retain his share of the territory and to oppose the prospective restitution of the paramount Sheikh by the Turks (*sic*). Colonel Taylor's despatch, dated 18th October 1843.

62. The year following, Mullah Firz Ollah, Persian Governor of Khuzistan, having brought to a satisfactory arrangement his claims on Sheikh Faris for the arrears of revenue, made a demand on Sheikh Jabir of Mohammerah for the arrears of revenue due by him on that district, together with the liabilities of the Bawi Arab, amounting altogether to a sum of 60,000 krans. Sheikh Jabir made at first a show of force with the Bawi Arabs, but on the Persian Governor advancing with a large force and threatening to depose him and

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hand over his territory to Sheikh Faris, he surrendered himself and was confined as a prisoner. He was released only on his engaging to pay an annual sum of 70,000 krans on account of the revenues of Mohammerah and its dependencies.

63. Sheikh Thamer who had been expelled from the Kaab territory, first took up his abode in Basrah; he transported his wives and children to that city, purchased lands, houses and gardens and settled in the lands as a wealthy and independent gentleman. After a residence of 2 or 3 years in Basrah, Nejib Pasha invited him to repair to Erzeroum to give evidence before the Commission that sat at Erzeroum with regard to Kaab and Mohammerah and he returned from that place about the beginning of April 1844. His intention was to have merely passed through Baghdad *en route*, to join his family at Basrah, but on the urgent representation of Sir H. Rawlinson of the inexpediency of permitting him to approach the frontier of Kaab during the then unsettled condition of that province, he was detained at Baghdad for three months, when Nejib Pasha in compliance with the Sheikh's pressing solicitations and the consent of Major Rawlinson, allowed him to go to Basrah on the strict condition that he by no means meddled in Kaab affairs. The Vali of Basrah was ordered to keep a careful eye on the Sheikh's movements and actions. The Persian Government pretended to be alarmed over this move of the Sheikh and complained of his making military preparations to attack Mohammerah. But

Secret C., dated 8th February 1845, Nos. 42-45.

Major Rawlinson who made careful enquiries in the matter was satisfied that there was no truth in these rumours (*vide* his letter to Colonel Sheil, His Majesty's Chargé d' Affaires at Tehran, dated 1st September 1844).

64. Notwithstanding these assurances, we find that the Persians despatched a body of 250 men from Dizful to Mohammerah, on the alleged ground of apprehension of the vicinity of Shaikh Thamer. Soon afterwards a full regiment of infantry with one gun was despatched by the Governor of Dizful to occupy Mohammerah as a permanent and effective garrison. The ostensible object of the expedition was to realize the arrears of revenue. Its actual result was to replace the uncertain dependency of the Kaab Governor by direct authority of Persia; for on the approach of the troops from Dizful, Shaikh Jabir evacuated the place and with a large portion of his tribe crossed the Euphrates and joined the Montefik Arabs on the right bank of the river. The Persian Commandant thereupon demanded of the Governor of Basrah the immediate extradition of Sheikh Jabir, and default of which he claimed to be permitted to

Secret C., dated 16th May 1845, Nos. 22-23.


march his troops into the Turkish territory in pursuit of the fugitive (Major Rawlinson's despatch to Sir S. Canning, dated 22nd January 1845).

65. The Porte strongly protested against the Persian occupation of Mohammerah, which it claimed as being in Turkish territory, being on an artificial canal (as the Hafar, it was contended, was) and not on a natural branch of the Karun. Colonel Sheil and the Russian Minister at Tehran, and the British and Russian ambassadors at Constantinople agreed as to the propriety of withdrawing the Persian garrison from Mohammerah pending a termination of the conference at Erzeroum, but the Persian Government refused to do any such thing, unless Sheikh Jabir was handed over to them in the first instance. Such an extradition could hardly

Secret C., dated 6th June 1845, Nos. 12-14.

demanded with justice by Persia, while several Turkish political refugees were harboured in that country (Major Rawlinson's despatch, dated 19th March 1845). The Persian Government then went further and made arrangements to build a commodious and defensible fort on the Hafar in place of the then miserable mud walls.

66. About this time a large portion of the Kaab tribe crossed over the Shat-el-Arab to the Turkish side, and not exertions on the part of Sheikh Faris could succeed in inducing them to come back (Resident's despatch, dated 6th August 1845).



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67. About the close of the year 1845 we find the Persian authorities at Mohammerah negotiating with Haji Jabir, for his return to that place. They proposed in the first place to withdraw the Persian garrison, and leave him in complete possession of the country, provided that he would furnish good security for the payment of an annual revenue of 30,000 krans (about 1,500£) and that he would send his son as a hostage to Dizful. After some deliberation, Haji Jabir accepted these terms, and returned with his tribe to the immediate vicinity of Mohammerah to arrange for his execution of the details.

The Persians however then insisted that he should accompany the troops on their return to Dizful and swear fealty to the Shah in the presence of Suliman Khan, Governor of the province; but the Kaab leader suspecting treachery, abruptly broke off the conference and recrossed the Euphrates into the Turkish territory.

68. It appeared to be the general impression that the Persians had never really entertained the idea of evacuating Mohammerah, but that they had carried on the recent negotiations in the hopes of obtaining possession of the person of Haji Jabir and thus removing the only present obstacle to their own ascendancy on the Hafar.

69. Simultaneously with these proceedings, communications had taken place between the chiefs of Fellahieh and Sheikh Thamer which had terminated in the voluntary return of the latter to the Persian Territory. He had been induced to adopt this step from the persuasion that he had nothing to expect from the Turkish Government, while under Persian auspices he might be restored to the Chiefship of the tribe in succession to Sheikh Faris, who was unpopular amongst the Kaab and with whom the Persian authorities were supposed to be dissatisfied. It was surmised, however, by many parties that the invitations from Fellahieh, and the ostensible dissatisfaction of the Government with Sheikh Faris were mere artifices, which aimed at the inveiglement of Sheikh Thamer into the hands of the Persians: they hoped by such means to put a stop to the emigration of the Kaab, which if he had continued much longer in the Turkish territory, threatened to drain the Persian districts of their inhabitants and to establish the chief seat of the power of the Kaab upon the right bank of the Shat-el-Arab.

70. The Governor of Basrah appeared in all these matters to have observed with scrupulous attention the instructions furnished him from Baghdad prohibiting his interference in the affairs of the Kaab: he had neither encouraged the continued expatriation of Haji Jabir and the Mohammerah colony nor had he placed any restriction on the movement of Sheikh Thamer (Major Rawlinson's despatch to the British Embassy, No. 30, dated 6th September 1746).

71. The following report of Major Rawlinson throws light on the uneviable position now occupied by the Kaab chiefs between an exacting Government and their turbulent tribesmen:—

Secret C, dated 26th September 1846, Nos. 59-60.


No. 52, dated British Consulate, Baghdad, the 26th November 1845.

From—MAJOR H. C. RAWLINSON, Consul at Baghdad,

To—HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE SIR STAFFORD CANNING, G.C.B., Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I was lately favored by Colonel Sheil with the copy of a letter addressed by the Governor of the Persian territory conterminous with Basrah, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Tehran, complaining of the conduct of the Turkish authorities in promoting intrigues among the Kaab, and requesting permission to retaliate. The contents of this letter will no doubt have been communicated to Your Excellency, and I do myself the honor therefore to submit a few remarks in explanation, a recent arrival from Basrah having put me in possession of Kaab intelligence as late as the 15th instant.

Undoubtedly there have been communications between the Kaab, both of Mohammerah and Fellahieh and the refugee chiefs of the tribe, who reside in the Turkish territory but these communications have certainly originated on the Persian side, and have been carried on for some time with the understood connivance of the Governor of Dizful.



Sheikh Thamir, discouraged, spurned I might almost say, by the Turkish Government lent himself for a short period to Kaab intrigue in the hope of bettering his condition, but he has latterly withdrawn from the connexion, and appears inclined to await with patience the settlement by treaty of the question of Chaab dependency.

Musellim Ibn Berkut, another member of the family, and refugee in Turkey has now taken his place with the movement party, and I fear that some unpleasant consequences may ensue; for the tribe are unceasing in their efforts to induce him to repair in person to Fellahiah and having failed in their endeavours to persuade the Governor of Dizful to remove Sheikh Fariss from the chiefship, they now threaten to eject the latter individual forcibly from the country, and to instal Musellim in his place. The source of all these disorders is to be sought in the natural turbulence of the Chaab tribe and in their disinclination to submit into any organized control. Their complaint against Sheikh Farris is his rigid exaction of revenue demanded by the Persian Government and if Musellim were on his coming to power to follow in his predecessor's steps, they would expel him likewise, and elect some easier ruler.

I do not see, indeed, even supposing the Turkish Government to be cordially inclined to co-operate in the consolidation of Chaab country that the Mutesselim of Bussorah could prevent a revolution at Fellahiah, for if the refugee chiefs were debarred from communication with the tribe, there are still numerous members of the same family within the Persian territory who would be too glad to take their places.

It is important at the same time to observe, that if Sheikh Fariss, acknowledged and supposed by the Persian Government be violently driven out from Fellahiah, and a refugee from the Turkish territory succeed him, the Governor of Bussorah can hardly avoid laying himself open to the suspicion of having hastened the rebellion. I have pressed this subject, accordingly with Nejib Pasha's approval, upon the notice of Ibrahim Iffendi, who has lately proceeded to Bussorah as the lessee of the current year, and in compliance with my suggestion he has promised to do every thing in his power on reaching his Government to break off the connexion at present existing between Musellim, who is still in the Turkish territory, and the discontented party at Fellahiah.

I have only to add that the expectation of the return of Haji Jaabar to the Turkish territory, which Your Excellency will find mentioned in enclosure No. 2* to my despatch No. 44 has been verified, and that the Governor of Dizful being thus disappointed in the hope of securing the person of that chief has replaced in Mohammerah a Persian garrison strengthened by a further detachment of 200 men and has nominated Hamed Ibn Saadan, a nephew of Haji Jaabar's who was previously in confinement at Dizful to the Government on an annual liability of 36,000 krans.

72. One of the measures the Turks took at this time to support their pretensions to Mohammerah, was to maintain a guardship at the mouth of the Hafar, which interfered with the traffic with Mohammerah and the Karun River. To this measure the Persian Government strongly objected. After due representations to the Porte orders were given to the removal of the guardship from its position, but these orders were not fully carried and the guardship hovered about the mouth of the Hafar. When protests were made against this course, the Pasha of Baghdad contended that the Turkish guardship at the mouth of the Hafar did not interfere in any way with the trade of Mohammerah.

Secret C., dated 26th September 1846, No. 72.


73. Before the treaty of Erzeroum was fully concluded, advices were received at Basrah that the Governor of Dizful had in view of the determination of the Commission to allow Persia to return Mohammerah, received instructions from his Government to take measures to construct a fort at that place and baths, mosques, houses, etc., around it. A demand was also made for the withdrawal of the guardship from the mouth of the Hafar (Major Rawlinson's despatch, 9th April 1846).

74. In March 1847, report was received at Baghdad that a boat laden with merchandize partly for Mohammerah and partly for Basrah was forcibly prevented by the Turkish guardship from entering the Hafar creek and was compelled in the first instance to proceed to Basrah and pay the full duty on the entire cargo.

On the representation of the Persian Consul, Nejib Pasha called for a report from Basrah and promised to take due notice of the alleged misconduct, if the report he found true (Major Rawlinson's despatch to Sir S. Canning, dated 31st March 1847).

Secret C., dated 29th May 1847, Nos. 47-48.

31st March 1847).



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75. In March 1847, one Raghieb Pasha was deputed by the Porte to Baghdad with a firman and sword of honor for Nejib Pasha. The presentation of these to the Pasha was celebrated with much *eclat* in Baghdad. Raghieb was after the celebrations to proceed to Basrah for the purpose of inspecting Basrah and the river Shat-el-Arab and the country adjoining with a view to find means to increase the revenue, improve the town, and increase the Turkish fleet at the mouth of the Shat-el-Arab. There was great danger of the mission exciting the susceptibility of the Montefik Arabs, who claimed the date plantation near Basrah as their own, and of secondly irritating the Persian authorities, who would by no means relish the prospect of the presence of a large Turkish fleet on the Shat-el-Arab (Major Rawlinson's despatch to the British Embassy, dated 31st March 1847).

Secret C., dated 29th May 1847, Nos. 47-48.

76. As the Turkish guardship still continued to block the mouth of the Hafar, on the protests from the Persian Government and the representation of Major Rawlinson made at Colonel Sheil's instance to Nejib Pasha, orders were sent by the Pasha immediately to withdraw the Turkish guardship from its position off the mouth of the Hafar Canal to the Basrah road (Major Rawlinson's despatch to the British Embassy, dated 12th October 1847).

Secret C., dated 28th January 1848, Nos. 23-28.

77. By the treaty of Erzeroum signed by the Turco-Persian Commissioners on 1st May 1847, it was adjudged that—

"The town of Mohammerah and the island of Khizr, with the anchorage, as well as so much of the eastern bank of the Shat-el-Arab as is occupied by tribes confessedly belonging to Persia, are to remain in the possessions of Persia, besides which Persians will enjoy complete liberty of navigating the Shat-el-Arab from its mouth to the point of contact of the two frontiers."

78. As under this treaty Mohammerah passed under Persia, Sheikh Jabir soon made terms with that Government and was installed as Governor of Mohammerah. The ex-Sheikh Thamer having never been able to return to his territory, there sank with him the glory of his tribe. The subsequent history of Mohammerah and the Kaab country falls under Arabistan and is treated in the *Arabistan Précis*.

(iv) Crimean war and the attitude of Persia towards England and Turkey.

79. During Crimean war in 1854 fears were entertained lest Persia should join hands with Russia and declare war against England and Turkey. The Governor of Dizful massed troops on the frontier for the avowed purpose of executing a *coup d'main* upon the city of Basrah, whereupon the Pasha of Baghdad summoned the Arab tribes to arms as a measure of defence and was engaged in negotiations with Sheikh Jabir, the disaffected Chief of Mohammerah, in order to secure his co-operation in the event of the further advance of the Persian troops. A collision between the two parties would have been brought about by the last accident. But this danger was lessened by the presence of the British steam frigate *Auckland* at Basrah, which had been despatched by the Bombay Government in view of the critical situation in the Gulf (Colonel Rawlinson's Despatch No. 2, dated 25th January 1854, to the British Embassy).

Secret C., dated 26th May 1854, No. 46.


The Persian Government ultimately decided to adopt an attitude of neutrality during the war.

(v) Persian and Turkish pretensions to the island of Shallah (1877—1884) and the complaints of Persia against Turkey, 1877-78.

80. The island or rather the small mud-band of Shallah in the Shat-el-Arab, which made its appearance in about 1870 above the water-level has become a bone of contention between Turkey and Persia. A description of the place and how it was first occupied by Turkish authorities was given by Surgeon-Major Colvill, in his letter, dated 16th July 1877:—

[S646FD]

Secret C., dated October 1877, Nos. 37-144. (No. 139).



The Shallah Island is about thirty-two miles below Mohammerah and six miles above and within sight of the Turkish Custom House at Dawosir. Shallah appears to be no name but in Arabic a generic term meaning out-growth, and it is well it should have been applied in this case, for this is really no island but a bank, which had it been left alone would even now have been covered by every tide.


The bed of the Shat-el-Arab at this point is broader than usual, being about three thousand yards wide on account of the bank on the Persian side forming a sort of bay, and the island is about one thousand yards from the Persian and two thousand from the Turkish shore, and situated as it were in the mouth of this Persian bay. The result is that whatever it might have been originally the whole force of the current now is between the island and the Turkish bank, while the bay is fast filling up; even now a man can wade at low tide from the island to the Persian bank, and there is no question but that in a few years more the island will become a portion of the Persian mainland. To describe the island would be to take a piece of swampy alluvial soil two, three or say even four acres in extent, for I could not well measure it, form this into a parallelogram twice as long up and down the river as broad and surround it with an embankment of clay and reeds sufficient to keep out the ripple of the high tides but with slits to allow of irrigation, surround this with a fringe of bulrushes, in extent three times the area of the parallelogram but at high tide under water sufficient to float a boat, and we have a very fair idea of Shallah Island. The Persian bank of the Shat-el-Arab opposite this island is low and apparently uninhabited, while the Turkish bank is abrupt and covered with a forest of date trees and is the private property of His Excellency Nasir Pasha. Thus Nasir Pasha as private proprietor of the opposite bank built the embankment of clay and reeds on the island and in 1876 planted some offshoots of date trees, while two or three cultivators sowed melons and gourds, but never permanently lived there. That Nasir Pasha had some ulterior object in view in making this embankment is certain, for the place is so wretched that not a family of cultivators, however poor, would accept the island as a gift on condition of having to live there permanently.

81. While this question was pending Turkey and Russia became involved in war and much anxiety was felt as to the attitude Persia would take on this occasion. Persia massed its troops on the frontier, despatching a force of 1,000 men and 200 horses to Mohammerah; but ultimately the Shah's Government decided to remain neutral. The Persians had however a large number of grievances against the Turks, including the question of the Turkish occupation of Shallah, which they embraced this favourable occasion to get remedied. The principal points at issue were:—

- (1) the seizure of Katur and other places;
- (2) ill-treatment in Turkey of Persian subjects generally and pilgrims on particular;
- (3) the continued residence of the Shah's brother Mirza Abbas at Baghdad where he had resided for twelve years in defiance of an official promise given in writing by the Porte;
- (4) the recent outrage at Medina;
- (5) the non-settlement of the *Turco*-Persian boundary question;
- (6) the occupation of the island of Shallah by the Turks, which the Persians claim to be their own, on the analogy of the island Khizr near which it lies and which had been given to Persia by the treaty of Erzeroum.

The Shah's Government have always been claiming the most favoured nation clause, which it was impossible for Persia to expect from Turkey, considering the fact that both nations are in a backward condition, and that England herself could not recommend to a foreign power what he could not herself concede to that Power, namely, the reciprocity of privilege in their nature abnormal and exceptional. In the matter of the recent outrages against Persian subjects at Medina, Turkey agreed to depute a commission to make enquiries, but refused to allow a Persian to be represented on the commission. The Porte also agreed to remove the Persian Prince to Constantinople.

82. On the question of the island of Shallah, the Porte agreed to evacuate the place, provided Persia would engage not erect buildings on it until the question of its ownership should be decided by the International Frontier Commission. Nasir Pasha, Governor of Basrah, was accordingly ordered to evacuate the island, and Dr. Colvill was sent down to the place to see that the order was carried out.



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83. The Persian Government had intended to occupy the island by force, but this was abandoned (telegram from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated 5th August 1878).

Secret, August 1878, Nos. 58-57.

84. In 1884, the Mutessarif of Basrah sent a demand upon the Chief of Mohammerah for the evacuation of the island of Shallah, saying that it belonged neither to Nasir Pasha nor to the Persians, but was the property of the Turkish Government and that the latter wished to cultivate it. The island had been at this time occupied by subjects of the Sheikh of Mohammerah and planted with date trees which bore fruit. Mr. Plowden reported that from a report of Mr. Robertson it appeared that the island had been in Persian occupation since 1877 (No. 53, dated 23rd January 1884). There were found in 1884 mud huts, but no other buildings.

A. Pol. E., February 1884, Nos. 280-287.
May 1884, Nos. 365-367.

(vi) Wahabi incursions into Turkish Arabia and Turkish Expeditions against the Wahabis, 1897-1801.


85. Turkish Arabia was at the close of the 18th century threatened by a new danger, the predatory incursions of the Wahabi Arabs, which writes on 24th May 1798 Mr. Manesty, the East India Company's Agent at Basrah, extended even to the banks of the Euphrates and the vicinity of Hilla, within 50 miles of Baghdad, so that alarm was felt for the safety of the cities of Baghdad and Basrah.

Turkish Arabia, Précis 1646-1846, paragraphs 180 and 184.
Gulf Administration Report, 1879-80, (Memoir of Nayib).
History of the Wahabys in Arabia and in India Journal, Bo. Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, Volume XVI.

85-A. Orders were then repeatedly sent by the Porte to Soliman Pasha, Wali of Baghdad, to send an expedition into Nejd and chastise the Wahabis. An irregular force of Arabs having been first tried, and having failed, the Pasha in 1798 despatched his "Kahiya" or Secretary, Ali, in command of an expeditionary force of 5,000 Turkish infantry and artillery, with a contingent of about 10,000 Arab irregulars collected from the Montefik, Whafir, and other tribes under Ibrahim Thakib. Ali Pasha having penetrated to Hasa with his force, reduced that province, with the exception of the fort of Sahud of Mubarrik and the citadel (Kut) of Hoffuf, which held out against him for upwards of two months, after which time, by advice of his Arab colleagues, the Turkish Commander abandoned the siege and returned with his force northwards. Saud-bin-Mahomed intercepted the retreat of the Turkish Army, and took up a position at the walls of Taj. A battle was imminent, but was averted by the mediation of the Arab Sheikhs. Ali Pasha continued his retreat to Basrah, and Saud marched into Hasa, where he punished those who had submitted to the Turks, and rewarded the garrisons of Sahud and Kut. The plantations of all others were confiscated, and Suleiman-bin-Majid placed as Governor of Hasa. This affair contributed much to the extension and stability of the Wahabi power, and offers of submission came from all sides; the Amir, nevertheless, thought it prudent to endeavour to conciliate the Turkish Wali, by amicable overtures and the despatch of valuable presents of horses, etc., to Baghdad.

86. In 1801 the Wahabi's Amir marched with 20,000 men to Kerbella and entering the town in 20th April, on which day a large number of pilgrims had gathered for the annual festival, put to the sword every male member, destroyed the tomb of Hussein and carried away immense booty. The combined motives of puritanism of the Wahabi sect and hope of rich booty would account perhaps for this awful massacre and plunder of property of an innocent people.

87. Besides the above mentioned expedition of the Turks, which marched to Hasa, another one was despatched towards Deriah, the Wahabi capital, and reached the well Cheleibi, distant about one day's journey from Koweit. This expedition was commanded by the Montefik Sheikh Thoeny, who led besides his own people and several Bedouin tribes and the Turkish troops. Whilst, however, Thoeny was encamped at the well mentioned, he was murdered,



by a fanatic Wahabi, whereupon Saud-bin-Abdul Aziz approached, and the expedition dispersed.


(vii) Threatened attack on Basrah from the Sultan of Maskat, 1798.

88. In the wars which Karim Khan carried on against the Imam of Maskat, the Basrah Government seems to have lent its assistance to the latter. This served as one of the excuses for the attack which Karim Khan made on Basrah in 1775. The Imam of Maskat thereupon despatched a portion of his fleet to a Basrah, which having dispersed the Persian of gallivats under Sheikh Nasir, became masters of the river. The town, however, having ultimately surrendered to the Persian army, the Imam's fleet had to return to Maskat.

89. In 1798 besides the Wahabi incursions, Turkish Arabia was threatened by an attack by the Sultan of Maskat, we shall quote here the interesting account of the Resident of Basrah of the affair and of the action taken by the Residency when asked to intervene:—

"The Pacha of Baghdad has since the date of my last address made certain political requests to me. Early in the month of July, a report prevailed here that Syud Sultan meditated an attack on Bussorah on account of certain ancient pecuniary claims of his deceased father, on the Pacha of Baghdad, resisted by Soliman Pacha, and that in order to enable himself effectually to execute his hostile intentions, he was engaged in negotiating a peace with his formidable enemy, Seeggin Ebu Rasched il Mutter, the Joaseme Shaik, and towards the close of the month of July, this report was confirmed by the receipt here of letters from Maskat, communicating the designs of Syud Sultan in greater detail. On the 20th August the Pacha invited Mr. Reinaud at Baghdad to a confidential conversation in which His Excellency represented to that gentleman, that his servant, the Mussaleem of Bussorah, had communicated to him intelligence respecting certain designs entertained by Syud Sultan of Maskat, which considering the war in which he was engaged against the Wahabi Shaik and the recent inimical proceedings of the French against the Ottoman Empire in the invasion of Egypt he felt to be rather of a puzzling and unpleasant nature, and desired in the most forcible and pressing manner that he (Mr. Reinaud) would immediately communicate to me his (the Pacha's) request, that as a still further and finally convincing proof of my friendship for him, and of my personal regard for his welfare and his interest, I would, without delay, write letters to Syud Sultan and to Shaik Suggur, strongly expressive of my hope that they would, on mature consideration, give up the idea of operating hostilely against a friendly power, peculiarly connected by existing circumstances with the British Empire. Mr. Reinaud, in a qualified reply to the application of the Pacha, in which he carefully and prudently avoided committing either himself or the Residency, consented expeditiously to communicate to me His Excellency's important wishes. I received early in September Mr. Reinaud's private letter, and a letter from the Pacha on the subject, and the Pacha in his communication, which was a very friendly and satisfactory one, advised me of his having ordered the Mussaleem to co-operate with me towards the accomplishment of his desires. On the receipt of these advices, I instantly communicated with the Mussaleem, and expressed to him my intention to despatch two of the factory Janissaries without delay to Maskat and Razilkhima, charged with letters from me to Syud Sultan, and Shaik Suggur couched in terms even exceeding the ardent wishes of the Pacha. The Mussaleem in reply informed me that the active inclination, which I manifested to promote the interests of the Pacha's Government, could not fail very highly to gratify His Excellency, but that as he had himself written to Syud Sultan and Shaik Suggur on the interesting subject, and early expected their replies to his letters, he ventured to suggest the eligibility of my postponing my intended proof of friendship towards this country, until it might be possible further to ascertain the real intentions of Syud Sultan regarding Bussorah, I willingly closed with the proposal of the Mussaleem. I despatched a chocadar belonging to Government to Baghdad, charged with a proper letter for the Pacha, addressed to the care of Mr. Reinaud, to whom I gave instructions respecting its delivery to His Excellency. Mr. Reinaud, presented the letter to the Pacha in person, and on giving it into his hands, he, in obedience to my orders, assured His Excellency that I should always have the highest pleasure in facilitating the accomplishment of his general wishes, and that on the particular occasion in question, I was ready to adopt any means for their attainment, consistent with good policy, and with the ancient amity fortunately subsisting between our respective nations. The Pacha, after having read my letter with pleasure and attention, most kindly observed in his reply to Mr. Reinaud's communication that "Mr. Manesty has now completed his friendship towards me. He is my real, sincere, and faithful friend, and I will always consider his wishes as my own." The Pacha then requested Mr. Reinaud to receive another letter for me, which would be sent to him on the following day for speedy transmission, and charged him to be most particular in his communications to me respecting the satisfaction which he (the Pacha) felt in my friendly conduct towards him.

"The Pacha's second letter, which was a peculiarly kind and pleasing one, contained a request that I would preserve in my friendly disposition towards him, and take such measures




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in conjunction with the Mussaleem to prevent the threatened attacks of Syud Sultan as I might deem politic and expedient, and tending to the preservation of his honor and the security of the country. Previous to the receipt of the Pacha's second letter, the Mussaleem received replies to his letters to Syud Sultan and Shaik Suggur. A negotiation commenced between the Mussaleem and Moolla Ibrahim Ali, the Commander of the Maskat Annual Coffee Fleet, then lying at Bushire, which I did not find it necessary to interfere. The dispute between the Pacha and Syud Sultan, of which I had long foreseen the issue, has been amicably settled, the Maskat fleet has repaired to Bussorah, and actual friendly intercourse has taken place between the Turkish Government and subjects of the Imam. Thus Honourable Sir, without taking one single measure or exposing the nation or the Honourable Company to the smallest political difficulty, I have in the Pacha's estimation rendered him a most essential service, and given him the most unequivocal proof of my being authorized by you and personally inclined to promote his interests on all occasions."

90. In 1825 the Imam threatened to blockade the Basrah river, in case the Pasha of Baghdad did not immediately pay up the arrears of tribute withheld for several years. The Resident in the Gulf offered to mediate between the parties and communicated with the Political Agent at Baghdad. But the Bombay Government wished that their interference should be limited merely to producing a disposition to an amicable settlement, and as Captain Taylor could not succeed in inducing the Pasha to come to terms, the Imam was told that he was at liberty to pursue what course he pleased. His project of an expedition against Basrah was, however, checked by threats of the Mahomed Ali Pasha and ultimately abandoned.

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CHAPTER II.

The Baghdad and Basrah Pashaliks or Vilayats.

(i) Changes in the Pashaliks of Baghdad and Basrah.

91. At the early connection of the East India Company with Turkish Arabia, Basrah constituted a separate Pashalic from that of Baghdad, and it was from the Pasha of Basrah that Mr. French obtained a firman authorizing the East India Company to punish their own servants (see paragraph 7 of Chapter IV, *post*).

92. In 1749 we find the Pashas of Basrah and Baghdad fighting against one another and in a letter, dated the 12th August 1849, the Resident at Basrah reported to the Bombay Government that the Pasha of Basrah gained a great victory over the Pasha of Baghdad.

Turkish Arabia Précis, 1646—1846, paragraph 66.

In 1750 Soliman Pasha was appointed by the Sublime Porte to the Government of three provinces of *Basrah, Baghdad and Aleppo*.

Ibid, paragraph 68.

93. When Ali Pasha was appointed to succeed his famous father-in law Soliman Pasha in 1883, in writing to the Governor of Bombay, he described himself as "*Pasha of Baghdad, Basrah, Merdin, Kerbook, etc., etc., and Lieutenant-Governor of Kurdistan.*"

Ibid, paragraph 197.

94. When Soliman Pasha succeeded Ali Pasha in 1807, the Governor of Bombay, in offering him his felicitations, describes him as Pasha of Baghdad. Probably his extent of jurisdiction was not, however, less than that of his predecessor.

Ibid, paragraph 219.

95. When Daud Effendi succeeded Said Pasha in 1817, Mr. Rich addressed him his congratulations on his succession to the dignity of Pasha of "*Baghdad, Basrah and Shehezour,*" and Daud Pasha communicated to the Governor of Bombay the intelligence of his having been raised to the dignity of "*Pasha of Baghdad, Basrah and Kurdistan.*"

Ibid, paragraphs 240 and 241.


96. Daud's successor Ali Reza Pasha in a *Booyooroldi*, dated 2nd October 1831, confirming the privileges of the East India Company, describes himself as "*Pasha of Baghdad, Aleppo, Diarbekir and Mosul.*" The province of Baghdad in this *Booyooroldi* appears to have included the province of Basrah, for in the Imperial Firman given by the Porte in connection with the Chesney Expedition (see Chapter X, paragraph 13, pp. 109—110, hereafter) speaks of Ali Reza Pasha as "*Governor of Baghdad and Basrah.*"

Ibid, paragraph 281.

97. James B. Fraser in his "*Memorandum on the present condition of the Pashalic of Baghdad*" written in 1834 gives the boundaries and provinces of the Pashalic of Baghdad as follows:—

Appendix E. to Turkish Arabia Précis (1646—1841).

"The Pashalic of Baghdad extends in a direction nearly north-western and south-eastern from *Marleen* to the Persian Gulf, a space of about 750 miles in length by a medium breadth of 800, and its boundaries may be thus described: a line from *Mardeen* drawn up through Upper Mesopotamia or at *Jazeerah* (as it is termed by the Arabs) to *Kerkessia* at the formation of the *Khobour* and *Euphrates* separates it on the west from the Pashalics of *Arfa* and *Aleppo*; again a line stretching from *Mardeen* to *Arbeel*, including *Nisebun* and *Mensel*, and thence to the *Gerdain Mountains* (called *Karasadnaigh* by the Turks and *Joodee* by the Arabs) running along their feet by *Zolhab* to *Mendalee*, thence again skirting the mountains of *Touristan* to the river *Kerkha* or *Karasa* in *Keezistan*, following the course of that river to *Hameeza*, crossing the *Chaab* country to *Dorak* and touching the sea at *Gobaun* will indicate its north-eastern boundary.



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The habitable country west of the Euphrates from Kerbesia to *Mesked Allee*, and from thence the canal of Pollacopas, affords a palpable line of demarcation on the south-west, but as in times of prosperity and strength the power of the Pacha extended over the Arab tribes that range to the *westward* of that line, the boundary of the Pachalic on this side may be considered as *undefined*.

The extensive territory, comprising some of the most fertile country in the world, is by some divided into 26 districts, which may be separated into those lying on the Euphrates and those upon the Tigris. They are exhibited in the following list, where they stand nearly in geographical order from N. W. to S. E., and those which are at present productive to Government are marked to distinguish them from those that are not :—

Anah.	Euphrates.	Tigris.	Tehreet.
Rahbeh.	Semanah.	Mardeen.	Samevah.
Hit.	Soogu Shiok.	Nisebun.	Mendelee.
Kerbelah.	Bussorah.	Monsel.	Yohal.
Hillah.		Erbeel.	Jassan.
Nujjup.		Kerkook.	Bagdad Bedraee.
Femloom.		Suleimaneeh.	
Khesail.		Kiew Saujak.	
		Dour.	

98. In his despatch No. 14, dated 23rd April 1850, to Sir Stratford Canning, British Ambassador at Constantinople, Lieutenant A. B. Kemball writes :—

Bombay Volume 2379 of 1850.

"I have the honour to report for Your Excellency's information that Maashook Pasha, the newly appointed Governor of Basrah, who arrived here on the 3rd April 1850, left Baghdad on the 4th April for the seat of his Government, attended by the suite of Naval officers and artificers, which accompanied him from Constantinople.

The boundaries of Maashook Pasha's jurisdiction are declared to be identical with those which defined Basrah when existing formerly as a separate and independent Pachalic, *viz.*, the Heed River and Hye Canal on either bank of the Tigris; and Samawa on the Euphrates. This delimitation will include the territories of the great Montefik tribe. The executive Government is placed in financial and military subordination to Baghdad, but the new Governor is empowered to correspond direct with Constantinople."

99. In his "*Memoir of the Province of Baghdad*," Captain Felex Jones describes that the Pashalic of Baghdad :—

Bombay Selections No. XLIII, New Series.

"At the present time the Pachalic of Baghdad extends from the northern shores of the Persian Gulf along the Euphrates river as far upward as Anah, where the Aleppo districts commence. From thence a line is drawn across Mesopotamia to the Hamrin range of hills (where it crosses the Tigris), and led eastward so as to include the province of Sulimaniyah in Kurdistan, bounds it to the north, its eastern limit being then defined by the line of the Shirwan and Diyaleh rivers as far as Khanakin, whence it skirts the foot of the Zagras, including the great plains as far as the Kerkha river west of the Hawizeh, and thence to the angle formed by the meeting of the Shat-el-Arab and Mohammerah streams. This is a large and profusely-watered arable tract of country ranging over nearly five degrees of latitude and longitude, enclosing an area of available soil, which I compute at fifty-thousand square miles."


About the 1874, Mosul and Diarbekir were constituted into separate Vilayats.

100. In the years 1871-72 Midhut Pasha extended the Ottoman dominion over the District of Hasa and Katif. In

Précis on Turkish expansion along the Arab Littoral and Hasa and Katif affairs, paragraph 202-A.

Political A., November 1875, Nos. 52-58.

1875 this newly conquered territory—called by the Turks Nejd, along with Basrah, Nasariyah, the centre of the Montefik country and Kurna and Amarah were constituted with an independent Vilayat called the Basrah Vilayat and Nasir Pasha—the Montefik Sheikh was appointed the first Vali thereof.



101. In 1880 Basrah was restored to Baghdad. In 1884 it was again constituted a separate Vilayat, including the following Mutessarifiks :—
Mr. Plowden to the Embassy, No. 591, dated 20th August 1884.
External A., September 1884, Nos. 65-67.
(No. 67).

- (1) Basrah.
- (2) Nejd and Hasa.
- (3) Nasariyah ain.
- (4) Amarah.

102. In the Gazetteer of Baghdad, 1889, the boundaries of the Vilayats of Baghdad and Basrah are given as follows :

"The present boundaries of the *Pachalic or Wilaiat of Baghdad* (as it is now called) have never been accurately defined. Approximately they are as follows :

Northern Boundary.—Starts from the Persian frontier, 25 miles to the east of the town of Kifri, bends to the south and west of Karra Tappa and Ghurfa, thence north-west crossing the Tigris 20 miles north of Tikrit and then again due west across Al-Jazira to the 41° of east longitude (approximately) and then due south to the Euphrates, to the village of *El-Ezri* from where it again runs due west to the 39° east longitude.

Southern.—On the south the line dividing it from that of Basrah runs between Kut and Amara, and, crossing the Tigris below Kut, passes above the Hai country in Mesopotamia to Nasiria, and thence crosses the Euphrates to the Shamia desert.

Eastern.—On the east it is bounded by the mountain range which separates Persia from Turkey.

Western.—The western boundary is approximately that shewn in Kiepert's Carte Generale of the Ottoman Empire, *vis.*, 39° east meridian in that map.

Basrah.—A province of Asiatic Turkey is sometimes included in the Wilaiat of Baghdad; sometimes for a few years it exists as a separate Wilaiat, with a greater or less extent of territory attached to it; sometimes, as at present, it is a separate Wilaiat, without a Wali of its own, and still administered by the Wali of Baghdad, although the tract of country assigned to it is perhaps more extensive than that left under Baghdad.

Its present boundaries are as follows :—

North.—The boundary dividing Basrah Wilaiat from that of Baghdad lies between Kut and Amara, and, crossing the Tigris below Kut, passes above the Hai country in Mesopotamia to Nasiria (Montefik), and thence crosses the Euphrates to the Shamia desert. Thus the lower boundary of Kut, the river Hai and a point below Samawa divides the two Wilaiats.

South.—The Persian Gulf.

East.—A line from the Jabal-Himrin hills to the town of Mohammerah, and thence down the Shat-el-Arab to the Persian Gulf, divides the Wilaiat from Persia. The left bank of the Shat-el-Arab is Persian territory.

West.—The boundary ends at a place to the south of Nejd called *Birich*."

(ii) Pashas or Valis of Baghdad.

103. The earliest mention in our records of the Pashas of Baghdad is that of Ahmed Pasha, who in the year 1733 A. D. defeated Nadir Shah's forces in a great battle and saved Baghdad being taken by the Persians. He rendered the Pashalic practically independent of the Ottoman Government at Constantinople. It does not appear from our records who succeeded him. In 1750 Soliman Pasha was made the Pasha of Baghdad, Basrah and Aleppo.

104. It must be noted that the Pashas appointed as their ministers or Secretaries or Lieutenant-Governors, officers who were called *Kias* or *Khayas* : these Khayas were often so powerful and the Pashas so weak, that they usurped the whole government and exercised all the powers of a Pasha.

105. Below is given a list of the Pashas or Valis of Baghdad from the year 1750, so far as can be ascertained from our records :—



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Name of the Pashas.	The year of their appointment.
<i>Soliman Pasha</i> .—Pasha of Basrah, Baghdad and Aleppo ...	1750.
<i>Hussein Pasha</i> .—Deposed by the Janissaries and compelled to quit Baghdad, upon which the Sultan appointed ...	Not known.
<i>Soliman Aga</i> , Pasha of Baghdad and Basrah, who died in 1803 ...	1779.
<i>Ali Pasha</i> .—His son-in-law appointed "Pasha of Baghdad, Basrah, Merdin, Kerbook, etc., and Lieutenant-Governor of Kurdistan." He was assassinated by a party of Georgians, and the Sultan appointed his nephew— ...	1803.
<i>Soliman</i> .—Pasha of the Baghdad Pashalic who was defeated and killed in battle by the Kurds in 1810 ...	1807.
<i>Abdullah Pasha</i> succeeds him. He was taken prisoner and put to death by the Montefik Arabs in 1813, when— ...	1810.
<i>Said Beg</i> was appointed Pasha of Baghdad. In 1816 an order was issued by the Sultan for his deposal, which he resisted. Daud Effendi was despatched with a force against him, and he was ultimately captured and put to death. He was succeeded by—	1813.
<i>Daud Pasha</i> , who addressed a letter to the Governor of Bombay as having been raised to the dignity of "Pasha of Baghdad, Basrah and Kurdistan." He was deposed by the Porte in 1831, and was succeeded by order of the Porte by— ...	1817.
<i>Haji Ali Reza</i> .—In a <i>Booyooraldi</i> issued by him confirming the privileges of the East India Company, he describes himself as "Pasha of Baghdad, Aleppo, Diarbekir and Mosul" ...	1831.
<i>Nejeb Pasha</i> ...	About 1846.
<i>Manik Pasha or Namik Pasha and Abid Pasha</i> } Joint Pashas (as Lieutenants of Nejeb Pasha ?)	About 1849.
<i>Mahomed Rashid Pasha</i> ...	About 1853.
<i>Mushur Pasha</i>
<i>Amer Pasha</i>
<i>Mauri Pasha</i> ...	About 1859.
<i>Manik Pasha or Namik Pasha</i> ...	About 1862.
<i>Taki-ud-Din</i> ...	1863.
<i>Midhut Pasha</i> ...	1869.
<i>Reouf Pasha</i> ...	About 1872.
<i>Abdul Rahman Pasha</i>
<i>Redif Pasha</i> ...	About 1874.
<i>Akif Pasha</i> ...	About 1877.
<i>Mahomed Taki Eddin Pasha</i> ...	About 1883.

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(iii) Valis of Basrah.

105-A. The following is the list of the Valis of Basrah from the time that Vilayat was constituted in 1875.

Name of the Pashas.					The year of their appointment.
<i>Constituted in 1875.</i>					
<i>Nasir Pasha</i>	1875.
<i>Abdullah Pasha</i>	Removed in 1879.
<i>Zabit Pasha</i>	1879-81.
<i>Re-constituted in 1884.</i>					
<i>Saleh Pasha</i>	1884.
<i>Ali Reza Pasha</i>	Not known.
<i>Shaban Pasha</i>	Not known.
<i>Hidayat Pasha</i>	1889.
<i>Hamdi Pasha</i>
<i>Mohsin Pasha</i>	1900.
<i>Mukliss Pasha</i>	September 1904.

(iv) Characters and Policy of some of the Valis.

106. The characters and policy of the Vali will be known from the narrative of events described hereafter, in which they were concerned. Below are given descriptions of some of the leading Pashas and of their schemes and policy, which we find in our records.

107. The early Pashas of Baghdad were like powerful feudal princes of Europe, who were to a great extent independent of the Central Government of the Porte in the administration of the province. Of the Pashas mentioned in the above list the greatest and most famous was *Soliman Pasha* (1779-1803). His long reign corresponds to an important period in the development of the British influence in Turkish Arabia. He was on the whole very favourably inclined to the English, and though Mr. Manesty, the Company's quarrelsome Resident, fell out with him on flimsy* grounds, the Pasha as a rule treated the English with respect and consideration. His administration was on the whole peaceful, though plague, family intrigues and his own infirmities of old age gave rise to disorders about the time of his death. His only son then was a boy, and there was naturally much intrigue at Baghdad for the succession to the Pashalic among several rival claimants. The state of things, of the rival factions, and of the leading characters of the time are well described by Mr. Harford Jones in his despatch to Lord Wellesley, dated 9th May 1802 :—

Still deprived of Your Excellency's promised commands on the subject of our political relations with the Pashaw of Bagdad, I could wish to have postponed laying before you any detailed statement of the situation of affairs here, until I might have had the honor to receive them. Circumstances however are so much altered within these few months and indeed I may say within these few days, that I conceive deferring this task to a future period would be a neglect of my duty.

With Your Excellency's permission I would divide the details I propose laying before you, under three heads :—

1st.—The domestic state of this Government;

2nd.—Its exterior relations;

3rd.—The state of the country under the Government of Bagdad.



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Your Excellency knows that the Pasha is a person greatly advanced in years; my late addresses have spoken of his increasing infirmities, and I am now sorry to confirm what I formerly mentioned from report that His Highness had totally lost the use of his body from the waist downwards. The Pashaw has in all seven children—three sons and four daughters. The eldest of the former is near twelve years old; the two others are infants, and the four daughters are married or affianced to the following of his officers:—

To the Thir or Minister	Married.
To Selem Beg, late Mussalum of Bussora	"
To Daoud Aga Hasnudar	Affianced.
To Neseef Aga, Hapujular Hiassy	"

The Pashaw's principal Councillors are the Mushroff Effer, sometime since made Dafterdar Effendi, Mohammed and Abdull Aziz Beg. The Government of the two principal dependencies, that is to say, Bussora and Mirdin, are at present filled by Negum Beg and Abdullah Aga.

From the time of my arrival at this court to the present moment, the Pashaw has more particularly delivered himself and his affairs to the Council and management for the Minister in this respect has never been more than a shadow of two persons; the late Divan Effendisi, who was suspected to have died poisoned and the present Dafterdar Effendi, who was brought forward on the Divan Effendisi's disease. Consecutive acts of imprudence, Folly and injustice had lessened that respect for his person and government which the Pashaw had been near twenty years in acquiring; and his late disgraceful desertion of the City, his unjust and inhuman orders, after quitting it himself on account of the plague, that no one else should be permitted to do so, and his shameful negligence in respect to Meshed Hossien, have given the death blow to his character, whether as a good man, or a good Governor, and whenever he is called away from hence, whether it be by the course of nature or by orders from the Porte, he will feel in that moment the sad reflexion of having outlived his character, his reputation and his honor.

The domestic embarrassments which the Pashaw has to struggle against are the consequences of the plague which has made its appearance in the city; the divisions which form separate interests, prevail in his harem and amongst his sons-in-law and counsellors; the turn against turn of popular opinion in this City and the ill-favored state (I have great reason to think) his affairs are in at Constantinople. It is more than probable his infirmities will soon remove him from the midst of his difficulties, but if they should not, I cannot conceive the Porte will or indeed can support him against the loud complaints which will be made against him from all Mohammedan countries on the affair of Meshed Hossain.

In what manner soever we shall loose him, the public here have long talked of a number of pretenders to the succession and has fixed them to be his eldest son, his sons-in-law and Abdullah Aga the late Mussalum of Bussora. It is in a paper of this sort above that I could venture to trouble Your Excellency with a short sketch of characters which are only interesting from the situation of those to whom they belong.

The Pashaw's eldest son's name is Usedd Beg and his early age makes it unnecessary to say more than he is reported to be a boy of some parts and good disposition.

The Khia, whose name is Ally, was raised to this dignity, and married to the only daughter the Pashaw had born in Wedloch, in consequence of the part he acted in the massacre of Ahmed Kia of whose character and abilities, I cannot presume Your Excellency to be ignorant. He is a Georgian by birth, was a slave to the Pashaw, and may be probably about forty years of age. He is neither a man of business nor a man of Pashaw, he has not parts for the one, and his fanaticising prevents his being the other. During the time of his servitude in the palace, he applied himself particularly, it is said, to the study of the Khoran, its commentaries and Glosses which acting on parts more than commonly circumscribed has caused him to consider the orthodox profession and exercise of Islamism, as containing every excellent accomplishment a Manean possesses, has given him a prejudice against persons of other sects of his own religion, which often unpolitely manifests itself, and has given him a detestation and abhorrence of Christians and Jews, which he frequently does not choose the most proper time of expressing. His behaviour in public is puerile and disgusting; and many amongst those belonging to his own household, but most of the inhabitants of the town dislike him. It is singular that his devotion and bigotry have not procured him many friends amongst the Corps of Oulimas, but the mystery is explained when it is mentioned that the Kia destroys the friendship, they would otherwise have for him from a similarity of principles and opinions by making the rudest and most *mal à propos* speeches. His personal courage, notwithstanding the part he acted in the murder of Ahmed Kia, I have just reason from Mr. Raymond's account of him in his campaigns against the Casacts, to esteem very doubtful. He is said to be steady where he professes friendship, and I ought to do him the justice to say that, if he does ever depart from his word, it is unwillingly. So that upon the whole, if the Pashaw must be succeeded by one of his former Georgian slaves, I incline to think the Kia is in many respects the proper persons for that purpose, for some of his defects may be lessened by good counsel, which I have never found or heard him to be averse from receiving.



Selim Beg is also a Georgian by birth and enfranchised by the Pashaw. His manners and I think his understanding are much better than the Kias. But he is unexperienced in business, and has made, I believe, but a poor figure in the only trial of his fitness for Government, namely, in the Mussulmship of Bussora. His affability however has gained him some well-wishers in the town.

Daoud Agar the Kasnadar is another enfranchised Georgian. He has, it is said, good parts and he seems to have confined his ambition, to procuring himself the title of Moollah or learned. He is mild and even elegant, changed in his manners, but has neither the experience, fortitude, nor decision which are requisite in the high station of Pashaw of Baghdad.

Neseef Aga, the Kapejeelar Kiassy, is like the Kasnadar an enfranchised Georgian—and possessed neither parts nor experience. He is brutish and disgusting in his manners, and his haughtiness and self-conceit if they can be equalled by any other quality he possesses, must be so, by his ignorance alone. His personal courage however is said to be great. His age and of that Salim Beg and Daud Aga are nearly the same, that is about thirty-four or thirty-five years.

I now come to present Your Excellency with a character one of the most extraordinary that I have ever known during my residence in these countries, I mean that of Abdullah Aga the present Governor of Masdin; a character with which Your Excellency by the Despatches from the Resident at Bussorah must in some degree be acquainted; a character which I really doubt being able in my delineation, to do complete justice to.

Abdullah Aga is native of Bagdad, born of one of the most respectable families in the city, and was appointed from the Office of Hassiadur to the Pashaw; to that of Mussalum of Bussora, which he filled for many years with superior credit to himself and the greatest advantage to the Pashaw, his master. He is about forty-two years of age, coarse in his person, but most engaging and interesting in his manner and conversation, knowing and practising that great and invaluable secret of accommodating himself to his Company without the smallest loss of his own dignity. He is a man of letters, a politician, a financier and a merchant. He has procured himself, what people in these countries seldom think of, a tolerable distinct and correct notion of the State of Europe. He has been at uncommon pay to obtain some ideas of geography; and he is the only Turk I ever conversed with, that had a knowledge of the local situation and relation of the provinces of his own Empire. He is liberal in his religious opinions, and would, if policy would warrant it, be still more so. He is liberal to his people without being profuse, and has the happy talent of combining great expense with the most exact economy. He is always happy to receive information in whatever shape, or by whomsoever it may be offered to him—and is seldom or ever contented with knowing a thing superficially or by halves. In his Government at Bussora, he was prompt, decisive and vigilant, and contrived to procure himself a great character, for good faith, humanity and justice. He has been accused of being avaritious, but he certainly never gratified that passion by exertion and oppression, and though he amassed immense sums at Bussora, they were neither drawn from the Public Revenue of the Pashaw, nor from the private purse of the inhabitants, for he greatly increased the one, and afforded a security to the other, which had been long unknown. He increased his fortune at Bassora by means which the barbarous ignorance of other Mussalums prevented their seeing, and which had they seen should still have required abilities as strong and as good as Abdullah Aga's to have taken advantage of. He has been reproached with timidity,—he never shewed it in any act of his Government, and whatever personal act his apprehension of the malevolence of this Government towards him may have caused him to commit, great allowance for his situation ought to be made, and if it is fair to estimate the wisdom of conduct by the event, his conduct where he has been most censured, appears now to have been most sage. He is (very much to the credit of the Resident at Bassora) most firmly attached to the English and their interests; justly and on conviction of the truth of it, considering the latter as inseparably connected in these countries with those of the Porte.

Your Excellency will now permit me to pass to a recital of what I hear as the probabilities of each party's success.

It is evident the Pashaw, if he ever did hope that the Government of Baghdad would be continued in his family in the person of his son, must have entertained those hopes when his affairs wore a very different appearance both here and at Constantinople, to what they do at present, when he was beloved here and respected there; at present therefore it is needless to trouble Your Excellency with the prospect of a boy of twelve, obtaining the Government of a country so deranged in all its parts as Baghdad and its Dependencies.

The Kia's hopes, I am told, rest much on the access which it is probable his situation may give him to the Pashaw's Treasures on his decease; on the assurances of support he is said to have obtained from the Janissary Aga, the Dafterdar Effendi and Mohammed Beg; and on the advantage he has of having more people attached to his service, than either of the other sons-in-law of the Pashaw.

I incline however to think that the Janissary Aga is, either not engaged to support the Kia's pretensions, or if he has made any such engagement, it is but for the purpose of amusing him. My opinion in this respect is founded on a message he sent me the other day, when a



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Report was spread in Town of the Pashaw having died in his Camp. This substance of it was, that "his thoughts turned (he believed) the same way as mine," and that "a man always repented forming connections with fools."

It is however not to be doubted that the Dafterdar Effendi and Mohammed Beg have engaged themselves to support the Kia, but their characters are such, particularly that of the former, that I cannot think they will be able to give him much assistance in his views; for though they are now both of them in possession of much influence, they are neither beloved nor respected, nor will their efforts admit them to be as powerful as they can be imagined, be able to stem or turn the current of popular opinion.

It is also to be remarked that the Office of the one (I believe) and the consequence of the other ceases on the death or change of the Pashaw—a case far different to that of the Janissary Aga, whom Your Excellency knows by the canons of the Empire, takes charge for the Porte of the City and Palace, and the Treasures if he can get at them, of the late Pashaw, until a new Pashaw be appointed. His assistance therefore to whomsoever he shall lend it is an affair of the greatest importance—the chiefest men of the town being Janissaries, who look up to their Aga and particularly to the present—who is a man of great sense and ability and is both respected and believed.

What are the foundations on whom Selim Beg, Daoud Aga and Neseef Aga build their hopes, I am ignorant further than the weak ones of being sons-in-law to the Pashaw, and some trifling Cabals, which they may each have formed amongst the Georgians in the Palace, which from frequently canvassing, they have each in their own opinions magnified into powerful means of success.

It is sometime since I have indirectly heard that the Porte on some cause of discontent with the Pashaw was desirous of ascertaining whether in the event of a Firman for the Pashalik being sent to Abdullah Aga he would undertake to support it, but within these few months all eyes have been directed towards him; all hopes of seeing anything like prosperity and tranquillity restored to this country have rested on him. Holding situation I do I can not suppose it will be deemed impertinent to offer an opinion on this occasion, but when I find this opinion backed by the concurring sentiments of the majority of every sect and every class of people interested in the event, I feel I may deliver it with a greater degree of freedom and boldness. If the conservation of these countries be an object to the Porte, if the restoration to confidence and tranquillity of the inhabitants of them, and to preserve a decisive and preponderating influence in them be an object to us, I am convinced no time whatever, My Lord, should be lost in procuring for Abdullah Aga the Government of them. The Porte is infinitely more interested to make this appointment than we are, My Lord, that it should be made and I wish, with Your Excellency's permission, to repeat that, if there yet remains a possibility of her retaining this country, she has apparently no other means of doing so than appointing Abdullah Aga to the Government of it. Abdullah Aga will certainly make every arrangement human prudence can suggest for preventing the further progress of the Wahaby and probably his excellent character may induce those sectaries to listen to negotiation, for which at present there are fair grounds. On this, My Lord, depends the conservation to the Porte of these countries.

107-A. On the death of Soliman Pasha in 1703, the Janissary Aga obtained possession of the citadel, while the *Kia Ali Pasha* (1803-7) Soliman's son-in-law was proclaimed by Oulemas and Janissaries the *locum tenens* until the orders of the Porte arrived, and recommended by them to be appointed as Soliman Pasha's successor. There took place then a fierce fighting in Baghdad between Janissary Aga and Ali Pasha and their respective partisans, which caused much carnage and bloodshed. We have in our records a graphic description from the pen of Mr. Harford Jones of the reign of terror that prevailed in Baghdad for a few days, which throws light on the wretched condition to which Baghdad was reduced and shows the weak hold the Porte had in this region at this time. The Janissary Aga was successful at first and his party proclaimed the son of the late Pasha as Pasha. Soon after, however, Ali Pasha succeeded in defeating the Janissary Aga and capturing the citadel with the assistance of the Arabs of the Jebour, Bumferrage and Ageolie tribes, Janissary Aga was seized and put to death. Ali Pasha's nomination was ultimately confirmed by the Porte.

107-B. On 18th April 1807—Ali Pasha was assassinated by a party of Georgians, and in consequence of this event the Kia Pasha, minister of the deceased, assumed by general consent charge of the Government of the Pashalic, pending a reference to Constantinople. In reporting this event Mr. Hine, Acting Resident at Baghdad, stated that the death of Ali Pasha was welcomed with satisfaction throughout the Pashalic and that he was of

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opinion that the interest of the East India Company would be promoted thereby.

107-C. *Soliman* (1807-10) the late Pasha's nephew was appointed Pasha in his place by the Porte. Orders were sent by the Porte in 1800 for the deposition of Soliman, but they were challenged by him, and the Porte resorted to the expedient of exciting the Kurds to attack Baghdad and expel the rebellious Pasha. The Khurdish force was defeated by Soliman Pasha, but no advantage having been taken of the victory, the Turkish Army was attacked again and ultimately deserted their chief. Soliman fled with a few faithful Georgians towards Basrah, but was taken and murdered by a party of Dafayh as or Shummers.

"Thus terminated" writes Mr. Rich "at the age twenty-four the life and reign of Saliman Pasha, a man of warm affections and actual good principles. His faults were such as proceed from extreme youth and would have been corrected by age and experience. Since his reconciliation* with me he was ever been the strongest and most sincere friend of the British and I fear it will be long ere the Residency is so well situated."

107-D. *Abdullah Aga* (1810-13) probably the *Abdullah Aga* of Baghdad described by Mr. Harford James in his despatch of 1802 quoted above, was appointed Pasha. He fell in a battle with the Montefiks in 1813. His two successors became so powerful, that they could not be ousted but by force.

107-E. *Said Pasha* (1813-16) having in 1816 refused to resign the Government to Daud Effendi, the latter marched against Baghdad with a large force, but was defeated by Said Pasha's Army (17th January 1717). Shortly afterwards a defection took place in a portion of Said Pasha's army, which was followed by general insurrection at Baghdad, in which the *Mamelukes* took a conspicuous part. On 21st February Daud Effendi who had recollected his scattered army entered Baghdad, when the whole city submitted to his authority and on the following day he was proclaimed Pasha. Said Pasha, who had taken shelter in the citadal, was soon after beheaded.

107-F. *Daud Pasha* (1817-31) made a very poor impression on Mr. Rich, who reported as early as 1819 that he was merely a tool in the hands of his unworthy servants. He came with serious collision with Mr. Rich, having refused to redress certain wrongs of British merchants. Mr. Rich's successor Captain Taylor and Daud Pasha were on very friendly terms, a friendship which was used by the latter to strengthen his position considerably with the ostensible object of defending the country against the Russians by obtaining a large supply of arms and ammunition from Bombay by British Officers. Daud Pasha's power excited the jealousy of the Porte and orders were sent for his deposition and succession by *Ali Reza Pasha*. He determined to oppose the advance of Ali Pasha by force. Baghdad was besieged by Ali Reza Pasha for a few days, but Daud Pasha was betrayed and delivered to the newly appointed Pasha. The ex-Pasha was pardoned and sent to Constantinople.

107-G. It was during the reign of Ali Pasha (1831-1846) that the Euphrates expedition was undertaken by the English. He was the first Pasha of Baghdad, who was of Turkish descent, and with him there appears to have been inaugurated a new policy in Turkish Arabia, the main purpose of which was to destroy the power of the Georgians at Baghdad and to break down the old feudal system under which the Arab chieftains and their tribes enjoyed almost independent administrative powers. This Pasha was on whole friendly towards the British and favourably disposed to movements for the exploitation of the country. The following is the description of the governor given by Major R. Taylor and the policy inaugurated by him (see Pol. C., 21st May 1832, Nos. 8-32 :—



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No. 49, dated Bussorah, the 29th October 1831.

From—MAJOR R. TAYLOR, Political Agent, Bussorah.

To—CHARLES NORRIS, Esq., Chief Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

I have the honour to forward copies and translates of a Booyooroldi or Public Rescript of His Highness the Pasha together with a private letter to my address, to which is added copy of a private letter from His Highness's favourite and Chief adviser Mahomed Effendi Ibn Nayib, or Nayib Oghlee, written in English by the instrumentality of an English gentleman, a clergyman residing in Baghdad, and bearing the seal of the Effendi attached thereto.

The prompt and effective mode adopted by His Highness to confirm our privileges, and to mark his attachment to our nation, is not only pointed in itself, but has produced both here, and at Baghdad, a corresponding beneficial impression.

The Booyooroldi was the day before yesterday (Friday) read in the Devan at the Serie, and has been duly registered in the Archives of the Mehkemeh of the Kadhee, and the Chancellery of the Deetferdar; and it now remains for the Hon'ble the Governor in Council to take His Highness's wishes into favourable consideration, with reference to the contents of my dispatch No. 38 of this Department.

The disposition and temper so favourably attributed to His Highness by Ibn Nayib in his letter, making every allowance for the partiality of a favoured dependant, is fully borne out by private accounts, and by his public conduct since his accession. His very choice of Ibn Nayib, an individual known to him only by reputation as a favourite councillor, speaks much for His Highness's tact; for in the whole range of his Pachalic; he could not find his equal.

His Highness daily walks over portions of the city, accompanied by a few attendants to observe personally and minutely the temper, wants and disposition of the whole people; his Government has been mild and unostentatious; and he has hitherto revived none of the obnoxious impositions of the past administration; nor has his Court yet assumed the gorgeous and haughty department of the officers of the late Pasha.

The punishments he has hitherto inflicted have been imposed upon him by the order of the Sultan; and even these he has qualified as much as was in his power; many of the prescribed Georgians are indebted to him for their lives. Generally too his public conduct has been such as to revive the hopes, and to stimulate and refresh the recollections, of the fixed and most valuable portion of the population of the lower Pachalic, as to the benefit formerly derived from their Turkish masters.

The Georgian Governors of this fine Pachalic have, with the exception of the first Sooleman Pacha, acted as foreigners, led by the interests of a day; which the Turks, in spite of all their general errors of administration, have less injured the population, and true interests of the country. Their credulity and misplaced faith in the Georgians, in the former feudal Begs, and in the military tribes of the country alone, caused the decline and ruin of their authority.

A middle path appears now to be chosen by the present Pacha, of Turkish descent; by which, while the naturally armed force of the fine country is not neglected, a stipendiary permanent, counterpoise is secured in his disciplined levies, effective or under tuition.

The dominion of the present Pacha has been considerably extended; in addition to the Pachalic of Baghdad, he is placed over those of Diarbekir, Aleppo, and Mousul; which refers to his rule the greater portion of Mesopotamia, a part of Syria, and of Arabia; with the larger division of the whole course of the Euphrates and Tigris, and much of that of the Oroutes. The Arabs too, of the included tract, come within the range of his authority; so that his means of facilitating the communication by the steam, or otherwise, between the Mediterranean and the Gulph of Persia, are direct and important; nor would his authority prove less valid; in defending the navigation of these rivers against an enemy.

This Pacha is a Waxir of the Empire; he even bears the high and ancient title of Khaleefah, that of the first of Princes of Baghdad; and at the Porte he is considered as their champion against every people, beyond those of the modern curdistan.

The general impression now prevailing in these countries is, that a change in the principles of Government is approaching, that this change will be beneficial to all sincerely interested in the public welfare; injurious only to those who would repress it. These sentiments too are entertained and avowed by a people who have hitherto been silent, and were supposed callous to national interests, or public changes. They do, however, feel; and if the plans, now apparently, contemplated, are permitted by Providence to obtain strength and currency, they will revive the spirits of the people, and restore the country to what nature intended it should be.

During the two years of my absence at Baghdad, this place has been deserted; and Mohammerah twenty miles below this on the opposite or Chaab banks of the river; and the port of grain, near the site of the ancient Gerrha, in a barren uninviting spot, have been people, and supplied with the conveniences, and many of what are here considered, the luxuries of life.



But the unfortunate exiles cannot forget the soil of their nativity; and the first glimpse of better days will restore them to this spot.

The arrival of the documents mentioned in the commencement of this dispatch will I trust prove satisfactory to Government; the decision as to the Pacha's wishes remains with my superiors.

Dated 27th Rabee-ath thanee A. H. 1247 or 2nd October 1831 A. D.

From—His Highness Hajee Ali Raza Pacha of Baghdad, Alappo, Diarbekir and Mousu,
To— The Political Agent at Bussorah.

Official Sign.

To the spiritual leader of Islam, the Lieutenant of the Qadhee of Constantinople at Bussra; to His Excellency the Muftae Effende of Basra, whose piety and excellence be increased; to the Chief of the exalted ministry and Government, the Mutesellin Agha, be his rank and station increased; and to the elders and men of weight of the council and country whose dignity be magnified:—In reference to all affairs supervening at Bussorah and relating to the excellent resident of England, the high and exalted Mr. Taylor, Balecox Beg, residing with our eternal Government; and in observance of his rights; and those of his agents; interpreters and all his Protégés, and dependants; and of all the subjects of his Government; and the merchants and ships arriving from Hindustan; according to the stipulations and treaties which have been arranged and ratified with our exalted state, as they have been held in times preceding; to which we adhere, and for which we even exceed the former regard, out of a wish to protect their rights: So you also, the Nayib Effendi; and Muftae Effendi; and Mutesellin Agha; and Ayan; (inferiorministers) will in likewise deport yourselves towards, and protect the rights, and regards the just claims of the dignified Mr. Taylor Beg; his Agents; Interpreters; Protégés; and Dependants and the subject of the Government arriving from Hindustan; and their ships and merchants and all others soever; conformably to what we have promulgated in this our Booyooraldi, which you will on no account infringe:—and thus be it known unto you.

Dated 25th Rabee ath-thanee A. H. 1247 or 30th September A.D. 1831.

From—His Highness Aajee Ali Pacha of Baghdad, etc., etc., etc.,
To—The Political Agent at Rassora.

Our dear friend, it is imperative upon us to attend to your desires and wishes, from your being a public guest of the exalted Government; your requests will always be attended to and acceptable to us; we are desirous of your friendship and intimacy, much more than the Wazeer's who have preceded us. We inform you of our entrance into Baghdad by the Almighty favor, and we did not find you there; we are desirous of your arrival here that our friendship may increase towards you. If, therefore, please God you come to Baghdad in safety, you shall witness a friendly attention, surpassing that of all past Wazeers. I also assure you that there shall be no deficiency of attention, on any account, to the affairs of yourself, or of your Agents, Interpreters, Protégés, and Dependants; or of your countrymen from India, or your merchants or ships:—To which end we have sent to you our Solemn Booyooroldi, addressed to all the members of Government.

L. S.

Likewise whatever preceding Wazirs may have stipulated and established, as well by written engagements, as by the prescriptive authority of past friendly deportment and acts of annuity towards you; he also confirm and adhere to these claims; nay; will give extended force and effect to them and you shall witness our deportment towards you; shortly on your coming to us; and these are given for your information.

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Dated Baghdad, the 9th October 1831.

From—HAYEE EFFENDI, on the part of His HIGHNESS ALI PACHA,

To—The Political Agent at Bussora.

After salutations.

If you wish to know how I am, I am by the favour of God most happy, and my mind easy, all that you wish me and much more; and affairs are such as you would wish, and we do not feel anxiety or grief, except that we are not able to see you, and sit with you, as we could wish. And we will pray God that we may meet quickly, safely, and in good health.

Your Agent Agha Minas came here, and saw the Pacha, and me and Agha Minas received from His Highness the Pacha marks of attention and respect that exceeded his hopes, and he wrote for him the Booyooroldi thereof, for the public functionaries of the Government of Bussora, for the protection of the Resident and all their dependants upon him, and also a Shokka or letter from His Highness, by which it will manifestly appear how constant the desire of His Highness is, that there may be perpetual friendship between you. Moreover, His Highness desires that you should not lose an hour in returning to Baghdad as he greatly desires to see you face to face. My dear friend, by the truth of our friendship and affection! there has been no such Pacha come to Baghdad, nor will again. His disposition is so excellent, that no pen could do it justice; and so exceedingly desirous is he of seeing you, that he never lets an opportunity pass without asking when will the Balecoz Beg come. Now I hope when these letters shall arrive, you will come to us in the very first moment, and when you arrive, you will see the disposition of the Pacha towards you. The fruits of our friendship.

Nejeb Pasha (1842-49).

108. Few Ottoman Viceroy's have played a more important part in the affairs of Turkish Arabia for its good or evil than Nejab Pasha. We shall quote

See Consultation 31st March 1849, Nos. 34-35.

Major Rawlinson's description of the general character and particular evils of his administration:—

No. 77, dated Baghdad, the 6th December 1848.

From—MAJOR H. C. RAWLINSON, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Baghdad,

To—His EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE SIR STAFFORD CANNING, G.C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

In continuation of my despatch No. 69 of the 18th ultimo, I now proceed to report more fully, both upon the general character and the particular evils of Nejid Pacha's administration of Baghdad.

Your Excellency is no doubt tolerably acquainted from the antecedents of Nejid Pacha's career with the merits and demerits which distinguish him as an individual. He possesses or at any rate has possessed, a very remarkable natural energy, and his inflexible spirit, although too often degenerating into obstinacy, has on more occasions than one dissipated dangers that would have been fatal, if encountered with a less degree of firmness and serenity. That thorough knowledge also must be conceded to him of the craft of Eastern Government, which can be alone acquired by 50 years' experience of public life. Herein however are, I think, comprised his full catalogue of virtues, and unfortunately there is a terrible amount of evil in the frailties, prejudices and passions which make up the residuum of his personal character. Proud, superstitious and corrupt, he is alone accessible to the influence of flattery of saintly hypocrisy or of bribes. His bigotry increases with his tears and his rapacity with his wealth. Hating equally Christians and Sheeahs, whom he classes together as infidels and strangers, his conduct to the two communities at Baghdad is merely in so far distinguished, as the relative weight of the Persian and European Governments may be supposed to admit a greater or less latitude for the indulgence of his rancor. The Christians, to whom in public he invariably attaches the opprobrious epithet of "Giour," have chiefly to complain of an indifference to their wrongs, of a disposition to enforce against them civil disabilities which in other parts of the Empire have either fallen into disuse or have been formally annulled, of systematized endeavours to confirm, if not to aggravate, their social depression, while the Persians, to whom His Excellency commonly applies the equally dishonorable title of "Rafizi," are the objects of an undisguised and indiscriminating persecution. To enumerate the multitudinous grievances under which the latter parties suffer would be too great a trespass upon Your Excellency's time and patience. Those grievances have been catalogued for the most part in my previous despatches, and they extend over every portion of the body politic and every question of individual right, whether affecting religion, conscience, nationality, property, commerce or personal security. The last refinement of severity, to which my attention has been drawn (and which has been superadded to the prohibition of all charitable bequests or benefactory outlay upon the holy shrines and to a compulsory substitution of Soonee for Sheeah law in the towns of Kerbela and Nejef, not only in regard to civil contracts, conveyances of property, testamentary dispositions, etc., but in such personal matters as marriage and divorce) as a formal interdict that His

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Excellency has lately placed upon those traditional mourning ceremonies which, within certain bounds, the Persians have always hitherto been permitted to exhibit at the present season, in memory of their martyred Imams. This interdiction is regarded as almost equivalent to proscription of the Sheeah faith, and has called forth the most violent resentment generally amongst the Persian population.

Undoubtedly however of all the offences of which Nejib Pasha is justly chargeable, the gravest, inasmuch as they compromise the character of the Sultan's Government, alienate the affections of His Majesty's subjects and threaten to convert into a desert one of the finest provinces of the Empire, are the intolerable rigor of his financial administration, and the reckless greediness and venality with which His Excellency's officers throughout the Pashalic pursue the one sole object of raising money. I have in vain endeavoured to obtain materials for drawing up a return of what may be considered unjust and oppressive taxes. Such a task indeed is quite impracticable, for the rates and amounts are daily fluctuating according as the Collectors discover a more lucrative machinery of taxation, and any return moreover, however authentic and elaborate, would convey but a very imperfect idea of the real pressure upon the laboring classes and the consumers, as the realization of every item of revenue is in the hands of contractors, who are permitted to put in practice all conceivable means of extortion, even to the infliction of personal torture, provided, they fulfil their pecuniary obligations to the Government. The trade in corn since the last harvest has been a monopoly in the hands of the Government and the price to the consumer accordingly has been more than double that which was warranted by the abundant resources of the country. On animals, food and fruit and vegetables, the duties under a variety of denominations amount to an average of about 50 per cent. *ad valorem*, and dates which to the Arab population constitute the real necessary of life, are hardly less extravagantly taxed. All the internal trades to which the wants of the community give extension or importance, are reserved as monopolies, and farmed out to be highest bidder, among those monopolies I may instance the manufacture of soap, of spirits and of leather, the dyeing and painting of cloths, the cleaning of cotton, the storing and weighing of rice and grain, portorage, brokerage, etc. The transit duties also are enormous on hides, wool, sheep skins, gall nut, etc., the charges amount sometimes to 30 per cent. *ad valorem* before the goods reach the gates of Baghdad, and a further duty of 12 per cent. is levied on entrance into the town. New taxes too are being constantly added. Stamps are required for all public papers, whether bonds, acquaintances, agreements or even petitions. The passport fees press heavily on the poorer classes and the exorbitant charges on conveyance of property, on the realization of money, on the mere passing of contracts, deter the rich from making any use of their capital. According to the data which I have collected from various quarters and which furnish at any rate the means of approximately estimating the result of Nejib Pasha's financial operations during the last year, I find that His Excellency who was granted a farm of the Baghdad Pashalic at the assumed gross annual valuation of 60,000 purses [300,000£] has raised by ostensible means alone, above 120,000 purses [600,000£] and at the most moderate calculation for his extraordinary profits, those I mean which have accrued from his grain monopoly from his Kaziehs on the Arabs, from confiscations, fines, presents and above all from direct bribes, I should be disposed to assess the entire proceeds of his Government at not less than one million sterling and when Your Excellency considers that during the interval in question no single fresh source of legitimate revenue has been opened, that there has been no territorial acquisition; no barren lands reclaimed from the desert; no increased trade, or improved cultivation; no discovery of metallic treasure; no invention in manufactures or extension of produce; but that on the contrary every branch of agriculture, commerce, enterprise and industry has very essentially declined, you will understand that this immense sum, so entirely disproportioned to the present capabilities of the province, could not have been raised without entailing a terrible amount of individual suffering, and without calling forth a general execution of the ruling power which sanctions, if it does not encourage, such grinding tyranny.

On the particular subject of Nejib Pasha's relations to the British Consulate at Baghdad, I do not find it necessary to enter at any length. Your Excellency must be aware from my last six months' series of despatches, of the general spirit by which the Pasha is actuated. His hostility must be ascribed in its origin to his innate hatred of all Europeans, while it was no doubt called into more open activity, by finding that British privileges interfered with his pecuniary gains and that my assertion of those privileges impeded the exercise of what he would fain have considered an irresponsible power. Tardily awakening to a sense of the impolicy of having incurred so formidable a danger as might arise out of the exertion of Your Excellency's influence against him at the Porte, he is far from exhibiting at present the same disposition to invade our rights and to forget that which may be due to our honor and our interests, which he displayed during his former happy state of confidence in the complete



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Midhut Pasha appointed Vali of Baghdad, 1869.

109-A. A description of the schemes of Midhut Pasha, one of the greatest of the Valis of Baghdad is given below.

No. 7, dated 26th May 1869.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. HERBERT, Her Majesty's Officiating Political Agent and Consul-General at Baghdad,

To—HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE H. ELLIOT, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

I have the honour to report the arrival, on the 30th ultimo, of His Excellency Midhut Pasha, Governor-General of Turkish Arabia, accompanied by Shaker Beg, Lieutenant-Governor (Muteserif) of Baghdad, Raef Beg, Secretary (Maaoun), Hamdy Beg, Attaché (Mudeer) for Foreign Affairs, together with several subordinate officers of different grades.

His Excellency entered the city in state at an early hour, being met by all the principal employés of the Government and representatives from the Consulates of England and France.

On the third day after his arrival, the firman of his appointment was publicly read at the Government House (Serai), when His Excellency addressed the assembly, telling his audience that he had come hither with an earnest desire to benefit the country and enrich the people; that he proposed to introduce many changes and reforms which, he hoped, would be beneficial, changes which, perhaps, they might not at first altogether approve, but which they would appreciate when they had experienced the advantages that would accrue to them therefrom.

He commenced his career by the abolition of the following taxes, which are said to have been peculiarly local, and have proved obstructive and oppressive:—

- 1st.—Ihtisab, or octroi duty levied on all produce brought into the city gates for sale in the market.
- 2nd.—Kalibiyeh, a tax on the native craft on the rivers.
- 3rd.—Khums Hateb, a tax of 20 per cent. on fuel brought to the city on rafts and in boats.
- 4th.—Roosbukâr, the tax on irrigation wheels of the Arab cultivators. In lieu of these taxes, he has established one of 10 per cent. on the produce of gardens and fields.

His Excellency is organizing several new Councils (Mejlises), of which the members are to be paid, instead of, as heretofore, working gratuitously, with the opportunity of making what they could a source of corruption and trouble.

He has introduced the Wilayet system, and I have the honour to forward a copy (with translation) of a communication which has been addressed to the Foreign Consulates on this subject.

His Excellency has deputed an officer, Serri Effendi, to re-open an old canal called "Kenanich" from the Euphrates into the "Seglawich" canal, which falls into the Tigris, with the view to forming a channel of communication between the two great rivers, to be conducted by means of small steam vessels which it is proposed to bring from Europe for the service.

He has also deputed a steamer to proceed up the Euphrates to endeavour to arrange for the ultimate opening of the navigation of that river, with which object he proposes to remake the embankments of the Jezair territory, and so confine the water of the river to its own bed, and prevent the inundations which yearly immerse a large tract of country to the south, and reach even to the town of Bussorah.

These inundations convert the whole of that country into a tract of unhealthy and unproductive marsh, while the loss of the water from the bed of the river renders the latter unnavigable.

His Excellency's mind seems earnestly bent on various schemes for the improvement of the country.

He at once recognizes the two great wants, viz., security of property and means of communication with the world (from which the country is at present excluded), and of the transport of produce.

He contemplates the construction of a railway hence to Kerbella as a step in this direction in connection with the navigation of the Euphrates, the importation of several steamers for river and sea navigation, so as to connect the province with Suez, of machinery for cleaning the river channels, and also for various manufactures, as well as for irrigation.

I waited on His Excellency accompanied by officers attached to this Political Agency and Consulate-General, and the members of the British community on the day after his arrival and have since paid a private visit.



Translation of a letter from His Excellency Midhut Pasha, Governor-General of Turkish Arabia, to Her Britannic Majesty's Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, dated Baghdad, 5th Safer 1286, 5th Maia 1285, 17th May 1869.

As the Walayet system has been founded and enforced in all other provinces in the Turkish dominions, the Baghdad Province is likewise now reformed on the same system; consequently, the mode of administration has been altered in order to facilitate affairs that may occur. I deem it necessary to explain the mode of such administration. Baghdad Walayet is divided into nine different subordinate Governments (Muteseriflik). The Baghdad Province (Sinjak) is counted as one of these subordinate Governments (Muteseriflik). This place being assigned at head-quarters of the Walayet, therefore the separate Offices of Secretariat (Maaonlik) and Agency (Mudeerlik) for Foreign Affairs have been established for conducting the business of Government.

In transacting the important affairs of the subjects of your Government in other provinces (Sinjak), whenever anything may occur requiring settlement, it must be conducted in the same manner as is carried on here. In order to facilitate the business, it is necessary that the same should be communicated for settlement to the Lieutenant-Governor (Muteserif) on the spot; and in case the affair not being arranged on the spot, it may be referred to the head-quarters of the Walayet. In conducting business of your subjects with the Government, the affairs, or the claim, shall be represented by an official communication, as the case may require, either to the Sub-Government (Muteseriflik) or Agency (Mudeerlik) for Foreign Affairs, and, if necessary, it may be communicated directly to myself, and, in my absence, to the Secretariat (Maaonlik).

110. A brief summary of the schemes Midhut Pasha carried out is given on page 82 of the Gazetteer in Baghdad is quoted below:—

"When Midhat Pasha was Governor-General of Baghdad he did a great deal for the province. In Baghdad itself, among other institutions, he founded an industrial school, combined with an orphan asylum conducted in strictly military fashion, which is so great a desideratum in the east. To him is due the lighting up, by means of the petroleum lamps, of the bazar, of some adjoining streets, and of the bridges. He wished to establish communication with Aleppo by the Euphrates, and built forts at Ana, Rumadi, etc., to protect the road. He ordered steamers to navigate the Euphrates, but on arrival they were found to be unsuited for their work. He introduced the tramway into Baghdad, which is still running. Some of his other schemes were not so successful. One was to benefit the country by constructing a canal from the Euphrates to irrigate the surrounding country. Owing to the whole force of the water of the river rushing into the new channel, the country round Baghdad was converted into a pestilential marsh."

Dismissal of Hamdi Pasha and succession of Mohsin Pasha as Wali of Basrah, 1900.

111. The following account of the circumstances that led to the dismissal of Hamdi Pasha, who has been one of the most distinguished Pashas of Basrah, will be read with interest (Mr. Wratislaw's letter dated 24th January 1900).

"I have the honour to confirm my telegram No. 16 of the 19th instant, reporting the dismissal of Hamdi Pasha from the post of Wali of Basrah. Ever since Hamdi's reappointment in April last, the Nakib of Basrah, who is His Lordship's personal enemy and procured his dismissal before, has been working to effect his downfall. The first step the Nakib took was to send his son, Seyid Talib, to represent his interests at Constantinople. His second was to join forces with Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit, who has also reason to dislike and fear Hamdi. And the final move was to set up a rival to the Wali in the person of Mohsin Pasha, the Military Commandant here, who was no friend to Hamdi and coveted his post. I also believe Mohsin to have been bought by Mubarak.

Last September when Mubarak turned away the official sent to act as Harbour Master at Koweit, he telegraphed to the Sultan that he was ready to carry out all His Majesty's orders conveyed to him direct, but he would not recognise them when transmitted through Hamdi; and in consequence Mohsin (doubtless at Talib's suggestion) was appointed to act jointly with the Wali in all matters concerning Koweit. Ever since then, the Sultan would seem to have become more and more uneasy about affairs on the Arabian Coast, and his fears have been sedulously worked on by the Nakib's son and other supporters at Constantinople. They have assured him that Mubarak's refractory attitude is due solely to the hostility manifested him by Hamdi, and were the latter dismissed and Mohsin appointed in his stead, Mubarak would be as submissive as could be desired and would even pay a visit to Basrah to talk over matters and arrive at settlement for the future. How far Mubarak was a consenting party to these promises, I am unable to say. He probably knew they were made on his behalf, but I can hardly think he would be so foolish as to venture to come to Basrah.



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Matters seem to have been brought to a head by the arrival of the Germany Railway Commission. Mohsin informed a person, on whose statement I can rely, that while they were here he received an important telegram from Constantinople, and that his answer resulted in Hamdi's dismissal. I have been unable to learn the purport of these communications.

No other reason exists, so far as I can learn, Hamdi's downfall. He is that *rara avis*, an honest Turkish official, and though not in any way brilliant has administered his Vilayat well enough. His hot temper and arbitrary disposition however rendered him generally unpopular, and his subordinates disliked him for endeavouring to check speculation and corruption.

Mohsin is excessively elated at his promotion. At present he appears to be under the influence of Seyid Ahmed, brother of the Nakib and the clever member of the family. My personal relations with the new Wali are very friendly, but I do not consider him at all trustworthy.

112. The following memorandum by Mr. Block, dated 25th January 1900, contains some interesting details respecting the character and antecedents of Mohsin Pasha:—

"It is said that Mohsin Pasha is a distinguished mathematician, geographer and topographer. He is said to have obtained his military grades step by step by his own merits and not by favour. He appears to be little known at Constantinople where he has no protectors. He is an energetic soldier and upright official as far as I have been able to learn. He has acted as Head of the Staff in the 7th Division of the Army and withdrew from his post in consequence of a misunderstanding with the Wali and Mushir H. E Ahmed Ferzi Pasha whose system of administration in the Yemen he disapproved of.

Thereupon Mohsin Pasha at his own request was transferred to the 5th Army Corps (Baghdad) with rank of General of Division.

Subsequently the Imperial Government commissioned him to go to Basrah in order to investigate the complaints to which the conduct of the ex-Walis Arif Pasha and Emni Pasha had given rise. On this occasion, after carrying out the mission entrusted to him, he acted for a very short time as temporary Wali of Basrah.

Before his appointment as Wali, Mohsin Pasha held the post of Military Commandant at Basrah."

[S646FD]



CHAPTER III.

Arab Tribes and Tribal Feuds in Turkish Arabia.

(i) The Arab tribes of Turkish Arabia.

113. The internal history of Turkish Arabia to a great extent consists of the feuds and discussions of the numerous Arab tribes among themselves and with the Turkish local authorities. A list of the principal tribes, that play an important part in the political history of the country, is given below :—

Name of the tribe.	Location.
Kaab	On the Delta of the Karun and Euphrates mostly within Persian territory.
Montefik	Between Samawa and Busrah.
Albu-Mahomed	The marshes north of Kurna and the banks of the Tigris as far as the Hud stream.
Beni-Laam	East of the Tigris from Kut-el-Amara to the Hud river and the Mesopotamian side of the Tigris south-eastward of the Hye.
Zobeida	Between Tigris and Euphrates north of the Hai, as far as the Saklawiyeh canal to the west-north-west of Baghdad.
Shammar Togh or Tank and Deffafeh.	The plains east of the Tigris and south of Biyaleh as far southwards as Kut-el-Amara.
Shammar Jerbah	A nomadic tribe spread over northern Mesopotamia from south of the Sinjar and Khebur to the Saklawieh, west of Baghdad, even to the Hai river.
Dalaim	On the east bank of the Euphrates from west of Baghdad to the north as far as Hit.
Anaiza	From Aleppo in the north to Jabal Shammar in the south-west of the Euphrates.
Khazail	Inhabiting the marshes of Lam-lun on the Euphrates.

114. A history of the *Kaab* tribe is given in Sir H. Rawlinson's memorandum, 1844 (Appendix A) and in paragraphs 25-78 above. Their recent history pertains to Persian-Arabistan, for which reference must be made to the *Précis of Persian-Arabistan affairs*.


115. The *Montefik* tribe has been figuring very prominently among the Arab tribes in the political history of the southern part of Turkish Arabia. The principal family is descended from Maneh, one of the Sherifs of Mekka, who fled to the Euphrates to escape the consequence of a feud and rose to prominence among the tribes at the confluence of the Euphrates and Tigris.




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116. The following genealogical table of the family is prepared on conjectures based on occasional references in our records :—



117. The *Shammar Jerbah* is the most powerful of the Arab tribes in Northern Mesopotamia. They are said to have some blood connection with the Shammar tribe of Nejd, whence they were led by their Chief Faris Um Umr-ibn-Abdul Aziz into Northern Mesopotamia. The pedigree of the family of the Chief is as follows :—So far as can be made out—



118. Captain Felix Jones gives the following description of this tribe in his memoir of the province of Baghdad (1855), printed in the *Bombay Selections* No. XLIII :—

"They are the terror of the Turkish authorities and people. They live entirely in the desert tracts, or, rather, tracts where they appear to have become deserted, and, as caprice or fancied neglects on the part of the authorities seize them, they issue forth, on Ghazas or plundering excursions carrying off everything far and near, even to the gates of the cities. Unable to drive them away, the Turkish Government has consented to pay their chief a monthly salary to secure his allegiance, or, in other terms, to buy the forbearance of the tribe. This, however, serves only a purpose, and, as the chief *Farhan* says, is not sufficient to purchase coffee for his hourly recurring guests. A sort of hollow peace is, however, patched up by the contract, and comparative quiet, broken only by occasional reports of petty plunderings, exists for a time. They are useful to Government only under general rebellion of the minor Arab tribes, when they are called upon to fall on them with fire and sword, and are prompt enough generally in availing themselves of the permission. They sweep the country on these occasions. Friends and foes of authority are indiscriminately visited, and, though there is not much bloodshed, there is universal wreck. The tribes hasten to get out of their way; and so quick are Bedouin movements, that they succeed only in escaping from them with their families. Flocks, tents, household furniture, crops and kine are abandoned and fall into Bedouin hands to be driven off and sold at the lowest possible price, to any who will pay them in ready money. Plunder being their only object, they care not to pursue the proprietors or they have no real sympathy with the Government in these affairs."

119. As regards the political constitution of these tribes, we shall quote again Captain Felix Jones, a description which had been true always of the state of things among them since the Ottoman dominion was established in Mesopotamia, and has been true since he wrote :—

Felix Jones' *Memoir of the Province of Baghdad*,
Bo. Selections No. XLIII.



"To sum up generally on this head, owing to the nomad habits, I must add, they are one and all but little under the control of the Turkish Government. It is true that a sort of tacit understanding exists between them and the authorities, that, so long as the revenue at which the tribe is assessed is paid, they are to suffer no molestation. This assessment takes place annually, but much difficulty is experienced before the sum is fully paid up, the object of the Arab being to show he is really too poor, and that of the Government to obtain, if well-paid in one year, an increase of tribute in the next. Thus both parties fall out, are for the most part always at odds, if not at open war. Too weak to coerce them efficiently, the Government employs the usual weapons of the feeble, those of exciting party against party. Factions are thus raised in the tribes, the much coveted Sheikhships are sold, as it were, to the highest bidders, and a constant rivalry exists, fomented by the Government as an element to neutralize the combinations and rebellions so frequent in all ages among these singularly constituted people. It is this system, however, which has impoverished both the country and people.

On the Government of the province, and the *imperium in imperio* system pursued to weaken those who, when united, were able to set up in antagonism to authority, I have already touched. Generally speaking, the form of administration in Baghdad and in the minor towns is based on that of Constantinople, varied only to suit local usages and requirements, when these do not operate badly upon the general law, which, of course, is that of the Koran, and the interpretations which learned legislators have awarded to its less intelligible doctrines.

(ii) Brief history of the tribes from early times to 1843.

120. We have given above an account of the Kaab tribe and the disturbances they caused on the delta of the Euphrates and Karun to the inconvenience of the Turks and Persians and the British. We shall now give briefly an account of the feuds and disturbances among the several other Arab tribes.

121. In 1747 we read a letter of the Resident at Basrah mentioning a rebellion of the *Montefik* Arabs, because they thought that the Turkish Government was giving to impose too heavy a tribute on them. They went so far as to open the banks of the river, with the result that the desert was laid under water to the very walls of Basrah.

122. In 1769 we had a letter, dated 18th October 1769, from the Agent in Council at Basrah, reporting that the Turks had been for some months past engaged in a kind of mock war with the Arabs, whereby all communication with Baghdad whether by the Tigris or Euphrates had been entirely stopped. The cause of the troubles was the refusal of Sheikh Abdullah, the Chief of the Montefiks, to pay the tribute he owed for the lands he held from the Turks and for which he had been many years in arrears. One Sheikh *Fazal* was appointed Chief in place of Abdullah, but as the Agent observes, Abdullah, who was rich, would be likely to buy over the Pasha by rich presents.

123. In May 1787 Sheikh "*Stoiny*," one of the Montefik Arab Chiefs, entered Basrah with a large force, took possession of the town and the Turkish fleet, and imprisoned the Mussalim. He retained possession of the town until the Pasha of Baghdad expelled him from the place as October 1787.

123. There is in our records an interesting description written by Mr. Harford Jones in 1802 of the state the Arab tribes and other affairs in the Pashalik of Baghdad which would bear being quoted at length:—

"The fortifications of Baghdad, though almost truly contemptible in the eyes of Europeans, are nevertheless sufficient to defend it against the efforts of any eastern army; but other circumstances render it evident that were it blockaded for but a few days it must surrender. The population on both sides the Tigris does not exceed 102 M. souls, for the support of which almost every necessary article is brought from such a distance and in such a manner that the interception of these indispensable supplies would be easy to the enemy. The single article of firewood is brought from a distance of 100 to 200 miles; wheat is either brought from Coordistan or the country surrounding Mosul; rice principally from the country



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between Hillah and Samava. With an enemy before its walls, the want of forage would prevent the possibility of bringing any number of cattle into town, and those flocks which did not fall into the enemies hands, the Arabs assuredly drive to the places of security in the desert. The plague has, my Lord, at the moment I am addressing Your Excellency, carried off near 2,000 souls; we hope the approaching heat will check its present progress, but we know to a certainty that its ravage next autumn and spring will be dreadful.

"The Pacha probably at the beginning of a blockade might mount about 2,000 horse within the town. The Janissaries, undisciplined and unruly, who probably, when distressed by the inconveniences of a siege, would turn like a wounded elephant on their own party, may amount to between 6,000 and 7,000: these with five hundred ragamuffins under the names of Barata-ties, Tuffingues, &c., compose.

"In respect to Bussorah, Your Excellency no doubt has received from the Resident there more correct and detailed accounts of its present situation than I am able to give; but my own opinion is that it is as weak, defenceless, and hazardous a one as can well be imagined, besides which that unfortunate city can hardly hope to escape next year the visitation we are now suffering of the plague.

"The cities of Merden and Kerkook, which are dependencies on this Government, come so little within the prospect of this paper that is scarcely worth mentioning them, but the town of Hillah on the Euphrates is without walls, without other means of defence. I have not a doubt left on my mind if things are left to go on in their present train, but the Wahabee, during the course of the summer, will make himself master of it. The moment that event take place, Baghdad will begin to feel straitened for provisions, and the Carad Arabs, who from being Shvabs, might naturally be expected to surpass every other tribe of dependent Arabs in their willingness and steadiness to encounter the Wahabee, will have no other alternative than submission to them or extermination. I fear Your Excellency will think I err if I tell you the Government here is so besotted as not to perceive the importance of the port of Killah, but on my honor, my Lord, this is the case.

"The principal military assistance, which in case of need the Pacha can make use of, is drawn from Coordistan, the greatest part of which country is now under the Government of Baghdad. That part of it which forms a part of the Turkish Empire is divided into Pachalics, *Sang ahs* and other species of feudatory possessions. The policy by which the Pacha of Baghdad has hitherto prescribed his authority there is that of alternately elevating and deposing its Chiefs. From time immemorial there have always been two families, or two branches of the same family, with equal pretensions to each Pachalick or Sangiack, and consequently one may say there is a Pacha or Sungeah Resident, and another expectant, who always resides until this Government have occasion for him at Baghdad. Discontents and jealousies have manifested themselves to a considerable extent amongst the Chiefs of Coordistan, and although the Pacha since his departure from Baghdad has brought several of them to his camp, it is a well known fact that these persons measure their tribute and obedience according to the strength of the arm which enforces it.

"The principal tribes of Arabs dependent of this Government, and inhabiting the eastern banks of the Tigris are the *Benelarn* and *Sharmer*. The deposed Sheikh of the former has within these few days attacked the Sheikh lately appointed by the Pacha, and the country from Coole to Gissan, from Gissan to the environs of Haviza, is in an actual state of confusion. The Shumer Arabs have been on many occasions so cruelly treated by this Government that there can be no doubt of their joining the Wahabee whenever an opportunity shall offer.

"On the Euphrates and between the Euphrates and Tigris to the southward of Baghdad, the principal tribes are the *Casaets*, the *Montificks*, and the *Mydan*. The Casact Arabs possess but little territory on the western bank of the Euphrates. The tribe is numerous, the men composing it are brave and warlike. The country extends to the southward as far as Samavat and abounds in grain, herds, and flocks. They are Shyiah, and when the Persians under Sadeh Khan attacked Bussorah, these Arabs joined him and were the principal means of his success. The injuries and extortion they have lately suffered from the Baghdad Government will at all events make them cool in its defence, and if the Wahabees will receive their submission they will probably be eager to rid themselves of Turkish tyranny. The Montifick Arabs possess the country nearly from Tamaval to the walls of Bussorah, and have hitherto been the bulwark of this Government against the Wahabees; it is most interesting therefore to know what effect the Wahabees' late increase of wealth, power, and reputation, will produce on this tribe. The Government here has not certainly now the means of rendering them any



the supreme power in Persia, the Pasha of Baghdad has been obliged to manage every circumstance relative to the natives of that country with more delicacy and circumspection than was formerly manifested towards them. It is pretty generally credited that had the uncle of the present King lived much longer, he would have attacked Baghdad, and the conduct of Fath Ali Shaikh, the present King, has frequently given cause of uneasiness and apprehension to the Pasha."

124. In 1810 the *Montefik* Arabs offered to assist Selim Aga, Mussalim of Basrah, to rebel against the Pasha of Baghdad, and to make preparations for a march to Baghdad to depose the Pasha, but they soon turned against him. He then fled and was allowed to escape to Bushire.

Ibid, No. 231.

125. In 1813 Abdullah Pasha of Baghdad marched against the *Montefik* Chief, who was encamped near Basrah with a force of about 10,000 Arabs. But the Pasha was defeated, taken prisoner and put to death. The *Montefik* Chiefs then, particularly Sheik *Hamid-ul-Thamer*, gradually extended their territorial acquisitions as far as Samawa and rose to great power.

126. Daud Pasha (1817—1831) at length, resorted to a favourite device of the Turkish Government, namely, *Divide et Impera*, to create dissensions in the tribe by raising a rival Sheikh to the Chiefship. When Sheikh *Hamid* was the Chief, Daud Pasha elevated his nephew *Ajil* to the Chiefship. There commenced then fratricidal fighting amongst the two Sheikhs, which exhausted both and left the whole tribe quite weakened.

127. When orders arrived from the Porte deposing Daudh Pasha, Sheikh *Ajil* made a combination with the Kaab and the Grain Arabs and espoused Daud's cause. The Kaab and the Grain Arabs blockaded the Basrah river with their fleets and terrorized the Basrah Arabs. But Sheikh *Ajil* was very slack in his movements and the league came into nothing. Daud Pasha had to surrender, but was pardoned. Sheikh *Ajil* was also reinstated as chief of the *Montefik* by the new Pasha, but he was killed by a fall from his horse and his rival *Majid*, son of the late *Hamid*, was nominated chief in his place.

S. C. F. 21st May 1832, Nos. 3-32.

(Colonel Taylor's letter to the Bombay Government, No. 31, dated 6th October

1831, and No. 76, dated 22nd December 1831).

These events emboldened the southern Arabs in their intrigues against the Turkish control and the *Montefik* Arabs regained their former ascendancy and acquired possession of the finest lands.

128. About the year 1830, the *Jerbah Shammar* tribe became clamorous for the grant of more lands near Baghdad, and the Pasha, with a view to create dissensions in the tribe appointed as their Chief *Shulash* in place of *Suffuk*, their former Chief. *Suffuk* then began to pillage and ravage the country from Baghdad to Mosul, and became a terror to the people as well the local authorities. *Shulash* being unable to check him, the *Annaiza* tribe were called in by the Pasha to aid him on promise of ample compensation and grant of the lands of the tribe they were asked to turn out. The *Annaiza* came with a force of 30,000, but to find that *Suffuk* had retired to his haunts in the north.

129. As the assistance of the *Annaiza* was of no use to the Pasha, he wished to send them back empty handed, but they would not leave Baghdad in that condition. The Pasha then summoned the *Jerbah Shammar* tribesmen under *Shulash* to come and relieve the capital of the presence of the *Annaiza*. Both the tribes fought a fierce battle, the result of which was that the *Jerbah* tribesmen were completely defeated. The *Annaiza* since then made themselves masters of the western half of Baghdad city, and virtually held the Pashalic from the Tigris to Euphrates under their control, until they were induced to re-cross the Euphrates by heavy tribes, or satiated by their plunder.

(iii) The Arab tribal disturbances, 1843—1850.

130. There is little further of the tribal affairs of Turkish Arabia in our records until Major Rawlinson was sent as Political Agent, with the avowed



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object of averting war between Turkey and Persia on account of the tribal warfare on the undefined frontier between the two countries. The East India Company had also in view also purpose of establishing friendly relations with the tribes on the Mesopotamian rivers as well as the Turkish authorities in order to protect our commercial interests in the country (see paras. 17 *et seq.* page and para. 20, page .)

131. It happens thus that our Political Officers in those days took a lively interest in the tribal affairs, and their despatches fill several bulky volumes in our records. We have described above the state of the Arab tribes on the arrival of Major Rawlinson (paragraph). There reigned

S. C., 25th July 1849, Nos. 28-29.
25th August 1849, Nos. 25-26.
27th October 1849, Nos. 2-11.

comparative place on the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates until the year 1849, when the flames of rebellion burst,

but almost over the whole province. The events are well described in the following despatches of Major Rawlinson:—

No. 14, dated Baghdad, the 25th April 1849.

From—MAJOR H. C. RAWLINSON, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Baghdad,

To—HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE SIR STRATFORD CANNING, G.C.B., Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

The domestic troubles which have been long threatening the Baghdad Pashaic, are now assuming a form, which renders it incumbent on me, to bring them officially before your Excellency's notice.

S. C., 25th July 1849, Nos. 28-29.

lency's notice.

In Northern Kurdistan, the mountaineers have risen pretty generally against the Turkish power. A confederacy is believed to have been formed between the Tribes of Rowanduz, Khuz, Hnan, Balik, Akoo, and Bilhass, and although as yet, direct collision has only occurred in two points, at Khushuan and Rowanduz; it seems extremely probable that another regular campaign will have to be undertaken, before the mountaineers can be compelled again to submit to the Turkish Zakir-Reshid Pasha, the Kahya of Baghdad, is in the meantime being sent off express, to try and conciliate the Tribes, by remitting those Novel and excessive imposts; which have been introduced by the Turkish farmers of the districts, and which are understood to have thrown the mountains into revolt: and a military force will follow, as soon as the troops can be equipped for the field.

In another quarter, the Beni Lam, after in vain protesting at being sold by Nejib Pasha, to the rival tribe of Muntifik have taken the field in formidable numbers: and not content with ravaging the districts of Mendalli, Jestan and Badmi, have now ventured to approach within 20 or 30 miles of Baghdad, Nejib Pasha has endeavoured to meet this difficulty, by proposing to restore the Tribe to independence, and by offering to a knowledge at Sheikh, the leader whom they have placed at their head. But the Beni Lam show little appreciation for this tardy recognition of their rights; and even if they should find it expedient to accept of Nejib Pasha's terms, His Excellency will be compromised to a still more dangerous extent with the Muntifik Sheikh who has already paid 100,000 Shamies for his new acquisition, and will be by no means disposed to relinquish it at His Excellency's bidding unless the purchase money be returned to him.

Among the Arabs to the north also, a combination is believed to have taken place, which threatens even more serious consequences for Baghdad. The Shamimar Chiefs, whose power Nejib Pasha has hitherto paralyzed by placing one in opposition to the other, have become reconciled, and have agreed to direct their united efforts against the common enemy. Saidoon, the outlawed Sheikh of the Obeid, proposes also to join them with his entire tribe: and when this coalition takes place, the combined forces will have it in their power to sweep Mesopotamia to the very gates of Baghdad.

The city itself moreover has been infested for the last few weeks with armed gangs of plunderers, who parade the streets at night, and commit every species of atrocity, and it is believed that these parties have been purposely sent in from the desert to distract the attention of the Government, and prevent the detachment of troops for the suppression of the disorders in the district.

It would be unfair to attribute those troubles altogether to Najib Pasha's personal misconduct. Some allowance must be always made for the natural turbulence of the Kurds and Arabs but undoubtedly the immediate crisis has been produced by the character of His Excellency's administration which sacrifices all other objects to the one sole consideration of accumulating money.



No. 17, dated Baghdad, the 23rd May 1849.

From—MAJOR H. C. RAWLINSON, Her Britannic Majesty's Council at Baghdad,

To—His EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE SIR STRATFORD CANNING, G.C.B., Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

Since I wrote my despatch No. 14, informing Your Excellency of the troubles in Rowanduz and the revolt of the Beni Lam Arabs; disturbances of a still more serious nature, have

broken out among the tribes on the right bank of the Euphrates; and in this instance, the disorders are directly traceable to the corrupt and extortionate character of Nejjib Pasha's Government.

It appears that the lands watered by the great Hindiyyeh Canal, and the other offshoots from the right bank of the Euphrates, are alone assessed in the Registry which form the basis of Nejjib Pasha's contract with the Porte, at a sum of 3,560 purses; yet Sheikh Wadde, the Chief of the Zobad, who has formed the districts in question for the present year, has been permitted to raise from them the enormous amount of Rs. 21,000 purses; the complaints of the Inhabitant's Agricultural Arabs, who have thus found themselves suddenly reduced from State of comparative affluence to complete destitution, proving of no avail against the money bags of the farmer, who has paid into Najib Pasha's Treasury at the lowest calculation during the period in question, 10,004 purses, in excess of the sum for which credit has been given to the Porte. The intolerable severity of Sheikh Wadde's rules, and the apathy of the Government to the sufferings of those subjected to his power; produced in due course, the result that might have been expected. The Arabs of the Hindiyyeh, who, as hereditary cultivators of the soil, are perhaps the least prone to turbulence of any section of the Baghdad population, rose generally throughout the district, drove out Sheikh Wadde and his myrmidons, and in the first flush of their success, plundered the public granaries and store houses, and such other property as fell in their way.

When the news of this outbreak reached Baghdad, just after the departure of the last post to Constantinople; Nejjib Pasha, judging the case to be one of emergency, called upon the Seraskier Aldi Pasha, to proceed in person to the Hindiyyeh with a sufficient force; and to put down the insurrection at the point of the bayonet; but the Seraskier, already informed by public report, of the antecedent circumstances, which palliated, if they did not justify, the proceedings of the Arabs, refused to be a party to this unconditional re-establishment of Sheikh Wadde's power.

He sent out a considerable force to prevent any further pillage or bloodshed; but at the same time he directed the Commanding Officer to adopt conciliatory measures, to pursue a steady and impartial course of investigation into the causes of the outbreak and to await further orders before engaging in hostilities.

Nejjib Pasha in vain protested against what His Excellency was pleased to call a tampering with insurrection, throwing all the responsibility of consequences upon the Seraskier, and even threatening to denounce his conduct to the Porte. The Seraskier calmly replied, that he conceived the Arabs as subjects of the Porte to have rights not less sacred than those of Nejjib Pasha and his family; that if such rights had been flagrantly outraged, resistance became a duty which the Arabs owed to themselves, and that he was only acting in accordance with his instructions from the Porte in exercising his discretion as to the necessity of instituting an enquiry before employing military force.

A few days back the Commanding Officer's report reached Baghdad, accompanied by a detailed statement of the grievances which had forced the Arabs into rebellion, and the Seraskier, at once waited, on Nejjib Pasha, and presented the papers to him in person: His Excellency is said to have been infuriated at being thus boarded by a Subordinate Officer. He refused to hold any communication with the General on matters of Civil administration, stigmatized his conduct as in the highest degree dangerous to the stability of the Government, accused him of abetting insurrection to gratify a feeling of personal animosity, and finally called upon him once for all to take the field, and sweep down all opposition before the complaints of the insurgents were even granted a hearing to all which, however the Seraskier resolutely replied, that he should direct the Commanding Officer to act for the present entirely on the defensive, and that he should await orders from Constantinople before taking any more decided steps.

To-day I learn that after much official correspondence, and after several stormy interviews between the parties, it has been arranged that two Commissioners, one a Civil Officer, on the part of Nejjib Pasha, and the other a Military Officer on the part of the Seraskier, shall proceed to the Hindiyyeh and conjointly pursue their enquiries into the nature and origin of this serious outbreak, the re-establishment of Sheikh Wadde and the movement of the troops being made to depend upon the result of the Commission, and in the meantime I imagine that His Excellency and the Seraskier will each send their own report of the affair to Constantinople.

In concluding my report to Your Excellency on this singular collision, between the Civil and Military authority, I will only observe, that although there can be no question of the gross oppression practised by Sheikh Wadde in his administration of the Hindiyyeh, nor of the corrupt motive which influence Nejjib Pasha in striving to maintain such an individual in power, it is altogether so novel for the Arabs to find a Turkish Officer supporting them in their rights



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against the Government or indeed to learn that they have any right to depend, that I should apprehend the probability of the Siraskeirs benevolent exertions in this instance, if successful, proving fatal to Nejib Pasha's administration.

No. 19, dated Baghdad, the 6th June 1849.

From—MAJOR H. C. RAWLINSON, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Baghdad.

To—HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE SIR S. CANNING, G.C.B., Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

In continuation of my despatch No. 17. I have now the honor to report further on the progress of affairs in the Pashalic of Baghdad.

S. C., 25th August 1849, Nos. 25-26.

On the arrival at the Hindieh of the Civil and Military Commissioners sent from Baghdad, renewed attempts were made on the part of the former Officer to justify the proceedings of Sheikh Wadee and to persuade the military authorities to put down the revolt of the Arabs by force, but the instructions of Abdi Pasha, the Seraskier both to his own Commissioner, and to the Officer Commanding the troops, were so explicit against the adoption of any measures of offence, unless the Arabs committed fresh disorders, that this scheme entirely failed, and after a week's negotiation, therefore, Nejib Pasha's Officer found himself compelled, as the only means of preventing a further complication of the question, to acquiesce in the removal of the obnoxious Chief to Baghdad, and in the appointment of a popular local functionary to the temporary charge of the district. A most violent correspondence has in the meantime been carried on between Nejib Pasha and the Seraskier at Baghdad. His Excellency protesting against the interference of his Military Colleague in matters of Civil Government and threatening to hold him personally responsible for the residue of Sheikh Wadee's contract, amounting to a sum of about 5,000 purses; while Abdi Pasha has replied, that he is acting agreeably to his instructions from Head Quarters, and that he is perfectly willing to abide by the decision of the Porte on the merits of the pending question. Abdi Pasha, indeed on a late occasion, when Mons. Aristarch and many of the Chief Officers of the Baghdad Government were present did not hesitate to denounce in the strongest terms the terrible corruption and the withering tyranny of Nejib Pashas' system of administration, and to declare that if, as he was led to believe, the provinces of the empire were thus generally misgoverned, every consideration of loyalty, of justice, of humanity, of common prudence even giving way to a blind and unhallowed thirst for gold, so far from looking to the possible regeneration of the Turkish nation, or to its ever taking a place among the civilized powers of Europe, he trembled from day to day for the security of the Sultan's Throne. Such a sentiment delivered on a public occasion and coming from such an authority as the Seraskier, may give Your Excellency, an idea of the true character of Nejib Pasha's Government, as well as of the extreme danger to be apprehended from the two officers remaining associated in power at Baghdad.

The successful resistance indeed of the Arabs of the Hindieh and the notoriety of the misunderstanding between Nejib Pasha and the Seraskier are already producing their due effect generally throughout the Pashalie. The Obeid under Sheikh Saadoon, have within these few days risen "en Masse," murdered the Chief Youssouf-el-Omar, to whom they had been sold by Nejib Pasha, and after driving away the irregular troops who had been detached from Baghdad for that Chief's support, they are now reported to be plundering the whole tract of country from Sammarra and Tekrit up to the gates of Kerkook. A further altercation also has taken place between His Excellency and Abdi Pasha, as to the best means of meeting this new difficulty, Nejib Pasha insisting as usual, that the regular troops shall be employed immediately and in sufficient force against the insurgents, while the Seraskier has counselled the recognition of Sheikh Saadoon, the titular and hereditary Chief of the tribe, observing that at such a season and under circumstances of such general excitement, he cannot for the mere object of gratifying His Excellency's personal pique against that individual, or in order to secure a few thousand piastres for His Excellency's treasury, expose the Infantry and Artillery of the Sultan's Army to the intolerable hardships and the doubtful results of a campaign in the Mesopotamian desert.

With regard to the Peni Lam, I have further to report, this that have finally rejected Nejib Pasha's offers to restore them to independence, and to acknowledge Sheikh Madhkoor as their Chief on an adequate guarantee being provided for his regular payment of revenue.

An attempt was made by an officer of the Irregular Horse (the same Officer who murdered Suffook) to lure Sheikh Mudhkoor to an interview, the robe of investiture which had been brought out from Baghdad, being paraded before his emissaries, and a sealed Karan being sent to assure him of his personal safety—but the wily old chief would not venture into the Turkish Camp. He replied indeed to the Officer's invitation that "as it was contrary to etiquette for him to attend empty handed at the ceremony of his investiture, and as his late misfortunes left him penniless, he proposed to pitch his camp on the banks of the lower Tigris and await the arrival of the Bassorah fleet, after which he should probably be in a condition not only to return a suitable present for his robes of Office, but to satisfy Nejib Pasha with regard to arrears of revenue and to furnish a guarantee for the future."

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Whether Sheikh Madhkaor really intends to plunder the Bussorah fleet, or whether his threat is to be regarded as a simple message of defiance to the Government. I have no means of ascertaining, but the merchants engaged in the Bussorah trade have become seriously alarmed, and have sent down an express to detain the fleet at Ezra's tomb until they can either come to terms with the Beni Lam Chief or obtain an efficient protection against him.

It only remains for me to mention that the chief of the great tribe of the Muntifik is universally believed to be implicated in the Hindieh movement, that numerous other tribes, the Effij, the Khezzail, the Dilen and the Deffir actually furnished their quotas to the insurgents as soon as there appeared a prospect of a successful opposition—and that another considerable tribe, the Shamar Fokh on the left banks of the Tigris has just commenced an independent course of hostility to the Government, and Your Excellency will understand that the prestige of Nejib Pasha's power is gone, and that no remedial measures can be now applied with success by the Porte, which do not provide for a radical reform in the administration of the province, and do not guarantee a complete cordiality of action between the Civil and Military authorities.

No. 20, dated Baghdad, the 20th June 1849.

From—MAJOR C. H. RAWLINSON, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Baghdad,

To—His EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE SIR S. CANNING, G.C.B., Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

Shortly after the despatch of my last letter to Your Excellency's address, No. 19 of the 6th instant, the Seraskier, Abdi Pasha, becoming

S. C., 27th October 1849, No. 11.

alarmed at the pecuniary responsibility which he had incurred, or which it was pretended he had incurred, by his assumption of quasi-independent powers, resolved to proceed to the Hindieh in order to endeavour, by personal communication with the Arab Chiefs, and by a series of conciliatory measures, to prevent any further complication of the pending question, or defalcation taking place in the legitimate revenues of the State.

Nejib Pasha of course sought to throw every possible difficulty in the way of the General, and even sent emissaries amongst the tribes, repudiating by anticipation all the arrangements which might be made; yet I am happy to say that, up to the present time the Seraskier's measures have been eminently successful, and that there is now a fair prospect of tranquillity being maintained, for a sufficient interval to admit of the whole question being examined by the Central Government, and of the necessary steps being taken for a reconstruction of the administrative power, several of the chief who were previously in revolt attended at once to the invitation of the Seraskier, professing the utmost loyalty, and even devotion, to the Sultan and declaring that they had taken up arms, as the only means left of protecting themselves, against the tyranny of Nejib Pasha, and his Minion Sheikh Wadee. These parties, which included the Chiefs of the Effij and Khezzail tribes, and the local Sheikhs of the Hindieh, received accordingly their robes of investiture from the Seraskier and entered into sureties, for the payment of revenue, considerably above the amounts which were entered against them in the Government Registers, but of course far under the assessment demanded by Sheikh Wadee. It is further said that the Seraskier's manifesto, of which a copy will of course be sent to Porte, has been received with thankfulness generally, amongst the Arab tribes, and that the insurgent Chiefs of the Beni Lam, of the Shammar Tokh, of the Obeid, and even of the outlying tribes of the desert, are all preparing to visit the Camp near Babylon, and to place themselves under the exclusive direction of the military authorities whether at the same time the Seraskier will prove himself competent, in the sequel to control. And, guide the vast power which has put, in motion I think extremely doubtful divided authority amongst such a population, as that of the Baghdad Pashalic must be ever pregnant with danger, and the interposition of the Porte becomes thus daily of a more urgent necessity.

Nejib Pasha, I understand, is prepared to risk his case at Constantinople, exclusively on its pecuniary merits, he proposes to show in the first place that he disburses the entire proceeds of the Pashalic, in paying off instalments of his contract, in providing for the public expenses of his Government, and in supplying gratuities to the Ministers of Porte, and in order thus to bring to an approximate equality the two heads of expenditure and receipt, he is assiduously employed in a systematic falsification of his accounts, diminishing the receipt by obliging the Farmers and Monopolists to take back their original contracts, and furnish new papers for reduced liabilities, while he augment the expenditure by every conceivable fictitious charge, supported by fabricated vouchers. The real point for the consideration of the Porte, which is, that this once flourishing Pashalic has been ruined by seven years of the most rapacious rule. His Excellency affects to ignore or at any rate he maintains that that question personally concern him for if the Porte will have money, the money must be raised from the country.

This unfortunate collision between the Civil and Military powers, besides deranging the whole machine of domestic Government has, I regret to say, in particular points led to a state of affairs which may not improbably occasion renewed differences with Persia. The tribes of the frontier have availed themselves, as was to be expected, of the preoccupation of the executive, to recommence their old system of pillage and the Military Chiefs state that



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with the Arabs everywhere in arms, they cannot detach troops to control the Kurds. At Kerbela moreover, a state of feeling is being generated; of which the danger cannot be exaggerated, the troops of the garrison whose discipline has become much relaxed, whilst the attention of the superior officers has been taken up with their struggle against the civil power, have been lately committing gross disorders and when the Persian inhabitants have complained to Nejjib Pasha of the violence to which they have been subjected, and of the outrages, their faith has received at the hands of the Turkish soldier, His Excellency has plainly told them, that he has no control over the army, but that it rests with the Persians themselves, to protect their own rights, and interests. His Excellency has further taken the extreme steps of ordering the Civil Governor to repair to Baghdad, asserting that he will no longer submit to responsibility when the means are denied him, of carrying his measures into execution and a most critical position is thus likely to supervene the inhabitants binding themselves together in self-defence, and the garrison, in apprehension of a rising, adopting, it is to be feared a repressive system of still greater stringency.

That, Nejjib Pasha, if not actually instigating an outbreak, would willingly see a collision which could not fail to throw discredit on the army. I can have no doubt whatever, and I question if the Seraskier, involved as he is now is the meshes of financial management and in negotiation with the Arab tribes, will have either leisure to attend to the delicate question of Kerbela, or skill to pacify the irritated Persians while he disabuses the garrison of their sense of danger Mr. Aristarchi, at my suggestion, has forcibly pointed out to Nejjib Pasha the impropriety with reference to the relations with Persia of removing the Civil Governor of Kerbela, and has warned him that whatever may be the consequence, he alone will be assuredly held responsible but His Excellency feeling himself to be now engaged in a contest which must terminate either in his ruin or in a complete triumph over his military opponents, is not disposed to attach the same importance to the affair of Kerbela, viewed as a mere question of foreign policy and is altogether disinclined to sacrifice to such a consideration, the opportunity of striking an effective blow against the adversary who has risen up against him.

Inclosure No. 2.

No. 21, dated Baghdad, the 4th July 1849.

From—MAJOR H. C. RAWLINSON, His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Baghdad,

To—His Excellency the Right Honourable S. CANNING, G.C.B., Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have the honor to furnish Your Excellency with a brief report of the progress of affairs at Baghdad since the date of my last despatch.

S. C., 27th October 1849, No. 11.

The Seraskier having concluded a definitive arrangement with the Sheikhs of the Hindieh whereby the revenues of the lands in their possession when fixed at 2,000 purses in excels of the Registry assessment and having placed the general affairs of the districts and its dependencies, including Kerbela, on a footing of comparative security returned last week to Baghdad. On his arrival he duly reported his proceedings to Nejjib Pasha, and naturally took some credit to himself for having not only terminated without bloodshed a movement which threatened at one time the most serious consequences, but for having also augmented very considerably the legitimate proceeds of the Government, but he found to his surprise, that his services were by no means appreciated by the Civil Governor. The written engagements of the Sheikhs of the Hindieh to furnish 2,000 purses of surplus revenue, were regarded by Nejjib Pasha as so much waste paper notwithstanding that the Seraskier offered his personal guarantee for the realization of the amount and His Excellency again insisted either that Sheikh Wadec should be restored to a position of irresponsible power and should receive the full support of the military authorities in coercing the insurgent tribes or that the Seraskier should accept a liability for all defalcations of revenue that might possibly arise from the Arab outbreak and which His Excellency roundly calculated at from 15,000 to 20,000 purses.

The Seraskier finding His Excellency to be thus impracticable in personal intercourse and knowing that the whole question between them must sooner or later be submitted under authority to a rigid scrutiny, then resumed his official correspondence. He stated in writing the various arrangements he had made, the grounds upon which those arrangements rested, the results that might be expected to ensue from them and the subsidiary measures which were necessary to complete his plan of pacification and he concluded by inviting Nejjib Pasha to lay aside all personal animosity and to cooperate with him cordially for the advancement of the interests of their common sovereign.

I shall not pretend to follow the details of the correspondence which has since passed and between these high functionaries and which is said to have been characterized as much by extraordinary pretention and violence upon one side as by moderation and good sense upon the other, nor do I think it necessary to describe a scene which occurred at the Palace upon Sunday when the Seraskier accompanied by Dervish Pasha in the capacity of mediator, again visited the Governor and when the intemperate language and demeanour of the latter obliged the military officers to retire abruptly without even entering upon the business which they intended to discuss, but I may mention that the Seraskier has at length so far carried his point as to have obtained a peremptory summons for Sheikh Wadec who has hitherto on one



pretence or another remained in retirement amongst his tribes men, to repair to Baghdad in order that his previous conduct as Governor of the Hindieh may be submitted to a strict enquiry in presence of the Civil and Military Chiefs, and that the exceptional circumstances which induced the Seraskier to adopt an independent line of action may be thus brought forward and recorded in an open Court. It is also necessary to inform your Excellency that upon Dervish Pasha's arrival Nejib Pasha spared no pains to enlist him as a partisan upon his side, but that the Commissioner found His Excellency's cause to be so thoroughly bad, the corrupt motives which have alone dictated a support of Sheikh Wadde being patent to the most careless observation, that he at once adopted the other party and it is hardly to be doubted but that report which he is now sending to comple upon the subject will be as incriminating to Nejib Pasha, as it will be entitled to the respect of the Porte from the known probity and the enlightened character of the writer.

I regret to have to report to Your Excellency in conclusion, that the apprehensions which I entertained from the commencement of the Arabs being emboldened by their successful resistance against Sheikh Wadde to commit further disorders have been partly realized. In the district of the Hindieh where the Seraskier was brought into personal communication with the local Sheikhs, and in Kirbala even whether he despatched a Confidential Officer to supply the place of the Governor summarily withdrawn by Nijib Pasha the public peace has not been disturbed; but at more remote points where there has been no immediate check on the evil passions of the tribes, it would have been absurd to expect the same moderation. The Effij are thus reported to have attacked the fort of Dhukara, held by a party of Sheikh Wadde's men and having taken the place to have put the whole garrison to the sword. Sheikh Madhkond again of the Beni Lam still holds the Tigris and has put an entire stop to the communication between Baghdad and Bussorah, while the Obeid and the Shammar Tagh continue to send out plundering expeditions into the districts contiguous to their seats.

Nijib Pasha attributes all these disorders to the arrangement which the machine of Government has sustained from the factious opposition of the military, while the Seraskier accepts responsibility alone for the district of the Hindieh, which he has personally visited, and traces the general disturbance to the incapacity of Nijib Pasha's Officer. The views of both parties may very possibly be to a certain extent just, but recrimination of course yields no practical remedy and I continue therefore to augur ill to the country from the persecution of this miserable quarrel.

132. The despatches of 1850 from the Agent at Baghdad are full with melancholy accounts of the anarchy that reigned in and round about Baghdad in consequence of the Jerbah Shammar tribe having been invited by Abdi Pasha to take the place of regular troops, who had been to led against a Kurdish Chief that had rebelled against the Turkish Government. In order to subsist themselves, their families and flocks, they were allowed to have recourse to the grain stored in the villages. This was followed by pillaging of the villages and fearful excesses of the tribe everywhere. The defenceless people fled away in terror from their homes and the country along the Tigris, even as far down as Kut-el Amara was turned into a desert. The routes and the river became insecure trade of the country was at a deadlock and the British commerce suffered considerably.

133. In the southern districts near Basrah there existed at this time also complete disorder and anarchy on account of feuds between the Montefeik Chief Faris Ibn Ajil and his cousin Mansur Rashid. The latter appears to have been supported by Turkish local authorities. Trade on account of these dissensions came to a standstill.

134. Ultimately Mansur was appointed by the Pasha Chief of the Montefeiks and received the customary flag and firman. But scarcely had he established himself on the masnad, when he was surprised by his rival Faris with a large force and driven into the Kaab district. The authorities again recognized Ajil as the Chief of the Montefeiks. Many other tribes along the Euphrates also revolted at this time, the Annaiza, Daman and Khazail, and anarchy and confusion reigned supreme everywhere.

(iv) Arab tribal disturbances. Insurrections at Najaf, 1852-54.

135. The following despatch (No. 14, dated 21st July 1852), from Sir A. Rawlinson to the British Embassy throws much light into the state of the country at this time and the misgovernment the Porte:—



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There is probably no province in the Turkish Empire which might be governed with more ease and at a less expense than the large Pashalic of Baghdad. There is certainly no province which affords greater facilities for the development of industry and the extension of trade. On the one hand the Arab tribes of Mesopotamia are naturally unwarlike. Great provocation can alone rouse them into hostility, while sustained misgovernment can alone render that hostility formidable. On the other hand if any moderate degree of security existed the country is so rich, the influx of visitors is so great the means of transport afforded by those magnificent rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, are so ample and so excellent that commerce must flourish and peace and happiness must follow in its train.

Yet with all these advantages the Pashalic of Irak is now almost a desert. It has been the misfortune of the country for the last 9 years to be subjected to all possible abuses of Government. The rapacity and corruption of Nejib Pasha held the province in farm for about 6 years, not only arrested all progress, but actually forced trade backwards, and led to general impoverishment and in some cases to the depopulation of districts. The utter incompetence of his two successors brought the authority of the Government into contempt and the headstrong violence of the present Chief seeking with insufficient means to re-establish absolute power, has put the finishing stroke to the calamities of the country. Namik Pasha inaugurated his government by acts of severity which were totally uncalled for, he then goaded the tribe chiefs one by one into a hostile confederation against the Government; and he has since by exhibiting sometimes military weakness; by countenancing at other times measures of perfidy and scenes of cruelty, which it would be shocking to relate, and by maintaining throughout a violence of language and haughtiness of demeanour which to the Bedouins of the desert are of all things the most insupportable. So completely excited and exasperated the Arab population of the province that it would require perhaps a force of 50,000 men to put down opposition and restore general tranquillity.

If Namik Pasha had exhibited but ordinary prudence, when in a recent occasion as reported in my last despatch disunion broke out in the ranks of the insurgents, there would have been a fair chance of an honourable termination of his difficulties several indeed of the most influential of the Arab Chiefs withdrew from the field and sent into Baghdad for terms, and if these parties had been conciliated, the submission of the others would in all probability have followed. To one and all however the same imperious answer was returned, that it was beneath the dignity of the Sultan's representative to treat with rebels they were required to surrender unconditionally, to appear in person at Baghdad and to sue for pardon their cases would be then considered. This of course was considered by the Chiefs as equivalent to condemning them to imprisonment or transportation, and, accordingly, as their power was in reality undiminished, they laid aside their differences and met once more to resist the common enemy since then matters have been daily growing worse. The outlying detachments of the Turkish troops have been cut up or driven in the larger bodies of troops are beleaguered in their camps. Caravans have been plundered almost within sight of the walls of Baghdad, and as large bodies of horse, ten or twelve thousand strong, are now moving up from various quarters, there is an imminent prospect of the city being invested, in so far at least as such an operation can be carried out by mere parties of irregular cavalry under such circumstances trade of course is annihilated, and the British Mercantile houses established at Baghdad threatened with severe loss have appealed to me for assistance. But the only assistance I can render them is thus briefly to bring their case under your Lordship's notice and to suggest that, although the Ottoman Government may view with no great anxiety the disorganization of this Pashalic, considered merely as involving loss of revenue and waste of life or even as inflicting discredit on the Porte in the eyes of the neighbouring state of Persia, still they could hardly manifest the same indifference to Namik Pasha's misgovernment; if Your Lordship were to authorize a remonstrance from Colonel Rose on the ground of direct injury to British interest.

133. The tyrannical rule of the Turkish Pashas soon drove the tribes again to rebellion. Major Rawlinson describes in his despatches* quoted below how the whole province was ablaze with insurrections movements and how the conflicting military and civil authorities were at a loss to put them down:—

*Bombay, Volume 32 of 1832.

No. 25, dated Baghdad, the 27th July 1852.

From—MAJOR H. RAWLINSON, Her Majesty's British Consul-General, Baghdad,

To—COLONEL HUGH ROSE, C.B., His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Constantinople.

Affairs in this Pashalic are again plunged into a state of most complete disorder. Wadee Beg convinced, as far as he is personally concerned, that Namik Pasha is inexorable to all supplication and inaccessible to the mediation of others has within the last ten days, resumed the offensive, hoping, as it would seem towering from His Excellency's necessities, that which is unattainable by any other means. The combined forces of the Khezail Maadan and Anizen Arabs are now beleaguering the camp of Reshid Pasha at Diwanieh avoiding actual collision with the troops but interrupting their communications, destroying their supplies, cutting off stragglers and keeping the soldiers almost continually under arms, while Wadee Beg in person has moved up with a very large body of horse and after ravaging the Government lands and

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villagers on his line of march has established himself at Musail on the Euphrates within a couple of easy marches of Baghdad. From this point he is in immediate communication on his left flank with the Dilem and Anizeh, who are in undisputed possession of all the districts to the westward, as far up the Euphrates as the town of Annah, while his right flank threatens Hillah and not only blockades the roads conducting to Kerbela and Najef but also completely isolates the field force at Diwanich Detachments of horse from Wadec Beg's Head Quarters or from the Camps of the Dilem and Anizeh, are at the same time securing the country up to the gates of Baghdad, driving off camels, plundering caravans, clearing out and burning the villages in the suburbs, and committing every species of havoc and disorder.

Perhaps the most serious element of danger however is the spirit of discontent which is beginning to manifest itself in the army. The members of the military council have from the commencement of the present troubles protested against the impolicy of attempting with such inadequate means to coerce the entire Arab population of the province and the Senior Officer of the Baghdad Army Shakir Pasha, has been suspended by Namik Pasha from his functions for some time past owing to the freedom with which he expressed his opinions on this subject lately too several Colonels both of Infantry and Cavalry, have declined to undertake duties which Namik Pasha has proposed to them, and I am assured that the soldiers are now beginning to murmur at the privations and fatigues to which they are unceasingly exposed for no intelligible object, and without any prospect of termination.

To these murmurs indeed it is I think to be attributed that within the last few days Namik Pasha has for the first time condescended to have recourse to conciliation, in order to weaken the combination against him—he is now, I am informed sending out some of the "ulema" to make terms with the Dilem and to endeavour to buy off the Anizeh but he still remains as implacable as ever against Wadec Beg, and the influence of that Chief is so great at present over the numerous tribes which have ranged themselves under his banner that I can hardly augur favorably for a negotiation from which he is excluded and which is moreover tardy, ungracious, and almost compulsory.

In such a state of affairs Your Excellency will not be surprised to learn that the British merchants of Baghdad have thought it necessary to address to me a letter complaining of the severe losses to which they are exposed, nor that I have considered it my duty to transmit their complaint to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the hope that His Lordship may authorize a remonstrance at Constantinople against Namik Pasha's sustained misgovernment on the ground of direct injury to British Commercial interests.

A copy of my letter to Lord Malmesbury transmitting and explaining the complaint of the merchants forms enclosure to this despatch and as every day adds to the difficulties of our position, I beg respectfully to recommend the same to Your Excellency's consideration in the event of an opportunity offering for bringing the matter to the notice of the Porte in anticipation of instructions from Downing Street.

I have only to state in conclusion that at any other time on receiving the complaint of the merchants, I should have considered it my duty to despatch our war steamer to Bussorah to escort the boats laden with British cargo up the river, but at the present season the trip could not be undertaken without entailing a very severe loss of life among the European crew, owing to the intolerable heat and the pestilential climate of the lower river; while the steamer also is, I regret to say, owing to damaged boilers in such a state, that she could not be prudently sent on any service, where she might be required to come into action with the Arabs. A new steamer of war has been lying in the Bombay Docks for many months past, filled out expressly for the relief of the present crippled vessel, but the exigencies of the Burmese War have hitherto prevented the Bombay authorities from despatching a steam Private to the Persian Gulf in charge of the river Craft, and I thus hardly expect to be independent of Turkish assistance in protecting British Commerce in these parts before the end of the current year.

We the undersigned British merchants of Baghdad, have the honour to bring to your notice the very serious impediment to the prosecution of our business in these parts which have existed for many months and continue to the present time, owing to the extremely insecure state of the country which has almost entirely suspended the Trade of Pashalic.

We have each a large boat containing our respective goods laden at Bussorah for Baghdad from the British vessels 'Brilliant' and 'Fortitude' in the month of March last, which have since then, together with a number of other boats been detained, the Nakodas and Trackers being afraid to come on in consequence of the deplorably unsettled state of tribes on the river, and from the same reason, the communication between this and Bussorah being almost cut off, we are ourselves still without any certain intelligence as to whether or not they have as yet commenced their passage.

We would beg to call your attention to the actual loss. We necessarily sustain by this detention of our property, also to the very imminent danger there is, of the coast being plundered by Arabs, if they should now be on their way up the Tigris, and we make this joint representation, in the hopes that you will kindly take such steps as you may consider likely to have a tendency to bring this state of things to a termination.



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No. 26, dated Baghdad, the 11th August 1852.

From—MAJOR B. RAWLINSON, Her Majesty's British Consul-General, Baghdad,
To—COLONEL HUGH ROSE, C.B., Her Majesty's Chargé d' Affaires, Constantinople.

The accompanying copy of a despatch which I recently addressed to the Foreign Office will acquaint you with another very serious affair in which Namik Pasha has engaged with his characteristic rashness, and which threatens to bring still further discredit upon his Government. The officer Salim Pasha who was sent out to the Euphrates to concentrate troops from Hallah, Dagrah and Divaniyeh, and to lead the expedition against Nejef, has found himself unable hitherto to act upon the aggressive and has been compelled in consequence to employ the powerful influence of the Sheea "Uluma" with a view to persuade the insurgents, who are Shamerta Arabs, to surrender their Chiefs and evacuate the Holy City. As yet I am informed the Shamerta have shown no disposition to listen to pacific counsels, for they look with contempt upon the Turkish troops and are well aware that while Wadee Beg and the Anizeh hold the open country, no military impression can be made on their position. It appears indeed that the plain of defence adopted systematically by this tribe is one, which would try the metal of the best soldiers in the world. They place no reliance on the walls of the town, but intrench themselves within in the strongest and most populous quarter throwing up barricades a cross all the streets, connecting the houses by mines and galleries, loopholding the walls and occupying every commanding point with their match-lock men who are admirably armed, and are the most expert marks-men in this part of Asia. Salim Pasha's difficulties, if he thus attempted to expel the Shamerta by force, would be of the same nature as those which met Cavaignac in the Fanbourg St. Antoine, while his chance of success would be infinitely less, inasmuch as the narrow streets and high walled Courts or an Oriental City afford greater shelter to the defenders and the Turkish soldier, brave even to dying in the open field quails before a hidden enemy.

If the Turkish authorities, would condescend to employ the services of the Zigoort Arabs, a tribe who formerly shared with the Shamerta, the occupation of Nejef, but who were driven out by their rivals some years ago, there would be a fair chance of a successful issue to the enterprise, but although this course has been suggested and even strongly recommended, I doubt if Namik Pasha's pride be yet sufficiently humbled to have recourse to allies, whom he would consider contemptible and untrustworthy.

In the meantime Wadee Beg and the Anizeh have moved somewhat nearer to Baghdad, so as to have complete command of the roads which had from Baghdad to the Euphrates, while at the same time they keep up communication with Kerbela and Nejef upon one flank and with the Dilem upon the other. In the negotiations with the latter tribe, which Namik Pasha reluctantly consented to open little or no progress seems to have been yet made. To Civil Messages they have returned Civil answers; they are willing to receive robes of investiture for the Sheiks, who were recently denounced as rebels, but they have a decided objection to the payment of revenue and will not consent that any Turkish Officer should reside amongst them. Parties of Dilem horse continue moreover to scour the country around Baghdad and a day rarely passes without intelligence being brought in of plundering and burning and not unfrequently of bloodshed and even massacre.

The insecurity indeed of life and property throughout this Pashalic has become so notorious that the Persian Government has now issued a general notice, prohibiting the subjects of the Shah from crossing the Baghdad frontier, and measures have been taken in consequence by the Provincial Governor's to detain forcibly the various parties who were proceeding westward to join the great caravan which assembled at this season for the pilgrimage to Mecca. If this order which circumstances sufficiently justify, should be rigidly carried out and should remain in force for any considerable time, it will be a still more serious blow to Baghdad than even Turkish misgovernment on Arab devastation. Trade has languished of course ever since the commencement of the present troubles but the shops and bazars of the town have at any rate been kept open by the requirements of the Persians, who cannot be restrained by danger or disaster from pushing their way to the holy cities of Kerbela and Nejef. In ordinary times the annual influx of visitors from Persia is estimated at 30,000 even during the last year the pilgrims who passed through Baghdad must have amounted to half that number, and ten pounds may be reckoned as the average sum disbursed by each individual in the Turkish territory. If the demand then, which these visitors occasion, should be suddenly and entirely cut off, three-fourths of the shops would be closed and the merchants who furnished the retail traders, would be plunged into ruin. I merely mention this circumstance as an additional evidence of the evils of Namik Pasha's Government.

P.S.—Since writing the above despatch intelligence has reached me from Nejef of more favorable nature than I had expected.

It appears that the Sheeah Priesthood apprehending in case of actual collision the desecration and perhaps the plunders of the Shrine of Ali, and anxious moreover on the broad ground of humanity, to prevent the effusion of blood, have labored unceasingly, since their mediation was invited by Salim Pasha to effect an accommodation between the Shamirta Arabs and the Government and I am further informed that their efforts have been so far successful that the chief of the insurgents has now offered to evacuate the town of Nejef, and to remove to Hillah, provided that personal security be guaranteed to him, and that he and his followers be permitted to carry their arms and property with them in their migration.



Salim Pasha also has strongly recommended that these terms should be granted, pointing out indeed the hopelessness of any other favourable termination to the enterprise and there is thus reason to expect that Namik Pasha will allow for once his discretion to control his violence and will adopt the counsels of his deputy.

H. C. RAWLINSON,

Her Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad.

No. 15, dated Baghdad, the 2nd August 1852.

From—MAJOR H. C. RAWLINSON, Her Majesty's British Consul-General at Baghdad,

To—THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE EARL OF MALMESBURY, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, etc., etc., etc., London.

I am sorry to have to inform Your Lordship that the flames of revolt have now spread to the town of Nejef, which contains the tomb of the Imam Ali, and which is thus accounted one of the most holy places of the Mohammedan world. As the town in question is crowded with Persian refugees and Indian pensioners, the Turkish Authorities pretend to look with some suspicion on the outbreak, but I am satisfied that the rising is in reality quite independent of foreign influence or money. An Arab Chief, of some local notoriety who was very harshly treated by Namik Pasha in the spring, has judged the present moment to be favorable for reasserting his power. In concert accordingly with Wadec Beg and the other chiefs who are in the field against the Turks, he has assembled his followers and taken possession of Nejef, overawing the Persian and Indian Residents and declaring his independence.

Namik Pasha now professes, I understand, to make terms with Wadec Beg, and to turn his whole attention to the recovery of Nejef. He has indeed requested me to warn all British subjects to quit the place, as he is determined to employ the united forces of the Pashalic in its reduction, and if the town should be taken by assault he cannot be responsible for the lives and property of the town's people. Unless His Excellency's preliminary measures of pacification should be successful and he should thus be relieved of the enemies who swarm around Baghdad and cut off all communication with the Euphrates I know it to be quite impossible that he can recover or even menace Nejef but in the meantime I have considered it my duty to send out a Confidential Agent to look after the interests of our Indian subjects and in the event of there being any imminent prospect of hostilities, to recommend them to retire to Kerbela.

Your Lordship will remember that the Indian Government as reported in my despatch No. 2 of the 2nd February last pays a sum of £5,000 annually in virtue of its agreement with the late King of Oude, for the maintenance of the Shrine of Nejef, and the charities connected therewith; and you will understand that this payment has drawn a vast concourse of devotees from India to reside in the town. Their presence furnishes me with an additional motive for wishing to prevent a recurrence of that scene of carnage which took place at the Sack of Kerbela 10 years ago and I shall thus lose no opportunity that may occur for mediation as the affair proceeds; but I do not consider myself justified by our accidental connexion with Nejef in offering any direct opposition to Namik Pasha's attempt to vindicate the Imperial Authority and I trust accordingly Your Lordship will approve in the event of extremities, of my restricting my interference to the retirement of British subjects from the town and to my adopting such measures as may be practicable for removing them to a place of safety.

No. 16, dated Baghdad, the 20th August 1852.

From—MAJOR H. C. RAWLINSON, Her Majesty's British Consul-General at Baghdad,

To—THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE EARL OF MALMESBURY, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Office, London.

I have now to report for Your Lordship's information the sequel of the affair at Nejef.

Namik Pasha's first care was to lull the tribes around Baghdad into temporary inactivity by a pretended acquiescence in all their demands. The officer selected by him to conduct the operations against Nejef was thus enabled to cross the Euphrates without molestation, and even to assemble a select body of men in the vicinity of the revolted town, but the necessity of making head against the Arabs at so many other points prevented the concentration of troops in sufficient force to invest the place. The interference accordingly of the Sheeah Priesthood was solicited by the officer in command and the most honorable terms were offered to the rebel chief and his associates if they would evacuate the town. I did not myself of course enter into any communication with the Arabs, but I had previously urged the Chief Priest by letter to mediate if any opportunity offered, and it was as much I believe in consequence of this appeal, as from his own desire to prevent the effusion of blood, and the military licence and desecration which would have followed if the place had been taken by assault, that he came forward at the imitation of the Turkish Officer, and by his holy character persuaded the rebel chief to accept terms of accommodation.



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A few days ago at any rate the confidential Agent whom I had sent to Nejef to look after interests of the British Indian Residents returned with letters from the Chief Priest, stating that every thing had been arranged without blood shed; that the rebel chief and his immediate followers had retired to Hillah where they were assured an honorable treatment, and that the Indian Residents who had been prepared to remove to Kerbella if hostilities had supervened were accordingly still remaining in the place thankful for the warning and assistance which had been given them.

Of the termination of the affair I am only informed at present through Turkish Channels and I cannot therefore place much dependence on the accounts. Namik Pasha, however, stated to me in a recent visit which I paid to him, that on the day following the departure of my Agent, the Turkish Officer who had conducted the previous negotiations had judged it necessary to arrest other parties in Nejef who had not withdrawn with the chief, that the followers of these parties attempted a rescue; that the townspeople then rose; that street fighting was maintained for 24 hours with considerable loss on either side; that there was of course a good deal of pillage and destruction of property; but that ultimately the Arab combatants were driven out of the place, and that the authorities were now employed in restoring order and returning to their proper owners the effects which had been plundered. This may be doubtless a correct version of the story but I am rather disposed to think that the whole matter was prearranged, that the chiefs were previously enticed away, and that the towns people, when off their guard and relying on the capitulation were surprised by the Turkish troops and put to the sword. If any great excesses had been committed and British property had suffered to any serious extent I should doubtless have already heard from the Chief Priest on the subject; his silence leads me to hope that the Indians have escaped without much injury and that it may not therefore be necessary to complain of what looks, however, very much like a systematic case of deception and bad faith.

137. In 1854 there was a fresh insurrection in Najaf, the events of which are detailed below:—

S. C., 26th May 1854, No. 46.

No. 3, dated Baghdad, the 25th January 1854.

From—MAJOR H. RAWLINSON, Her Majesty's British Consul-General at Baghdad,

To—The RIGHT HON'BLE VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE, G.C.B., Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

Consequent on the withdrawal of the regular garrisons from the Euphrates, there has been another "emeute" at Nejef similar to that which occurred under the Government of Namik Pasha.

The Chiefs of the Shemort and Zegoort Arabs, who have been located from time immemorial in the town, and were only displaced and dispersed by the active measures Namik Pasha adopted against them, recently took advantage of the withdrawal of all the regular troops to Baghdad, to assemble their followers to the number of 2,000 men and to effect a forcible entry into the place. They met with little or no opposition and being now firmly established in the town they are prepared to set the Turkish authorities at defiance.

Reshid Pasha has already sent out one of the most influential of the Baghdad Ulema to treat with the Arabs, and to endeavour to persuade them to withdraw without provoking a contest with the Turkish troops, but His Excellency foreseeing a probability that this Mission may be unsuccessful, has also marched a pretty strong detachment of troops to Killah, and has further arranged with the officer in Command at Denaneya that in the event of the Arabs maintaining their position, a combined movement should be directed from those two points against the city with a view of dislodging them and driving them again into the desert.

No. 8, dated Baghdad, 5th April 1854.

From—MAJOR H. C. RAWLINSON, Her Majesty's British Consul-General at Baghdad,

To—The RIGHT HON'BLE VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE, G.C.B., Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

In continuation of my despatch No. 6, which announced that Reshid Pasha, during his sojourn at Hillah, would probably take in hand the affairs of the neighbouring town of Nejef,

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where the unruly tribes of Shemort and Zegoort had recently again established themselves in defiance of the authority of the Government. I have now the honour to report that a collision took place about a week ago, between the Arabs in question and the Turkish garrison of Nejef, and that after two days' fighting the obnoxious tribes have been again expelled from the place. The Turkish loss is, I believe, limited to 4 killed and about 20 wounded, but the Arabs have suffered much more severely and several unoffending citizens have also perished in the tumult. During the contest there was of course some violence offered by both parties to the property of the townspeople, but I am assured by the individual who officiates as British Agent at Nejef, that after the expulsion of the Arabs, all articles

[S3-6FD]



of plunder which could be identified by their Indian and Persian owners were at once restored to them by the Turkish Officers. In fact I have neither received complaints myself in the score of plunder from any Indian resident of Nejed nor do I hear that any such complaints have been addressed by the Persian residents to their protecting authority.

Reshid Pasha is still absent from the city but is expected to return in the course of the current week.

(v) Major Rawlinson's policy in regard to Arab tribes; how thwarted by British Merchants—1852.

138. The following despatch of Colonel Rawlinson (No. 26, dated 21st August 1852), discloses the policy followed by him and how the British merchants thwarted his schemes :—

The British merchants of Baghdad having raised the question of their right, to require the intervention of the Hon'ble East India Company's armed steamer upon the Tigris for the protection of their mercantile interests, now suffering much from the disorganization of the country and the inability of the Turkish Government to afford redress, I am constrained to bring the subject under the consideration of the Most Noble the Governor-General of India in Council, with reference to our general policy in this part of Asia.

2. The British Government has undoubtedly at present, owing to the efficient establishment which she has kept up for the last 60 years in Turkish Arabia, a paramount local influence, and there are two European eventualities, not perhaps imminent, but certainly to be looked for in due course of time, which may render that influence of great importance to India. One of these eventualities is the resumption of those schemes of ambition and aggrandizement which would probably inaugurate the reign of a new Russian Emperor; the other is the dismemberment of Turkey, which in the present sinking condition of the Empire would be the almost certain consequence of a European war.

3. I have thus considered it my duty, since my nomination to the Political Agency of Turkish Arabia, to adopt a general conciliatory conduct, and to strengthen and extend our local influence, as far as that end may be attainable without giving umbrage to the Turkish authorities. In the prosecution of these objects too my hands have been greatly strengthened by the presence of the Hon'ble Co.'s armed steamer upon the river, and by the success of her Commander in cultivating friendly relations with the Arab tribes, although in times of anarchy, such as have prevailed in this Pashalic for the last five years, the mere tie of friendliness must be expected sometimes to give way to an appetite for plunder and revenge, there is, no doubt, but that the Arabs generally of this part of Asia look up to the British Government with admiration and would not willingly offend its officers. That the British merchants of Baghdad, indeed, do not partake more largely in the benefits of this friendly feeling is in a great measure their own fault. They are continually protesting against the river dues, on which the Arab Chiefs depend for their support, they pursue their Arab debtors with relentless severity, they exact compensation for losses through the instrumentality of Turkish Officials, which is of all things the most distasteful to the independent Arabs.

4. The question which now arises is whether the merchants having thus embroiled themselves with the tribes, are justified in turning round on the Political Agent, and claiming the armed intervention of the Hon'ble East India Company's steamer on their behalf, whether in fact the personal interests of a commercial house are to outweigh all considerations of policy and oblige the British authorities to exchange their friendly relations with the Arab Chiefs for an attitude of intimidation and hostility. At the present moment the case is merely hypothetical for neither can the Steamer "Nitoeris," owing to her crippled condition, be sent upon service nor have the Turks authorized our armed interference, but I think it extremely probable that the Governor of Baghdad, finding himself altogether unable to deal with the Arabs, will ere long invite us to take the law into our own hands, and on the "Nitoeris" being replaced by the "Comet", now under orders for the Tigris, it will thus become necessary that the general question should be brought to an issue under authority.

5. My own opinion is that it would be highly inexpedient to bring our steamer needlessly into collision with the Arabs, and that British merchants should be grateful to the Hon'ble East India Company for the moral support, and the opportunity of convey which is afforded by the presence of an Indian vessel of war on the Tigris, rather than dissatisfied that they can obtain no more; but in order to enable the Most Noble the Governor-General of India in Council to arrive at a decision, I deem it my duty to forward copies of the letters which have passed upon the subject between this Political Agency and one of the Baghdad Mercantile houses, and which give in sufficient, detail the chief arguments upon either side.

I further think it proper to state that the charge of indifference to their interests imputed by Messrs. Hector & Co., to the Commander of the steamer on the Tigris is altogether undeserved. Captain Jones has on all occasions recommended the interests of the British merchants to the different Arab Chiefs with whom he has been brought in contact, and the merchants have more than once benefitted by this interference, and have gratefully acknowledged it. Captain Jones indeed on his last trip from Bussorah, although his vessel was crippled, actually offered to convey, through the disturbed districts, the very boat whose plunder is now



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made a subject of complaint, and the reason that Messrs. Hector's Agent did not take advantage of the offer was that he had an account of a few rupees to settle at Bussorah which he would not consent to abandon or postpone.

139. In 1855, the *Al-bu-Mahomed* tribe revolted, and began to plunder and pillage the villages, and attack the boats playing on the Tigris all navigation stopped for six months. It was found impossible to coerce the tribe, as no sooner did the Turkish Forces appear, the tribesman disappeared on the marshes, they were only reconciled by accepting the terms they offered for paying the tribute.

(vi) The Arab tribes construction of the Telegraph line,* 1863-1864.

140. As instances of the constant changes in the appointment of the Chiefs of Montefiks and the increase of tribute levied from them, we shall quote the following statement from Colonel Kembal's despatch dated 9th January 1856 to the Embassy:—

1851 Sheikh Faris	with a liability of 2,00,000	thamies per annum.
1851 Autumn Sheikh Mansur	" 2,40,000	" "
1852 Spring " Saleh	" 3,00,000	" "
1853 October " Mansur	" 3,10,000	" "

and the sequestration of the Beni Hatheym territory, including Sumawa, at an estimated revenue of 1,00,000 thamies the same being the amount at which it was immediately farmed to Sheikh Wadi.

1855 October Sheikh Bunder with a liability of 3,10,000 (believed to be 3,50,000) thamies with the further sequestration of lands specified in Mr. Taylor's letter.

Prior to Nejib Pasha's Government the aggregate revenue of the Montefik districts amounted to 1,00,000 thamies, since that time the decay of the country, produced by excessive taxation has been evinced both by a considerable falling off of trade and the diminished cultivation of the land.

141. In 1863 owing to the persistent omission of Sheikh *Bunder* the Montefik Chief to pay up the arrears of revenue, Munib Pasha, Governor of Basrah under orders of *Namik Pasha*, arrested him when he came to visit Munib Pasha on the Turkish steamer. He was, however, released on arrival at Basrah on payment of bribes, as was suspected by *Namik Pasha*. Sheikh *Bunder* was thereupon summoned by *Namik Pasha* to Baghdad and pay up the arrears of revenue.

Munib Pasha was suspended and arrested and brought to Baghdad, where his guilt was proved. Sheikh *Bunder* in obedience to the summons and in hopes of getting the farm of the Montefik district renewed, came to Baghdad and paid into the treasury 1,25,000 thamies, in part payment of the arrears of revenue.

142. *Namik Pasha* then attempted to introduce an important change in the administration of the *Montefik* districts, as will be seen from the despatch of Colonel Kembal, No. 42, dated 18th November 1863, which the latter expected would supply a guarantee for the *security of the telegraph**:—

No. 42, dated the 18th November 1863.

From—COLONEL A. B. KEMBALL, C.B., Her Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad,

To—HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE SIR H. L. BULWER, G.C.B., Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

His Excellency *Namik Pasha* has taken advantage of the lapse of the farm of the *Montefik* districts to set aside the independent Government of the Arab Sheikhs, and to substitute the more regular system of administration obtaining in other parts of this Pashalic. After separating the lands bordering on the Sbat-el-Arab south of Kornah, to be annexed to the Kaim Mukamlik of Bussorah, and the lands situated on the right bank of the Tigris, north of Kornah, including the district of the Hye, to be annexed to the Kaim Mukamlik of Azeezieh, His Excellency has appointed (Sheikh) *Munsoor Beg* to be Kaim Mukam of Suk-esh Shiookh on a salary of Purses 30,000 per mensem, and has associated with him as Mubasibebehee a Turkish Officer of the name of *Suleiman Beg*, late Mudeer of Khannikeen. The power of life and death of mutilation and of corporal punishment, hitherto exercised by the Sheikhs, as also the exaction of arbitrary dues of whatever nature, including Nikal, or blood-money on account of inter-tribal feuds, have been abolished. The regular duties and taxes sanctioned by the Sublime Porte are alone to be levied, and all suits, civil and criminal, are to be adjudicated by a *Majlis* composed of landowners, merchants, and other influential persons of the community on the spot whose appointment must be confirmed by His Excellency. His Excellency is conscious that so radical a change can hardly be carried out without creating discontent among the

* The construction of the telegraph line was commenced about the close of the year 1863, and after some interruption caused by disturbances among Arab tribes, the work was completed in January 1865. A party of British engineers were engaged in the work in co-operation with Turkish officials. See Goldsmid's *Telegraph and Travel* pp 95—111 and 245—248.



members of the ruling families, whose privileges and immunities must be thereby greatly curtailed, nor, indeed, without some sacrifice of revenue at the outset; but he has directed Suleiman Beg to deal prudently and leniently with these individuals; and he is justly confident that with the gradual amelioration of the condition of the ryot, which it is hoped to introduce, must ensue also an increase of income to the public treasury.

It cannot, I think, be doubted that, while on the one hand a more regular administration must eventually supply a better guarantee for the security of the telegraph, the continuous intercourse with Turkish and English employés by enhancing the responsibilities of all the parties concerned must, on the other hand, operate to promote its successful establishment.

As regards the construction of the dyke of the Jezair, the reform thus initiated will, of course, preclude a recourse to the former vicious system of contract through the instrumentality of the Arab Sheikhs, with its attendant evils of forced labor and arbitrary exactions; accordingly, His Excellency informs me that, having failed to procure the appointment of a competent engineer from Egypt, he purposes to move the Porte to engage the services of an experienced Dutch Officer for this purpose, who should be conversant with the execution of similar works. From 8,000 to 10,000 purses are already available to defray the cost if sanctioned by the Porte.

Sheikh Bunder, late farmer of the Montefik districts, died at Baghdad after a brief illness on the 13th instant, leaving a deficit of 5,000 purses due to the treasury, of which sum not a moiety is now probably recoverable. As is natural, the sudden demise of this Chief has given rise to suspicions of foul play; but Turkish officials had obviously no interest in his decease, and such suspicions accordingly, for which, however, no foundation has been discovered, are directed more especially against the rival members of his own family.

142. From the subsequent despatches of Colonel Kemball, however, it appears that the reform introduced by Namik Pasha met with a disastrous failure. We shall quote some of Colonel Kemball's despatches *in extenso* throwing as they do much light on the state of the rival parties among the Montefiks, which Namik Pasha tried to set against one another, and show how the British Resident took a lively interest in these tribal affairs especially with a view to facilitate the construction of Telegraph from Fao to Baghdad and was admitted to his confidence and consulted confidentially by Namik Pasha as well as looked up to by the Montefiks as an intermediary. It will be noticed that Namik Pasha viewed the friendly relations of Colonel Kemball with the Montefiks with extreme jealousy:—

No. 1, dated the 13th January 1864.

From—COLONEL A. B. KEMBALL, C. B., Her Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad,

To—The Hon'ble E. M. ERSKINE, Her Majesty's Chargé d' Affaires, Constantinople.

I have the honor to report my return to Baghdad yesterday evening, and to submit for your Excellency's information copy of a despatch which I addressed from Bussorah to the Secretary to Government, Bombay.

The telegram which I this day transmit to Constantinople (copy and translation subjoined) will have explained to Your Excellency the nature of the partial disturbances therein referred to. Sheikh Munsoor, the recently-appointed Kaim Makam of the Montefik districts, dissembling his irritation at the restriction of his powers and at the dismemberment of the territory over which his family had previously exerted an hereditary control, laid his plans to intimidate the Government into the restoration of the former régime. Accordingly, on arrival within his own limits, he suppressed the public notification, which, by defining his own authority, extinguished the arbitrary rule of the Arab Chiefs, and placed the country under the same system of administration elsewhere prevailing in the Ottoman dominions; he virtually confined Suleiman Beg by surrounding him with guards under the pretext of his life being endangered; and he dispatched emissaries in every direction to misrepresent the intentions of the Government, and to invite the heads of tribes to join him in making a stand for Arab independence, to the extent at least of recovering their position as mere tributaries. Happily in those quarters where it might be apprehended that such suggestions would be well received in the newly-settled *Beni Lam* and *Alboo Mahomed* districts, as also among the *Khazaal* tribes, the experience of Turkish sway has not disposed the inhabitants to second any efforts for its subversion, and judging from my own observation even among the Montefik peasantry, the oppression to which they were subjected by their Arab rulers (who, it will be remembered, exercised the power of life and death) would assuredly deprive them of all sympathy with the latter were they assured of the power and determination of the Government to carry out its policy, and not again to abandon them to the vengeance of their oppressors. Accordingly, the small tribes subordinate to the Montefik Sheikhs, on either bank of the Euphrates, while obeying the behests of Sheikh Munsoor to the extent of stopping the navigation of the river, have abstained from any overt act, or movement, that would commit them to rebellion; and the same expectant attitude may, indeed, be said to have been assumed by the neighbouring Arab communities, who are watching the endeavours of the local authorities to counteract his intrigues.

But while thus exciting disaffection against the Government, Sheikh Munsoor writes to His Excellency Namik Pasha professing his loyalty, but attesting the aversion of the influen-



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tial Chiefs, his dependents, to the proposed change in the form of Government; charging his brother, Sheikh Nassir, with stirring up the tribes against him, with organizing the pretended attack upon one of the Turkish steamers, and with seizing the Government grain destined for Jeddah; and, finally, declaring the personal danger to which himself and Suleiman Beg are exposed, and his helplessness to vindicate his authority unless aided by troops from Baghdad.

I learn from Namik Pasha, whom I visited this morning, and whom I found fully informed of Sheikh Munsoor's proceedings, that His Excellency, affecting to acknowledge the difficulties of his (Sheikh Munsoor's) position, had recalled both this Chief and Suleiman Beg to Baghdad, and had dispatched a steamer to summon Sheikh Fuhud-el-Alee, now encamped on the bank of the Tigris near the Hudd, with the view of appointing him Kaim Makam at Sukesh Shiokh in lieu of Sheikh Munsoor; but that, in order to guard against the recusancy of either Chief, he had, in the meantime dispatched reinforcements to the garrison of Koot-el-Amareh and Dewanieh, and had taken every precaution to restrict the disturbances to the narrowest possible limits.

Although, in ignorance of the views and intentions of Namik Pasha, I abstained on my passage from Basrah from holding any communication with Sheikh Fuhud, I agree with His Excellency that his rivalry to Sheikh Munsoor will readily induce the former to embrace this opportunity of serving the Government, the more especially that the hope has been held out to him the grant of a portion of the lands, the private property of the latter, which will be declared forfeited. In this case order must be speedily restored, and the construction of the telegraph would not be for a moment delayed; but assuming the contrary, I venture to think that the permanent security of the work hereafter must depend upon the success of the plan in progress to give a more settled administration to the districts through which it must cross: and on this account I submit it is not to be regretted that the occasion, though late owing to the term of the late Sheikh Bunder's lease extending to the end of the past official year, should have been seized by Namik Pasha to give effect to his policy.

The party which plundered the telegraph operatives on the Hilleh section were some mounted Bedouin Dhiefys and match lockmen from the Montefik tribe, led by a slave of Sheikh Munsoor. His Excellency Namik Pasha has promised to obtain indemnification for the operatives who were shipped.

No. 3, dated the 27th January 1864.

From—COLONEL A. B. KEMBALL, Her Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad,

To—The Hon'ble E. M. ERSKINE, Her Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Constantinople.

The attitude assumed by the Montefik Sheikhs and the determination they avowed of armed resistance taken in conjunction with the refusal of Sheikh Fuhud-el-Alee to accept the

Political A., May 1864, Nos. 136-138.

Kaim Mukamlik of Sukesh Shiokh, have induced Namik Pasha to forego his projects of changing the form of Government in the Montefik districts, and His Excellency has accordingly proposed to invest Sheikh Nassir, brother of Sheikh Munsoor, and to grant him the lease of those districts for one year on the same terms as it was held by the late Sheikh Bunder.

This determination has been suddenly come to by Namik Pasha after he had summoned reinforcements from Kirkook and Mosul, and otherwise made considerable progress in military preparations in consideration of the time and expense that would be necessary to carry out his purpose, and I infer from his remarks that he has it in view also to facilitate that purpose at a later date by creating rivalry between the brothers. That Sheikh Nassir, conscious of his guilty opposition to Government, will immediately obey His Excellency's summons to Baghdad is, I think, doubtful.

Shortly after my return from Bassorah I received a communication, signed by that Chief and other elders of the Montefik, deprecating the plan formed by the Pasha and soliciting my intervention to dissuade him from its further prosecution, which communication I immediately submitted to the perusal of His Excellency, with the draft of my proposed reply. This reply was, of course, superseded by His Excellency's change of intention, but I subjoin it in copy for your Excellency's information, as indicating the course that, with His Excellency's approval, I had determined to adopt on the occasion; when, however, Sheikh Nassir's Agent was quitting Baghdad, charged with the summons to his Chief, he waited upon me to state that no hope existed of its being complied with, unless I would pledge my word as a guarantee for the Sheikh's personal security. I declined, of course, to take upon myself such a responsibility, unless so solicited in writing by Namik Pasha, to whom I accordingly referred him; but his fears, it seems, not permitting him to broach this condition to His Excellency, I thought it my duty to advise Namik Pasha of what had passed between us. His Excellency replied, that the solemn pledges he had already given, together with the prospect of investiture, would suffice, in his opinion, to re-assure Sheikh Nassir, and for the present he would not avail himself of my intervention.

No. 4, dated the 24th February 1864.

From—COLONEL A. B. KEMBALL, Her Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad,

To—The Hon'ble E. M. ERSKINE, Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Constantinople.

I regret to inform your Excellency that the Montefik difficulty is still unsettled, and that I apprehend, in consequence, the protracted interruption of our telegraphic operations in

Ibid.

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Mesopotamia. Sheikh Nassir came to Baghdad on the 11th instant, having previously, for many days, refused to enter the town unless his personal safety were guaranteed by the British and other Foreign Consuls, or by the delivery of a koran sealed with the seal of the Pasha. These demands being successively rejected, he was eventually induced to present himself on the transmission of the *Kefyet-el-Aman* (korechief from the harm of His Excellency), which among Arabs is regarded as one of the most sacred pledges of the good faith of the sender; but during the past fortnight the same distrust of the Turkish Authorities has influenced Sheikh Nassir's proceeding, and as Namik Pasha refuses to sign the firman of investiture until he shall have paid down three thousand purses, the earnest money it seems which he originally tendered when, prior to his brother's nomination as Kaim Mukam he was a candidate for the Sheikship; while he is persistently pleads his inability to advance so considerable a sum until he shall have returned to his own districts: the consequence is a dead-lock, which, however, it may terminate, must occasion the loss of much valuable time. To my appeal on this head His Excellency has remarked that the interests of the telegraph must give way to those of the Government, and although he still looks for a speedy decision of the question, did it even issue in the postponement of the work till next autumn, he would not consent to a sacrifice of authority, which must eventuate in confirming the quasi-independence of the Montefik Chiefs by assuring them of the means on all future occasion of evading their just obligations.

It is clear, indeed, that the present policy of Namik Pasha is to effect gradually, by creating division among the Chiefs themselves, what he shrunk from attempting by force when, on Sheikh Munsoor's appointment, he found them unanimous in resisting the proposed change in the form of Government. To this end he has avowedly again summoned *Fahul-el-Alee* and another Chief named Musharee, to Baghdad, and as the result of their competition, he hopes, though the idea of a Kaim Mukamlik is necessarily abandoned, that he may be enabled to retain the lands extending from Bussorah to Kornah on the Shat-el-Arab, and from Kornah to the Hye, on the Tigris, which he had in the first instance separated from the territory formed by the late Sheikh Bunder.

The main objections to this policy are the time which would be needed to give it effect and the bar which it would oppose to any attempt on my part to subsidize some of the tribal Chiefs. There can be no doubt, I believe, that, where Namik Pasha prepared to carry out his views by means of a military expedition, and thus to establish the authority of Government in the *Montefik* districts as it has been established in those of the Alboo Mahomed, the result would be conducive as well to the advantage of the people, who, if assured of constant support against their own Chiefs would readily accede to the change, as to the permanence of the telegraph under construction; but in the absence of adequate force for this purpose it is certainly to be regretted that he should have initiated measures which, in spite of reinforcements brought from Mosul and Kirkook and of menaces of action, could only serve to demonstrate his weakness.

In the end I feel assured that His Excellency will be compelled to restore matters to their original condition, but in the *interim* the boats, which two months ago I left laden with materials for the Euphrates are still detained at Bussorah, nor will His Excellency permit me, associated, of course with an officer on his part, to attempt their transit by means of separate negotiations with the tribes on the banks of the river. His Excellency has, however, consented to depute Mahomed Beg, an officer possessing much experience of Arabs, to Bussorah for the purpose of promoting, so far as may be safely done, the object in view, and in anticipation of his success, I purpose to proceed myself immediately to Hilleh, and thence down the Euphrates to Divaneh (to which point the line has been nearly completed), prepared to take the earliest advantage of any settlement that may be effected by Namik Pasha.

No. 14, dated the 16th March 1864.

From—COLONEL A.B. KEMBALL, C.B., Her Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad.

To—THE HON'BLE E. M. ERSKINE, Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Constantinople.

In obedience to a summons from Namik Pasha who desired to consult me on certain matters, "I returned from Hilleh to Baghdad on the 13th instant.

At our interview on the following day I learnt that His Excellency had received a telegram from Constantinople requiring explanation of the protracted duration of the *Montefik* difficulty, and promising that both Sheikh Nassir and Sheikh *Fahul-el-Alee* had declined to accept the farm of the Montefik districts in any other terms than those upon which it was administered by the late Sheikh Bunder, while Sheikh Muoharee, if invested, was too weak and uninfluential to maintain his authority. His Excellency condescended to ask my opinion as to the course which should now be pursued. His Excellency admitted that the time for a military expedition had passed away, and that, even if preparations for transport and commissariat, instead of being wholly overlooked, had been fully matured, the season was still too far advanced to allow of operations being carried to a successful issue before the spring rise of the rivers. He admitted that measures of coercion would be regarded with distrust and anxiety by the Turkish Ministry, with whom success alone would be the test of their expe-



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diency, and he acknowledged that the *Montefik* Sheikhs, now fully alive to the effect which His Excellency's policy must have upon their position, but conscious of his inability, or rather unpreparedness, to enforce it, and assuming, therefore, the absence of superior sanction, had momentarily suspended their rivalries in order to gain a common object. On this point, indeed, His Excellency himself suggested that his time had been ill-chosen, seeing that a part of their plan being (as in the case of the opposition of *Wadee Beg* in 1852) by mere passive assistance to prolong the crisis in the hope of compelling his recall to Constantinople: the immediate requirements of the telegraph and His Excellency's engagement to supply grain to Jeddah, which might otherwise fall through seemed to them to furnish the means to the end.

I ventured to submit that, under the conditions and circumstances above stated, no alternative remained to His Excellency (were it only as a temporary measure,) but to make the concessions necessary to restore order; and as the same state of things was obviously existant at the period of Sheikh *Munsoor's* defection, while everyday's delay added to his embarrassment, I must regret that His Excellency did not then and without reserve fulfil his intention of appointing Sheikh *Fahud* upon the terms proposed, rather than compound with rebellion by making overture to Sheikh *Nassir*. This course I thought was still the one which entailed the least sacrifice of dignity, for although His Excellency had continued to cherish the hope that he might be able, as the condition of investiture, to retain the lands severed from the *Montefik* territory, he admitted that the former Chief had steadily rejected such a condition, while the latter, being still at Baghdad and fearing to speak out had coupled with its acceptance a *proviso* that he should not be held responsible for the disturbances, which he affirmed would certainly ensue, but which, following the example of his brother, it was clear he would himself foment, not only as the means, indirectly, of effecting his purpose, but as a plea also for excusing the short payment of tribute.

In advocating the nomination of Sheikh *Fahud*, a man whom I had never met, but who was described as being not less popular with the dominant *Montefik* families than his rivals, I observed that His Excellency would at least avoid the appearance of yielding to intimidation, and whether hereafter it was determined at Constantinople to maintain the administration of the *Montefik* districts upon its original footing, or eventually to give effect to the policy of His Excellency, the selection of a person who had thus far acted a passive part must be attended with certain advantages. In the one case the least amount of encouragement would have been afforded to successful rebellion; in the other time would be gained for maturing the plans of Government and for preparing the way for a military expedition, while supported by the *prestige* of the Sultan's authority would suffice, I believed, without risk of defeat, if not without bloodshed, to bear down all opposition.

I thus pointedly alluded to the direct action of the Central Government, because it alone, I was of opinion, would convince recalcitrant Chiefs of the futility of resistance, as it alone would re-assure friendly adherents, and because, as I reminded His Excellency on the occasion of Sheikh *Munsoor's* appointment to be *Kaim Mukam*, His Excellency had led me to believe that his proceedings were sanctioned by the Porte. Were Sheikh *Fahud* invested, the first act of that Chief, like his predecessor, would probably be to require the removal of Sheikh *Nassir* and *Munsoor* from the limits of his jurisdiction, a measure which under certain conditions, would be not less easy of accomplishment to the Government, than it proved on the occasion of a similar application from Sheikh *Bunder*. These Chiefs should, of course, be warned that by their past conduct they had forfeited every claim to future employment; but considering their power for mischief, every inducement should be afforded them to come and reside at Baghdad, to which end it would be necessary, doubtless, that formal guarantees should be given, confirmed, if need be, from Constantinople, for the security of their persons and property inclusive of their large landed estates on the *Shat-el-Arab*. Did they accept these conditions, they would thence forward



As the letter which accompanied the Bayurldi states generally that the office is conferred on the same footing as that whereon it was held by the late Sheikh *Bunder*, I submitted to His Excellency that the absence of the usual contract, specifying the conditions of its tenure such as the period of the lease, the limits of jurisdiction, the amount of tribute and other obligations of the nominee, might, under existing circumstances, suggest to Sheikh *Fuhud*, the suspicion of an *arrière-pensée* on the part of the Government, in which case he might postpone the active exercise of his function until these points had been clearly defined; but His Excellency observed that the terms employed were those precisely of Sheikh *Fahud's* original proposal; and, moreover, that his personal attendance at Baghdad was necessary to the completion of the contract.

I confess that I am not without anxiety as to the issue on the score of the loss of valuable time. The officer charged with the Bayurldi has, however, been empowered to give every assurance verbally to Sheikh *Fuhud*, and the new Sheikh has been directed to make immediate arrangements for the safe transit of the telegraph boats and to give me instant notice at Dewanieh when the way is clear.

I enclose in copy and translation a letter which, with the approval of Namik Pasha on leaving Baghdad, I have addressed to Sheikhs *Nasir* and *Munsoor* and the elders of the Montefik tribe, and in subjoining copy and translation of a telegram which I have this day forwarded to Your Excellency.

No. 19, dated Hilleh, the 5th April 1864.

From—COLONEL A. B. KEMBALL, C.B., Her Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad,
To—The Hon'ble E. M. ERSKINE, Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Constantinople.

I regret that I am still unable to acquaint Your Excellency with the issue of Namik Pasha's proposed investiture of Sheikh *Fuhud-el-Alee* as Chief of the Montefik tribes. His Excellency had scarcely intimated to me by

Troops have been despatched from Baghdad to drive off these marauders, and a Non-Commissioned Officer, Royal Engineer, is in readiness here to proceed and repair damages so soon as the road is reported clear.

conclusion that the wires must have been cut and the line, perhaps, otherwise injured by the party in question. On the same occasion His Excellency stated his conviction that the appointment of *Fuhud* would have the effect immediately of restoring order, and on this ground he earnestly objected to the intention I had expressed, with His Excellency's sanction, to place myself in communication with Sheikh *Munsoor*, or even, if necessary, to proceed in person to his camp.

In the meantime Your Excellency will observe, from the enclosed Report just received from Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Bussorah, that the same cause, the non-nomination of a Sheikh, is producing the same effects on the banks of the Lower Euphrates; but if, as reported from native sources, Sheikh *Fuhud* has really embarked in a Turkish Steamer to wait upon Namik Pasha at Baghdad, I trust that our difficulties in both directions may speedily cease. I cannot, indeed, avoid the suspicion that the step now taken by Sheikh *Munsoor* has been prompted by the protracted detention of his brother, Sheikh *Nassir*, against his will, at Baghdad, in spite of the safe conduct, *rai-aman*, promised by Namik Pasha. In that case I have directed Mr. Vice-Consul Michael, while disclaiming any desire on my part to meddle with the affairs of his Government, to express clearly my dissent from such a violation of the pledges given by His Excellency, and my opinion of the expediency, come what may, of immediately dismissing Sheikh *Nassir* should he desire to return home.

No. 25, dated the 4th May 1864.

From—COLONEL A. B. KEMBALL, C.B., Her Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad,
To—His Excellency the Right Hon'ble Sir H. L. BULWER, G.C.B., etc., etc., etc.

I regret to inform Your Excellency that no improvement has yet taken place in the state of affairs in the Montefik districts, and that Namik Pasha has now despatched a considerable* force, under the command of Ferek Hafiz Pasha, to overawe Sheikh *Munsoor*, and, if practicable, to penetrate even to Shukish Shiook. In spite of the difficulties arising out of the marshy character of the country, the lateness of the season, and his own state of unpreparedness, His Excellency has ever inclined to this measure. Having reluctantly conceded the several points which had become indispensable to Sheikh *Fuhud's* nomination, His Excellency still omitted to publish the general amnesty, which might have had the effect of bringing to his side the rebellious adherents of Sheikh *Munsoor*, thus facilitating the designs of the latter Chief in misrepresenting His Excellency's intentions: and although this omission has at length been supplied in the form of letters forwarded through Sheikh *Fuhud* to the more influential persons, it is feared that their effect may be counteracted by

* One thousand Infantry and two guns, which left Baghdad on 2nd instant, to be reinforced by 500 Regular Infantry under Mahomed Beg at Koot, and by the fighting, it is believed, of the Rubeca and Beni Lam Arabs. Sheikh Pasha has also been directed to co-operate from Dewanieh with a regiment of Cavalry, 400 Irregular Horse, and 4 guns.



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the present expedition, if, indeed, that expedition should not alienate Sheikh *Fukud* and revive his suspicions as to the ulterior views of the Government.

Sheikh *Fukud* is still located on the right bank of the Tigris at Aleo Sherkee, assisted by a detachment of troops from the camp at the Hud he is reported to have successfully repelled an attack (more feigned it is said than real by Sheikh Munsoor's party, but he has been unable to move

300 Infantry, 1 gun.
200 Agail matchlockmen.
100 Bashee Bazouks.

from his original position; nor is it probable, unless he should succeed in creating a division among his opponents, that they will relax their efforts to intercept his advance. Under these circumstances, should Hafiz Pasha's force fail in its object, the result must be to compel the Porte to carry out at all costs the policy of coercion thus initiated by Namik Pasha, or to accept the humiliating alternative of confirming Sheikh *Munsoor* in the headship of the Montefik tribes. From the known sentiments of Namik Pasha, I believe his real aim to be to force on this issue. His dread of the extension of British influence among the Arabs amounts to *Mania*, of which the exhibition is no longer disguised. Thus, when advised from the best sources that the elders on the Montefik only needed, my assurance of the sincerity of Namik Pasha's concessions as regarded both the resumption of their lands and the treatment of themselves in order to make their submission, I tendered my mediation in that sense, and submitted to His Excellency drafts of the letters I proposed to write to them (of which I enclose copies). His Excellency, while admitting their probable efficacy, replied that the example of the Libanon after the occupation of Syria by Ibrahim Pasha, had determined him to decline foreign intervention on all occasions and in any form whatever, nor could he be persuaded of the want of parallelism or analogy in the two cases.

Again, when more recently informed by a telegraphic despatch from Shebli Pasha at Dewanieh that the heads of the Montefik families proposed to address me collectively in order to ask my mediation, His Excellency immediately sent to desire that I would reject their application and refuse to answer it.

This course I have declined to adopt as needlessly discourteous to my correspondents, but I have assured His Excellency that their letter when received should be immediately laid before His Excellency, and that His Excellency's decision, provided it were not coupled with any matter of a nature to commit or compromise myself, should be faithfully communicated to them. I deemed it right to specify this condition, because, on the last occasion, when, with His Excellency's sanction, I addressed Sheikh *Nasser* and *Munsoor* (vide despatch No. 16, dated 26th March 1864), His Excellency privately urged the former Chief, then, as now, his guest at Baghdad, not only to repudiate my interference, but even to adduce the telegraph as the cause of the existing disturbances. To this suggestion, of course, Sheikh *Nasser*, perceiving the trap that was laid for him, declined to accede, but, without betraying my knowledge of His Excellency's procedure, I ventured to profit by a hint to myself in the same sense in the course of conversation, in order to point out the futility of His Excellency's argument. Not only, I observed, was an after-thought of this nature inconsistent with the hostility displayed by the Arabs in plundering a large quantity of Government grain destined for Jeddah (an act which could hardly have been prompted by their aversion to the telegraph), but, on the contrary, the appeal made to myself by the rebellious Chiefs and their kindly and cordial demeanour towards Mr. Johnston and the officers*

* Vide enclosure to despatch No. 19, dated 5th April 1864.

of the Cornet on a late occasion, the trip having been undertaken in concert with Samee Effendi, sufficiently refuted the motives attributed to them; while, on the other hand, His Excellency could not be ignorant of the universal belief that His Excellency had purposely compassed the existing embroglio, in order to bar a work from which he was supposed to be averse. His Excellency then assured me that I had misapprehended his meaning, but I mention the circumstance, lest, in order to justify his policy and to excuse the delays it has occasioned, Namik Pasha should have had recourse to such an argument in his communications with the Porte. I need hardly, I believe, assure your Excellency that the insinuation it conveys is wholly unfounded; nothing could be more friendly than the present disposition of the Arab tribes towards to English, or more willing, I am satisfied than would prove their co-operation in a measure known to have emanated from the authority of Her Majesty the Sultan were it not their aim by every means in their power, including, of course, the stoppage of the boats laden with materials, to discredit Namik Pasha with the central Government.

No. 35, dated the 15th June 1864.

From—COLONEL A. B. KEMBALL, C.B., Her Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad,

To—HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE SIR H. L. BULWER, G.C.B., Her Majesty's Ambassador.

The nomination of Sheikh *Fukud* to the Chiefship of the Montefik for the same period, being three years, and on the same terms precisely on which this Office was held by the late

Political A, August 1864, Nos. 100-101.

Sheikh Bunder, appears to have satisfied the elders of the tribe, the great majority of whom have tendered their submission to his authority. I should add, however, that of three of their number who were induced by the promise of Rae-Aman to present themselves in Sheikh

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Fuhud's camp, one, *Suleyman-ul-Khuleif*, *Sheik of the Ajwud*, was put to death, and the two others, *Sheiks Alej and Shubeet-el-Davood of the Beir Saeed*, have been placed in confinement.

Their execution has been also reported, but the severity, coupled with perfidy, was said to have been exercised with the sanction, if not by the order, of *Namik Pasha*, and not improbably may have been so justified on the spot by *Sheik Fuhud*, yet may really be accounted for by feudal rancour or personal animosity. At any rate His Excellency has to me disavowed the act, which he declared to be "disapprovable," though he added that, as these *Sheiks* had been foremost in resisting the substitution of Turkish for Arab rule in the *Montefig Territory*, he could not reject that they should have been the first to experience the effects of the despotism they had themselves mainly contributed to set up. Such sentiments would appear to cast doubt upon His Excellency's disavowal, but inasmuch as the conduct of the parties in question in supporting a cause which was virtually the cause of *Sheik Fuhud*, however obnoxious to Turkish officials, could have constituted no demerit in the eyes of that Chief, their offence towards himself must have rested on separate grounds, and their punishment, I believe, have been prompted by other motives than Turkish instigation.

Sheik Fuhud is still in the neighbourhood of *Shutreh* engaged in distributing the farms of the districts and in securing the obedience of the tribes prior to proceeding to *Sukesh Shiookh*. *Sheik Munsoor* and his few remaining adherents are encamped in the desert west of the *Euphrates*, about six hours south of *Sumaneh*, but have as yet manifested no disposition to create disorder or to oppose the rule of *Sheik Fuhud*. I am, indeed, credibly informed that, when assured of the terms of the latter Chief's appointment, and convinced then, perhaps of the futility of his own pretensions, *Sheik Munsoor* wrote to *Sheik Fuhud* stating that their common object having been attained by the subversion of the policy initiated by *Namik Pasha*, he had no further ground of quarrel with the Government or with its nominee, and, rather than be the occasion of bloodshed amongst the tribe, he would withdraw from the contest.

The troops which composed the expedition of *Hafiz Pasha* have returned to their respective garrisons, save only a detachment of three hundred men with one gun, which, *Namik Pasha* informs me, at the request of *Sheik Fuhud* has been temporarily stationed at *Ras-el Jezireh* on the *Hye*, at no great distance from *Koot-el-Amareh*. With respect to the intention previously announced to me by His Excellency to construct a fort and barracks and to establish a garrison at *Shutreh*, I have learnt from *Hafiz Pasha* that, finding His Excellency's design to be impracticable, he had abstained from disclosing it. According, however, to native report, it would seem that the subject was broached to *Sheik Fuhud*, who so earnestly deprecated the proposed measure, threatening to resign the Chiefship of the *Montefig* if it were persisted in, that it was necessarily abandoned.

Sheik Fuhud having deputed one of his relatives to escort the boats laden with telegraph materials up the *Uphrates*, orders have been issued by *Namik Pasha* for their dispatch to their respective destination.

No. 36, dated the 29th June 1864.

From—COLONEL A. B. KEMBALL, C.B., Her Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad,

To—HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE SIR H. L. BULWER, G.C.B., Her Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

Namik Pasha has informed me with much satisfaction that the report which had reached Baghdad of the execution of *Suleyman-ul-Khuleif*, *Sheik of the Ajwud*, had proved to be

unfounded, though his informant, a Turkish Officer from *Sheik Fuhud's* camp, had confirmed the statement that this Chief (who was very ill), with the two others mentioned in my despatch, No. 35, dated 15th instant, and several elders of the *Montefig*, had been imprisoned in chains in spite of the promises of security by which they had been induced to place themselves in *Sheik Fuhud's* power. His Excellency mentioned at the same time his intention to point out to *Sheik Fuhud* the propriety under the circumstances of releasing his prisoners. Meantime, the severity exercised by the *Sheik of the Montefig* appears to have estranged some of the influential members of the tribe, and to have encouraged *Sheik Monsoor* to resume his efforts to annoy the Government. According to the accounts communicated to me by *Namik Pasha*, the rebel Chief had succeeded in assembling a sufficient number of adherents to enable him to threaten *Sumawch*, and by his intrigues south of *Busserah* had incited the *Beni Malik* to revive their claims upon the produce of the lands from which they were formerly ejected by *Muneeb Pasha*. To counteract these movements *Shubli Pasha* has been dispatched to *Sumaweh* with the entire garrison of *Dewanah*, consisting of 1,100 Infantry, and *Mahomed Pasha*, with a detachment of Riflemen, is about to proceed per steamer to *Bussorah*: pending the issue of those expeditions the distribution of telegraph materials at different points on the banks of the *Euphrates* is, of course, suspended.

Namik Pasha has now established a service of Arab messengers to run twice a week between *Bussorah* and *Diwanieh*.



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No. 37, dated the 13th July 1864.

From—COLONEL A. B. KEMBALL, C.B., Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad.

To—HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE SIR H. L. BULWER, G.C.B., Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

The expedition which, as reported in my last despatch, had been ordered by Namik Pasha to proceed from Diwanieh to relieve Sumaweh, has sustained a severe defeat at the hands of the Arabs. The infantry portion, consisting of 350 Riflemen, with three guns, embarked in boats; after losing more than half of its number, including *Been Bashekol Aghasee* and most of its officers, was so completely dispersed, that up to the date of the last accounts, a week after the event, only 90 men, of whom 30 wounded, had succeeded in reaching Diwanieh. Shubli Pasha travelling by land with the cavalry and Arab contingent (derived from the *Zobeid*, *Booj*, and *Jebor* tribes), arrived near the scene of action on the following morning, but was compelled to retreat before the superior force of the enemy.

Shubli Pasha, in writing to Bagdad for reinforcement, justifies the rashness with which he exposed so small a detachment in a comparatively helpless position to the attack of overwhelming numbers by the assurance that the *Beni Hachem* and *Alboo Hossein* who opposed its advance, had hitherto shown themselves friendly to Government, and had even promised a contingent from their tribes to co-operate with him against *Sheikh Munsoor*; and that their collision with the Sultan's troops had been occasioned, not by any change of feeling on their part, but by their enmity towards Murdan Effendi, the farmer of the district, who had incurred their animosity, and whom, being under the escort of the troops, the commander, of course, refused to surrender into their hands. He has accordingly thrown the blame of the disaster upon this officer, not only for permitting Murdan Effendi to accompany him from Aboojwareed, but for continuing his progress in spite of the warning which he states was conveyed to him, that the Arabs had assembled in force to attack him. This view having been adopted by Namik Pasha, reinforcements have now been sent under the command of Ferik Hafiz Pasha to punish the rebels, and, if practicable, to relieve the beleaguered garrison of Sumaweh. It is notorious, however, that *Sheikh Saadoon*, one of the principal Chiefs of the *Beni Hachem*, is at present associated with *Sheikh Munsoor*, that both of these Chiefs are maintaining an active correspondence with *Sheikh Mooluk*, the Chief of the *Khuzal* and that the *Alboo Hossein*, though not located within the limits of the territory under the control of *Sheikh Mooluk*, are, as weaker neighbours, certainly amenable to his influence in almost an equal degree with the tribes who

* They are even so termed in the Turkish Reports. *Sheikh Mooluk* is *quasi* independent; his coercion has been repeatedly attempted without success. He pays a moderate tribute, but refuses to render homage in person.

acknowledge themselves "his subjects."* If, therefore, it should prove that the *Sheikh* of the *Khuzal*, yielding to the counsels of *Sheikh Munsoor* or suspecting some design upon his own independence, has instigated this new revolt, prepared himself hereafter to support the rebels, I apprehend that the force under the command of Hafiz Pasha will be found inadequate to the restoration of tranquility, and that, of the policy of coercion initiated by Namik Pasha is to be persisted in, additional troops must be sent to this province to give it effect. Rumours are already rife of disturbances in other quarters and of *Sheikh Munsoor* having again crossed into Mesopotamia, but they have not as yet been authenticated. Of the three guns which fell into the hands of the Arabs, two have been brought back to Diwanieh by a small tribe of *Syed* whose abode is situated near the scene of the engagement; the third is said to have been conveyed to *Sheikh Munsoor's* camp, but being useless to Arabs, I incline to think that its non-restoration is more probably to be attributed to its submersion in the river, or to its transport being otherwise rendered impracticable. I should mention here as an incident of the Mont-firg rebellion that *Sheikh Munsoor* was at an early stage joined by Osman Beg, formerly Mudeer of Sumaweh and a defaulter to the treasury, who, on his supersession in office, sought this means of evading his liabilities. From his capacity and position little importance is due to this man's defection, but he is reported to have been very active of late in directing the operations of the Arabs, to whose cause a certain degree of prestige must accrue from his adhesion.

Osman Beg is the son of the late Mahomed Pasha Injeh Beyrabadar, for many years Governor of Mosul.

As regards the telegraph, despairing now, after nearly a year's trial, of the ability of Namik Pasha to open the way for its construction, I believe that one of the only courses left to the Porte to effect this object is either that I should be permitted at length to act independently and to negotiate directly with the Arabs for a safe conduct, or that a campaign should be undertaken and vigorously prosecuted with a sufficient force to subdue the districts on either banks of the Euphrates from Diwanieh to the sea. I adhere to the conviction I have uniformly expressed, that with the good will of the Turkish official British Agents dealing directly with the Arabs would experience no difficulty in carrying out the undertaking. But under Namik Pasha's rule the proposed policy would be certainly impracticable. The occurrences at Fao on the occasion of the landing of the cable have served to illustrate the extreme jealousy of His Excellency at anything like independent action on our part, and your Excellency is aware that every offer from me to place myself in communication with the revolted Chiefs personally or by letter, with the view of furthering our telegraphic purposes to induce their submission to Turkish authority, has been systematically rejected on the ground of His Excellency's aversion to every form of Foreign intervention; nor in a patriotic point of view, perhaps could His Excellency be blamed for preferring the second course to which I have referred, but its adoption would occupy time, and would probably entail a greater sacrifice of revenue and a greater substantive outlay than the Porte would be willing to incur.



Before concluding this despatch, I beg Your Excellency to pardon me for alluding to a matter of a personal nature. Great disappointment is naturally felt in England at the non-completion of the Mesopotamian telegraph, and success being taken as the test of efficiency, the discredit of failure is to a certain extent, I understand, reflected upon myself. How far my efforts have been rightly directed Your Excellency can alone judge, but if they could have been so fortunate as to gain your approval, I respectfully hope that in the measures under contemplation I may be honoured with Your Excellency's support and permitted at least to accomplish a task of which, having been once entrusted with its execution, I could not but feel it a disparagement to be relieved at the last stage.

No. 39, dated the 13th July 1864.

From—COLONEL A. B. KEMBALL, C.B., Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad,

To—HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE SIR H. L. BULWER, G.C.B., Her Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

The Rais Pasha, with about 2,000 Regular Troops, 350 Irregular Cavalry, and a large Arab Contingent, marched from Diwanieh on the evening of the 21st instant.

Previous to the departure of his expedition the Beni Zeraij, a tribe located in Mesopotamia between Runneythah and Elkhidr, who are at feud with the *Alboossein* and *Dhuwaylim*, the tribes who defeated the Turkish detachment, were invited by the Government to co-operate against the latter, and, according to a telegram received yesterday by Namik Pasha, had already commenced the attack and inflicted much loss upon the tribes in question, when the troops coming up completed their discomfiture. The missing gun is reported to have been recovered and 60 or 70 of the Arabs killed, with the loss of only two killed and three wounded on the side of the Turks and 10 killed and wounded amongst the auxiliaries.

From letters received from Sheikh *Fahud* it would seem that an incursion made by Suleyman, the son of the rebel Chief *Munsoor*, into Mesopotamia had been successfully resisted, and that *Munsoor* and his adherents had been compelled to return to the right bank of the Euphrates: Sheikh *Fahud* at the same time announces his intention to advance from the Hye to Durojee, taking with him the detachment of troops, consisting of 300 men and one gun, which was left at Shutreh by the Rais Pasha. It is to be hoped that, owing to the weakness or defection of its Arab supporters, so small a force may not a second time be exposed to the attacks of overwhelming numbers.

From Bussorah Mr. Johnston reports that the Beni Malik had attacked and plundered some of the tribes friendly to government, but had been checked by the arrival of Mahomed Pasha with a detachment of regular troops in one of the Turkish steamers.

Osman Beg has surrendered himself to the authorities of Diwanieh; a price offered for his head appears to have induced him to take this step.

No. 43, dated the 10th August 1864.

From—COLONEL A. B. KEMBALL, C.B., Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad,

To—HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE SIR H. L. BULWER, G.C.B., Her Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

The expedition under Rais Hafiz Pasha, after gaining a further advantage over the rebel tribes in its progress towards Sumaweh, has made good its march to that place. The action

is reported to have occurred on the banks of the Abou Chelb. The loss of the Arabs was excessive, being stated at not less than 600 in killed and wounded, including women and children, for little quarter was confessedly given on the occasion and much cattle and booty fell into the hands of the troops.

This victory is confidently believed by Namik Pasha to have put an end to the rebellion, and if, as Mr. Johnston reports by a telegram from Bussorah, dated 4th instant (received at Bagdad in four days), Sheikh *Munsoor* be really preparing to retire to Koweit on his way to Nedjd, the hope is thus afforded of tranquillity being for a time restored, the more especially that the *Khuzail* Chief, whose conduct was regarded with much suspicion by the Government,

has abstained from overtly assisting the rebel tribes, and that Sheikh *Fahud** has succeeded in joining Hfiza Pasha at Sumaweh. The loss on the Turkish side is said not to have exceeded nine killed and wounded.

The above are the details derived from Turkish sources. I am bound to add, however, that, according to native information, the tribes plundered by the troops were not those in rebellion, which tribes, previous to the engagement reported by last post, had removed their families and chattels to the *Khuzail* districts, but pastoral tribes, who had previously sent peace offerings to the commander of the Turkish force, and had been assured by him of immunity from molestation. The capture of so large a number of 17,000 sheep, acknowledged by the Turks and the undoubted slaughter of women and children under circumstances, it is said, of great atrocity (whereas revolted Arabs are wont to place their flocks and families in safety when expecting to be attacked) give some color of truth to this version of the affair.

Accounts from Bussorah continue to be satisfactory, the threatened movements in that quarter having been apparently suppressed.



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(vii) Disturbances among Khazail, Montefek and other tribes: construction of the telegraph line, 1864-66.

143. An expedition was now organized by Namik Pasha against the *Khazail* tribe, whose Chief Sheikh *Mutluk* had recently nearly dragged himself into open rebellion in conjunction with the ex-Chief of the Muntefiks, Sheikh *Mansur*.

No. 50, dated the 7th September 1864.

From—COLONEL A. B. KEMBALL, C.B., Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad,

To—HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE SIR H. L. BULWER, G.C.B., Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

His Excellency Namik Pasha has engaged in new military combinations, which, I apprehend, may not only compel the postponement of operations for the construction of the Mesopotamian Telegraph, but may even bar their prosecution for another year.

The object of the present expedition is the coercion of the *Khuzail* tribe, originally Bedowin, but which, having been located many years in the neighbourhood of Shenafieh, has exercised dominancy over the more settled communities inhabiting the districts situated between that place and Nijef on the one side and Aboo Juwareed on the other. To this end a force, consisting of 3,000 regular troops and 1,000 irregulars, marched from Dewanieh on the 4th instant. The offence of Sheikh *Mootluk*, Chief of *Khuzail*, who is also the appointed farmer of the above districts under Government, is not that he has failed to discharge his revenue liabilities, for it is admitted that he has even supplemented the punctual payment of tribute by presents of horses and also money, or that he took an overt part in the late revolt, but that he has declined to do homage in person to the Turkish authorities, and that he has harboured the *Dhuwaylim* and *Alboo* Hussan tribes, who lately cut up a Turkish detachment.

Before undertaking this measure His Excellency did me the honor to consult me regarding it. I said that however patriotic His Excellency's desire to reduce the larger tribes of Turkish Arabia under complete control, I was of opinion that the force at his disposal was unequal to the purpose, not, perhaps, to beat the Arabs wherever they should encounter the main body of the troops, but to maintain the positions which might be successively occupied; and that in consequence, and for a period probably very protracted, not only would the highways of communication be rendered impassable, but the settled districts would be exposed to incursions, leading, of course to the usual results, a desolated country, stoppage of trade, and loss of revenue, which, sooner or later, must oblige the Government to compromise its aims and to restore matters to their normal condition. I readily admitted that the dominancy of the Arabs over the most fertile portions of this province was a great evil; but it was an evil which could not be overcome by isolated and convulsive efforts at coercion, and was assuredly the lesser evil compared with the state of anarchy accruing upon failure. On my instancing the more recent case of the *Montefik* tribe, His Excellency did not deny that the attempt to establish Turkish rule at Sukesh Shiookh had had this issue. Sheikh *Fuhud*, the Government nominee, after the defection of Sheikh Munsoor, had declined to visit Bagdad for the purpose of being invested; had even declined to assume the functions of his office until provided with the contract whereby the Government was bound to relinquish for three years the policy it had initiated; and, mistrusting still the assurances given by His Excellency, had purposely abstained from exerting his authority to restore order, while he refused positively to co-operate in any expedition against Sheikh *Mootluk*. The official year would lapse on the 11th instant, and one thousand purses only had been paid by Sheikh *Fuhud* in the form of revenue. Up to a very late date this Chief, though apparently master of the position and acknowledged by all the *Montefik* tribes, had not advanced beyond Durajee, the limit of his own territory: and though twice called upon to furnish a safe conduct to the boats laden with telegraph materials, or with grain destined for Jelda, he had as often professed his inability to do so, on the ground that his rival was unsubdued and that the river was open to his incursions. Viewing all the circumstances of the case and the obligations which weighed upon His Excellency, the present time, I thought, would be specially ill-chosen for the movement under contemplation; its effect would be to unite Sheiks *Mootluk* and Munsoor in a common cause, and by confirming the fears of Sheikh *Fuhud* for his own independence, completely alienate that Chief also from the side of Government.

For some days His Excellency appeared to hesitate between a policy of conciliation and the employment of military force; but his own proclivities being in the latter direction and being urged by flatterers, whom I believe to be so little his friends as to desire to involve him in difficulties which should lead to his recall, he took his final resolution in the manner above stated. That Sheikh *Mootluk* and his adherents would retire before the troops, as he is now reported to have done by a telegraphic despatch from Dewanieh, was of course only to be expected; but the result will belie all past experience if his withdrawal into the desert be not the forerunner of serious and extended disturbances.

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During the period employed in deliberation, Namik Pasha instructed Sameh* Effendi to inform me by letter that he had determined to resume operations for the construction of the telegraph, and to invite me to depute English Engineers and to form working parties for this purpose: my reply addressed to His Excellency is embodied in a despatch to the India Office, of which copy is enclosed. Were the materials distributed an operation to be effected by Turkish officials, I should be prepared at once to enter upon the work; but, after due reflection, His Excellency has determined not to challenge the disappointment of the Porte and of Her Majesty's Government by exposing these stores to loss in transit pending the issue of the expedition to Shenafieh.

Dated Bagdad, the 31st August 1864.

From—COLONEL A. B. KEMBALL, C.B., Political Agent in Turkish Arabia,

To—The Under-Secretary of State for India, India Office, London.

I have the honor to report, for the information of Sir Charles Wood, that additional materials for 40 miles of line have been lately received at Bussorah from Bombay, and that the stores at my disposal are now amply sufficient to complete the Mesopotamian Telegraph.

Already Namik Pasha has proposed to me to resume operations for this purpose; but as His Excellency is preparing a military expedition to coerce Sheik Mootluk, the powerful Chief of the Khuzail tribe, located not far from Samaweh, and as the rebel Montefig Chief, Munsoor, who is still at large may probably join the Khuzail, drawing with him the disaffected portion of his own tribe, I do not feel equally sanguine with His Excellency of tranquillity being restored; nor should I be justified, I believe in exposing my European employés under canvas, to the malaria of the marshes, until materials shall have been distributed along the banks of the Euphrates and until the weather shall have become cooler, conditions both which will need a full month to be realized. A brief delay at this season, with the view of certifying our objects, must be comparatively immaterial; but did any considerable portion of stores fall into the hands of revolted Arabs, or become swamped in the river, the work must necessarily be postponed for another year, and the risks of such a contingency would, of course, be imminent pending the issue of the plans now under prosecution by His Excellency.

No. 9, dated the 8th March 1865.

From—COLONEL A. B. KEMBALL, C.B., Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad,

To—THE HON'BLE WILLIAM STUART, Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Constantinople.

I have again received letters from Sheik Mootluk of Khuzail asking my intercession in his behalf with Namik Pasha; but yesterday His Excellency spontaneously showed me the reply he had already sent to this Chief requiring his unconditional surrender at Bagdad, where on his making his submission in person, he would be permitted to reside without molestation. As the occasion did not thus justify any allusion to the appeal he had made to myself, I simply observed that Sheik Mootluk might sooner or later give trouble to Government if driven to desperation.

Sheik Munsoor of the Montefig is located with his immediate adherents in the desert, about six hours from Sukesh-Shiookh; but unable, of course, to cope with Sheik Fuhud, the Government nominee, he is powerless to create disturbances during that Chief's tenure of the Sheikship.

Namik Pasha also informed me yesterday of the success of an expedition organized by His Excellency from Sulimaniah and Kerkook to hunt down the Hemawund freebooters, who, to the scandal and discredit of the Turkish Authorities, have so long infested Shahrizor. Intelligence from other sources confirms this issue to the extent of the surrender of Fakak-Kadir, one of the Hemawund Chiefs, and the capture of a number of his followers, with their families and property; but the results can hardly be considered complete, if, as my informant from the spot adds, one of the worst offenders, Kak-Ahmed, and some seventy horsemen are still at large to levy black mail on the villages and commit depredations upon the settled inhabitants.

The difficulties of the expedition were of course increased by the sympathy which the Hamawund receive from the quasi-independent tribes on the Turco-Persian Frontier.

No. 16, dated the 5th April 1865.

From—COLONEL A. B. KEMBALL, C.B., Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad,

To—THE HON'BLE WILLIAM STUART, Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Constantinople.

Sheik Fuhud has come to Bagdad to receive the insignia of investiture as Chief of the Montefig tribes, which usually herald similar appointments, but which were postponed in his



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case until he should present himself in person to do homage to Namik Pasha. His Excellency informed me, shortly after Sheik Fuhud's arrival, that he would certainly observe his pledge to confirm the terms on which the office had been conferred upon him, and the period of its tenure being three years, dating from September 1863; but His Excellency affected so far to countenance the candid nature of Sheikh Nassir, accompanied with offers of increased tribute, as to induce the former Chief to accept liability for the arrears due by his predecessor, the late Sheik Bunder. This Sheik Fuhud has done, and the issue augurs well for the continued success of the Mesopotamian Telegraph, while the administration of the Mont-fiq districts remains in his hands.

The report of the success of the late expedition against the Hamawund proves to be premature. These freebooters, exasperated by the pursuit to which they were subjected and by the capture of some of their harems, proceeded to infest the road and to burn down villages and levy black-mail throughout the districts of Shahrizor; and finally, doubling back upon Sulimanieh in the absence of the garrison, they threatened that town with pillage. I subjoin, for your Excellency's information, certain items of intelligence which have reached me from the spot, and which are in the main confirmed, I find, by the reports received by Namik Pasha. Troops have been sent from Bagdad to reinforce the detachments now operating against the Hamawund; but His Excellency, I understand, though not from himself, since he cannot coerce, has directed Tekkee-ood-deen Pasha, Governor of Kerkook, to revert to the system of subsidizing these turbulent borders.

No. 41, dated the 23rd August 1865.

From—COLONEL A. B. KEMBALL, C.B., Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad,

To—HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE SIR H. L. BULWER, G.C.B., Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

The expedition of Shibli Pasha against the Bahatha and the inhabitants of Bedoor ended as usual in the retreat of the disaffected tribe, after a short conflict, into the marshes of Doghara and Effej, and in the partial destruction of their mud forts on the borders of the marsh. Namik Pasha believes that the report of a conflict is without foundation, and that the Bahatha and Bedoor people, alarmed at the approach of the troops, entered into engagements to pay up the arrears of revenue for which they are accountable; but as His Excellency in conversation with myself rather depreciated the administrative capacity of Shibli Pasha, while he praised the energy and activity of that officer, I infer that he is not altogether satisfied with the result of the expedition. The two refugee Khuzail Chiefs have affected their escape beyond the Euphrates.

Sheikh Abdul Muhsin, the Anezeh Chief, has, on the remonstrance of Namik Pasha, caused Sheikh Mootluk to remove from his camp, but has professed his inability to control Sheikh Sumair. The adherents of this Chief, supported by Dughaim, a relative of Abdul Muhsin, have in the meantime proclaimed their defiance of the Government by carrying off 100 camels belonging to the inhabitants of Bagdad, and grazing in the immediate vicinity of the city.

More than usual excitement would appear, indeed, to actuate the Bedowin tribes this year. Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mosul advises me that a formidable body of Anezeh, since estimated by Turkish Official Report at 4,000 horsemen and camel riders, have crossed the Euphrates into Mesopotamia, but whether in Ghuzzoo only (plundering expedition), or followed presently by their tribesmen in still greater force to possess themselves of the Shammer pasture grounds, is yet uncertain. The latter design may, perhaps, be inferred from a telegram which reached Namick Pasha yesterday from the Governor of Mosul, announcing that a portion of the Shammer were preparing to cross the Tigris into Assyria, in order to avoid the threatened attack; if so, considerable disorder must ensue. The presence of Bedowins in the cultivated districts, whether as invaders or refugees, is almost equally to be dreaded, and however gladly His Excellency would restrict the conflicts between these large Nomad tribes to the waste lands west of Mosul, he is unhappily powerless alike to prevent the encroachment of the one, or the retreat of the other.

No. 20, dated the 25th October 1865.

From—COLONEL A. B. KEMBALL, C.B., Her Majesty's Political Agent and Consul-General at Bagdad,

To—HIS EXCELLENCY SIR C. ALISON, C.B., Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Persia, Tehran.

The Mesopotamian Sections of the telegraph from Bagdad to Fao have, I believe, uniformly worked well as double lines since the date of their construction. The Inspector in charge of those sections, Mr. Carthew, is an efficient officer. The mode of maintenance as in the first instance established differs only from the system generally prevailing in Turkey by the re-duplication of the Chaooshes in the persons of Native "Musseyers," or escorts, at those points, where the administration of the country is vested in Arab Sueiks. While tranquillity



prevailed, I should experience the utmost confidence in the complete efficiency of these sections and for another year at least, ending September 1866, the condition of tranquillity is secured, by the incumbency of *Sheik Fuhud*, to whose tenure of office as Chief of the *Montefig* tribes the Turkish Executive is pledged for that period.

No. 18, dated the 16th May 1866.

From—COLONEL A. B. KEMBALL, C.B., Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad,

To—HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD LYONS, G.C.B., Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

Sheik Mootluk, Chief of the *Khazzail*, whose expulsion from the districts of the Shamieh west of Sumaweh, and subsequent movements have been duly reported by me, has at length

accepted the amnesty offered to him by Namik Pasha, and has come to Bagdad to do homage to His Excellency preparatory to entering upon the occupation of lands on the eastern banks of the Tigris, which have been assigned for the location of himself and his immediate adherents.

The districts in question, though nominally farmed by *Sheik Mootluk*, had been for many years subject to his independent control. It was therefore for a time doubtful if a system of apportionment amongst minor Sheiks, now rendered directly accountable to Government, could be successfully maintained: but the rights and interests of the new lessees being effectively supported by a military force, they were alike encouraged and enabled to defeat *Mootluk's* repeated efforts to recover his predominance. On the other hand, the rapacity of the Bedouin tribes, with whom he was obliged to seek asylum, and from whom (their allowances being regularly paid by Government) he failed to obtain open and continuous assistance, has sickened *Sheik Mootluk* of a life of vagrancy in the desert.

The example of *Sheik Mootluk* is likely sooner or later, I believe, and for the same reasons, to be followed by *Sheik Munsoor*, the recusant Chief of the *Montefig*, who is at present encamped among the Dhefyr. As anticipated, the appointment of *Sheik Fuhud*, the present incumbent, whose tenure of the Sheikship extends to September next, at once deprived *Munsoor* of the hope of successful opposition and placed him in a condition of onerous dependence on the Bedouin Sheiks; but this Chief being more seriously compromised by the act of open rebellion, of which he was guilty, is also more diffident of Turkish promises of pardon and good treatment; and as Namik Pasha will tolerate no guarantee beyond his own words he may yet for a while defer his coming to Bagdad.

Sheik Nassir, the brother of *Sheik Munsoor*, who by his timely submission escaped the proscription that fell upon the latter, has proceeded on a pilgrimage to Mecca. He will, however, return in time to compete for the farm of the *Montefig* Districts in September next, when, as usual, I presume, the Government will take advantage of the rivalry of candidates to raise the value of the lease. As the security of the Mesopotamian Telegraph must depend for the time upon the policy then pursued, it is to be hoped that the system referred to will not be carried too far, or give place to the same futile attempts to assume the direct administration of the country which so seriously impeded the construction of the line in 1863-64.

(viii) Robbery of a caravan by Arab tribes, 1866.

144. In 1866 a caravan carrying British goods was plundered near Anneh on the Euphrates by the Fuddaan and Subaa branches of the Anezeh tribe. The details of this incident are given below:—

No. 41, dated the 17th October 1866.

From—COLONEL SIR ARNOLD KEMBALL, C.B., AND K.C.S.I., Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad,

To—HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD LYONS, G.C.B., Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

Referring to my despatch No. 30, dated 25th July last, I have the honour to report the plunder of a caravan coming by the direct desert route from Aleppo. After crossing the Euphrates at Anneh, a section of this caravan, consisting of 75 camels with their loads, being goods of English manufacture to the value of £6,000, left the usual track and struck across Mesopotamia; but, presently encountering foraging parties of the Fuddaan and Subaa branches of the Bedouin Anezeh under Sheikhs *Ibn Muhad* and *Egugee*, was captured and carried off. Its Agail leader, though warned against quitting the main body of the caravan, relied for immunity in doing so upon his connection by marriage with an Anezeh family, or, as is by some supposed, he deliberately conducted his charge into an ambush preconcerted with his Bedouin friends. Forty of the 75 camels have been returned to their owners, and the remainder will probably be restored; but of the recovery of their loads, belonging exclusively to Turkish subjects, among whom are the late and the present *precvois des marchands*, no prospect whatever



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exists. To the remonstrances of Namik Pasha the one Sheikh has returned no reply; the other: pleading the contumacy of his followers, has boldly referred His Excellency to the sword as the only means of vindicating the authority of the Government: and His Excellency's threats of reprisals and of stopping the Musabich (permission to traffic with the towns) are, as usual, invalidated by the dread of provoking general disturbance and by the impossibility of distinguishing the real offenders. For the rest a sudden fall in the price of long-cloths, etc., is a sure indication that the plunderers have already bartered their booty to pedlars and petty traders.

The great Bedouin tribes have now moved down to their usual autumn seats, the Shammar, on the line of the Figris on the right bank of this river to within 10 or 12 miles of Bagdad, and the *Anezeh*, on the line of the Euphrates on either bank of that river to Mussaib and in the vicinity of Kerbela and Nejjeff. They are, however, so far subservient to the behests of their subsidized Chiefs as to abstain from invading the cultivated districts and from infesting the high-ways. *Sheikh Ferhan*, Chief of the *Shammar*, came, into Bagdad on the 15th instant, his object being to carry his camps south of Bagdad, to which movement permission has as yet been denied him by Namik Pasha. Owing to the converging course of the two rivers at this point, his position there would expose his retreat to be cut off did he defy the Government and drive it to coalesce with the *Anezeh* against him. This resource is, of course, the chief instrument of control which the Provincial Authorities possess over the rival Bedouin tribes, but, owing to the full appreciation by the latter of their common interests, apart from the mere acquisition of plunder, and to the difficulty of leading such allies to discriminate the property of friends and foes, one of dangerous and doubtful efficacy, and only to be employed in extremity.

The appointment of a Sheikh to the *Montifig* districts is still in abeyance. *Sheikh Fuhud*, whose lease expired last month, is presently expected to arrive at Bagdad, and although it appears probable that he will be re-invested for three years, advantage will doubtless be taken of the candidature of *Sheikh Nassir* to induce him to accept the higher rate of rent and other concessions promised by his rival.

Cholera has been present at Bagdad during the past 50 days, but in a mild form, the greatest number of deaths from the malady registered in one day by the Quarantine Department having been 15. The epidemic is also dying out in the districts.

No. 48, dated the 28th November 1866.

From—COLONEL SIR A. B. KEMBALL, Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad,

To—HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD LYONS, G.C.B., Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

A fair prospect exists of compensation being recovered to a limited extent for the property plundered from a caravan coming from Aleppo, as reported in my despatch, No. 41 of 17th ultimo.

This end has been attained by the instrumentality of the *Anezeh* Chief, *Abdool Muhsen*, supported by a Turkish Military Force, of which, however, the employment was not needed; and the result has been the surrender of camels and cattle, of which the sale may probably realize, for the benefit of the consequences, one-half the value of their consignment. So far recourse had not been had to force, but a division having occurred among the offending tribes, which led to the secession of several families, *Sheikh Abdool Muhsen* fell upon the latter and plundered their camp, though not, it seems, on the account of Government, for the booty so obtained is claimed as fair prize by himself and his followers, and of 2,000 camels captured, only 142 were secured by his Irregular Turkish Auxiliaries, and of these, 82 only, very inferior animals, have reached Bagdad.

Owing to the operations of the Local Government to effect the promised supply of grain to Jeddah, the prices of wheat and barley have risen to double the ordinary rates, and considerable discontent has been engendered in consequence amongst the town populations. This feeling is justified by the well-founded conviction that the distress which is experienced is not the result of any real scarcity, but has been occasioned by the competition of the Government and the monopoly to which it has had recourse of the means of transport in order to secure the consignments required. Appeals made to His Excellency by deputations of the people, including a mob of women, have been productive of little relief, and His Excellency observed to the French Consular Dragoman that high prices ruling temporarily were in the present case no evil, seeing that, owing to a famine in India, grain might otherwise be drained out of the country. It may be inferred that His Excellency's measures have been taken with a design, the more especially that the shipments to Jeddah for the current year have been completed, and that the grain now somewhat prematurely stored is destined for exportation next autumn. I need hardly inform your Lordship that Namik Pasha's fears, real or pretended, with respect to the famine in the distant districts of Bengal, are wholly groundless. No vessels have come this year to Bussorah to carry away grain to India, though the charterers of one or two vessels seeking their annual cargoes for the Mauritius have been this year disappointed. I have before expressed an opinion that the supply of grain to Jeddah, regarded as a mercantile speculation and freed from Government action, could, under proper management, be turned to excellent account in developing the resources of this country, but in the sense of

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encouraging extended cultivation, and not by hampering trade and agriculture, as under the existing system.

The salaries of all Government servants (from the highest and lowest employé, including the private soldier), which were sequestered by the Porte for the month of August, have aggregated for the whole province 4,436 purses, which amount has been already forwarded to the capital in specie. The forced contribution demanded from the population, and aggregating 7,000 purses, is in course of collection.

No. 51, dated the 12th December 1866.

From—COLONEL SIR A. P. KEMBALL, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad.

To—HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD LYONS, G.C.B., Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

The compensation recovered from the plunderers of the caravan coming from Aleppo is found to fall short of one-fourth of the value the property which fell into their hands. This

issue, though, indeed, reflecting credit upon the management of Namik Pasha as productive of a result more substantial than that which usually attends the ostensible efforts of the Turkish Executive to save appearances, is an additional instance only of their powerlessness in such cases. Nor does that result represent an un-mixed gain, for the Sabai and Fidaan offenders, angered at the co-operation of Sheikh Abdool Muhsen against them, have resorted, or pretended to resort, to retaliation, and, while seeking to surprise his outlying adherents, have intercepted a caravan with money to the amount of 85,000 G. S. purses passing from Nejjeff to Kerbela, which they have carried off.

As illustrating Turkish mode of procedure with respect even to the simpler form of highway robbery, apart from the organized depredations of Bedowin tribes, I beg to submit to your Lordship copy and translation of a letter which I addressed to Namik Pasha in August last in a case concerning the property of a British subject, together with a copy of the Report of the Governor of Kirkook to His Excellency on the same subject. These papers speak for themselves. I need hardly observe that the portion of value due by the robbers, who, though known, have evaded apprehension, has never been recovered.

Burglaries are by no means of unfrequent occurrence in this city, to often attended with murder, and during the past month three have been committed which were so characterized. In no case, however, can I recall the conviction of the burglars; the official opinion being that the institution of the Tanzimat when not supplemented by the machinery of police as organized in Europe forms as effectual bar to the detection of malefactors. In one of the three instances above mentioned the Office of a British Indian Merchant was forced and his watchman killed; but as on a former occasion, when the same

Office was robbed of £1,500, the perpetrators were discovered and lodged in jail, yet effected their escape under circumstances which implied the connivance of the Zabtieh, I may on the present occasion anticipate no better result when the burglars succeeded in putting out of the way the only witness of their act. Lest murder should follow, people, conscious of the inefficiency of the Police, though aware of the presence of thieves in their houses, abstain from giving the alarm.

The Bedowin, *Anezeh*, and *Shammer* tribes are now again moving to their northern and western pastures. Though here and there they have not refrained from pilfering the settled districts, their conduct generally has been free from wilful depredation.

Dated the 2nd August 1866.

From—COLONEL SIR A. B. KEMBALL, Her Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad,

To—HIS EXCELLENCY MAHOMED NAMIK PASHA, Governor-General, Baghdad.

A bale containing 65 pieces of calico, of the value of 423½ kerans, belonging to Agha Mahomed Hussein, having been robbed last year in the month of July on the road between Sharan and Bacooba, some of the robbers were apprehended and imprisoned by Tukkee-ed-deen Pasha.

Consequent upon repeated orders from your Excellency that Officer has at length succeeded in recovering from the individuals in question the sum of 148 kerans, which he has forwarded to Baghdad, and he reports that the balance is due by their associates, who are still at large.

I beg, however, to submit to Your Excellency that the practice of holding each robber responsible for his share of property plundered in company is scarcely just. In commercial transactions the liability of a partner may very properly be limited to the amount of capital he may have contributed to the concern; but such a principle could hardly be extended to malefactors, and I venture to hope that Your Excellency will be pleased to compel the individuals actually in custody to make good the balance still due to Agha Mahomed Hussein.



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(ix) The Montefik Arabs, 1872-1881: Sheikh Nasir.

145. In 1872 we find that Sheikh Nasir was employed by the Turkish authorities in settling the newly conquered districts of Hasa and Katif, and ultimately he himself was appointed Vali of the newly constituted Vilayat of Basrah, including Hasa and Katif (called Nejd). He founded the town of Nasariyah and restored peace and prosperity to the Vilayat.

146. Nasir Pasha proved himself too powerful for the Turks, and was, soon afterwards, quietly called to Constantinople and installed in honorable confinement as a Member of the Council.

147. In 1881 the Montefik Arabs were again in rebellion. We have seen already the policy attempted by Colonel Rawlinson and Colonel A. Kemball with some measure of success in acting as the intermediary between them and the Turkish authorities. How far their policy, if continued to follow, might have succeeded in establishing British influence among the Arabs on a permanent basis a matter of conjecture. His two successors Colonel Herbert and Colonel Nixon were however by no means fitted to carry out that policy; on the contrary their self-assertiveness and want of tact in dealing with the Turkish authorities would have stood in the way of success if the line of policy followed by their predecessors had been attempted.

Mr. Plowden was anxious to re-inaugurate the old scheme and the following despatch of his offering his suggestions in the matter will be read with interest:—

Dated Baghdad, 17th June 1881.

From—TREVOR CHICHELE PLOWDEN, Esq., Political Agent in Turkish Arabia and H. B. M. Consul-General, Baghdad,

To—EARL OF DUFFERIN, Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

In continuation of previous despatches, I beg to report that, although the local Government has been able as yet to hold its own, the state of affairs in the Montifk country continues extremely critical.

The telegraph line between Baghdad and Basrah has been cut, and the troops and the Arabs have twice come into collision. About three miles to the north of Nasariya there is an embankment, which prevents the water from a large marsh formed by the rivers Euphrates and Hai from overflowing and destroying that town, where the bulk of the Turkish forces on duty in the Montefik country are now stationed. On the 10th June a body of about 1,000 Arabs ascended the marsh in the skiffs and endeavoured to cut the embankment, which was defended by the troops. The fight lasted for two hours, and ended in the defeat of the Arabs, some thirty of whose boats were sunk.

On the following day the Arabs attacked Nasariyah, but were beaten off with a loss, it is said, of 150 men.

2. There is considerable uncertainty as to the policy which the local authorities at Baghdad are likely to pursue in this matter. The dispatch of additional troops to Nasariya, and the issue of the order, copy of which was inclosed in my letter of the 3rd June, appeared to indicate a determination to adopt rigorous and uncompromising measures. But the impression exists that, whether under instructions from the Porte or as the result of a more careful survey of the actual situation, more moderate counsels now prevail. Thus I am informed that the Porte has condemned the dispatch of additional troops to Nasariya, as an irritating and uncalled-for proceeding, has given a conciliatory reply to *Mansour Pasha's* telegram explaining the cause of his flight, and has sent a reassuring message to *Faleh Pasha*, who, in the absence of his father *Nasir Pasha* (under detention at Constantinople), is probably the most influential personage amongst the Montifk and their subordinate tribes. It is said that the point under immediate consideration is whether *Faleh Pasha* should be appointed Mutesarifi of Nasariya, or whether a Special Commissioner should be sent to the spot to inquire into matters and promote an arrangement. If the latter measure be adopted, everything will depend upon the character and ability of the officer who may be selected, and on the powers with which he may be entrusted. Three persons have been mentioned as likely to be sent. They are all small men, and will not, I think, carry any weight; I should doubt, also, whether any of them is in a position to resist the pecuniary temptations with which he will probably be confronted. Recently, however, I have heard that the Vali's Adjutant (*Moavin*)

* See Chapter VIII



Ataalla Effendi may possibly be chosen. This man belongs to the Ulema class, and enjoys a high reputation for astuteness and capacity for intrigue. He is on good terms with the Montifik Sheikhs, and is believed to have inspired the measures, which enabled the late Vali Abdul Rabam Pasha to effect last year a temporary settlement of the Montifik grievances. Probably, therefore, he is the best man to send; he will promise everything, and if he can succeed in dividing the interests of the different Sheikhs or induce them to believe once more in the possibility of the Ottoman Government fulfilling its engagements, the difficulty may be tided over. At any rate, time will be gained, and this is a point of no small importance, for if the plague ceases presently, as people hope, and the quarantine is removed, a number of troops will become available for repressive operations. There remains the other expedient of appointing Faleh Pasha, or some other member of the *Al-Sadoon* (the ruling family of the Montifik tribe), Mutessarif of Nasariyah. If this measure be adopted, tranquillity will be at once restored, and the revenues of the rich tract occupied by the Montifik will be realized with more or less punctuality. The objection is, that if the *Al-Sadoon* are invested with civil authority as recognized Government officials in addition to the power which they exercise as Sheikhs of a numerous and wealthy tribe, they will become strong enough to set at naught superior authority, and, possibly, secure their independence.

3. No doubt this view of the case deserves consideration; nevertheless, I hold that, even from the Ottoman standpoint, the appointment of one of the *Al-Sadoon* as Mutessarif of Nasariya is the best expedient of which the circumstances admit. Its immediate effect in calming local agitation is certain; it will put the Turks in funds, and give them time to make their preparations for dealing effectually with the *Al-Sadoon* in case the latter should show signs of an intention to lift their heads too high.

Moreover, the *Al-Sadoon* cannot acquire their much-dreaded influence in a day; their principal Sheikh, Nasir Pasha, is in honourable detention at Constantinople, while the Sheikhs on the spot are mutually jealous, and could, by skilful management, be pitted against each other in the ordinary Oriental fashion. At the present juncture, a temporizing policy seems to me essential, for although the Turkish troops at Nasariya do not exceed 1,500 men, the

Infantry 300, Cavalry 300, Artillery 250, total garrison at Baghdad has been reduced to the 850 men.

number shown in the margin, and could not safely spare any reinforcements. Of two expedients to gain time that one appears preferable which offers the greatest certainty of relief from present embarrassments, while the danger which may possibly result from it is remote, and can be watched and guarded against. And it is better for the Turks to do voluntarily and with a good grace that which, if the mission of Ataalla Effendi should fail, they may otherwise have to do on compulsion.

4. I venture to add the following observations on the course which it might be advantageous to our interest in these parts to pursue. The Montifik are the wealthiest and most powerful tribe in Southern Mesopotamia, and dominate the whole Lower Euphrates down to the walls of Busrah, a place of growing commercial importance, and possessing a considerable trade both with Western India and England. *Their influence might, under certain eventualities, be of the utmost value to our interests, and their friendship is worth an effort to secure.*

For example, if the Montifik Sheikhs had been in power at Nasariya, I question whether the "Khalifah" outrage would ever have occurred, and their co-operation now affords probably the best chance of capturing Seyhood, the ringleader in that affair. If, through British intervention, the Vilayat of Busrah could be reconstituted—it was only abolished last year in consequence of the failure of Zabit Pasha's repressive policy towards the Montifik—and Nasir Pasha be reappointed Vali, there would be an end of these disturbances on the Lower Tigris and Euphrates which have done so much injury to local commerce, and we should have at Busrah a strong and capable ruler, friendly to British interests, unless his character has changed during his enforced stay at Constantinople, in place of a Vali 500 miles off at Baghdad, who is enfeebled by old age, and whose principal characteristic is a fanatical dislike to all Europeans. If this measure is not feasible, the next best arrangement would be the appointment of Faleh Pasha as Mutassarif of Nasariya.

We are concerned in the matter, not only for political reasons, but also in defence of our commercial interests which are seriously damaged by the continuance of strife between the Turks and the Arabs, which makes the Tigris unsafe, and renders possible the occurrence of such outrages as the attack last year on the "Khalifah."

148. In accordance with Mr. Plowden's suggestions Lord Dufferin proposed to Assim Pasha (Foreign Minister) the appointment of Nasir Pasha as Vali of Basrah, or if that arrangement was not possible, of his son Faleh Pasha as Mutassarif of Nasariya. Assim Pasha explained that the jealousy among Montefik Arabs was so great, that it was very difficult to arrive at a permanent settlement and that Nasir Pasha's appointment had been already tried and failed (Lord Dufferin's despatch No. 613, dated 26th July 1881).

* See Chapter XX (iii).



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(x) Recent Turkish relations with the Shammar tribes of Mesopotamia, 1889.

149. The Shammar Jerbah tribes came into prominence again in 1889. It appears from a report of Colonel Henry Trotter, Military Attaché, British Embassy at Constantinople (dated 3rd April 1889) that the Shammar tribes of Mesopotamia emigrated about 200 years ago from Jebel Shammar in North Arabia, and that their Chief Sheikh Farhan is a blood relation of Ibn Rashid of Hayil. Mr. Robertson however in his report No. 247, dated 29th July 1889, thought otherwise, though, at the same time, he speaks of the consanguinity between two Shammar tribes of Arabia and Mesopotamia.

150. In the report quoted above, Colonel Trotter brought to the notice of the British Embassy the raids committed by the Shammar Arabs of Mesopotamia and the measures taken by the Turkish Government to punish them by despatching a battalion of troops against Sheikh Farhan. But the Chief appears to have made a timely submission and made every reparation by restoring the plundered property and offering presents to the Commander of the battalion.

(xi) Arab risings on the Tigris between Amara and Kurna.

Revolt of Sheikh Sayhud and his Arabs, 1892.

151. In April 1892, there was a rising of a large number of Arabs against the Turkish Government under the leadership of one Sheikh Sayhud. Telegraphic communication between Baghdad and Basrah was interrupted. Several native boats were plundered between Kalah Saleh and Kurna. The Turkish steamer *Mosul* was fired at Humay and compelled to return. Ezra's tomb was barricaded. The *Blosse* (Messrs. Lynch Brothers' steamer) when coming down the river was warned by the Mutassarif of Amara not to proceed further without a guard, which he was unable to furnish. But the steamer steamed down the river to Kurna without molestation. The Vali of Basrah left with troops for quelling the insurrection.

152. The *Khalifa* (Lynch's steamer) steamed up the river with a guard furnished by the Vali of Basrah and arrived at Amara without being molested.

153. On the night of the 3rd May 1892, a gang of Arab robbers broke into a shop in Basrah, killed two men, wounded one, and carried away a safe with valuable and cash. Sheikh Sayhud had built a strong and almost unpregnable fort amidst impassable marches $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Kalah Saleh. In the midst of the confusion, on the 20th of April the prisoners in the Turkish jail at Basrah overpowered the guards and 16 Arabs with a notorious assassin escaped from prison.

154. The origin of the insurrection appears to have been that a canal, which had hitherto been leased to Sheikh Sayhud, was in 1892, let to his nephew and that Sayhud's children were imprisoned by the Mutasarrif of Amara. Sheikh Yessar (a cousin of Sheikh Sayhud) declared himself for the Government and led his Arabs against the insurgents. Sheikh Sayhud was the brother-in-law of the Chief, the Beni Sad Arab, and appears to have received much secret assistance from them.

155. The Turkish authorities took prompt measures to protect the Consulate and the British ships by furnishing the necessary guards. As a further protection H. M. S. *Brisk*, which had gone to Basrah was detained until the insurrection was quelled.

156. For the purpose of quelling the insurrection, the principal means employed by the Turks was to set the Arabs against Arabs, while the Turkish troops marched near the scene of revolt without having the necessity of firing a shot, a precaution which they took in order to give no chance for blood feuds.

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157. The telegraphic communication was still interrupted when Major Jennings despatched his report on 11th May. But 65 native boats arrived at Basrah from Kalah Saleh and Amara in safety on the 12th May and reported that everything was quiet.

158. There appears to have been a recurrence of disturbances in the beginning of July, but at the close of the month the traffic on the Tigris was progressing without molestation from the Arabs.

(xii) Rising of Sheikh Hassan el Khayoun, 1899.

159. In April 1899, a depredation was committed on the Tigris between Kurna and Amara by Sheikh Hassan el Khayoun and his Arab followers, who numbered about 600 (Mr. Wratishlow's letter No. 21, dated 21st April 1899, to the British Embassy), and traffic between the two places was considerably endangered.

Sheikh Hassan el Khayoun, who appears to be the most influential Sheikh of the district, received formerly an annual allowance from the Turkish Government for the guard of the river and the maintenance of the telegraphic line between Kurna and Shatra. Some ten years ago, however, owing partly to the intrigues of certain Sheikhs of the Montefik district and partly to his own insubordination, difficulties arose between him and Hamdi Pasha, (Governor-General of Basrah), which ended in Hassan's breaking into open rebellion and being consequently declared an outlaw by the Turkish Government.

160. In May 1900 it was reported that the Sheikh had offered submission and petitioned for pardon. The petition was received by Mohsin Pasha and forwarded to the Sultan, with a strong recommendation.

(xiii) The Montefiks seek British protection and rebel against the Turks.

161. In his Despatch No. 54, dated 31st November 1899, Mr. Wratishlow, Consul at Barrah, reported that he had received a message from Suleiman Beg, son of Mansur Pasha al Sadun, late Sheikh of the Montefik Arabs, to the effect that he wished to send a confidential person to all upon British Consul. On the latter enquiring the object of the proposed visit, he was told that Suleiman Beg was discontented with the Turkish rule and wished to be taken under British protection. Mr. Wratishlow replied that in the circumstances the proposed interview was very undesirable, as he had no reason to believe that Her Majesty's Government were desirous of entering into relations with Suleiman Beg and it would result in unpleasantness to Suleiman Beg, if known to the Wali.

162. Abdul Rahman bin Feysal who had been a protégé of Sheikh Mubarak was reported to have left Koweit and proceeded against certain Shammar tribes about August 1900. It appears that he soon gained some slight successes over certain divisions of the Shammar tribes owing allegiance to Abdul Aziz Ibn Rashid and he then wrote to Sheikh Mubarak, asking him to send him reinforcements. His request was complied with, and acting under Mubarak's directions, the Bedouin tribes owing him allegiance assembled to support Abdul Rehman-bin-Feyzal.

163. About this time another raid on Abdul Aziz's people was made by Sadun, another friend of Mubarak's and, to all appearances, as part of the latter's general plan of campaign. This Sadun Pasha (he had received from the Sultan a rank bearing the title of Pasha) was nephew of the late Nasir Pasha, formerly Sheikh of the Montefik Arabs, to whose devotion to the Turkish cause was due the final submission of this tribes to the Sultan of Nassrye, and died. Sadun himself, was a confirmed rogue, and lived mainly by robbery. His last raid on



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Abdul Aziz's tribes was a great success and resulted in considerable booty. Followed by Abdul Aziz with a large force, and worsted in an encounter which appears, however, to have been only a petty skirmish, he retired with his men and most of his loot to Turkish territory.

164. Abdul Aziz, taking what was obviously the correct course, proceeded to the nearest Telegraph Office, at Suk-es-Shuyukh, and, put himself into communication with the Vali of Basrah, to whom he complained of the misdeeds of Sadun, a Turkish subject, and demanded redress. This Mohsin Pasha promised with alacrity, but he does not seem to have taken any energetic steps to carry out his undertaking. Sadun was said at the time to have fled into the marshes, but from his subsequent movements, it is evident that he could have retired to any very great distance from the desert path to Koweit. After some days' fruitless waiting, Abdul Aziz got impatient and threatened that, unless the Wali procured him immediate satisfaction, he would proceed forthwith to Koweit, and take it out of Mubarak, whom he regarded as the real author of the attacks made on him.

165. The main facts were telegraphed by Mr. de Bunsen to London on the 1st November, with a recommendation that a gunboat should go to Koweit to watch events. A previous telegram from Consul Shipley had reported matters at Koweit to be quiet and hostilities suspended; and a subsequent message (dated 2nd November) from Mr. de Bunsen withdrew his recommendation on the ground that the situation had improved, and that the Amir had promised to remain quiet pending settlement of his claims by an Imperial Commissioner. On the 9th November, therefore, the India Office recommended to the Foreign Office that no further action should be taken for the present; but a less reassuring account of the state of affairs having been received from the Admiralty on the following day (10th November), the India Office again addressed the Foreign Office (14th November), suggesting that a British Agent should be sent in a ship of war to ascertain the true state of affairs and to endeavour to warn the Amir of Nejd that no attack on Koweit would be allowed. It was further suggested that should it prove impossible to resist a land attack with the force available at the moment, the Sheikh should be offered a refuge and steps taken as soon as possible to repulse the invaders. Further news was received on the same day that an attack on Koweit by the Amir of Nejd was considered improbable, but possible; and that the Turks were reinforcing their garrison at Basrah. The Foreign Office agreed to the despatch of a gunboat, but added that no active measures should be taken without further reference to Her Majesty's Government. The Government of India were then instructed in Secretary of State's telegram dated 15th November 1900—

"Foreign Office are informing Admiralty that vessel should be detailed to take an Agent to Koweit to enquire state of affairs and endeavour to warn Nejd Amir, if necessary, not to attack Koweit. Preliminary steps will be taken by Admiralty to protect Sheikh if attacked, but no active measures for this purpose will be taken and no force landed to expel invader without further reference to Her Majesty's Government. I presume you will inform Naval Commander-in-Chief and send Resident, Bushire."

166. Meanwhile Mubarak's warlike preparations had been completed, and he proceeded to march northwards to meet Abdul Aziz. Thalib Pasha was then again despatched by the Vali of Basrah in hot haste to hold him back, but found he had already started. At the same time reinforcements were sent to the Turkish troops in the Montefik district, both from Basrah and Baghdad and Saiyid Ahmed Pasha was sent along with Ali Bessam, the Amir's Basrah Agent, to see Abdul Aziz, and do their best to induce him to go home, and leave his grievances in the hands of the Turks.

167. Sadun was now at Sakria, and Abdul Aziz near Samava in the Vilayet of Baghdad. The forces of Mubarak and Sadun effected a junction without much difficulty, and once united were equal, if not slightly superior in number, to the troops Abdul Aziz then had on the spot. This consideration joined to the presence of a considerable Turkish force

Political Resident's telegram, dated 14th November 1900, No. 42 of Secret E., February 1901, Nos. 22-107.



ready to intervene if necessary, lent additional weight to the Vali's arguments in favour of peace ; for, in Arab warfare, it is customary to force on a battle only when in overwhelming numbers, and in this case the inferior side usually anticipates the fray by a timely retreat. Any how, both parties agreed to return home, the Amir making the first move. Mubarak was accompanied on his homeward journey by the Mutessarif of Muntelik just to see him safe off the premises, and through this official, an interview was arranged between Mubarak and Mohsin Pasha which ended in the former offering his submission to the Porte. This took place at the Nakib's residence near Zobair on the 17th

No. 52 of Pros. cited. November 1900, and during the course of it, Mohsin was able to persuade the Sheikh to return to Basrah with him the same night. Next day they were for several hours at the Telegraph Office, communicating with Constantinople, and early on the 19th Mubarak started again for Koweit.

168. One of the conditions on which the Amir of Nejd was induced by the Vali of Basrah to withdraw was that Sadun Pasha should be hunted down and satisfaction should be obtained from both Sadun and Mubarak for the raids made into his territory. It was reported that late in November Major-General Mahomed Pasha, Daghestanli, was sent to conduct operations against Sadun, and actually captured him. But Sadun soon after escaped or perhaps was allowed to escape.

169. On 8th September 1902 Mr. Wratislaw (Consul, Basrah) reported to Sir N. O'Connor that a number of leading Montefik Arabs had applied to him to procure British nationality or protection on the ground that the Russian Consul at Baghdad has been issuing passports to Native Shiah of that district. Mr. Wratislaw replied that it was impossible for him to comply with their request. They then applied to the acting Russian Consul for protection. An answer was promised on return of the Consul who had been absent on leave. On his return it was reported that their application was preferred to the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople. We have not heard further as to what was the result of this application.

170. We next hear of the Montefik Arabs in connection with disturbances, in which Sadun Pasha plays an important part and Sheikh Mubarak was believed to have secretly embroiled himself. The origin of these disturbances was explained by Mr. Wratislaw in his despatch, dated November 21, 1903, to Sir O'Connor :—

"Sadun Pasha and his followers, whose wanderings are generally confined to the marshes west of the Euphrates, wished to cross into the Levant."



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171. Mr. Crow reported on 16th November 1903 that Sadun Pasha had returned to his property at Sakharieh, a place near the Euphrates between Nassiriyeh and Kamisieh and had telegraphed to Constantinople, throwing all blame on Colonel Agassi, who was killed in the action. In December he was reported to be at Jehara near Koweit, and General Mahomed Pasha Daghestani to be at Zobeir, with 1,200 Turkish troops, watching his movements and on the look-out to capture him. The local authorities were inclined to believe that Sheikh Mubarak was at the bottom of the disturbances, but Sir N. O'Connor thought that this was unlikely, as the Sheikh and Sadun had not been on friendly terms at the time. Colonel Kemball (see his letter No. 8 January 1904), visited the Sheikh in January 1904 in company with Mr. Crow (Acting Consul at Basrah). They were informed by him that Sadun was 36 miles from Koweit and had applied to him for help, but that he refused, since, in the Sheikh's opinion, Sadun had acted foolishly in getting himself into trouble with the Turks. The Sheikh was warned by Colonel Kemball not to involve himself in any way with the matter in hand between the Turks and Sadun.

172. During an interview Mr. Crow had with the Vali of Basrah on 25th January 1904, the latter urged that the fact that the Sheikh had allowed Sadun to take refuge at Jehara, within his territory, showed clearly that he had offered protection to Sadun, and that he ought to take him and hand him over to the Turkish Government, to prove that he was not his ally in the recent disturbances. Mr. Crow pointed out that this would be a serious breach of the laws of Arab hospitality. Sadun had, however, at this time left Jehara, and had offered to lay down his arms on condition of Imperial pardon. Mr. Crow thought that this would probably be granted. If, however, the Turks tried to corner him, it was feared he would slip to Jehara, and his presence there would be a source of irritation to the Turks.

173. On February 3rd the Secretary of State telegraphed—

"Sir N. O'Connor reports that the Sheikh of Koweit is in all probability abetting Sadun Pasha and is likely to be involved with him in raids on tribes under the protection of Turks. Early opportunity should be taken by Colonel Kemball of warning him once more that the good offices of His Majesty's Government can only be extended to him, if he refrains from aggression and is guided by their advice."

174. In reply, the Viceroy reported by telegraph, dated 11th February, the action taken by Colonel Kemball and Mr. Crow as reported in his letter of 8th January in warning the Sheikh.

175. About this time the Shammar and Anaiza tribes who had been long at feuds (see Secret E., April 1903, Nos. 212-213) became reconciled and were reported to be marching in the direction of Basrah against Sadun and his party. Mahomed Pasha who had been sent to catch Sadun fell soon into disgrace on account of his ill-success, due either to his inability or perhaps to his unwillingness arising out of his relationship with Sadun.

175-A. In November 1904 Mr. Townley reported to the Foreign Office from Constantinople that Sadun had written a letter protesting his loyalty to the Sultan.

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CHAPTER III-A.

The Mahomedan Religious Forces in operation in Turkish Arabia.

(i) Shiah and Sunnis: The Shiah of Kerbella and Najaf: The Persian Ulema in Turkish Arabia: Agitation against Russian preponderance in Persia Sheikh Abdul Ali Herati.

176. The main divisions into which the Mahomedans of Turkish Arabia are divided are Sunnis and Shiah. The origin of these divisions is briefly as follows—Abu Muhammad Hussan and Hussain were the two sons of Ali Taleb the cousin, and Fatimah the daughter of Mahomet; and after the murder of their father, A. H. 40, at Kufah by the contrivances of the Kaliph Yezid, the son of Muaiwiyeh, they with their families removed from Shawn or Kufah the capital, to Medina. The elder, Hassan, voluntarily abdicated to avoid embroiling the state any longer in civil war; but shortly afterwards he was poisoned by Yezid, the son of Muaiwiyeh, at Medina, A. H. 49. Abu Abdallah Muaiwiyeh bin Abi Sufyan, the first of the Omniades, then began to rule A. D. 661, and was succeeded by his son Yezid (A. D. 679, 683); but after several years the people of Shawn, being tired of King Yezid's tyrannical rule, invited Hussain to return to the capital and assume his lawful right as Imam (leader of the faithful). Before accepting this invitation, Hussain sent Moslem, his cousin, as a messenger, to report the true state of affairs to him; and on Hussain's arrival with his two sons at Shawn, he was murdered with all his retinue, at Kerbella in Turkish Arabia on the 10th day of Arab month Muharram, A. H. 61 (9th October A. D. 680). Zainul-Abdin, the eldest son of Hussain, alone escaped. This forms the subject of the ten days' weeping during the Muharram. The Muhammadans became in consequence of the murder of Hussain and his followers divided into two distinct sects, called the Shiah and the Sunnis; the former regard Ali and his descendants, Hassan, Hussain, Zain-ul-Abdin, and certain of descendants (though on this there is difference—see Section IV, paragraph 215 below), as the lawful leaders after Muhammad; and the latter as Kalifas, Abubakar, Omar Osman and Ali.

177. The principal seats of the Shiah in Turkish Arabia are Kerbella (where Hussain lies buried with his martyred companions), Najaf (where Ali was buried) and Kathimain (where there are the tombs of two Imams Musa-ul-Kadhim, the 7th in descent from Fatima (Mahomet's daughter), and his grandson Mahomet-bin-Ali Ridtha, surnamed Ali Takki. The population of these towns has mainly consisted of Persians with large number of Indians, supplemented by thousands of Shiah pilgrims from all parts of the world.

178. The people of Kerbella and Najaf have been always hostile to the Turkish rule and have been kept down by military force against which they have frequently rebelled. The local tribes occasionally sided with the inhabitants of the two places.

We have already dealt with the massacre of the Persians in 1843 at Kerbella under orders of Nejib Pasha (paragraph 22 *et seq.*).

179. In 1877 a portion of the reserve militia (called Redif) at Kerbella (consisting presumably of the local Shiah tribes) rose in rebellion. The facts are thus described by Hyder Ali Khan, the British Honorary Agent at Kerbella, in his report dated 6th September 1877:

Owing to oppressions of the troops the bazaars have, for the last three days, been closed up, with the exception of a few shops open here and there, but articles of food, such as bread and mutton, are procurable. The mutineers of the reserve troops who had located themselves in the gardens commenced troubling the people and plundered a caravan; they took an amount of specie belonging to a Jew, and certain other articles they required, such as coffee and tobacco.

On Monday, 24th instant, the Turkish troops marched out and a fight took place between them and the rebels: the troops brought in five heads and put them up at certain places in the town and barracks. Ten or twelve of the Arabs were wounded, and from the Turks two men were killed.

On Tuesday the troops went out again to attack, of whom one officer was killed and seven or eight soldiers wounded and they returned to town.

On Wednesday the authorities having summoned the Maadan Arabs of the Beni Hassan tribe of Hindiyeh and the Anizeh to aid, about 600 men arrived were sent to attack the rebels; this party entered the gardens and returned, reporting that the rebels had left the gardens and removed to a distance.



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To-day, Thursday, the troops going out of the town, demolished the entrenchments of the rebels and returned, and it is said that the authorities intend to destroy the gardens close to the walls of the town.

180. The Governor-General, Akef Pasha, requested the Consul-General to warn the British Indian subjects against joining the insurgents. This the Consul-General did effectually through the Honorary British Agent at Kerbella.

181. There appears to have been disturbances also at Najaf, and the British Indian subjects there also were warned accordingly, and attempts were made, through the mujtahids of Najaf to put a stop to the disturbances, as appears from the following report, dated 5th August 1877, of the Mujtahid to the Consul-General :—

Political A, October 1877, Nos. 201—218.

Translation of a Report from SYED ALI BAHR-OOI OOLoom, Mujtahid of Nejjeff, dated 28th Rejib 1294=9th August 1877.

In acknowledging the receipt of your letter strictly enjoining that I should use every effort in putting a stop to the quarrel and disturbances that have taken place between the mischievous persons of the tribe of Zogurt and the Imperial Ottoman troops, I have the honour to bring to your honour's notice that such quarrels have always been and are of frequent recurrence at Nejjeff, some times occurring between the two tribes of Nejjeff themselves who are called Zogurt and Shumurt, and sometimes between these tribes and the Turkish troops, and that I have, as is patent to all, on every occasion of such disturbance, never failed in using my best efforts towards putting an end to them. I thank God that on the present occasion, owing to our intervention, it did not last more than two or three days. My intercession towards the suppression of the disturbance was asked by Meer Alai Hages Beg, the Commandant of the troops, and my attendance at the Government Office being required I was also invited there by the authorities to the same effect. The rebellious party having by this time taken their position at Cufa, about a parasang and a half distant, and placed themselves in a state of defence, we sent them word and letters until we restored in them a feeling of confidence to some extent that we would obtain pardon for them from the authorities. After which I instructed my nephew, Agha Syud Ali Nuckee, whose services I employ on such occasions, being myself unable to attend personally on account of my ill-health, and deputed him to the rebels accompanied with a party consisting of Ulemas, Elders and Chiefs of the Hindia Arabs. This party brought the rebels into Nejjeff to pray for mercy, exhibiting on their person the marks indicative of submission usual to Arabs, that is, their heads uncovered and the ropelike tie of the head let down round their necks accompanied with repentful expressions and prayers for pardon; they were thus conducted to the barracks and made to fall upon the hands and feet of the Meer Ali, and the Ulemas begged pardon for them, which the Meer Ali granted, and gave them leave to go. Thus tranquillity was restored to the inhabitants of the town, and thanks God everything is now quiet.

182. The correspondence on the subject of the Oudh Bequest throws considerable light on the constitution of the body of Mujtahids at Kerbella and Najaf (see pages 279 *et seq* hereafter).

183. The Russian loans contracted by the Shah of Persia, the changes in the customs administration and the ascendancy of Russia at Tehran roused great discontent among the Persians, which was fanned by the Shiah clergy in Persia and the Persian Ulema in Turkish Arabia. Thus a powerful movement was started against the then Grand Vizier Atabeg-i-Azam, which was skilfully directed by the court party opposed to the Atabeg's régime and were anxious to bring about the reinstatement of Amin-es-Dowlah, now an exile from Persia. The leading Persian Mujtahids in Turkish Arabia (Najaf) *Agha, Fazil Sharabiani, Haji Mohomed Hussain, Mirza Khalil Mamughani, Mullah Kadhim Khorasani*, played an important rôle in this clerical agitation against the then Persian régime.

184. In April 1903 the Consular Agent at Kerbella reported that the Ulema at Najaf had addressed a strong protest to the Shah in regard to the state of things in Persia, and that under the Shah's instructions the Persian Consul-General at Baghdad had proceeded to Kerbella and Najaf in order to offer His Majesty's salutations to Agha Fazil* Sharabiani and Haji Mirza Hussain, son of Mirza Khalil, and to explain to them that matters had been misrepresented to them. But they were not apparently satisfied.

Secret E., June 1903, No. 4.

Secret E., May 1905, No. 295.

* Fazil Sharabiani died on December 1904.



185. In June 1903 reports were received of disturbances in various places, especially at Tabriz, against the Belgian Customs, and against the Babis at Ispahan, Yezd, etc., which could be traced to the clerical movement organized in Turkish Arabia under the leadership of Agha Fazil Sharabiani and supported by the clerical party in Persia.

186. The attitude to be adopted by the British Government in these circumstances was a matter of great delicacy. Their influence at Kerbella and Najaf, especially through the distribution of the Oudh Bequest, was undoubted. While anxious that no agitation on the part of the Shiah clergy at Kerbella and Najaf should be allowed to the extent of creating anarchy and confusion in Persia or weakening or dismembering Persia, the British Government would, it was thought, be well advised to establish such favourable relations with the Ulema as would act as a counterpoise against Russian intrigues at the Court of Tehran. The policy therefore adopted was to strengthen our influence with the Government of Persia by exerting it in a manner which would be favourable at Kerbella, but at the same time to enter into such friendly personal relations with the chief priests as would enable us, if necessary, to use them as a lever, in the event of the Persians following an unfriendly policy, or showing signs of contracting fresh loans from Russia. The following message approved by Lord Lansdowne was ordered by Sir A. Hardinge to be communicated to Agha Sharabiani: —

"The British Government is a firm supporter of the independence of Persia; their political interests are identical with those of that kingdom; their administration of the Oudh Bequest is, to take a small matter, one of many proofs of their respect for the Mohomedan religion, which is that of millions of their subjects, and they will never favour measures which could injure or weaken Persia. But they strongly deprecate all appeals to religious hatreds as likely to do Persia more harm than good. Whatever may be said against Persian tariff, it has been agreed to, not only by the Russians, but also by England and Turkey, and can only be changed by negotiation with those three Powers, which at present would entail great difficulties. If the Hazarat have any complaints against the Persian administration, let them address them to the Shah or Grand Vizir in a respectful manner, and in the meantime discourage all languages by the clergy here, which might be misunderstood by the ignorant as inciting to riots or violence."

187. Sir A. Hardinge desired that in communicating this message, it would be advisable by a friendly and sympathetic attitude, to encourage explanations of the views and real objects of the chief priests, which there was reason to suspect were mainly directed against Russian preponderance in Persia, and have a letter sent by them to Sir A. Hardinge if possible (Sir A. Hardinge's telegram to the Government of India, dated 18th June 1903, and Major Newmarch's letter, dated 13th July 1903, to Mirza Mohomed Hussain Mohsin, Kerbella).

188. The message was delivered verbally to Agha Sharabiani by the First Dragoman of the Consulate at Baghdad, Mirza Mahomed Mohsin, and was on the whole well received. He said that he had issued notices to all the Mujtahids in Persia to the effect that the British Government was not in the least interested in the affairs of Persia, and that the only object of the British Government was to maintain the peace and stability of the country.



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to himself alone—which wish it was impossible to accede to. On 25th July 1903 he wrote to the Resident to say that he would in no way accept whole or any portion of the bequest.

191. The Persian Consul-General at Baghdad, probably under orders from Tehran, was instigating the clergy in Turkish Arabia against the Resident and advising them to avoid the bequest as a trap land for them. It was also said that the Turkish authorities were being incited to object to any distribution. There was reason to suspect that the letter, dated 23rd July 1903, referred to above, was written at the instigation of the Consul-General.

192. At the same time the Persian Consul-General went so far as to request the Resident to give something from the bequest to one Seyyid Kamal-ud-din (a brother of Seyyid Abdullah Hijjat-ul-Islam at Tehran). To show the inconsistency of the Persian Consul-General's conduct, Major Newmarch purposely referred this proposal to Agha Sharabiani for favour of his opinion. He replied that he would refrain from making any suggestion either negatively or affirmatively; and requested that his communication might be kept secret (letter, dated 17th August 1903).

193. Here the correspondence closed so far as the Oudh Bequest, and Major Newmarch proceeded to work out a system of distribution as approved of by the Government of India (see Chapter XVI).

194. The Mujtahids caused in 1904 further uneasiness to the Russian Government and the Russo-phil party at Teheran. It appears the Mujtahids had been befriending a certain Persian paper called the *Hablul Matin* published at Calcutta, which used to publish strongly worded articles against the Persian Minister Atabeg as being the chief instrument of Persia's ruin and its interests being sacrificed to Russia. The paper once published what purported to be "correspondence with the Sultan of Turkey" supposed to proceed from certain Mujtahids. This alleged source of the correspondence was denied by the Mujtahids. The Prime Minister prohibited the circulation of the paper in Persia. Some of the Mujtahids of Najaf also passed a decree against its circulation among their people. This was attributed by one of the Mujtahids (Mulla Abdullah Mazandarani) to the alleged imputation made by the paper against the Mullah class. The British Vice-Consul at Kerbella, however, did not credit this information (British Vice-Consul's letter, dated 26th March 1904, to the Consul-General).

195. It was further rumoured that the Mujtahids of Najaf issued a decree of ex-communication against the same Prime Minister but this was denied by them (see Consul-General to Sir A. Hardinge, dated 22nd March 1904).

196. Mahomed Hassan Mohsin (British Vice-Consul at Kerbella) in his letter, dated 27th May 1904, to the Resident, reported that the Vali of Baghdad had received a telegram from Constantinople and had sent copies thereof to the Mutarserif of Kerbella and the Kaimakam of Najaf for information and guidance. The purport of the telegram was as follows:—

"The Persian and Russian Representatives at Constantinople have been directed by the Governments to represent to us that the Mujtahid of Atabat have for some time past been interfering in certain matters which were purely connected with their State affairs and that their conduct has been looked upon by them as very displeasing and offensive. They have therefore requested us that in future if any of them behave in the old manner *we should forthwith execute whatsoever is necessary* in that connection."

The words italicized are supposed to mean banishment from Turkey.

197. In the recent troubles, one *Sheikh Abdul Ali Herati*, son of Kasim, a native of Herat, played an important, though not a very useful, part. He was a Russo-phobe and heartily hated the Grand Vizier Atabeg-i-Azam for selling the country to Russia. But he was of a turbulent character, and a blustering fellow, whose warmth, zeal, and restlessness did not, as a rule, keep

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pace with discretion. In the summer of 1901 he was expelled from Teheran for being implicated in a conspiracy against Atabeg-i-Azam. He travelled then to Constantinople and ultimately found his way to Baghdad. In May 1903 he proceeded to Kerbella and Najaf and carried on an agitation with the Mujtahids against the then existing régime in Persia.

193. On 8th July 1903, Sir A. Hardinge telegraphed to the Resident at Baghdad that the Persian Government had applied to the Legation, and would probably apply to the Porte also, for the removal of Abdul Ali from Kerbella, and Major Newmarch was desired to send him a message, telling him that he would do well to withdraw from there for the time being to some other part of the Turkish Empire, and that he would be given a present for himself and pecuniary assistance for this purpose.

199. On 15th July 1903, Abdul Ali left Kerbella for Baghdad and on the following day he was sent by the Resident on board the *Khalifa*, provided with a through ticket for Karachi for Rs. 250. He arrived at Karachi on 29th July and at Lahore on 27th August. He resided afterwards at Karachi and travelled about in Sind and Punjab.

200. In September 1903, he was remitted Rs. 70 by Sir A. Hardinge in response to his complaints that Karachi was an expensive place to live in, and a verbal message was asked by Sir A. Hardinge to be communicated to him that in view of the fall of the Grand Vizier and the formation of a new government in Persia, there was reason to hope that he might before long be able to return either to Persia or to Irak Arab.

201. In October 1904, Abdul Ali was informed that the Persian Government had no objection to his returning to Asiatic Turkey, and the Commissioner in Sind was instructed to pay the passage of the Sheikh from Karachi to Baghdad, should he elect to proceed to that place.

202. It would appear that a pension enjoyed by the Sheikh in common with other Afghan refugees since the days of Nasir-ud-din Shah was stopped at the time of his expulsion from Teheran in 1901, but Sir A. Hardinge proposed to approach His Highness Amin-ed-Dowlah, for whom (and on whose pay probably) he had acted whilst agitating at Kerbella and Najaf against Atabeg-i-Azam, with a view to relieving the British Government of the necessity of giving him further financial assistance. Sir A. Hardinge deprecated a complete abandonment of the Sheikh; since although we have no immediate need of his services, he might, under easily conceivable circumstances, be useful to us as a secret agent among the Ulemas.

203. Abdul Ali contemplated, however, remaining in India. Major Newmarch was glad to learn of this determination, for he regarded him as a dangerous and useless person, who had already cost Government more than he was worth and who was ready to sell his employer to the highest bidder. Major Newmarch could not see how he could ever be again employed as our secret agent, as his identity, position and dependence upon us were well known to the Turkish authorities (Major Newmarch to the Foreign Department, dated 19th April 1905).

204. It may be mentioned that Agha Sharabiani died in 1904, and is succeeded by Agha Fazil Memakani in the influential position he held. On 28th March 1905, the Ulema at Najaf appears to have addressed a message to "all the protectors of Islam and great priests in Teheran" praising the administration of Amin-ed-Dowlah and desiring that he should be supported in his projects for the welfare of Persia.

205. It appears that the attitude of some at least of the Persian Mujtahids in Turkish Arabia was regarded as once somewhat hostile towards the Hedjaz Railway. One of them issued an order prohibiting the Shiaks from making use



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of the new route on account of its insecurity. This order was withdrawn on a secret warning from the Porte. The Mujtahid afterwards proceeded to Constantinople, was well received by the Sultan and returned with strong Pan-Islamic tendencies.

(ii) The Nakib of Basrah, the late Syed Mahomed Said.

206. With his letter No. 562, dated 24th November 1897, Colonel Mockler forwarded to the Government of India the following account of the late Nakib of Basrah :—

Memorandum regarding the late Syed Mahomed Said, Nakib-el-Ashraf of Basrah.

The late Syed Mahomed Said (who died in August 1896) belonged to the well-known family of Rafai and was appointed in 1874 as Nakib of Basrah (Secretary to the Mosque of Sayid Ahmed Rafai) after the death of his brother Sayid Abdul Rahman Effendi, whose co-adjutor he had been.

He was appointed in 1886 Vice-President of the Royal Property Administration on a monthly salary of 40 Liras, but while accepting the appointment he declined to receive any salary, saying that the honour of serving his master the Sultan was a sufficient reward.

In 1890 owing to his advanced age he nominated with the sanction of the Sublime Porte his eldest son Syed Rejeb to act as Nakib. He had in 1890 risen by grades to the rank of "Istamboul Payasi" and two decorations, viz., the "Osmanieh" and 1st class "Medjidieh," had also been conferred on him, the former in recognition of the services which he had rendered to the Turkish Government in inducing Sheikh Jasim Thani of Katar to submit to their authority.

The late Nakib was not a man of high moral principle—a fact which Hamdi Pasha, the present Wali, is said to have discovered shortly after his arrival, with the result that his relations with Syed Mahomed Said were the reverse of friendly.

His son Syed Rejeb Effendi was on his death appointed Nakib.

The Nakib's family is said to receive support in Constantinople from Abdul Huda, one of the "Palace party."

(iii) Nakibs of Baghdad.

207. In 1882 the Ambassador at Constantinople wrote the following interesting letter about the Seyyid Suleman Effendi, Nakib of Baghdad :—

Secret, November 1890, Nos. 6-14.

No. 302, dated Therapia, the 30th August 1880.

From—His EXCELLENCY GEORGE J. GOSCHEN, H. M.'s Ambassador, Constantinople,
To—EARL GRANVILLE, K.G., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I have the honour to forward herewith to Your Lordship a memorandum, in which it is stated that the Sultan is about to confer a high civil dignity on Seid Selman Effendi, Nakib-ul-Echraff of Baghdad, similar to that which His Imperial Majesty conferred on Sheikh Fadhl as reported in my despatch No. 265, Confidential, of the 21st instant, and that Seid Suliman Effendi is about to return to Baghdad, bearing with him the instructions of His Imperial Majesty.

I am told that the power and influence of Seid Suleman Effendi extend far beyond the Province of Baghdad, even as far as India, and that he owes this partly to his position as Nakib-ul-Echraff, or chief of the descendants of the Prophet, in the Province of Baghdad, but chiefly to the fact that he is himself a descendant of Abdul Kadar Keyhani, a highly-esteemed Mussulman saint.

Great importance seems to be attached in the memorandum to the influence that this personage is alleged to possess in the Mussulman world, and, consequently, over the Mussulman population of India. However this may be, the statement is at any rate interesting, as giving a fresh indication of the line of conduct that the Sultan seems inclined to pursue with regard to his own position as Caliph, from which it would appear that His Imperial Majesty hopes, by increasing the importance of the Caliphate, to increase thereby his own power and authority over Mussulmans.

I have sent a copy of this memorandum to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad, and have instructed him to give me any information that he may obtain as to the proceedings of Seid Selman Effendi on his return to Baghdad.



MEMORANDUM.

(Secret et Confidentiel.)

Votre Excellence sait déjà que le nommé Seid Selman Effendi, Nakib-ul-Echraff de Bagdad, est l'hôte du Sultan depuis six mois.

On vient d'assurer le Scheikh Suleiman Effendi que ce personnage important ne tardera pas à recevoir, à pinstar de ce qui a été fait pour Seid Fazil un grade civil très-élevé, et retournera bientôt à Bagdad muni des instructions de son Souverain.


Ce personnage occupe parmi le clergé Musulman la position la plus élevée (puisque le Scheik-ul-Islam lui-même est tenu de lui embrasser la main), et il va sans dire que son influence est immense soit auprès du Sultan soit auprès des populations Musulmans du monde entier.

Il est possible que l'on se serve de ce personnage pour travailler les populations des Indes. Il serait par conséquent prudent que le Consul-Général de Sa Majesté à Bagdad reçoive pour instructions de surveiller les mouvements de Seid Selman Effendi.

(Sd.) HUGO MARINICH.

Péra, le 28 Août, 1890.

208. The following is the genealogy of the family to which the Nakib belongs:—



209. One or other of the brothers of the late Nakib Suleman or his nephews have been visiting Mohamedan States in India, the distinct purpose of which has not been made very clear. The Saint Abdul Kadhi Ghelani is very popular in India and one of the ostensible purposes of visits of his descendants has been to collect alms.

210. In December 1895 Ahmad, son of Zeinuddin and nephew of the Nakib left Baghdad for India, but returned from Basrah. The Consul-General at Baghdad was informed that the Nakib had received letters from the Sultan of Turkey asking him to send emissary to the Amir of Kabul to stir up feeling against the British Government regarding the Armenian question (Resident's telegram, dated 14th December 1895.)

211. In July the Nakib's brother Abdus Salam left Baghdad for Karachi (Resident's telegram dated 2nd July 1896). Later on we find Ahmad, son of Zein-ud-din, travelling in India, on 18th September 1897. He was allowed an interview by the Nizam and appears to have left with 200 gold coins valued at Rs. 24 each.

212. The Afghans hold the Nakib in high esteem and the Amir has been sending here large presents annually.

Secret E., September 1898, Nos. 1-3.

Sayyed Suleman Effendi died in May 1898, and was succeeded as Nakib by his brother Sayyed Abdur Rahman as Nakib.



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(iv).—The sect of Ismailians. Trial and conviction of some of their members at Damascus, 1903.

213. Within the Turkish Dominions the Ismailians are to be found chiefly in Syria. A few of them are to be found in the vicinity of Baghdad and Mosul. They are of peculiar interest to us, inasmuch as they owe spiritual allegiance to His Highness Agha Khan, K.C.I.E. Fourteen of them were tried at Damascus in 1903 on the following charges:—

1. The abandonment of Islam and a disavowal of its tenets as laid down in the Koran and the Hadeeth.
2. The non-recognition of the Sultan as Caliph, the only person who in their eyes has a valid claim to that title being a certain "Sultan Mohamed Shah," who is residing in Bombay and who claims to be a lineal descendant from Fatima, the daughter of the prophet and wife of Ali. This personage is held by them to be an absolute and final judge in all civil and religious matters, being even authorized by God to annul and repudiate the existing text of the Koran and to promulgate new commandments whenever he thinks fit.
3. The levying of taxes amongst the members of their community, the proceeds of which are dispatched from time to time to the said Sultan Mohamed Shah in Bombay.
4. The belief in the doctrine rigidly inculcated that injury done to non-believers, *i.e.*, all those who are not Ismailieh is not only permissible but praiseworthy, and so many crimes have been committed by the prisoners and their co-religionists as the immediate outcome of such teaching.
5. Their estimation of Mohamed Shah is far above the Sultan; for whereas the latter is only Sovereign of this country and a mere terrestrial monarch, the former is an omnipotent and omnipresent being whose "material envelope" only is to be found in Bombay, whereas his "divine impalpable essence" pervades the whole universe.

214. The accused were convicted of treason and murder under the Ottoman Penal Code, their treason consisting in their rejection of the Sultan's Caliphate and their alleged murderous acts of violence being ascribed to their religious fanaticism (Letter from the Acting Consul Monahan, Damascus, to Sir N. O'Connor, dated 7th October 1903.)

215. The following memorandum by Consul Alvarez on the sect of Ismailities will be read with interest:—

Memorandum by CONSUL ALVAREZ.

The Ismailians or Ismailities (in Arabic Ismailia), otherwise known as Bathenia, those who admit the authority of the internal, hidden, or allegorical sense of the Koran and deny that of the apparent and literal meaning of the text, constitute one of the Mahomedan sects generally considered "Shiah," or heretical, in opposition to the Sunnite or orthodox Moslems.

They are to be found chiefly in Syria (although there are also a few in the vicinity of Baghdad and Mosul), in the districts and villages of Selamia, at Massyad, and three or four villages in its immediate vicinity, in the Sandjak of Hama, Killis on the borders of the Provinces of Haleb and Hama, south of Schogher, on the Orontes, and at Keftun, Kadmos, Kohf, Aleyka, and Merkab, in the Jebel Kulbié, in the Sandjak of Latakia.

There may also be a few in Homs, Hama, and Tripoli, although this cannot be asserted with any certainty, as, owing to the disfavour, if not persecution, they meet with from Muslim authorities they carefully conceal their religious opinions and outwardly conform to the precepts of Islam.

Massyad is apparently the chief seat of the sect from of old, the castle there having been in its possession from 1107, when the followers of the Ismailian day, Hassan-ben-Sabbah seized it. After the downfall of the Haschaschyn, better known in Europe as the assassins, a branch of the sect, a number of Ismailities appear to have been allowed to remain in their native villages by the Sultan of Egypt, Malek-ed-Daher.

In 1807 they were attacked in a most treacherous manner by a branch of the Ansarié (with which sect they have always been at enmity on account of religious differences), but who had been received with open arms by their Chief, Mustapha Logheby-ben-Suleyman, and most hospitably treated for a period of three months; 300 of the sect perished, and those families which succeeded in making good their escape by the sacrifice of all their property fled to Hama, Homs, and Tripoli. After sacking the town the Ansarié, who had received reinforcements, successfully attacked three other Ismailian castles in the mountains. They were in their turn attacked, routed, and driven out in the same year by Jusuf Pasha, Vali of Damascus, at the head of an army of 4,000 or 5,000 men, but the Pasha kept the ill-gotten booty of the Ansarié for himself.

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When Jusuf Pasha was exiled in 1810, the Ismailians were allowed to return to their ruined villages. The date of the origin of the sect which was originally established in Khorasan and on the Indus, cannot be fixed with any certainty, but in any case was not anterior to the year of the Hegira 148, A.D. 765, the year of the death of Imam Jafar-es-Sadyk, father of Ismail, from whom the sect took its name. On Jafar's death some Shias refused to admit the legitimate succession as Imam of his second son, Musa-al-Kazim (restrainer of anger), and attributed spiritual headship to his elder brother Ismail, who, after having been designated Imam by his father, had been deposed from that office on account of his parent's having seen him drunk on one occasion.

This intoxication is considered by the Ismailians as a proof that he accepted the hidden meaning of the Koran as the expounder of Islam, even while violating its teaching! Ismail having died in his father's lifetime, his son Mahomet was recognised as his successor. Thereby the Ismailians cut themselves off from communion with the two main bodies of Imamia, viz., those of Persia and India, who believe in the legitimate succession to the Imamate, or spiritual headship of Islam of the Prophet's son-in-law Ali, and the hereditary transmission of the same to Hassan, Hussein, Ali Leyn-ul-Abedyn, Mahomet Bakyr, Jafar Sadyk, Musa-al-Kazym, Reza, Mahomet Taky, Ali Naky, Hassan-al-Askary, and Mahomet Ab-ul-Kasem-al-Mahdy, and those of Arabia and Yemen, known as Zeidia from their belief in the legitimate succession as Fifth Imam of Zeyd, son of Ali Zeyn-ul-Abedyn.

In addition to the belief in the direct transmission of spiritual leadership through Mahomet, son of Ismail, known among the sect as Al-Kaym-ez-Zeman (Ruler of the Age), and the seven Imams, known as the Hidden in consequence of the persecution of the Abbasside Caliphs, their principal dogma, as formerly enunciated by the fourth of these Hidden Imams, Abdallah-ben-Maymun-al-Kaddah (the Oculist), first in Irak, then at Bussarah, and, finally, at Selamia in 864 or 865, is the belief that the Deity is a Being without attributes or association and inaccessible to thought or beyond the bounds of imagination, that universal reason, which was one with Him, is His manifestation to the world in order that mankind may comprehend and worship Him. The universal soul is in its turn a creation of reason.

Primary force or matter has been created by the soul, and in its turn has produced space and time. The tendency of the universal soul is to elevation and reproduction of universal reason; when this shall have been attained every movement will cease, and the reunion of universal reason with the Deity will take place. That if the salvation of the human soul may be ensured it must acquire the knowledge transmitted to it by a Prophet, the incarnation of reason for the elevation of the universal soul.

On account of the shortness of human life reason has been successively incarnated in Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus Christ, the Messiah, Mahomet, and Mahomet, the son of Ismail, the seven Embya-i-Nathekyn speaking Prophets.

The soul has in its turn been successively incarnated in the bases, or Silent Vicars, Esasyn or Sametyn, so called because they taught nothing new, viz., Seth, Shem, Ismail (Ishmael), Aaron, Joshua, Simon Peter, Cephas, and Ali. Immediately after these come the seven Imams, who after the mysterious disappearance of Mahomet-ben-Ismail, who is immortal and impalpable, are but his mortal and visible representatives. Every duty initiated member of the sect is supposed to be enrolled in Mahomed-bin-Ismail's service, to be ready to follow him when he shall eventually re-appear.

The initiated were at first divided into seven and afterwards into nine classes or grades. The first or lowest class comprises those proselytes who, being of simple character, or incapable of much thought, are taught by their "Day" (man of prayer, Prior) that religion is a secret science, and that only a few beings such as the Imams, who are privileged, can penetrate its mysteries. To impress his imagination, the Day will ask him to explain why God created the world in seven days, why there are seven verses in the Fateha, why man has ten fingers and ten toes, etc., and will teach him that passages of the Koran cited are so mysterious that



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The 5th grade comprises those philosophers who are taught to despise the traditions (Hadeeth) looked upon as the necessary complement of the sacred teachings of the Koran, and the legal observances imposed by the text of the book.

The sixth, those who are taught that no legal Ordinance is literally obligatory on those who are acquainted with its hidden and mystic meaning, and that such laws have been divinely established for the common herd, for the maintenance and repose of society. Reverence for ancient philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Pythagoras is inculcated in this degree, beyond which many, if not most, of the Days do not go.

There are, however, three other grades comprising—

1. Those Days who are taught to believe in two principles, that of the supreme giver or male superior principle, and that of the female or inferior but fertile principle.
2. Those who study the nature and origin of these two principles; and, finally,
3. Those who follow the philosophical system which attracts each individual most, whether unitarian, dualist, materialist, pantheist, or rationalist, etc., or believe in a combination of them.

These initiates are respectively entitled Daylkebir or Grand Prior, Khoja or Master, and Scheykh or Elder.


It may be of interest to state that the Sultan Mahomed Shah, mentioned by Consul Richards as being the supreme head of the sect, is His Highness the Agha Khan, G.C.I.E., who some years ago, Mr. Block informs me, while on his way to London to attend the celebration of Her late Majesty's Diamond Jubilee, passed through Constantinople, and was graciously received by His Majesty the Sultan. He also attended, I believe, at His Majesty King Edward's Coronation last year.

With regard to the charges of treason and disloyalty, i.e., rejection of the Sultan's Caliphate, etc., brought against Sheikh Ahmed, the head of the sect in Syria, and thirteen of his disciples, while I can express no opinion on the charges of murder which may have been brought against them, there can be no doubt that the effect of this prosecution is to penalize the profession, not only of Ismailian religious tenets, but also those of all Shiabs within the Empire who do not recognise the Sultan's pretensions to the Caliphate, or even the existence of that supreme dignity.

This is the impression that will doubtless be created by the sentences (especially the sentence of death imposed on Sheikh Ahmed) pronounced against the prisoners throughout the Islamic world, and especially in Persia and India.

The 22nd October 1903.

JUSTIN ALVAREZ.





CHAPTER IV.

History of the Basrah, Baghdad and other agencies and Consulates.

(i) Origin and growth of the Basrah and Baghdad Agencies, 1646—1783.

An exhaustive Précis of the correspondence in this subject is given in the *Précis of information regarding the East India Company's connection with Turkish Arabia*, 1646—1846, drawn up in the Bombay Secretariat, and we have here only to indicate the main events.

2. A pinnace, with a small investment, was sent by the East India Company's Agency at Gombroon to Basrah as early as 1635 (Bruce's *Annals of the East India Company* Vol. I, pages 330 and 334). Messrs. Thurston and Pierson were sent to Basrah in 1640 with goods, which they were allowed to land by the Pasha. The Civil war in Turkish Arabia rendered, however, the project of establishing a factory at Basrah difficult. In 1643 the Agency at Gombroon is reported to have decided to continue the factory at Basrah (Bruce's *Annals*, Vol. I, pages 376, 383 and 460.)

3. But it appears that the East India Company had no Agent constantly residing at Basrah till the beginning of the 18th century, one or more of their servants belonging to the Factory at Surat or in Gombroon in the Persian Gulf, being, from time to time, sent to Basrah for the sale and purchase of investments, who returned to their station on the completion of the service on which they have been sent.

4. In January 1661 a Treaty of 67 articles was entered into between Great Britain and Turkey, Appendix A., annexed to the Précis quoted above. This Treaty was concluded on the part of the British Government by Heneage, Earl of Winchelsea, Ambassador Extraordinary from His Majesty King Charles II, to the Court of Mahomed Sultan of Turkey. The Treaty, amongst other stipulations, provided that all vessels sailing under the British flag should be permitted to trade without molestation to all ports within the Turkish limits; that all British subjects should freely and securely come and go by land through all the imperial limits of the Turkish dominions; and at their own pleasure, safely and securely, navigate and traffic in all parts of those dominions, and that all accusations, of whatever kind, made against Englishmen residing in or passing through Turkish territory should be investigated in the presence of the Ambassador or Consul. It was further agreed that all privileges and capitulations which in former times had been granted by the Turks to the French, or any other Christian nation, should also be conceded to the English; that no English Consul or Resident in the Turkish dominions should, under any circumstances, be subject to imprisonment; and that no merchandize belonging to the English should be subject to a higher rate of customs in the Turkish dominions than 3 per cent.

5. In September 1675 a further Treaty, Appendix B to the Précis quoted above was concluded between Great Britain and Turkey, confirming, with several amendments, the above Treaty, and clearing up several ambiguous expressions in the former Treaty, which were considered to require explanation. A consolidated edition of the Treaties of 1661 and 1675 is printed in Aitchison's *Treaties* (1892) Vol. XI.

6. From a letter dated the 14th July 1677, addressed from Surat by the President in Council, Surat, to the Deputy President in Council, Bombay, it appears that the East India Company's factories at Basrah and all ports of Persia were under the control of the Agent in Council at Gombroon.

6. There are numerous letters on record, dated between the years 1683 and 1707, written from the Factory at Gombroon and from the Chief in Council of that Factory from Ispahan while on occasional visits at that place. In these letters, however, no allusion is made to any Agent on the part of the East India Company being permanently stationed at Basrah. These letters allude to the sale of Company's investments in Persia, but no specific allusion is made to Basrah, further than that the "Basrah ships" are occasionally mentioned, but no account is given of their arrival or departure at that place, or of what sales were effected there on the Company's account.

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Paragraph 86.

7. On the 6th April 1724, as appears from the following entry from the Diary of the Bombay Government, a special meeting of the President and Governor in Council was held, at which the following resolutions were passed :—

"Read and approved our last consultation. The President acquaints the Board the occasion of this meeting is to consider of the state of our hon'ble masters' affairs in Persia, and the needful directions to be given that Agency by the *Comptoir*, now under despatch for Gombroon ; and first our settlement at Basrah, when it is observed there is nothing yet done for the advantage of our hon'ble employers, more than a promise obtained from the Pasha that we shall pay but three per cent. duties on the broadcloth, none of which being disposed of at the time Mr. Houssay despatched those advices; the prospect he gives us of selling it seems rather an amusement than any real application to serve his employers, while he continues so much involve in private trade.

Mr. French obtains from the Pacha of Basrah a Firman granting authority to the East India Company to punish their own servants, in the event of their committing any crime, without any interference being exercised by the Turkish Government. A stipulation is also made that in any dispute on the subject of debts or contracts between the *East India Company's Factory at Basrah* and the inhabitants of that place, an investigation shall be made by the Turkish Cazee in the presence of the British Resident, which shall be open to appeal by that officer to the Pacha."

8. The above extract shows that there was Resident at Basrah in 1724.

Paragraph 88.

9. In a letter to the address of the Hon'ble the Court of Directors, dated the 18th April 1759, the Resident at Basrah stated that the *French Resident* at that place had a short time since proceeded to Baghdad and had obtained a Firman from Soliman Pasha, directing that thenceforth he (the French Resident) should "be first received on the ceremonial visits and be respected as first of the European Residents." In consequence of his having obtained this firman, the French Resident, after his return to Basrah, treated Mr. Shaw with indignity, and issued an order that all the great men of the place and also the merchants (particularly Christians) should on all public days visit him previous to their paying their respects to the British Resident. This order was resisted by the parties to whom it was addressed, who stated that they felt a preference for the English, and that their inclinations led them to pay their first visit on these occasions to the British Resident. Mr. Shaw accordingly represented this circumstance to Soliman Pasha, who in consequence sent an order to the Mussalim at Basrah—

"directing him and all his officers to regard the English as first in his esteem."

The Pasha at the same time addressed a letter to the French Resident at Basrah reprimanding him for the above order. The Pasha also addressed a letter to Mr. Shaw expressing his concern at the Frenchman's impudence.

Paragraph 92.

10. The Pacha, in August 1760, issued an order for the exaction at Basrah of a duty of 5 instead of 3 per cent. upon all European goods landed at that place. On the remonstrance, however, of the Resident at Basrah the Pasha relinquished this demand.

Paragraph 99.

11. On the 22nd January 1763 Government directed the removal of the *Gombroon Factory to Basrah* and appointed Mr. William Andrew Price "Provisional Agent in Persia," and directed him to establish his headquarters at Basrah.

Paragraph 107.

12. His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople obtained in August 1764, a "Consulary Birat" for the *English East India Company's Agent at Basrah*, Mr. Garden and "whoever be Agent in future and whoever be British Consul for transacting their affairs in the city of Basrah or other places there belonging or dependent thereon."

Paragraph 116.

13. In 1765 Mr. Garden was sent to Baghdad with a representation to the Pasha in order to effect some sales of the East India Company's goods, but was recalled, and Mr. Dymoke Lyster, one of the Council at Basrah, was ordered to proceed on to Baghdad and relieve Mr. Garden. The Agent in Council at Basrah about this time made a recommendation that for the future one of the *Company's servants should permanently reside at Baghdad*. This arrangement was approved by Government on the 15th January 1766, and Mr. James Morley, then in Bombay, was appointed Resident at Baghdad, where he arrived on the 2nd May following, when Mr. Dymoke Lyster returned to



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Basrah. The Hon'ble the Court of Directors having, however, disapproved of this arrangements Mr. Morley was, on the 23rd November 1766, recalled by the Bombay Government from Baghdad.

14. In 1775 Karim Khan, Vakil of Persia captured Basrah. On the 2nd August 1778 Bombay Government under the authority contained in the following extract from a despatch from the Hon'ble the Court of Directors, dated the 4th July of the preceding year, directed the withdrawal of all the Company's servants from Basrah, with the exception of one, on whom it was resolved to bestow the appellation of Resident:—

"We have lately received such advices from Basrah, dated the 24th January and 23rd February 1777, complaining much of the oppressions from the Persians on the merchants and subjects, as give us very little prospect of the revival of trade there, consequently an addition of servants and expenses would be only increasing the present burden of that settlement, for which reason we now order that Mr. Moore be admitted to a seat at the Board agreeable to his standing. We are very apprehensive when the Persians find that the merchants and inhabitants have no more money they will begin with our servants, which happened some years past in Persia, by which the Company were very considerable sufferers. As the Agent and Council seem to think that the Persians would not permit them to leave the place, they applied to Karim Khan to withdraw to Bushire, hoping by that means to obtain orders from him for better treatment, which was very proper; but from what has past, and having been so often deceived by the firmans, we have no expectation of redress, and have come to a resolution to withdraw our servants from thence as soon as can be done, in such a manner as not to endanger their persons or effects of the Company. The best method that occurs to us is to obtain leave from the Khan to come to Bushire which probably he may not refuse being under his Government. When this is effected, and after staying a short time there, all the servants but one, must return to Bombay. We now repeat our former orders never to risk more of the Company's property at Bushire than Rs. 10,000 at any one time. If Basrah should be given up to the Turkish Government, as before, we permit in such case that a Resident be sent there; but you must give us previous intelligence of such measure that we may give orders in what manner the settlement is to be ultimately established."

15. In the diary of this Government for the 25th May 1779, allusion is made to a letter having been received from the Resident at Basrah, dated the 25th of the preceding month, "reporting the circumstances of the late revolution in that city, by which it has again reverted to the hands of the Turks," and that the Resident entertained the pleasing hope that by this change "the Hon'ble Company would again possess every advantage which they formerly had in the Gulf."

16. In the same letter the Resident stated that it appeared to him probable that the Court of Directors on hearing that this change had taken place in the Government of Basrah, and that there was every expectation that the Hon'ble Company would meet with the same countenance as formerly from the Pasha of Baghdad, would resolve on continuing the factory at Basrah; the Resident therefore resolved, pending further orders, to retain Mr. Abraham at Basrah for the purpose of assisting him in the management of the Company's affairs. The Resident also solicited that the Surgeon who had hitherto been attached to the factory might be permitted to remain. Both of these applications were complied with by Government in a letter dated the 31st December 1779.

17. In a letter dated the 10th July 1783, the Resident at Basrah solicited permission permanently to locate a Native Agent at Baghdad on a salary of Rs. 1,100 per annum for the purpose of transacting business with the Pasha on account of the Hon'ble Company, whose duty it would also be to forward intelligence and packets to Basrah. This arrangement was sanctioned by Government on the 30th November 1783.

(ii) Appointment of Resident at Baghdad and Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, 1798-1846.

18. On the 5th July 1798, the Court of Directors appointed Mr. Harford Jones (then in England), formerly "Joint Factor," at Basrah to be "Resident at the Court of Baghdad", at which place Mr. Jones arrived on the 24th of the following month, and assumed charge of that appointment. This appointment was made by the Hon'ble Court in supersession of a temporary arrangement made a short time previously by Mr. Manesty by sending a Mr. Reinaud to



Baghdad, as Agent on behalf of the Hon'ble Company, and had in view amongst other objects the facilitating the transmission of news to, and from India, and of watching the proceedings of French emissaries who were occasionally proceeding to, and from, India, through the Baghdad Pashalic, with the view, as was supposed, of communicating intelligence to General Bonaparte, who it was believed projected an invasion of India *via* Egypt and the Red Sea.

Paragraph 190.

19. In consequence of a representation to Government from Mr. Jones of the danger to which he had been recently exposed from being without medical advice during his illness, and the Pasha having about the same time expressed a wish that a British Medical Officer should be permanently located at Baghdad, that he might have the benefit of his medical advice whenever requisite, Government, in September 1800, appointed Mr. James Short, a Surgeon on the Bombay Establishment, Civil Surgeon to the Baghdad Residency.

Paragraph 191.

20. In September 1800 Government complied with an application preferred by Mr. Jones for having a *native guard* attached to Baghdad Residency, and a Jemadar, with 1 Havildar, 2 Naiks, 25 Sepoys, and a Drummer and Fifer were sent from Bombay to Baghdad for that purpose.

Paragraph 196.

21. On the 16th January 1803 the Earl of Elgin, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at the Court of the Sublime Porte, addressed a letter to Mr. Harford Jones, stating that the experience His Lordship had had of the interruptions to which Mr. Jones' residence at Baghdad was liable, and the intrigues to which he was exposed, from not possessing the same sanction from the Turkish Government that every other accredited foreigner enjoyed within the Ottoman Empire, had induced His Lordship to avail himself of the opportunity which the recent appointment of a new Pasha to the Baghdad Pashalic had afforded, as a favourable occasion for *establishing a right to the establishment of a British Resident at Baghdad*, and that His Lordship had accordingly obtained from the Sultan a "*Birat*" to that effect, conveying to Mr. Jones, the then Resident "every privilege and protection in the same form in which they are granted in all provinces of the Empire."

22. The translation of the *Birat* shows that it was granted to Mr. Jones, as "*British Consul of Baghdad and the environs*;" and there is not a word in the document that would lead one to infer that it was given on account of his position as an accredited representative of the East India Company at the Court of the Pasha.

23. In 1806, the Residents at Baghdad and Basrah were placed immediately under the control of the Bombay Government and were ordered to correspond with it exclusively.

Paragraph 215.

24. When Mr. Rich was appointed Resident in 1808, the Government letter to Soliman Pasha ran :—

"The Government ever anxious to preserve the relations of friendship and amity which have subsisted from time immemorial between the British Government in India, and the Walis of Baghdad, but more especially the late Suleiman Pasha, have appointed a new Resident, etc.

Paragraph 217.

25. In the same way, in 1808, Sir John Malcolm was appointed :—

"Envoy extraordinary to the King of Persia and the Pasha of Baghdad."

Paragraph 223.

26. In 1809, Mr. Rich, not having been treated by the Pasha with the respect and attention to which he considered himself entitled, withdrew from the Residency and encamped at some distance : he refused to return until the Pasha had written out an agreement containing six articles and binding himself down to the due fulfilment of its conditions.

Paragraph 228.

27. In a despatch dated 30th August 1809, the Court of Directors said they had resolved to immediately consolidate the Basrah and Baghdad Residencies, and that the Baghdad Residency should be withdrawn; and that whatever communication of a political nature it might be necessary in future to have with the Pasha of Baghdad, should be made through the medium of the Resident at Basrah as formerly, or by his assistant deputed to Baghdad for that purpose. Mr. Rich, who was to be the new Resident at Basrah said that from "motives connected with the good of the service," he had decided

Paragraph 230.



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to continue to reside at Baghdad for the present, leaving his assistant at Basrah.

28. In 1812 the designation of "*Resident at Basrah*" was changed to that of "*Political Agent in Turkish Arabia*," with liberty to reside either at Basrah or Baghdad, and with authority to depute his assistant to either of those places. Paragraph 236.

29. In 1819 the French Consul at Baghdad intimated to the Pasha that in receiving him—

"His Highness ought to bear in mind that throughout the Ottoman Empire it was ordained by existing treaties, that any French Agent was to be ranked above all British representatives whatever."

30. In the Pasha's reply the following words occur:—

"Mr. Rich, being a Resident Minister and Mons. de Pigouroux only a Consul, there could not, under any circumstances, be a competition between them. Whatever may be the rule elsewhere the ceremonial of my Court gives the precedence to the British Resident." Paragraph 243.

31. In 1821, however, the Pasha treated Mr. Rich with such indignity that the latter determined to leave Baghdad, the Pasha would not let him go. Mr. Rich put the Residency into a state of defence, and finally got the whole establishment away in safety. The Bombay Government wrote to the Pasha demanding an apology, and informing him of the only conditions on which friendly relations could be restored. Eventually the Pasha agreed to the whole of the conditions except the apology to Mr. Rich, who died while negotiations were proceeding. Paragraph 260.

31-A. In May 1822 Captain W. Bruce was, in consequence of abolition of the Residency at Baghdad, appointed *Political Agent in the Gulf of Persia*, making Kishmar Basrah his head-quarters, and Captain Taylor was appointed Assistant to him. But in November 1822 Captain Bruce was removed from his office and Captain Taylor appointed *Political Agent at Basrah*. Paragraphs 262-3.

32. The question of abolishing the Turkish Arabia Agency was seriously taken up several times (*scil.* in 1827, 1830 and 1834) by the Government of Bombay, and it was decided that the earliest opportunity should be embraced to merge it in the Persian Gulf Agency, and appoint only native Agents at Basrah and Baghdad.

33. Lord Clare, then Governor of the Presidency, however, observed in a Minute, dated the 18th September 1834, that undoubtedly, if merely the protection of British Commerce was required in Turkish Arabia, a Native Agent at Basrah would answer as well as a European Political Agent; but that His Lordship was of opinion that interests purely Indian were more deeply concerned, and that looking to the connection between European and Indian politics, it appeared very doubtful to His Lordship whether it would be advisable, at all events for the present, to abolish the Political Agency in Turkish Arabia. The Government of India entirely concurred in the sentiments entertained by Lord Clare on the above subject (Government of India letter dated 9th October 1834). Paragraph 273.

34. On the 1st July 1831 the Hon'ble the Secret Committee addressed a despatch, from which the following is an extract, to the Governor-General of India in Council, containing instructions for the guidance of the public conduct of the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, and for the regulation of his various public relations:— Paragraph 282.

"Our Agent in Pashalic of Baghdad is not to regard himself as the Plenipotentiary at the Court of a Sovereign and independent Prince. He is not to consider it as part of his ordinary duty to mix himself with the local duties and civil contentions of the restless and unscrupulous chiefs by whom he surrounded. He is not at liberty to enter at his own discretion, and without instructions, into negotiations and political engagements of any description. He is to recollect that we can regard the Pacha only as the dependent and subject of the Sultan, with whom we maintain amity, and at whose Court we have an Ambassador. So long as our alliance with Turkey subsists, our peculiar relations with any of the Pachas of that empire must be regulated by a reference to the paramount obligations which connect us with the master authority." X

The Company's Resident in Turkish Arabia ought, we conceive, to consider himself as acting exclusively in a consular capacity. On the duties which belong to that character it is not necessary here to enlarge, but a watchful protection of British interests and the persons of British subjects, diligence in the collection of important information, and an unfailing communications to your Government and to this country of all public events, and political changes, all these are perfectly consistent with that firm and guarded abstinence from personal interference with the internal administration, and external relations of the Pashalic, which we conceive it for our honor, no less than our interest to observe." X

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Paragraph 820.

35. On the 10th August 1841, Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, was appointed by Her Majesty's Government *British Consul* at Baghdad. The following is an extract from the Hon'ble Viscount Palmerstons' letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, informing him of this appointment and communicating instructions for his guidance in the conduct of his duties in that capacity :—

" Her Majesty's Government has judged that it will be advantageous to the public service that Consular power and rank should be conferred upon you; I have to acquaint you that the Queen has been graciously pleased to sign a commission appointing you Her Majesty's Consul at Baghdad. This Commission will be forwarded to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Constantinople, in order that the necessary exequatur may be obtained from the Sublime Porte, recognising you as Her Majesty's Consul and Mr. Cartwright will transmit those documents to you; I have, however, to acquaint you that it is not intended by this commission to interfere with your present position as the *East India Company's Resident* at Baghdad, further than to place under your superintendence the *British Vice-Consul*, who has lately been appointed to reside at Mussoul, and Mr. Hassan will be instructed to consider himself under your superintendence, and to attend to the instructions which you may from time to time give him for the guidance of his official conduct."

36. On the 7th March 1843, Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, submitted to the Bombay Government, with his favourable recommendation, an application from the Pasha of Baghdad, soliciting that he might be furnished from Bombay on his defraying their cost with 20,000 cannon shot of different sizes, and with an iron steamer similar in all respects to those (lately) employed on the Euphrates. This steamer, the Pasha stated, was intended as the foundation "of a small fleet" he proposed to establish on the rivers of the Baghdad Pashalic, and he solicited that Commander Lynch might be appointed to the charge of the vessel for which he had applied. This application was referred by the Bombay Government on the 18th May 1843 for the orders of the Governor-General of India, with the remark that even if it should be deemed expedient by His Lordship to comply with the requisitions of the Pasha, the services of Commander Lynch could not, "in consequence of the present paucity of officers in the Indian Navy," be spared. In reply, the Government of India stated in a letter, dated the 6th July 1843, that the Pasha's application was one which could not be complied with, and was of a nature that Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor ought not to have transmitted to Government.

37. On the 29th June 1843, the Secret Committee forwarded to the Bombay Government copy of a letter from a Mr. Thomas Stirling residing at Sheffield, the Agent in England for Messrs. Hector & Co., merchants at Baghdad, stating that the application of the Pasha for a steamer had created considerable excitement amongst the trading community, and complaining of the general conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor in matters of trade as he had an interest in certain commercial undertaking. A copy of Mr. Stirling's letter was on receipt forwarded to Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor for his explanation, and a copy of the Secret Committee's communication was on the same day forwarded to the Government of India, with the remark that the Bombay Government was of opinion that the Political Agency in Turkish Arabia had for a long time past been maintained on a scale far more expensive than was necessary, and that all the objects which either Her Majesty's Government or the Hon'ble East India Company could desire in that quarter could be attained either by an Assistant to the Resident in the Persian Gulf being stationed at Bussorah, or by the appointment of a Consul to Her Majesty, on something of the same footing as Her Majesty's Consul in the territories of the Imam of Muscat, by which arrangement it was observed a saving might be made of about two-thirds of the expense at present incurred. In reply the Government of India stated



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38. The Bombay Government was at the same time furnished with copy of a letter which had on the same day (16th September 1843) under the orders of the Governor-General of India in Council been addressed to Major Rawlinson, informing him of his having been appointed to the above charge, and containing instructions for his guidance in the discharge of the duties devolving on him. In compliance with a request made to this Government by His Lordship in Council, orders were on receipt of the above letter issued to the Resident in the Persian Gulf and to the Commanders of the vessels of the Indian Navy employed in that quarter to attend to any requisitions or instructions they might expectively receive from Major Rawlinson on his assuming charge of the duties of Political Agent in Turkish Arabia.

39. The instructions of the Government of India to Major Rawlinson above alluded to were to the following effect:—

"The Governor-General in Council has directed me to inform you that he has appointed you Political Agent in Turkish Arabia. His Lordship in Council has adopted this measure in the earnest desire to *preserve peace between Persia and Turkey*, and in the confidence that you will most zealously devote all your exertions to the accomplishment of this object; you will feel that your efforts can only be effectually aided by the reliance of both Governments upon your perfect impartiality in every question which exists or which may arise between them and you will so act as to induce them to place their reliance upon you.

You will keep yourself in constant communication with Her Majesty's Ministers at the Courts of Constantinople and Teheran; you will afford them all the information you obtain, taking special care to sift the information you may receive, and to transmit it to Her Majesty's Ministers with such remarks as may lead them to attach the just value to the facts stated. You will in all cases endeavour to carry out the views of Her Majesty's Ministers at Constantinople and Teheran whenever they may be communicated to you, and any instructions you may deem it necessary to give to the Political Agents of the Government of India in the Persian Gulf will be in entire conformity with the spirit of the instructions you may so receive; you will understand that the sole object of your mission is the preservation of peace and the creation of a good understanding between the Governments and subjects of Persia and Turkey, and you may be assured that the Governor-General in Council will place the most favourable interpretation upon your conduct zealously directed to the attainment of this result."

40. On 15th March 1844 Major Rawlinson was appointed Her Majesty's Consul at Baghdad in succession to Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor. In informing Major Rawlinson of this appointment, Lord Aberdeen, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote to him in July 1844:—

"I think it right to observe to you that Consular rank was given to the East India Company's Agent at Baghdad not with the view of making that Agent especially a servant of the Crown, but solely in order that he might be able in circumstances called for Consular interference to act as Consul, and it was expressly stated in the instructions to Colonel Taylor of the 10th August 1841, which you will find amongst the Consular archives at Baghdad, that *Her Majesty's Commission was not intended to interfere with or alter his position as the East India Company's Resident at Baghdad further than to place under his superintendence the British Vice-Consul at Mosul*."

41. In 1851 Lieutenant-Colonel Rawlinson was appointed Consul-General, Baghdad. No contemporary authority can be traced for this alteration in our records, but whereas before the year 1851 Colonel Rawlinson is called merely Her Majesty's Consul at Baghdad, he is entitled Her Majesty's Consul General at Baghdad in our records from the year 1851 on his return from leave, during which time Lieutenant-Colonel A. Kemball acted for him and was also called Her Majesty's Consul at Baghdad. From Mr. Hertslet's memorandum (Proceedings No. 65 in Secret, October 1874, Nos. 62-68), it appears that Lieutenant-Colonel Rawlinson was appointed Consul-General at Baghdad on 22nd November 1851.

41-A. From the same memorandum it appears Colonel Rawlinson was reminded that the new commission empowered him to appoint Vice-Consuls and that he was authorized to appoint as British Vice-Consul at Baghdad the person who might be appointed as the East India Company's Native Agent at that place.

(iii) List of Political Officers in Turkish Arabia from 1788-89 to 1843-44.

42. We shall reproduce here a statement forwarded by the Bombay Government to the Government of India showing names, salaries, etc., of the Political Officers in Turkish Arabia from the year 1788-89 to 1843-47.



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Statement showing the names, salaries and emoluments and establishments at different periods of several officers, who have filled the offices of Political Agents in Turkish Arabia from 1788-89 to 1843-44 (the date of the first establishment of those Agencies not being traceable).

Names and designations.	Periods of employment.	Specifications of allowances.	Total amount drawn per month by officers during each period of employment specified in column 2nd.		REMARKS.
			Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	
BUSSORAH RESIDENCY. Samuel Mansety, Esq., Resident ...	From 1838-89 to 1802-03	Diet money ...	150 0 0		
		Salary ...	26 10 8		
		Gratuity ...	300 0 0		
		Allowance for public days and table linen ...	33 5 4		
	From 1803-04 to 1805-06	Salary ...	500 0 0	510 0 0	In 1801-02 Mr. Mansety drew also extra gratuity at Rs. 500 per month.
		Gratuity ...	300 0 0		
		Pay as Accountant and translator ...	35 0 0		
		Allowances for public days and table linen ...	33 5 4		
	From 1806-07 to 1808-09	Gratuity ...	300 0 0	508 5 4	
		Extra gratuity during war ...	500 0 0		
		Diet money ...	150 0 0		
		Allowances for public days and table linen ...	25 0 0		
	For 1809-10	As above with the exception of allowance for public days and table linen which was drawn this year at Rs. 33-5-4 per month.		975 0 0	
				988 5 4	

Part II.



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Assistant Residents.

H. Jones, Esq.,	Designation not stated	{ From November 1788 to 20th November 1790.	Salary as Factor	13 5 4	
		{ From 21st November 1790 to April 1793.	Salary as senior merchant	14 14 6	
		{ From 1788 to 1793	{ Diet money	...	40 0 0		
			{ House-rent	...	20 0 0		
Thomas Day, Esq.,	{ Writer	{ From May to November 1793	{ Diet money	...	40 0 0		
			{ House-rent	...	20 0 0		
	{ Accountant	{ Ditto ditto		Ra. A. P.	{ 60 0 0		
					{ 20 0 0		
					{ 15 0 0		
					{ 12 0 0		
	{ Reader of Divine Service				{ 15 0 0		
					{ 30 0 0		
James Kinlock, Esq., Assistant.	{ As above	{ From December 1798 to February 1801.	As above in addition to a salary of Rs. 10 per month.		162 0 0		
		{ From March to April 1802					
Thomas Day, Esq.,	{ Ditto	{ For 1802-03	As above with the exception of salary which was drawn this year at Rs. 13-5-4 per month.		165 5 4		
J. Law, Esq., Assistant		{ For 1802-03	As above with the exception of salary which was drawn this year at Rs. 13-5-4 per month. House-rent drawn at Rs. 40 per month.		185 5 4		
J. Law, Esq., Assistant		{ For 1804-05	Salary		400 0 0		

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Statement showing the names, salaries and emoluments and establishments at different periods of several officers, etc.—contd.

Names and designations.	Period of employment.	Specification of allowances.	Total amount drawn per month by officers during each period of employment specified in column 2nd.	REMARKS.
BUSSORAH RESIDENCY—contd. Assistant Residents—contd.	For 1805-06	Salary Salary Pay as Accountant Pay as Translator	Ra. A. P. 400 0 0 400 0 0 20 0 0 15 0 0	
W. C. Bruce, Esq., Assistant	For 1806-07	Pay as reader of Divine Service Moonshee allowance House rent Servant and servant cloth	12 0 0 30 0 0 20 0 0 15 0 0	
	For 1807-08 and 1808-09	Salary War allowance	400 0 0 92 0 0	
G. Colquhoun, Esq., Acting Assistant	From 1807-08 to 1809-10	Salary	300 0 0	
	From 1788-89 to 1792-93	176 0 0	
	From 1797-98 to 1798-99	364 0 0	
	For 1799-1800 and 1800-01	301 15 7	
Residency establishment	For 1801-02	311 8 5	
	For 1802-03	416 6 4	
	From 1803-04 to 1805-05	786 14 4	
	For 1806-07 and 1807-08	525 1 3	
	For 1808-09 and 1809-10	495 1 3	

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The cash accounts from 1793-94 to 1799-97 are missing; the information for those years cannot therefore be given.



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Civil Surgeons.										Chapter IV.	103
Surgeon C. Nevill	From November 1788 to November 1789.	Salary	12	0	0	152 0 0
					Diet money	120	0	0	
					House-rent	20	0	0	
Surgeon James Small	From May 1790 to June 1792	As above	152 0 0	152 0 0
David Carnegie, Esq., Surgeon	From May to December 1798	Ditto	152 0 0	
				For 1798-99	As above	152	0	0	193 3 3
					Country medicine	20	0	0	
					Factory repairs	6	3	3	
					Servant and servant cloth	15	0	0	
				For 1799-1800	As above with the exception of salary which was drawn this year at Rs. 24 per month.	205 3 3	
John Miln, Esq., Surgeon		Salary	23	0	0	200 3 3
					Diet money	120	0	0	
				For 1800-01	House-rent	20	0	0	
					Private dispensary	50	0	0	
					Contingencies	41	3	3	
				For 1801-02 and 1802-03	As above with the exception of salary which was drawn at Rs. 24 per month.	205 3 3	

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Statement showing the names, salaries and emoluments and establishments at different periods of several officers, etc.—contd.

Names and designations.	Period of employment.	Specification of allowances.	Total amount drawn per month by officers during each period of employment specified in column 2nd.	REMARKS.
			Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.
BAGHDAD RESIDENCY (1798-1810).				
H. Jones, Esq., Resident	From 1798-99 to 1805-06	Salary 1,000 0 0 House-rent 300 0 0	1,300 0 0	
	For 1806-07, vacant.			
C. J. Rich, Esq., Resident	From 1807-08 to 1809-10	As above	1,300 0 0	
Assistant Resident.				
John Hine, Esq., Assistant	From 1806-07 to 1809-10	Salary	400 0 0	
	From 1798-99		192 0 0	
	From 1799-1800 to 1804-05		391 0 0	
	For 1805-06		757 0 0	
Establishment consisting stable charges, servant wages and contingencies, &c.	For 1806-07		523 8 0	
	For 1807-08		545 8 0	
	For 1808-09 and 1809-10		599 4 0	
Civil Surgeon.				
James Short Esq., Surgeon	From 1800-01 to 1802-03	Pay and full field allowance as Major	865 0 0	

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Part II.

BUSSORAH AND BAGHDAD RESIDENCY (1810-12).								
C. J. Rich, Esq., Resident at Baghdad	...	{	From 1810-11 to 1814-15	...	{	Salary	2,000 0 0	{ 3,600 0 0
						Table money and house-rent	1,500 0 0	
John Hine, Esq., Assistant at Baghdad	...	{	From 1815-16 to 1820-21	...		Salary and other allowances	3,000 0 0	
Establishment	{	From 1810-11 to 1821-22	...		Salary	400 0 0	
			From 1810-11 to 1814-15	950 0 0	{ Establishment for 1815-16 and 1816-17 does not appear to have been charged.
<i>Bussorah.</i>			From 1817-18 to 1821-22	150 0 0	
<i>Assistant Resident.</i>								
G. Colquhoun, Esq., Assistant	{	From 1810-11 to 1817-18	...	{	Salary	400 0 0	
						Table allowance	600 0 0	
						Allowances for establishment	300 0 0	
						Balloons, crew and provision	40 0 0	
						Factory repairs	200 0 0	
							1,540 0 0	
TURKISH ARABIA RESIDENCY (1812-44).			From 1818-19 to 1821-22 as Assistant			As preceding	1,540 0 0	
			For 1822-23 and 1823-24 as Political Agent.			As preceding with the exception of salary which was increased to Rs. 600 per month.	1,740 0 0	
Lieutenant-Colonel R. Taylor, Political Agent	...	{	From 1824-25 to 1828-29	...	{	Salary	800 0 0	
						Table allowance and contingencies	1,000 0 0	
						Establishment	400 0 0	
						Factory repairs	200 0 0	2,400 0 0
N.B.—Promoted from Captain to Major on the 2nd April 1827 and from Major to Lieutenant-Colonel on the 7th September 1831.			For 1829-30	...		As above with the exception of establishment which was reduced from Rs. 400 to Rs. 200 and allowance for Factory repairs discontinued.	2,100 0 0	
			From 1830-31 to 1835-36	...		As above in addition to house-rent at Rs. 450 per month.	2,550 0 0	
			For 1836-37 and 1837-38	...	{	Consolidated salary	2,500 0 0	
						Allowance for establishment	300 0 0	2,800 0 0
			From 1838-39 to 1842-43	...		Consolidated salary	2,500 0 0	{ 2,256 8 0
						Deduct Military net pay drawn from the Military Department. 243 8 0		

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Statement showing the names, salaries and emoluments and establishments at different periods of several officers, etc.—concl'd.

Names and designations.	Period of employment.	Specification of allowances.	Total amount drawn by month by officers during each period of employment specified in column 2nd.	REMARKS.
			Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.
TURKISH ARABIA—cont'd.				
Major (Brevet Captain) H. C. Rawlinson, Political Agent.	For 1843-44	Consolidated salary Deduct Military net pay drawn from the Military Department.	2,500 0 0 60 14 0	2,439 2 0
Establishment, including boats, crews and contingencies.	From 1824-25 to 1828-29			651 0 8
	From 1829-30			639 12 0
	From 1830-31 to 1833-34			639 12 0
	From 1834-35 to 1843-44			779 12 0
Civil Surgeon.				
C. Jones, Esq., Surgeon and Vaccinator	From 1824-25 to 1828-29	Salary Medical allowance Vaccination allowance	300 0 0 150 0 0 60 0 0	610 0 0
A. J. Montefiore, Esq., Surgeon and Vaccinator	For 1829-30	Salary Vaccination	150 0 0 60 0 0	210 0 0
A. C. Baigrie, Esq., ditto	For 1830-31	Salary Medical allowance	300 0 0 150 0 0	450 0 0
Assistant Surgeon J. Ross, Civil Surgeon	From 1831-32 to 1834-35	As above		450 0 0
	From 1835-36 to 1842-43	Consolidated salary		615 0



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Surgeon J. Ross, Civil Surgeon	For 1843-44	...	<div> <div>Civil salary</div> <div>Military pay and field allowances</div> </div>	300 0 0	}	715 6 0
						415 6 0		
Vaccination establishment	From 1824-25 to 1829-30	...							36 0 0
BAGHDAD.											
Native Agent (or Broker)	From 1824-25 to 1843-44	...	Salary		200 0 0
Establishment	From 1829-30 to 1832-33	...							79 4 8
			For 1833-34	...						90 0 0	

BOMBAY CASTLE,
CIVIL AUDITOR'S OFFICE ; }
The 19th December 1844.

J. B. ELLIOTT,
Civil Auditor.

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(iv) Political Agents in Turkish Arabia, 1855-1904.

43. After the retirement of Colonel Rawlinson, Colonel A. Kemball was appointed to succeed him as Political Agent in Turkish Arabia and Consul-General at Baghdad in April 1855.

44. In September 1870 Colonel Herbert succeeded Colonel Kemball as Political Agent, Turkish Arabia. He was subsequently in February 1871 appointed also Consul-General at Baghdad, and also authorized to solemnize and register marriages of British subjects.

45. The following is the list of Political Agents on Turkish Arabia since 1855 :—

Names of officers.	Date of appointment.
Colonel A. Kemball	April 1855.
Colonel Herbert	September 1870.
Colonel Nixon	September 1874.
Colonel Miles.	
Mr. C. H. Plowden.	
Colonel Tweedie.	
Colonel Talbot.	
Colonel Mockler.	
Colonel Loch.	
Colonel Newmarch.	

(v) The Assistant Political Agency and Consulate at Basrah, 1810-77-98.

46. On the amalgamation in 1810 of the separate Residencies of Basrah and Baghdad, an Assistant Political Agent was appointed to Basrah. The appointment was held by Dr. Colquhoun from 1810 to 1818, and by Captain Taylor until 1822. In that year after the death of Mr. Rich, Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, some changes were made in the Company's establishments in these parts which resulted in Captain Taylor being appointed Political Agent at Basrah, the Baghdad appointment remained unfilled. In 1828-29 he was made Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, but continued to reside at Basrah until 1832, when he transferred his head-quarters to Baghdad where they have ever since remained. The Office of Assistant Political Agent was not, however, then revived.

47. On various occasions between 1810 and 1819, during the absence of Assistant Political Agent from Basrah, the Company's broker held charge of the factory and was granted in 1819 a salary of Rs. 200 per mensem. Subsequently in 1821 on the ground that the duties for which this salary was allowed were not services performed for the Company in its commercial capacity, but were rather of a Political character; he was given the designation of "Native Agent." The first Native Agent was Khoja Johannes, who died in 1821 and was succeeded by his son Khoja Parseigh B. Johannes, who seems to have taken the place of the former European Assistant, for in 1832 when Major Taylor finally transferred his establishment to Baghdad, he reported that he had left "the Native Agent in charge as heretofore." Khoja Parseigh Johannes died in

* Son of Captain, afterwards Colonel Taylor, Political Agent in Turkish Arabia. June 1851, and was succeeded by Mr. John Taylor,* who was appointed by the

Government of India on the joint recommendation of Messrs. Rawlinson and Kemball. In 1856, with retrospective effect from August 1854, the salary of the appointment was increased to Rs. 400 per mensem. In 1858, Mr. Taylor took leave and was succeeded by Mr. Rogers, the purser, of the *Comet*, who was confirmed in the appointment on Mr. Taylor's transfer, as Consul to Diarbekr. Mr. Rogers died in 1862, and on the recommendation of Colonel Kemball the Government of India appointed Mr. Johnston,† a junior partner in Lynch and Company's firm, his successor. In April 1868, Mr. Johnston took eighteen months' sick leave, and Colonel Kemball then nominated Mr. Robertson, an Assistant in Lynch and Company's firm, to act for him. In November 1869,

† In 1864 a recommendation submitted by Colonel Kemball to increase Mr. Johnston's pay by Rs. 150 was refused by the Government of India (Foreign Department No. 163, dated 16th June 1864).



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on Mr. Johnston's death, the Government of India confirmed Mr. Robertson, * Foreign Department Notification No. 2923-G, and in 1877* the Basrah appointment was included in the third class of Political Assistants on the graded list of the Indian Political Department, and subsequent vacancies were until 1893 filled from this list. All the officers, who have been appointed to Basrah, beginning with Mr. John Taylor, have held Consular powers of a Vice-Consul, subordinate to the Consul General at Baghdad.

48. The officers, who held the appointments as indicated above at Basrah, are shown in the following tabular statements:—

List of Agents at Basrah, 1810-1877.

Year.	Designation of appointment.	Holder.	Salary.	REMARKS.
1880—1822	Assistant Political Agent	(1) Doctor Colquhoun ... (2) Captain Taylor.	Rs. 400 per mensem ...	Assisted by a Native Agent.
1822—1853	Native Agent ...	K. Pars. Johannes ...	Rs. 200 per mensem ...	Unconvenanted service.
1851—1858	Hon'ble Company's Agent	Mr. Taylor ...	Rs. 200 per mensem, afterwards Rs. 400 per mensem.	
1858—1862	British Agent ...	Mr. R. Rogers ...	Rs. 400 per mensem...	
1862—1868		Mr. W. Johnston ...		
1868—1877		Mr. P. Robertson ...		

List of Consuls at Basrah, 1877-1898.

Name of Consul.	Date of arrival.	REMARKS.
Captain Fraser ...	1878	Salary regulated according to place in the graded list.
Mr. Robertson ...	1879	
Captain J. H. Newill ...	June 1881	
Major Mockler ...	February 1883	
Captain H. Ramsay ...	May 1883	
Major Mockler ...	October 1883	
Mr. P. C. Robertson ...	April 1886	
Lieutenant-Colonel Mockler ...	January 1887	
Mr. P. C. Robertson ...	April 1887	
Captain Ravenshaw ...	December 1889	
Lieutenant Stratton ...	April 1890	
Captain Trench ...	March 1891	
Major Jennings ...	February 1892	
Lieutenant F. G. Beville ...	August 1892	
Lieutenant S. G. Knox ...	November 1894	
Captain Whyte ...	November 1895	
Major Fagan... ...	February 1897	
Captain Forbes ...	September 1897	

(vi) Change of designation of Political Officer at Basrah from British Agent at Basrah to Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, 1873.

49. By Notification No. 1553-G., dated 17th July 1873, the Governor General in Council was pleased to change the designation of the *British Agent at Basrah* to "*Assistant Political Agent*."

50. This change of title was suggested by Political Agent in Turkish Arabia in appreciation of the zeal, unwearying exertions and tact displayed by Mr. Robertson in tracing the offenders in the *Kashmere* Piracy case.* The designation of "a British Agent" was, it was understood, given to an Agent of the Government, who is a native of the country, where he serves, and was apt to deprecate the position of the Vice-Consul in the estimation of travellers, particularly Indian.

51. The Government of India sanctioned the change of designation proposed, on condition, however, that it entailed no extra cost on Government (Foreign Department letter No. 1554-G., dated 17th July 1873.)

* Chapter XX (i).

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(vii) Appointment of Mr. Robertson as Consul in place of Vice-Consul at Basrah, 1879.

52. In the year 1879, Mr. Robertson submitted an application requesting that the Consular Officer at Basrah should be appointed a Consul instead of a Vice-Consul, with a view to increase weight which his official communications might have with Turkish officials. Colonel Nixon supported this application and the Government of India in submitting the correspondence observed (Despatch No. 59, dated 2nd June 1879) that owing to the increased Turkish activity in the Persian Gulf, Mr. Robertson had to communicate frequently with Turkish authorities and that these communications would carry greater weight should his rank be that of a Consul. Further it was necessary that the local Political Officer at Basrah should be in a position to render adequate protection to British Commerce and his promotion to the rank of a Consul would augment his influence.

Political A., June 1879, Nos. 177-179.

53. Her Majesty's Government approved of the proposal, but subject to this condition (Foreign Office to India Office, dated 28th July 1874):—

"It is understood that this appointment gives Mr. Robertson no claims upon Her Majesty's Government for his services as Her Majesty's Consul, and he will remain as heretofore under the jurisdiction of Her Majesty's Consul General at Baghdad."

(viii) Proposed appointment of an Assistant Political Officer at Baghdad, 1883.

54. The first application that was received for an Assistant to the Consul-General at Baghdad was made by Mr. Plowden in February 1881, but the Government of India were not prepared then to strengthen the Staff at Baghdad.

General B., August 1881, Nos. 391-392.

54-A. In July the same year Mr. Plowden asked once more whether there was any chance of his getting an Assistant at Baghdad and requested to be permitted to fill up the appointment of *Native Agent*, if he could not be sent an Assistant. In reply he was authorized to nominate an officer to the appointment of *Native Agent*.

General B., September 1881, Nos. 204-205.

54-B. With his despatch No. 45 (Political), dated 31st May 1883, the Secretary of State sent to the Government of India, for opinion, copy of a memorandum by Mr. Plowden, while he was in England on leave from which the following extract is taken bearing on the above proposal:—

* A., Political E., July 1883, Nos. 118-120.

"As I am dealing with Baghdad affairs, I take the opportunity of mentioning another matter, the expediency of giving the Resident in Turkish Arabia an Assistant. There is no officer in the Indian Political service who has to deal single-handed with so large a charge as that entrusted to the Resident in Turkish Arabia and Consul-General in Baghdad. The country under my political supervision measures about 140,000 square miles, and it is part of my duty to keep the Imperial and Indian Governments informed of all political events of importance, which may happen throughout this extensive country, of the movements of the Kurds in the north and north-east, of the condition of affairs on the Turco-Persian frontier, and of the relations of the Arab tribes towards each other and towards the Ottoman officials, with the Foreign Consuls, French, Russian, and Persian (with the two former the correspondence is in French while I have to translate myself), with my two Assistants at Basrah and Mosul, with the Resident in the Persian Gulf, with the Government of India and Bombay, with the English Foreign Office and the Ambassador at Constantinople, and occasionally also with the Minister at Teheran. I have also the charge of an Indian Post Office, which is largely used as a channel for the import of valuable merchandise and of a Treasury. And whereas in India the duty of personally certifying the balances of cash in the Treasury on the last day of the month, and submitting the Treasury and stamp accounts on certain fixed dates, is ordinarily assigned to a young Assistant Magistrate, at Baghdad the duty devolves upon me. It hampers me very much, for it obliges me to be present in Baghdad on certain specified days. Petty litigation and petty disputes among the British Indians take up a further large share of my time. Then I get a number of telegrams, necessarily in cipher, for every open telegram is seen by the Turkish authorities, and which have to be answered in cipher. The English and the Indian Governments do not use the same code so that I have sometimes to communicate the same message in two different ciphers, and as I am obliged by stringent orders to do cypher work entirely by myself, all other business has in the interval to be put aside.

My staff consists of two Portuguese Clerks, who in Bombay would be worth Rs. 40 per mensem, a Syrian native agent, an Armenian dragoman, an Armenian treasurer, one or two native clerks. Naturally, I have frequent business with the Vali and other Ottoman officials. Very little can be done in Baghdad by despatch writing, and at the same time it is not always convenient or proper that I should go in person to the Vali or his subordinates. And yet I have no person on whom I can rely to send in my place. The native agent and the Armenian dragoman are local Christians who carry no weight and who are really afraid of the Vali.



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I am most reluctant to send them, for they can rarely get anything done, and yet practically I have no choice. Contrast my position with that of the Resident in the Persian Gulf. I have at least as much work to do and yet while I am single-handed, the Resident at Bushira has an Assistant Resident (until lately he had two), and a Treasury Officer of the status of an Extra Assistant Commissioner. There is no comparison between my work and that of the French Consul at Baghdad, the proportion is as ten to one, and yet the latter is allowed by his Government an European Assistant carefully trained in the Oriental College at Paris.

Moreover, the value of Baghdad as a field for training a young Political Officer is worth of some consideration. He would have an unrivalled opportunity of learning Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, of mixing with Orientals of many and various types, and of seeing what Muhammadanism is like in a country where Islam is the dominant faith. I cannot help thinking that, if Baghdad were nearer India, the necessity of giving the Resident an Assistant would have recognised long before this, and I am strongly of opinion that the public interests suffer through the omission to appoint one."

55. The reply of the Government of India to the Secretary of State was (Despatch No. 78, dated 13th July 1883):—

"It would undoubtedly be useful to the Resident, and advantageous to the Government of India, to add an Assistant to the Residency Staff. At the same time we are not satisfied that the work of the Baghdad Residency and Consulate is sufficiently heavy to justify the expense which would be incurred in creating a fresh appointment in our political service, as proposed by Mr. Plowden. We shall endeavour, however, to depute to Baghdad from time to time any young officer who may not be required for more urgent duty elsewhere. At present we have no one available for this purpose, but when an opportunity occurs we will give the matter full consideration."


55-A. During Mr. Plowden's absence on leave, Colonel Tweedie (in temporary charge) revived the question of the need for increasing the Staff and proposed the appointment of two Indian Mahomedan Attachés to a British Civil or Military Officer. Government, however, decided to take up the question at some later date.

55-B. There was some further discussion in 1884 and 1885, but nothing was done for strengthening the staff of the Baghdad Residency.

55-C. In November 1904, Major Mewmarch represented to the Foreign Office commenting on the great difficulty he experienced in drawing up Trade reports and in coping with consular duties in addition to his political duties, which occupied most of his time. He therefore proposed the appointment of a Consular Assistant at Baghdad. His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople thought it advisable to attach a member of the Levant Service to the post. The Foreign Office agreed to the proposal and the Government of India, while expressing concurrence in the proposal which would encumber them with one-half of the cost pressed the appointment of Mr. Gaskin, then on special duty with Mr. J. G. Lorimer on tour in connection with the Persian Gulf Gazetteer (Despatch No. 72-Secret—External dated 27th April 1905). Mr. Gaskin, however, proceeded on privilege leave of three months joined with furlough of five months with effect from 28th June 1905.

(ix) British Agents at Kerbella and Kathimain: appointment of Consular Agent at Kerbella.

56. Certain members of the Arcot family have been acting as our "*Honorary Agents*" at Kerbella and Kathimain. Owing to the important positions they held as distributors of the Oudh Bequests,* and as they have been playing an important part in those places, we shall attempt to draw a pedigree of the family so far as can be made out from our records:—



57. Hyder Ali Khan appears to have been the first Agent for the distribution of the Oudh Bequest, mentioned in our records. He is spoken of as our *Honorary Agent at Kerbella*. On his death Mahomed Taki Khan, apparently his son, succeeded him, and he was also appointed our *Honorary*

* See Chapter XVI as to the Oudh Bequest.



Agent at Kerbella cum Nejaf. When this appointment was originally made it cannot be traced; but Mahomed Taki Khan held the post since 1885 (Colonel Mockler's letter No. 171, dated 23rd August 1892). As Agent for the Oudh Bequest, he received a salary of Rs. 255 per mensem out of the bequest, besides many of his relations who assisted him received handsome salaries out of the same fund.

External A., September 1892, Nos. 173-181.

58. Nawab Mahomed Hussain Khan was for long the distributor of the Oudh Bequest at Kathimain, and held the position of our *Honorary Agent at Kathimain*. After his death about 1888, his eldest son Aga Mahomed Khan was appointed Agent in his place. He received a salary of Rs. 253 out of the fund (Colonel Tweedie's letter to the Government of India, No. 123, dated 12th March 1890).

Internal A., June 1890, Nos. 37-43.

59. In 1879 Colonel Miles, Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, visited Kerbella and Nejaf. At the former place he found an Indian population estimated at 5,000 in number. Much inconvenience was felt by them for want of a Consular Officer. The Agent appointed by the Residency for the purpose of distribution of the Oudh Endowment Fund, Nawab Hyder Ali Khan, interested himself in the welfare of Indians. But as he had no recognized official position he was not able to give them that full and adequate assistance that was urgently required. Colonel Miles therefore proposed the appointment of an Honorary Consular Agent for Kerbella cum Nejaf, with a small establishment (Colonel Miles to the British Embassy, No. 142, dated 24th November 1879).

Secret, March 1880, Nos. 176-179.

60. The proposal was favourably considerably considered, but it was abandoned on account of the unwillingness of Her Majesty's Government to sanction any expenditure on this account from Imperial funds. (Second enclosure to letter from the Secretary, Secret and Political Department No. 31, dated 12th February 1880.)

Political A., June 1880, Nos. 142-147.

61. In 1885 Mr. Plowden proposed the appointments of Consular Agents at Kerbella and Kathimain (Mr. Plowden's despatch No. 262, dated 28th May 1885, to the British Embassy). But his proposal was abandoned on the ground of the inexpediency of moving in the matter, when the question of new Consular Agencies was under consideration between Her Majesty's Government and the Porte.

62. In 1890, Colonel Tweedie, in making certain proposals about the administration of the Oudh Bequest, suggested that Mahomed Taki Khan, the distributor of the Bequest at Kerbella, should be *gazetted* as our Agent, and paid out of our revenues, that the appointment should be attached to the Baghdad Consulate and that its incumbent should be liable to transfer (Colonel Tweedie to the Government of India, No. 123, dated 12th March 1890).

External A., June 1890, Nos. 37-43.

No orders were passed on this proposal.

63. In 1892 Colonel Mockler reported that there was at Kerbella and Najaf a population of about 2,000 souls, whose disputes among themselves were referred to our native agent Mahomed Taki Khan for adjudication. But he had no recognized position as a Consular Officer to legalize his decisions. For this and other reasons he proposed that Mohamed Taki Khan should be appointed as our *Consular Agent at Kerbella cum Nejaf* (Colonel Mockler's letter No. 171, dated 23rd November 1892).

64. The Government of India recommended this proposal for approval to the Secretary of State, pointing out that the agent was paid of the Oudh Bequest at the rate of Rs. 255 *per mensem*, and that the proposed appointment involved no charge on the British Government (Despatch No. 140-External, dated 9th August 1892).

65. The Foreign Office approved of the proposal and the Porte, having been moved in the matter, sent instructions under date 10th August 1893 to the Vali Mahomed Ibrahim Khan, a nephew of Mahomed Taki Khan deceased since the original proposal made by in 1892 (Foreign Office to the India Office, dated 8th January 1894).

Secret E., March 1894, Nos. 577-578.



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66. In writing to the Vali, the Turkish Foreign Minister in the instructions referred to above said:—

"Your Excellency is requested that with the recognition of his appointment (as "Consul at Karbella"), you will be pleased, out of consideration due to him, to favour him with the use of your high efforts in applications he may have to make and to render him the necessary facilities according to treaties and custom."

67. A British flag was hoisted on the Consular Agency at Kerbella, when the above recognition was made known.
Secret E., July 1894, Nos. 94-102.

68. When the Vali of Baghdad visited Kerbella in 1894, he treated our agent with marked attention and civility, a fact which was probably due as much to the reputation of the agent as an Indian nobleman and enormously wealthy and influential, as to his position as our agent.
Consular Agent's letter dated 12th April 1894, to the Resident.
Secret E., July 1894, Nos. 94-102, (No. 102).

68-A. Under the new system of distribution of the Oudh bequest, sanctioned in 1903, an agent ceased to exist at Kathimain. Ibrahim Khan was removed from Kerbella and *Mirza Mahomed Hassan Muhsir* was appointed Vice-Consul at Kerbella (see Chapter XVI).

(X) Transfer of the Basrah Assistant Political Agency to Her Majesty's Consular Service, 1898.

69. In November 1897 Mr. G. S. Mackenzie of the firm of Messrs. Gray Mackenzie & Co., drew the attention of Foreign Office to the frequent changes that

had taken in occupants of Basrah Consulate since the date the practice of drawing the Consular Officers from the Indian Political Department commenced, whereas, previously the appointment was of a permanent character and so secured to the officers who held them valuable local influence.
General A., June 1898, Nos. 1-6.

70. The Government of India on being consulted, expressed their views in their despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 72, Genl., dated 5th May 1898:—


"The present arrangement, whereby the appointment is held, by an officer of our Political Department, undoubtedly tends to bring about frequent changes of *personnel*. With the object of retaining officers in the appointment, it has been the practice to give the incumbent, wherever possible, officiating promotion in advance of his seniority on the graded list of the Department. This practice is open to objection and it has not met the difficulty. We do not see our way to prevent frequent changes as long as the appointment is held by an officer on the graded list. Longer tenure might perhaps be secured by recruiting for the appointment from Her Majesty's Consular service and we are prepared, if Your Lordship concurs, to make over the appointment to Her Majesty's Government and to pay from Indian revenues a contribution in rupees based on the average cost of the last five years. We enclose a statement showing that the average expenditure has, from 1892-93 to 1896-97 inclusive, actually been, in round figures, Rs. 21,500. With effect from March 1894, however, we sanctioned the payment of a standing fee of Rs. 100 a month to a properly qualified practitioner for medical attendance on the Government servants at Basrah. If the full payment of Rs. 1,200 a year had been made under this head throughout the five years covered by the statement, the average cost would have been, in round figures, Rs. 21,640 a year. This is the contribution which we are prepared to make. Should the arrangement be accepted, we would simultaneously reduce the graded list of our Political Department by one Political Assistant of the 1st class on Rs. 800 a month. The addition which was made to the Department when the appointment was brought on to the graded list was an Assistantship of the 3rd grade on Rs. 500 a month, but the average cost of the actual incumbent approximates to Rs. 800 a month.

It would be convenient to receive very early information by telegram, as to whether the above suggestion does or does not commend itself to Her Majesty's Government, for the reason that the present Assistant Political Agent and Consul, Captain L. A. Forbes, has intimated his wish to take furlough. Should Her Majesty's Government be prepared to take over the appointment on the above terms and be in a position to fill it an early date, Captain Forbes would, if possible, be retained at Basrah until relieved by the Consular officer selected by Her Majesty's Government. Her Majesty's Government would, in that event, no doubt determine the relations between the Political Resident and Consul General in Turkish Arabia and the Consul at Basrah, who has hitherto been subordinate to the Political Resident.

71. The proposed arrangement was accepted by Her Majesty's Government subject to a modification. The Treasury insisted upon provision being made in the Indian contribution on account of the non-effective charge for the Consulate. The India Office accordingly sanctioned an annual charge on Indian revenues of £1,400 for five years to cover all expenses, effective and non-effective, of the Consulate (Despatch from the Secretary of State to Government of India, No. 95-Political, dated 8th September 1898).

72. Mr. A. C. Wratislaw was the first British Consul appointed at Basrah (Secretary of State's telegram, dated 27th September 1898).

73. The following is the list of British Consuls at Basrah since 1898:—
[S646FD]



CHAPTER V.

Chapter V.—CONSULATE HOUSES AT BASRAH AND BAGHDAD.

(i) Consulate House at Basrah.

(a) *The old Consulate at Maaghil.*

74. At the beginning of the 19th century Mr. Manesty, the East India Company's Resident at Basrah, bought the ground, on which he afterwards built and resided, and which was called Maaghil, * from the Arab proprietors. Subsequently it passed into Colonel Taylor's hands, and, whilst in the latter's possession, served as a depot for the vessels attached to the Euphrates expedition. From Colonel Taylor Lynch and Co. got Maaghil, and with them the East India Company's Agent was authorised to treat for the purchase of the property and to offer £1,000 for it.

Correspondence No. 1473 of 1851.

Correspondence No. 2859 of 1851.

75. A legal transfer of the property by Lynch and Co. to the East India Company was not however possible, because Colonel Taylor had not formally conveyed it to them, but had merely handed it over to Lynch and Co.'s charge with a power-of-attorney giving them the right over its usufruct. These negotiations for the purchase of the property by the Company took place at the time when Colonel Taylor was too ill to attend to business, and it was consequently impossible to obtain from him any more definite powers.

Correspondence No. 17 of 1852.

76. Negotiations to purchase Maaghil having failed, the East India Company rented a portion of it, and there our Consuls resided until Mr. Robertson left it in 1870 and went into Basrah.

(b) *The early history of the site of the existing Consulate.*

77. Soon after we find Mr. Robertson occupying the present Consulate house two miles outside Basrah town (now re-constructed).

78. The history of this house and the grounds is as follows :—

The property in question was sold in 1872 to a purchaser described in the deed of sale as Haji Ibrahim-bin-Osman-bin-Abdul-Wahid-el-Maimani residing in the Mahallat-el-Pasha of Basrah.

See notes External A., July 1894, Nos. 79-272, page 1.

79. At the period of the above transaction there was a firm trading under the name of Osman Vydina having a place of business at Basrah.


External A., July 1892, Nos. 202-216 (No. 216).

80. The local agent of the firm was one Haji Omer-bin-Abdul Mola, who was born in India and always known in India as Haji Omer-bin-Othman. When this individual went to reside at Basrah he took the name of Haji Ibrahim-bin-Osman-bin-Abdul-Wahid-el-Maimani, because he wished it supposed that he belonged to the family of his employer, who had an infant son of the same name. The head partner of the firm of Osman Vydina appears to have purchased the property in question in the name of his infant son who bore the name (Haji Ibrahim-Osman-bin-Abdul-Wahid-el-Maimani) which his father's agent assumed, but who was not residing in the Mahallat-el-Pasha. Owing to the description as to residence in the deed of the purchaser, Haji Ebrahim's title was a bad one.

81. Ten years later, however, i.e., in 1882, Haji Ibrahim, in conjunction with his brother, sold the property under an English deed of sale to his uncle Haji Ali (deceased) and his cousin Esmail; this latter was the vendor.

External A., April 1888 Nos. 10-107 (No. 62).

* For a detailed account of the Maaghil property, see Chapter XII, section (ii), paragraphs 237-240.



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82. It appears from the letter of the Assistant Political Agent, Basrah, No. 455, dated 26th July 1892, that the whole of the property which stood up to now in the name of Haji Embrahim-bin-Othman, the Agent of Osman Vydina, has been legally transferred by him in the Shera Court to Esmail.

83. This history of the property is important to note on account of the difficulties which had to be cleared later on when the Consulate house was purchased by the British Government.

(c) History of the lease of the Building.

84. By an agreement, executed in August 1872, between Mr. P. J. C. Robertson, Her Majesty's Agent and Vice-Consul at Basrah and the house-owner's agent, Haji Ibrahim-bin-Osman, the latter undertook to build the present Consulate house, and to let the premises to Government "during such time as the said Government may choose to retain them, in consideration of a yearly rent of Rs. (1,200) one thousand and two hundred, to be paid.....quarterly in instalments of Rs. (300) three hundred each."

85. In 1875 it occurred to Haji Ibrahim that he had made a bad bargain and that he could get more than Rs. 1,200 as rent for the house. He therefore asked that the premises might be made over to him or that the rent might be raised, Mr. Hearn, the Government Solicitor at Bombay, was consulted, and he advised that from a strictly legal point of view the Haji was not entitled to any increase of rent, which was accordingly refused.

86. In 1878 the question of rent was again raised, and the Haji's lawyers threatened legal proceedings unless the house were vacated in six months. This time the Bombay Government Solicitor was of opinion that the lease was not terminable by a notice to quit on the part of the lessor. The occupiers therefore declined to move out of the premises.

87. In 1881 the Haji endeavoured to put the premises up to auction, but he was restrained from doing so. He then proposed to sell the house to Government for Rs. 40,000, or to raise the rent from Rs. 100 to Rs. 400 per mensem.


88. The matter having been referred for orders, Government considered it undesirable to continue, longer than was absolutely necessary, the arrangement under which the house was occupied; and requested the Officiating Political Resident, Turkish Arabia, to report (1) whether a suitable house could be hired on reasonable terms; (2) if so, what would be the rent; and (3) if not, what would be the cost of building one.

89. In reply, the Political Resident, Mr. T. J. C. Plowden, (1) proposed to continue in the present Consulate house (2) on payment of rent at Rs. 250 per mensem, with effect from 1st November 1883, "for one year certain, with power to renew for a further period of six months at the same rate," and (3) he reported that a suitable site and building would cost about Rs. 40,000.

90. The payment of rent at Rs. 250 per mensem was sanctioned temporarily, and the Political Resident was authorised to negotiate for the purchase of a site and to arrange for building a house at a cost not exceeding Rs. 40,000.

91. In accordance with the orders passed, the Political Resident at once entered into correspondence with the owner's agent, and arranged to occupy the house at a monthly rent of Rs. 250, for a further period of 12 months from 1st January 1884; stipulating, however, that if the house were required for any longer period, a fresh agreement would be made.

92. The Haji consented to the terms "on the understanding that on expiration of the year there will be a new arrangement made on fresh conditions such as both parties shall agree to at the time—with respect to re-letting. Consequently the previous agreement made in the year of 1871 in the name of Osman Ibn Abdul Wahid Maimani has become null and void, and a new contract of lease should be drawn out in the name of Haji Ali Ibn Abdul Wahid Maimani to remain in force until the end of the present year."



93. Mr. Plowden informed the Haji that there was no occasion to make out an agreement at the time, as it was understood that either the house would be vacated on the 31st December 1884 or that it should be required by Government for any lengthened period beyond the year a fresh agreement would be entered into.

94. The arrangement was approved by the Government of India and Mr. Plowden was informed accordingly.

95. Meanwhile Mr. Plowden was in search of a site for building a new Consulate house. He found three plots of ground on the left bank of the Shat-el-

A., General E., May 1884, Nos. 63-65.

Arab, which would suit the purpose in view. The most desirable was what he described as part of the Tannumah estate; the second was known as Milk Khoja Sahib, and the third as Girdilan. Unfortunately the acquisition of the first of these required tedious formalities to be complied with. Mr. Plowden therefore requested Mr. Robertson, the Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, to endeavour to secure one of the other sites. Mr. Robertson made enquiries about the second plot, but found that the owner who resided at Koweit had just left for Jeddah, and that, even if time permitted correspondence with him, it was thought extremely unlikely that he would consent to sell the property except at an exorbitant price. Mr. Robertson then went about the Girdilan estate. This was found to be divided into 12 shares and to be the joint property of various owners, Jews and Muhammadans, who held out for Rs. 2,000 a jerib ($\frac{3}{4}$ of an acre) of land, being just double the price Mr. Robertson was authorised to offer. Failure having attended the efforts of Mr. Robertson to secure either of these two plots, Mr. Plowden promised to see what could be done in connection with the Tannumah estate.

96. To the above report Government returned the reply that as it was clear that there was no immediate prospect of securing at a reasonable cost a site for the Basrah Consulate, Mr. Plowden should bear in mind the advisability of *renewing the lease* of the present building, which would expire in December 1884.

97. A fresh lease for a year was taken on a rent of Rs. 250 per annum, with effect from 1st January 1885.

(d) *Purchase of the Consulate house and site.*

98. In his letter No. 719, dated the 31st December 1885, Colonel Tweedie, Political Resident, Turkish Arabia, submitted two proposals made by Lieutenant-

External A., April 1886, Nos. 264-272.

Colonel Mockler, Assistant Political Agent, Basrah, for housing the Consulate and other public offices at Basrah, namely:—

- (1) to purchase for Rs. 42,000 the premises then occupied by the Consulate together with a small strip of land at the back of the building; and
- (2) to acquire for Rs. 67,000 the property covered by (a) the above premises, (b) Messrs. Lynch and Company's house of business which, however, was not the same as the Marghill, (c) certain store rooms.

99. The Government of India was at first inclined to sanction the smaller purchase, but as the Political Resident urged the desirability of having round the buildings a larger ground—the larger purchase was approved. The sanction, however, could not be given until after very lengthy correspondence

Proceedings of External A.—
April 1888, Nos. 10-107.
July 1888, Nos. 92-120.
March 1889, Nos. 97-123.
August 1889, Nos. 109-113.
March 1890, Nos. 242-253.
August 1890, Nos. 50-58.

caused on account of difficulties of the legal title and other matters, of length in Foreign Department letter No. 1120-E., dated the 20th May 1890, the Government of India sanctioned the purchase, for Rs. 65,000, of Consulate buildings and grounds, together with the neighbouring premises formerly occupied by Messrs. Lynch Brothers, and the strip of land in rear of the Consulate said Political Resident's letter No. 719, dated the 31st December

External A., July 1891, Nos. 41-48.



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1885, to measure $1\frac{1}{2}$ jarib. They also authorised the expenditure of a sum not exceeding Rs. 9,000 on strengthening and repairing the Consulate, adding Post Office and clerks' quarters and the provision of a new flag-staff. Provision was also made for an annual outlay for repairs of Rs. 1,000.

100. There arose then the objection of the Turkish authorities to the transfer of the property. The Turkish Law did not prohibit acquisition of immoveable property by an alien, but the authorities objected to a transfer in the name of the Government of India, Secretary of State, the British Embassy or the Consulate. The fact was that the Turks were strongly opposed to foreigners acquiring landed property in their dominions. In this connection we might quote the opinion of Messrs. Lynch and Company in reply to an enquiry by the British Council, Basrah, of their experience in the matter:

In reply, we beg to state that we are not subjected to any exceptional taxes or dues, nor is any open expression or jealousy manifested on the part of the Government, but at the same time our tenure of landed property is not wholly satisfactory. In instances where we have addressed the local Government for redress of certain grievances, our petitions have always met with stolid indifference, and failing their settlement through the mediation of influential natives, we have been obliged to abandon them. It is true that none of the questions have been of vital importance, but the disinclination which is thus shewn to attend to our claims, augurs, we think that our possession of landed property here is not altogether acceptable to the Turkish Government.

101. The Porte thus tried all sorts of obstructive measures against our acquiring the site in question. In the first place, we were told that the Porte would object to the "Secretary of State," "British Government" or "Consul" being entered in the title deeds as purchaser of the Basrah Consulate. The Government of India enquired whether the difficulty could not be removed by diplomatic action at Constantinople. In reply we were told that there would be difficulties in getting the transfer made in the Secretary of State's name but that the Embassy could arrange for sanction being given to transfer in the name of the "British Consul." The Government of India agreed. Then it appeared that the Porte had discovered some objections to "Consulate" and the transferee must be the Embassy. The Government of India were asked if they had any objections. There was of course none, but the Government of India took the precaution of getting the Secretary of State's leave. That was in September 1893. In February 1894 we learned from the Embassy that the Porte's sanction would be given in two or three days. The Porte swung round again, refused to sanction the transfer in name of Embassy and wanted a private individual entered as the purchaser which would not suit us for obvious reasons.

102. It was then proposed by the Government of India that Mr. Beville, the British Consul at Basrah, should be the purchaser. Though there were obvious objections to this course, the Embassy had no objection to it provided he had children or other relations to inherit the property and that sufficient security could be given by him. The arrangement however was not to be permanent (See Foreign Department telegram to the Resident, dated the 16th June 1894).

103. The Land Department then began to raise their obstructions to the transfer sanctioned. The matter, after further repeated representations by the Embassy to the Porte, was ultimately settled by an Irade passed by the Sultan sanctioning the transfer to the Embassy (see Sir P. Currie's Despatch, dated the 24th May 1895 to the Foreign Office.)

104. In their letter No. 2267-E., dated the 27th December 1895, the Government of India then sanctioned the expenditure of the following sums:—

- (1) Rs. 9,000 for repairs and additions to the Consulate.
- (2) Rs. 650, on account of fee to the Basrah Land Department for effecting transfer of the property.

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105. In 1902, the Haji Ismail (recent owner of the Consulate building) offered to sell to Government a garden at the rear of the Consulate Premises, over which a right of way had been granted when the recent sale was effected. Government declined to purchase it.

External A., March 1903, Nos. 13-14.

106. Haji Ismail then proposed to sell it to another person, Major Newmarch raised no objection to this but only reminded him of the right of way granted at the recent sell and warned him to take proper measures to secure this right when the sale of the garden is effected.

External A., July 1903, No. 71.

107. Pending completion of the new building the British Council was allowed to hire a house on an annual rental of £7,150 per annum.

External A., May 1901, No. 95.

(e) Proposed construction of a new Consulate building at Basrah and the liability of the Government of India to pay its cost, 1900.

External A., May 1900, Nos. 127-129.

108. The following letter of the Foreign Office to the India Office, dated 13th November 1899, shows how this question arose :—

"By your letter of the 31st August 1898, the Secretary of State for India in Council sanctioned a charge on Indian revenues on account of Her Majesty's Consulate at Basrah of £ 1,400 a year, which was to include all charges effective and non-effective, connected with the Consulate.

I am directed to transmit to you copy of a despatch from Mr. Wratishaw, the present Consul Wratishaw's No. 5 (Consular), dated 28th September 1899, relative to the Consular premises at that place.

Mr. Wratishaw states that one of his predecessors, Major Fagan, reported to the Indian Government, same time before the transfer of the post to the Imperial Government, that the Consular house was in a dangerous condition. Mr. Veevers, the official, sent by the Indian Government in consequence to inspect the house, furnished a report, copy of which is inclosed by Mr. Wratishaw, showing that the buildings were at that time in a state of extreme dilapidation and subsequently prepared plans and estimates for a new Consulate which the Indian authorities refused to carry out on the ground that the post had meanwhile been taken over by the Home Government.

There is nothing in the correspondence relative to the transfer of the post to show that the Consular premises would require immediate re-building; and Lord Salisbury was unaware of the fact when consenting to the term of the transfer. His Lordship considers that an undertaking of such magnitude cannot be held to come under the heading "Contingent expenditure" shown in the statement which accompanied the despatch from the Government of India of May 5th, 1898, and on which the negotiations were founded. The Indian authorities might fairly be expected to transfer the house in a habitable condition, and Lord Salisbury trusts that the Government of India will not repudiate all liability in connection with the matter, on the ground that they are now making a contribution bases on average expenditure.

The cost, according to the estimate drawn up by Mr. Veevers, as modified by the Council amounts to three thousand pounds. Part of this could, if absolutely necessary, be raised by selling a portion of the Consular site, although

Mr. Wratishaw deprecates this arrangement, and Lord Salisbury agrees that it would be most undesirable.

I am to request that you will move Lord George Hamilton to represent the above considerations to the Government of India and urge upon them the propriety of reconsidering the decision conveyed to Her Majesty's Council at Basrah, of carrying out the plans prepared by their Agent, and of defraying the cost thereof from Indian funds."

109. Lord George Hamilton referred the matter to the Government of India, who replied in their despatch No. 53, dated 3rd May 1900.

"We acknowledge the liability of the Government of India to meet the cost of rebuilding the Consulate, which is represented to have been in a dangerous condition at the time of the transfer of the Basrah Consulate to the control of Her Majesty's Government, and we are prepared to contribute a sum not exceeding £ 3,000 from Indian revenues for the work. Your Lordship is aware that the calculation on which our present contribution towards the cost of the Basrah Consulate is based includes a sum of Rs. 5,759-3-6, representing the average expenditure incurred on account of the Agency during the five years 1892-93 to 1896-97 under the head of "Contingent Expenditure." We notice that, when the Consulate has been built, Lord Salisbury is prepared to admit the Consul's liability to meet the cost of repairs until the proposed revision of the whole arrangement after five years. In these circumstances, and considering that a large portion of the sum previously disbursed under the head of Contingent "Expenditure" represented expenditure on reclamation and repairs to the Con-



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consulate building and site, the recurrence of which charges will be largely obviated by the construction of a proper building with a river revetment, we are of opinion that that part of our annual contribution which is based on the average cost of the Agency under the heading of "Contingent Expenditure" may, when the new building is completed, be with justice reduced. We shall submit detailed proposals to Your Lordship on this point, when we are in possession of fuller information regarding the plan of the new building and the expenditure on reclamation and repairs which have been incurred in the past."

109 A.—As regards maintenance and repair of the new buildings, the arrangement agreed to was (1) that all internal repairs, including those to the Post Office portion of the building, should be arranged for by the Consul, and the cost of the repairs to the Post Office should be recovered from the Indian revenues, and (2) that the Government of India should contribute for the external and structural repairs in proportion to the estimated cost of the Post Office rooms.

(ii) Consulate House at Baghdad.

110. The Consulate Houses and the grounds at Baghdad formed part of the property of the late Sir Ikbal-ud-Dowla,* who died in December 1887, and was held at an annual rental of Rs. 4,014-14-0 made up as follows:—

	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.
	Per mensem.			Per mensem.		
(a) Government of India contributed	157	1	2	1,884	14	0
(b) Political Resident	100	0	0	1,200	0	0
(c) Residency Surgeon	47	8	0	570	0	0
(d) Foreign Office	30	0	0	360	0	0
Total	334	9	2	4,014	14	0

111. The Foreign Office contribution was fixed at £ 30 per annum in 1883— as an office allowance, in reduction of what the Consul-General had to pay previously, on condition that the Foreign Office contribution should be met from the Consular fees which were all credited to the Home Government.

Vide No. 526, Secret E., March 1893, Nos. 490-530.

The property was bought in the following lots. The purchase money and rent at 4 per cent. of each is given below.

Residency premises, sepoy's lines, and stables, Rs. 95,250 rent Rs. 317-8 per mensem.

House in back garden Rs. 10,000, rent Rs. 33-5-4 per mensem.

Residency Surgeon's house and dispensary Rs. 19,500, rent Rs. 65 per mensem.

Rs. 1,24,750, rent Rs. 415-13-4.

4 per cent. on his actual outlay (Rs. 1,24,750), exclusive of an annual contribution of Rs. 1,200 a year for current repairs. The premises were purchased for Rs. 1,24,750 and 4 per cent. on this makes the monthly rental payable Rs. 415-13-4.

113. The purchase by our Native Agent was completed in 1896, and the increased rent for three years would commence from 1st May 1896. As regards the contribution to this rent, the decision of the Government of India was (letter No. 3529-A, dated 22nd February 1897, to the Political Resident):—

"The rent hitherto paid by the Residency Surgeon may remain unchanged, but the Government of India consider that the Resident's quota must be revised, the premises now include a house in the back garden, and the Resident is a gainer by the increased accommodation thus provided. The rental of this house at 4 per cent. on the purchase money is Rs. 4,006 a year, and the Government of India cannot under the circumstances accept more than half of this as an additional charge on Indian revenues. The total rent of Rs. 4,990 a year (which is exclusive of an annual contribution from the Government of India not exceeding Rs. 1,200 for current repairs) will therefore be distributed as follows:—

	Rs.
Government of India	2,550
Resident with the assistance of the contribution from the London	1,870
Foreign Office	570
Residency Surgeon	570
Total	4,990

* As to the estate of Nawab Ikbal-ud-Dowla, see Chapter XVIII.



"The present contribution of £ 30 a year from the London Foreign Office is equivalent at the current rate of interest to about Rs. 470."

114. While negotiations for the renewal of the lease of the old Residency on the new terms were going on, Colonel Mockler in his letter No. 40, dated the 19th January 1892 (paragraph 3), mentioned

External A., March 1892, Nos. 220-221 (No. 220). a very fine property, measuring 17,000 square yards, which belonged to the late Nawab Sir Ikbal-ud-Dowlah. Its advantages were that it was situated on the Tigris, with good anchorage alongside for the Residency steamer. On the other side it was bordered by a wall and the high road, thus being secure from encroachment. It contained sufficient room for all the Residency requirements, including sepoy lines, stables and a garden, whereas in the old Residency, the last were detached from the main buildings. Certain buildings already standing on the land were said to be convertible at a small cost into sepoy lines; there were already stables on it in a fair condition; and the foundation of the Nawab's old residence could be utilized for the Residency. The cost of the whole was estimated at Rs. 86,250 (said to be an outside figure) for the site, and Rs. 60,000 for the new buildings required. The site was said to be the best in Baghdad from all points of view. Colonel Mockler

External A., March 1893, Nos. 400-580 (No. 529). again referred to it in paragraph 8 of his letter No. 85, dated the 4th February 1893, in which he said that a three years' lease of the present Residency would give sufficient time to build on the new site.

115. Colonel Mockler's letter No. 385, dated the 6th August 1896, again mentioned "a splendid site" which he would "almost certainly advise Government to buy" for Rs. 50,000. He estimated the cost of building at Rs. 1,10,000. The property was described as "one of Sir Ikbal-ud-Daowlah's, purchased by Nawab Agha Mahomed Khan." From the rough survey of the site mentioned in paragraph 17 of the letter, it appears to be the property previously recommended, but of the buildings only a part of the stable was by that time repairable.

116. In his letter No. 476, dated 10th August 1897, it was reported that Nawab Agha Mahomed Khan, after for a long time demanding Rs. 48,000 for it, offered to give Government the option of purchase at Rs. 36,000 for six months.

117. The old Residency was in a convenient site in the middle of the town. But the building did not belong to Government and the sepoy lines were situated at some distance from it, and as far as the Resident was concerned, the arrangement under which he occupied a few rooms in practically a public office was most inconvenient from the want of privacy. The strongest argument for retaining the Residency, hitherto, was, apart from this question of expense, that the buildings were "in great part sound, strong and seasoned," and probably repairable at "no great outlay." This argument had now disappeared, for the Resident was of opinion that "this dilapidated old building would not hold together much longer." Further the owner was anxious to get back that property, and the lease expired in April 1899. Another objection to the building was that the arrangements of its rooms and courtyards were intended for the residence of a Mahomedan nobleman with a large Zenana rather, and unsuitable as quarters for an European officer.

118. The cost of transfer, in the absence, of special agreement to the contrary, the purchaser has to pay and is fixed by the Land Department on their own valuation of the property at 1 per cent. In this case the property was valued at Rs. 43,000, on which the duty would be Rs. 330. There were besides other accidental charges. The total came to Rs. 36,681.

119. It was necessary to obtain the permission of the Porte for the purchase. This was granted after some hesitation, and as in the case of the Basrah Consulate the transfer of the property was allowed to be made in the name of the British Embassy (Resident's telegram dated 3rd July 1900).



Chapter V.

121

119. At this time the question for housing the Consulate at Basrah was also under consideration. It was therefore considered desirable to obtain professional advice as to the projects for rebuilding, and as to the feasibility and cost of thorough repairs to the existing buildings, both at Baghdad and Basrah. The Bombay Government was asked to provide an officer for the purpose. Mr. Veevers, an officer in the Bombay Public Works Department, was thereupon deputed on this duty to Basrah and Baghdad. After considering his and the Political Resident's report it was decided to purchase the new site at Baghdad for Rs. 36,000 (Foreign Department telegram to Resident,* dated 17th January 1900) to which now to be added the cost of transfer Rs. 681.

120. As to the buildings, the Government of India were not prepared to sanction more than Rs. 3 lakhs including the price of the site. The plans and estimates were subjected to a good deal of scrutiny, and the ultimate revised estimates (including the cost of site) amounted to Rs. 3,10,901 or Rs. 3,02,887 accordingly as the Residency building was to be constructed with or without *sardaks*. Government sanctioned the higher estimates. The sum sanctioned included Rs. 54,097, for the establishment required for supervising the construction. In case the work was given to a contractor, this sum would go to him as his profits (Foreign Department letter No. 6429-A., dated 2nd April 1901).

121. Government expressed their inability to provide any officer to supervise the works. So tenders were invited for constructing the building. The tender of Herman and Co. was accepted which amounted to Rs. 2,38,041 including import duties as Rs. 2,31,541 exclusive of all import for the materials (Foreign Department telegram to the Bombay Public Works Department, 30th June 1902).

122. As the estimates for the Residency building proper had to be revised subsequently, Rs. 1,28,570 were sanctioned for it, on condition that the total cost of all the buildings did not exceed Rs. 2,74,220 including import duties (Foreign Department telegram to the Bombay Public Works Department, dated 6th June 1903).

123. The Political Agent at Baghdad had represented to the Government of India his inability to superintend the construction of the new Residency buildings at Baghdad or to arrange for the submission of the usual departmental accounts. With the view to relieve him as far as possible of these duties, the Government of India decided that Messrs. Herman, the contractors, should be allowed from time to time to submit through the Political Agent to the Executive Engineer, whom the Chief Engineer, Indus Right Bank Division, might select, their own bills for work done. The Political Agent in forwarding them would certify as to the level to which the building had been carried, so as to allow of the Executive Engineer roughly checking the quantities billed for work done. The Executive Engineer after having signed the bills, was to return them to the Political Agent with a certificate as to the total payment permissible on account. It would rest with the Bombay Government to decide whether it would be necessary to depute a Public Works officer to inspect the building and check the final bill on the ground before payment is made, or whether Messrs. Herman's own bill be accepted, supported by a certificate by the Political Agent that everything had been properly executed to the best of his knowledge (Government of India, Public Works Department, letter No. 646-C.-W.-B., dated 12th May 1903).

124. Before constructing the building, it was found necessary to rebuild the river wall of the compound. The Vali, however, stopped the work, on the

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ground that it would interfere with the river. It took some time before the obstruction could be removed, for which a reference had to be made to the Porte by our Ambassadors.

External A., May 1903, Nos. 39-41.

125. The buildings were not expected to complete before May 1904, while the lease of the old Residency would expire on 1st May 1902, and its owner was anxious to terminate the lease to enable him to sell the building, for paying off his debts. After much higgling Major Newmarch induced him to renew the lease for 3 years in the following conditions:—

External A., September 1903, No. 106.

- (1) for the year ending 30th April 1903. on the previous terms ;
- (2) for the year following at Rs. 460 per mensem, exclusive of the allowance of Rs. 100 for repairs ;
- (3) for the third year at Rs. 580 per mensem on the same condition as No. (2).

126. The Government of India sanctioned this proposal, and decided to pay the extra rent out of their own funds. It was pointed, however, that under the contract with Messrs. Herman & Co., the buildings were to be ready for occupation by 1st May 1904 (Foreign Department letter to the Resident, No. 1586-E.A., dated 6th August 1903.)

Ibid No. 106.

126.-A. The ultimate cost of the buildings came up to Rs. 3,24,303, which included about Rs. 36,000 for the 1st and 2nd river walls.

External A., April 1905, Nos. 35-69.



CHAPTER VI. RESIDENCY GUARD AND ESTABLISHMENTS.

(i) Baghdad Residency Guard, 1800-84: Objection of the Porte to an alleged increase of—1884.

127. The following memorandum of Mr. Plowden forwarded to the Government of India with letter No. 12, dated 6th January 1884, gives full history of the Residency Guard at Baghdad:—

I find from my records that the maintenance of a sepoy guard at the British Residency in Turkish Arabia dates from the year 1800. It was sent on the application* of Mr. Harford Jones who asked for the "Honorary guard allowed to all Residents." This guard, consisting of the strength shown in the margin, arrived at Baghdad in August 1800; about a month later two drummers were added, bringing up the total strength to 31 men. In 1808 Mr. Harford Jones was succeeded as Resident by Mr. C. J. Rich, who died in 1821, and was succeeded by Captain R. Taylor, who held office until 1843. During the whole of this period the sepoy guard was maintained at a strength varying from 29 to 32 men, and with the occasional substitution of a fifer for the drummers.

"In 1843, when Major (now Sir Henry Rawlinson) became Resident, the guard consisted of 32 men, viz., 1 native officer, 5 non-commissioned officers, 2 drummers and 24 privates. Owing to certain difficulties connected with the relief of the sepoys, Sir Henry proposed† at first to send the whole guard back to India, and to substitute for them a mounted escort of fifteen or twenty sabres recruited on the spot. But subsequently, being unable, as he wrote, to find people of the country in whom he could place implicit confidence, and it being necessary also to provide for the safety of the treasury, he modified his original proposals, and asked leave to retain ten‡ sepoys for employment as a treasury guard, and a mounted escort of the strength shown in the margin. In 1859 a horseman was substituted for farrier, but with this exception no further change was made either in the sepoy guard or in the mounted escort until 1861-62, when on grounds of economy the men (including grooms) to ten men. In 1880 one of these grooms was discharged, and the strength of the mounted escort is now as follows:—

- 1 Duffadar.
- 6 Horsemen.
- 2 Grooms.

The sepoy guard continued at ten men until the spring of 1878, when at the request of the Resident, Colonel Nixon, who thought that number insufficient for the work, it was increased to sixteen men. In February 1881,§ I asked for a further increase, and this application having been sanctioned, the strength of the Residency guard has consisted, since May 1882, of 25 men, viz.:—

- 1 Native officer.
- 4 Non-commissioned officer.
- 20 Privates.

25

It appears, therefore, from the foregoing account, that a sepoy guard has been attached to this Residency for upwards of eighty years, and a mounted escort for forty years; and that the present strength of the sepoy guard is less by seven men than that of the original guard, and that the mounted escort consists now only of seven,|| instead of ten men. From first to last there has been no objection on the part of the Turkish authorities to the sepoy guard; year after year one detachment of sepoys has succeeded another without remonstrance and without interference of any kind. In by-gone days the sepoys used to escort the British



Resident when travelling about the country, but this practice has been discontinued, and they are now employed solely in guarding (1) the Magazine and the Treasury, both of which are situated inside the Residency; and (2) their own quarters and the escort stables, which are distant a few minutes' walk from the Residency."

128. In August 1883 the Secretary of State informed the Government of India that a complaint had been received from the Porte regarding an alleged increase in the strength of the Residency Guard at Baghdad. Mr. Plowden reported as above and added :—

"I know not whether any change is contemplated in existing arrangements. I sincerely hope not. The payments from my Treasury amount to nearly £30,000 a year, and I have sometimes as much as* £10,000 and rarely less than £5,000 in my charge. If the guard were removed, I could not accept any responsibility for this large sum, or indeed for any considerable sum. Besides the Treasury there are the Magazine and the sepoy's quarters and escort stables, which require a guard. The inhabitants of Baghdad are an excitable people, and recently Colonel Tweedie thought it necessary to take special precautions for the safety of the Treasury. The country in general too very far from being settled or safe; the condition of Basrah, for instance, is so bad that I shall probably have to press for a guard being allowed to the Assistant Political Agent. I think also that for political reasons it would be very inadvisable to permit any interference with the Resident's guard and escort. The local authorities in Turkish Arabia have for a long time past been making a "deed set" against British influence, partly because the political connection of the British Government with this country has a special character; partly because at the present moment the leading Ottoman officials on the spot, headed by the Wali, happen to be intensely anti-English, and partly because the suppression of foreign influence, in all parts of the Empire is a leading idea of the Ottoman policy of the moment. It would be a mistake, which might produce serious consequences, to make any concession to this policy so far as Turkish Arabia is concerned."

129. From Mr. Plowden's report it appears that in 1884, the strength of the guard was less by seven men than that of the original guard. When the new boat *Comet* should come. Mr. Plowden proposed to bring it up to its original strength. But he was strongly against its reduction, as the country was too unsafe to allow of any decrease.

130. The facts were explained to the Porte and there the matter rested in 1884.

(ii) Objection to relief of the Residency guard without giving notice to the Vali, 1885.

131. In March 1885 Mr. Thadeus, Dragoman of the Baghdad Consulate called upon the Customs Master at Baghdad to-day about some other business, and in the course of conversation the latter drew his attention to the sepoy relief, which had arrived from Bombay that month and was just leaving the steamer for shore in boats, and asked whether notice had been given to the Vilaiat of their arrival, for it was not right that foreign troops carrying Martini guns should arrive and be allowed by the Customs House to and, add the authorities to have no notice of it. Mr. Thadeus told him there was no necessity for a notice, because it was a thing well-known to the authorities from time immemorial that there is a treasury guard in the Consulate-General and is relieved every year, and add that in former times the detachment thus serving consisted of 50 or 60 men, and it had even a band attached to it, and when the detachment escorted the Consul-General to the Serai upon visit to the Vali, the band used to play in front of the detachment as they went in the streets. The head clerk, a native of Baghdad, confirmed the Dragoman's statement and added that a standard-bearer also used to fly the British flag going ahead of them. The Collector of Customs also said that the Vali did see them every time he went to visit the Consul-General and was saluted by them. The Customs master said "be it so, still I am surprised at the way that certain matters are going on here. The Vilait should have been given notice to authorize our allowing them to land with their guns, otherwise we are wrong," whereupon he was told that his remarks were only due to his being new to the place and unaware of certain well-established customs.



Chapter VI.

125

(iii) Residency Escort allowance.

132. In 1884 an allowance of Rs. 400 per mensem was sanctioned for 15

F. C., 8th June 1844, Nos. 30-32.

Rs. 400 distributed as follows :—

	Rs.	A.	P.
Moiety of pay with batta of Treasury guard consisting of one naik and nine sepoye ...	98	8	0
Pay, etc., of escort consisting of one Daffadar, nine horsemen, three grooms, and three peons ...	101	8	0
Total ...	400	0	0

Proceedings, No. 86 of Finance B., April 1862, Nos. 84-86.

of one Duffadar, six horsemen and three grooms in all 10 men. In 1880 one of these grooms was discharged.

133. In 1879 when proposing an increase of pay to the men, Colonel Miles,

Paragraph 18 of Proceedings No. 179, General B., November 1879, Nos. 179-180.

then in Baghdad, pointed out that the rent for escort lines and stables stood at the high figure of Rs. 37 per mensem, and that, "thus heavily weighted, the allowance appears to have been hardly enough to keep the escort efficient;" and, as a portion of the building was used as native infantry lines and store-room, he did not think that the full rent of the stables was a fair charge in the escort allowance.

134. The sufficiency of the escort allowance was further discussed by Mr.

Paragraph 4 of Proceedings, No. 337, General B., May 1881, Nos. 331-339.

Plowden, who said that the balance, after paying the men, was sufficient when prices were normal; but—

"it is insufficient when the price of grain stands, as it did in the summer months, at nine and ten seers for the rupee."

135. Mr. Plowden therefore considered it would be best to continue the

Proceedings No. 339 of the above Proceedings.

plan which has been adopted since May 1879 of charging Government with the

actual expenditure of each month.

136. The proposals submitted by Mr. Plowden were sanctioned in May 1881, when the strength and cost of the escort were as follows :—

	Rs.
1 Daffadar ...	24
6 Horsemen @ Rs. 12 each ...	72
2 Grooms @ Rs. 12 and 8 each ...	20
Total ...	116

and these figures continue to the present time.

137. In 1887 the Finance Committee suggested that it might prove more

External A., November 1887, Nos. 113-117.

economical to fix the pay of the daffadar

and horsemen, so as to include the keep of horses and noticed that the number and pay of horsemen had not been fixed. Colonel Tweedie pointed out that—

"this has sometimes been thought of here. But before it could be done the whole establishment would have to be remodelled. At present it consists entirely of natives of this country. Not only are these less of soldiers than of messengers, performing mixed duties; but, as subjects of a foreign Government, they are but imperfectly amenable to our discipline and authority. If the feed of their horses rested with them, they would starve them, and if troubled too much about them, or about the state of their equipments, very likely one of them would occasionally ride away altogether with a horse for the purchase of which he had perhaps just been assisted with an advance of money.

138. With reference to the number and pay of the escort, Colonel Tweedie stated that—

"neither item has undergone these many years any increase or diminution. Neither is it possible for it to do so without the sanction of the Government of India being first of all obtained. Total cost of establishment, in so far depending on price of barley and other forage, must necessarily be fluctuating; the prices of forage of every description having all this

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year been ruling unprecedentedly high.....; and the only security for economy seems to be the constant endeavour made locally to keep down expenditure without sacrifice of credit and efficiency."

139. The Government of India did not think that any change in respect of the Residency Escort, as proposed by the Committee, was required (Foreign Department letter No. 2065-E., dated 12th October 1887, to the Resident).

139-A. In the correspondence about the murder of Jemadar Ghulam Din in 1904 and the removal of the detachment that was implicated on it (see Chapter XXIV), paragraphs 215 *et seq.*, we find that the then guard consisted of 1 Jemadar, 5 non-commissioned officers and 27 privates. At the suggestion of the Resident the number of privates was increased to 30.

Secret E., March 1905, Nos. 45-51.

(iv) Quarters for the Residency guard, 1884-85.

140. In 1884, Colonel Beville, Commandant, Marine Battalion, inspected the detachment at Baghdad, and considered the site of their quarters undesirable, as the men in the event of an attack on the Residency would be unable to give ready assistance owing to the distance at which they were situated from that place, and the narrow streets through which they would have to force their way. It was suggested that the *Comet* should be used to hulk the men, but this proposal could not be accepted, as that vessel had soon to be broken up.

External A., February 1885, Nos. 214-223.
External A., June 1885, Nos. 162-163.

141. The Government of India were inclined to secure the house belonging to Nawab Ikbāl-ud-Dowla and occupied by Dr. G. Bowman, when he should vacate it.

142. Upon reconsideration of the question the Government of India decided to retain the detachment of the Marine Battalion at Baghdad in the occupation of the then existing lines.

External A., November 1885, Nos. 241-244.

143. The reasons leading the Government of India to this decision were:—

- "(i) That it has not been found possible to secure the house on the north side of the Residency, the owner objecting to its conversion into a barrack;
- (ii) as the possibility of danger anticipated by Major Beville in paragraph 2 of his letter of the 24th April 1884 is a very remote one, and even in the case of an *emeute* occurring in the city, there would be no difficulty in marching the guard from their present lines to the Residency;
- (iii) that the construction of new lines for the guard would be likely to arouse the suspicion of the Turkish authorities and would lead to opposition on their part and to diplomatic difficulties;
- (iv) that the only site that can be suggested for new quarters is the Residency Garden, which is not the property of the Indian Government, and that building a barrack on that site would practically involve the destruction of the garden, which would be exceedingly unpopular both amongst the European and native residents of Baghdad;
- (v) the proposed move would also entail undesirable additional expenditure."

(Letter from the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1498-C., dated 28th October 1885.)



Chapter VI.

127

(v) Office Establishment, Baghdad Residency.

144. What was the exact Residency establishment prior to Major Rawlinson's appointment it is not clear; the total amount spent is given in the statement in chapter III, section (iii).

144a. The following establishment was sanctioned in 1844 for the Baghdad Residency—
F. C., 12th October 1844, Nos. 222-225.

	Rs.
1 Native Agent	200
1 Dragoman	150
1 Head writer (English)	100
1 Accountant	50
1 Treasurer	50
1 Assistant writer (English)	40
1 Turkish writer	90
1 Persian writer	60
Total	740

144b. In 1879 the Officiating Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, when submitting proposals for a revision of the office establishment, brought to notice that the establishment as it then stood had been sanctioned many years previously, "and though slight modifications have been sanctioned * it has remained essentially the same for the last thirty years"; and he added that he would not have taken up the subject of revision had he not been convinced "that the office was not altogether in the most efficient form."

145. The establishment at this time was as follows:—

(a) English Office.

	Rs.	Rs.
1 Native Agent	200	
1 Dragoman and Accountant	150	
1 Head writer	100	
1 Second Clerk	70	
1 Treasurer	70	
	590	

(b) Vernacular Establishment.

1 Turkish writer	36	} Rs. 695
1 Persian writer	30	
1 Arabic writer	24	
1 Shroff	15	
	105	

(Formerly the Turkish and Arabic writers both drew Rs. 30 each, but owing to the youth of the latter at the time of his entertainment his pay was fixed at Rs. 24, the balance (Rs. 6) being given to the Turkish writer—General B., March 1874, Nos. 208-209.

(c) Post Office—Paid by Postal Department.

	Rs.
1 Postmaster	80
1 Munshi	30
Total	110

146. The scheme proposed by the Officiating Political Agent involved (i) an increase of expenditure in the English Office of Rs. 30; (ii) a decrease in the Vernacular Office of Rs. 30; and (iii) a further decrease in the Post Office of Rs. 20 per mensem. But though the scheme was, in certain respects, sanctioned, the orders of the Government of India were not carried out, as it was expected that Mr. T. J. O. Plowden was to be appointed to the Agency and would like to make his own arrangements.

General B., February 1880, No. 254.

Proceedings No. 242 of General B., October 1880, Nos. 242-243.



Proceedings No. 399 of General B., May 1881, Nos. 391-399.
Proceedings No. 113 of General B., September 1881, Nos. 112-113.

147. On Mr. Plowden joining the Agency, that is, in 1831, he obtained sanction to the following establishments:—

(a) *English Office.*

	Rs.	Rs.
1 Native Agent	200	
1 Dragoman	150	
1 Senior Clerk	100	
1 Junior Clerk	80	
1 Translator	125	
1 Treasurer	70	
1 Third Clerk	20	

745

(The Treasurer drew also Rs. 70 from the Desert Post Fund and Rs. 30 from the Indian Postal Department.)

(b) *Omlahs—Vernacular Establishment.*

1 Turkish writer	36	
1 Persian writer	30	
1 Arabic writer	24	
1 Shroff	15	

Rs. 850

105

(c) *Post Office—Paid by the Postal Department.*

	Rs.
1 Postmaster (duties performed and pay drawn by the 3rd Clerk of the Agency)	60
1 Munshi (duties performed and pay drawn by the Treasurer of the Agency)	30
Total	90

148. Subsequently (in 1883) the Officiating Political Resident in Turkish Arabia submitted two proposals, whereby savings of Rs. 20 and 30 in each case were to be effected. But these proposals were referred to Mr. Plowden, who submitted and obtained sanction* to the following scheme, that the arrangement under which the Postal Department pays the Treasurer of the Residency Rs. 30 per mensem, and the Political Department pays the Postmaster (otherwise called 3rd Clerk of the Residency) Rs. 20 per mensem should cease, each Department paying the entire salary of its own clerk; that the Treasurer, Mr. G. Thaddeus, should also be made an Accountant, and draw a salary of Rs. 150 per mensem, and that the Desert Post Fund should pay Government Rs. 35 monthly for work done for the Desert Post by Mr. Thaddeus.

149. The effect of these arrangements was to make Government pay an additional sum of Rs. 25 monthly as shown on the margin on account of these establishments. But this additional charge was borne by Government for about two years only, as in June† 1886, a saving of Rs. 74 per mensem was effected by the abolition of the post of second clerk who drew Rs. 80 monthly, and by the addition of Rs. 6 per mensem to the pay of the Arabic writer of the Vernacular Office, which raised the latter's pay from Rs. 24 to Rs. 30 a month.

	Rs.	Rs.
Increase to Treasurer	80	
Deduct—Pay of 3rd Clerk	20	
Contribution from Desert Post Fund	35	
	—55	
Cost to Government	25	

† External A., July 1886, Nos. 126-131.



Chapter VI.

129

150. A further reduction in the expenditure of the Residency was made when the Turkish writer of the Vernacular Office retired. He drew Rs. 36. This was reduced for his successor to Rs. 20 which was formerly fixed for the post.

151. When the Finance Committee submitted proposals for reduction of the expenditure in the Baghdad Residency, Colonel Tweedie proposed to endeavour to reduce the pay of the Accountant and Treasurer on the occurrence of a permanent vacancy in that Government. The Government of India accepted this proposal (Foreign Department letter No. 2065-E., dated 12th October 1887, to the Political Resident, Turkish Arabia).

151-A. It would be useful to bear in mind the names of the members of the establishment, as some of them come into unworthy prominence later on (see Chapter VIII (iv), page 957. The following list is taken from Consul-General's No. 28, dated 18th March 1874:—


List of the Establishment of the Political Agency in Turkish Arabia.

No.	Names.	Designation.	REMARKS.
1	Mr. Michael Minas	Native Agent	Grandfather came from India: was registered as a British subject in the time of Midhat Pasha.
1	Mr. George Thaddeus	Dragoman	Armenians born at Busrah, their grandfather leaving Julfa near Ispahan in Persia settled at Busrah, himself as well as his son (their father) served successively the British Government as Dragomans at the Factory of the Hon'ble East India Company at that Port since 1778. They resided at Bombay from childhood, and being there educated held employments at the Presidency until the appointment in 1843 of Major (now Major-General Sir Henry) Rawlinson, Political Agent, Baghdad, when they were entertained at Bombay by that officer as office establishment of the Political Agency in Turkish Arabia and accompanied him to Baghdad, where they serve ever since. I beg I may be informed whether under the circumstances of their having thus served the British Government for three generations I may claim them as British subjects.
1	" John Thaddeus	Head Writer	
1	" James Thaddeus	Accountant	
1	" Gabriel Thaddeus	Treasurer	
1	Meerza Mahomed Hossein	Persian writer	British Indian subject.
1	Mahomed Effendi	Turkish do.	
1	Synd Hassan	Arabic do.	
1	Abdoolla ibn Yusuf Ezrah	Scroff do.	
1	Mahboob Agha	Jemadar of peons	
1	Huran	Peon	
4	Elyas	Do.	
4	Haji Mahomed	Do.	
2	Kauthem ibn Jaood	Do.	Turkish subjects.
2	Hormuzd	Durbar servant	
2	Joodes	Do. do.	
2	Rahim	Kulasee	
2	Kauthem	Waterman	
ESCORT.			
1	Mahmood Agha	Duffadar	
1	Eunus Agha	Horseman	
6	Shebeeb	Do.	
6	Ashor	Do.	
6	Mahomed Khaled	Do.	
6	Ali ibn Mahmood	Do.	
6	Mahomed Ibrahim	Do.	
6	Mahomed	Groom	
3	Abdoolla	Do.	
3	Hussein	Do.	

[S646FD]



"ملخص شؤون الجزيرة العربية التركية. ١٨٠١-١٩٠٥" [٧٥ظ] (٣٨٨/١٥٠)





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CHAPTER VII.

Turkish encroachments on the rights and privileges of the British Agents.

160. We shall deal in this chapter with certain restrictions imposed or tried to be imposed upon some of the privileges connected with the British Residency in Turkish Arabia.

(i) Suspension of Mr. Michael Minas as Vice-Consul at Baghdad, 1868.

161. In February 1868 Namik Pasha complained of the general behaviour of Michael Minas, Native Agent in the Residency, who had been made Vice-Consul at Baghdad in 1859, as rude and disrespectful, and desired that another person might be appointed to be the medium of communication between the British Consulate and the Turkish Government. Sir A. Kemball declined to remove Mr. Minas on a general charge, and requested Namik Pasha to specify instances of misconduct on Mr. Minas' part. Namik Pasha, without noticing the requisition, refused to transact business with Mr. Minas.

162. Sir A. Kemball reported that Mr. Minas had been attached to the Political Agent as a paid *employé* for 24 years, and that hitherto no complaint of any kind had been preferred against him by the Turkish authorities. He mentioned the following circumstance, which he thought had given rise to the present charge.

163. A respectable Indian British subject was robbed on his way to Baghdad, and two of his plunderers were imprisoned by order of Namik Pasha; but a long time having elapsed without any steps being taken to bring the offenders to justice, the complainant left for Mecca. After four months, Namik Pasha ordered the case to be sent up to the Criminal Court, and called upon Mr. Minas to produce his witnesses. Mr. Minas replied that the only witnesses were the plundered man and his attendants, and as they had gone away, it rested with the Government to detain or release the robbers as it thought proper. Upon this, Reza Beg, who was present, observed to Mr. Minas that he at least was not a dweller in tents, and ought to know that the formalities of a trial could not be dispensed with. To this Mr. Minas retorted that the argument was indisputable, but after the lapse of four months the witnesses might not be forthcoming, and that for the rest, such formalities were very often dispensed with at Baghdad. On Namik Pasha's remarking that the blame was due to the laxity of the executive, the subject was dropped, and Mr. Minas took his leave.

164. It appears that Mr. Minas' remarks about the formalities of a trial displeased Namik Pasha; but Reza Beg, to whom Sir A. Kemball first spoke of the affair, stated that he perceived nothing offensive in Mr. Minas' tone. Subsequently, however, he said that Mr. Minas' manner on the occasion was provoking; but Sir A. Kemball did not credit the second statement.

165. Being pressed upon about the illegality of his proceedings and invited also to establish his charge, Namik Pasha after the lapse of two months withdrew the plea of misconduct and admitted the innocence of Mr. Michael Minas. Namik Pasha was then succeeded by Taki-ud-din Pasha as Vali. He, however, refused to recognize that officer.

166. Representations were then made to the Porte, with the result that the Vali was ordered to allow Mr. Minas to resume his duties. The Vali, however, recognized him only as a Dragoman and not as Vice-Consul. He asserted that there was nothing in the records of the serai to show that he was ever appointed as Vice-Consul and recognized as Vice-Consul.



Political A., 1868, Nos. 72-73.

167. Colonel Kemball then telegraphed to the Embassy (12th June 1868) :—

"Unless a Berat can be exceptionally obtained in consideration of Foreign Office appointment and long recognition, there is no hope of compromise or tacit conformity here."

168. The reply of Sir H. Elliot (dated 13th June 1868) was—

"No Herat can be asked for a Vice-Consul in a place where there is a Superintending Consular Officer. If the Vice-Consul is recognized as the medium of communication between you and Turkish authorities, we have no right to claim more. The Vice-Consul at Constantinople is not officially recognized as such by the Turkish Government, though he holds his office by Foreign Office appointment."

169. Mr. Michael was thenceforth known only as a Native Agent.

(ii) Firing of a salute to the Consul-General from the *Comet* at Baghdad, 1873.

170. In 1873 a salute was fired from the *Comet* on the return of Colonel

Secret, October 1874, Nos. 62-68.
Colonel Herbert to the Embassy, No. 67, dated
23rd December 1873.

Herbert to Baghdad from a tour. This was objected to by the Turkish authorities. The Political Agent reported :—

"In former times the guns of the *Comet* were always employed to fire salutes both for the Political Agent, and on such occasions as called for them.

"In the time of my predecessors one of the two guns was removed, with the view, I believe, of giving more accommodation on deck, and the former practice was consequently intermitted, but this not being in accordance with what I deemed proper I suggested to the officer that this gun should be replaced. This he was only too glad to do, and the year before last he was able, when at Basrah, to fire salute on the occasion of the anniversary of the Sultan's accession, no objection whatever being then raised, but, on the contrary, the Commodore expressing admiration of the manner in which this was done.

"Unfortunately last year at the time of that anniversary, and also on the day of Radif Pasha's arrival, the vessel was not in a position to fire salutes as I wished to be done.

"On my recent return from Basrah Mr. Powell fired a salute of 13 guns to which I am entitled under Indian Regulations, and I was astonished to hear that this had given umbrage to the Governor-General of the Province."

171. On this point Mr. Hertslet noted :

"She belongs now to what is called the Bombay Marine, and is commanded by a retired Lieutenant of the late Indian Navy, without a commission, and her crew consists almost entirely of Nestorean Christians (Turkish subjects). She only carries two nine-pounders (fore and aft guns), and according to the Admiralty Regulation no vessel carrying less than 10 guns has a right to fire a salute, except when omission to do so would give offence to a foreign power, or a foreign officer.

"Nevertheless I am informed by Sir Arnold Kemball, who was for many years Political Agent and Consul-General at Baghdad, and by Captain Felix Jones, who commanded on the rivers for 15 years, that prior to 1863 the *Comet* constantly fired salutes, and that when she did so no exception whatever was taken for so doing by the Turkish authorities."

172. Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires wrote to Colonel Herbert (letter dated 7th April 1874)—

"The question raised by Rachid Pasha is not, as I understand it, whether you are entitled by the rules of the services to which you and the Commander of H. M. S. *Comet* respectively belong, to receive a salute, but simply whether that vessel is to be allowed to fire salutes at Baghdad in honor either of yourself or any one else, or in fact, under any circumstances whatever. His Excellency declares that the vessel cannot be allowed to do so, and inasmuch as *Baghdad is not an open seaport*, but in a large town situated on a river far in the interior of the country, I do not see that the Ottoman Government can be denied the right to decide the matter, nor can that right be impaired by the occasional or even frequent discharge of small arms within the town.

"I regret, therefore, that it is out of my power to give you, as you request, my support in this matter. On the other hand, I feel that it is but due to yourself and the position which you have so long held as Her Majesty's Political Agent and Consul-General at Baghdad that



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I should myself take no step which should have the character of being final, but should rather await the expected return of Her Majesty's Ambassador, who will be better qualified than myself to give a definitive instruction. I will therefore abstain from making any reply to the Porte's note. On the other hand, I must count on your taking the necessary measures, in the meantime, to prevent any further salutes being fired within Turkish internal waters by the ship in question.

172-A. The Foreign Office was of opinion that Colonel Herbert acted injudiciously in raising the question by reviving the obsolete practice of saluting, which seems to have been always irregular as not in accordance with Admiralty Regulations Foreign Office to the India Office, dated 10th July 1874).

172-B. The Government of India concurred in this opinion, and observed that—

"Colonel Herbert's right to be saluted on proper occasions is quite a different question. As a Political Agent with the status of a Resident he is entitled under Her Majesty's Order in Council of 23rd January 1860 to a salute of 13 guns".)

(iii) Attitude enjoined on its Governors by the Porte towards Foreign, especially, British Consuls, 1884.

173. In 1884 the Grand Vizier to the Sultan issued a secret order to the Governors of Hedjaz, Yemen, Baghdad, and Arabistan, giving them instructions as to the attitude they should observe towards Foreign Consular agents and warning them to be specially careful in their dealings with those in the service of the British Government. Colonel Ross thought that the circular was probably intended to express displeasure at the general policy of England towards Turkey and was probably drafted with a view to its being read by the British and other Foreign Governments. Colonel Ross added—

"Whilst the comments on the present policy of England are strong, the actual instructions as regards treatment of Consuls are a mere 'flesh in the pan'."

(iv) Tours of the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia and objections of the Porte, 1876—1897.

174. During the times of Colonel Rawlinson and Colonel Kemball our Political and Marine officers made extensive tours in Turkish Arabia partly on duty and partly for the purpose of extending geographical and antiquarian knowledge.

The surveys and the geographical and archaeological work of Colonel Rawlinson, Sir Felix Jones are the monuments of their enterprise and industry. What is important to note is that their tours never appear to have been objected to. Latterly the Turkish authorities have attempted to restrict the privilege enjoyed formerly by our Political Officers.

175. The Political Officers formerly do not appear to have submitted proposals for their tours to Government. They travelled and reported their movements to Government occasionally, if they were of any importance. Latterly the practice commenced to make a reference to Government long before tour was undertaken.

176. In February 1876, Colonel Nixon, who was then Resident at Baghdad, submitted proposals for a tour to Kermanshah and the neighbouring Persian frontier.

177. But Colonel Nixon did not carry out his proposed journey, although general permission to travel was granted him in the following terms :—

"The Governor-General in Council recognises the advantage of your being placed in such a position as will enable you to undertake tours of inspection when and where the interests of the British Government may require you to do so."

178. The next journey of which we can find any record is that of Colonel Miles to Kerbella and Najaf, 1879. His object in going was that these towns had not been visited by the Political Agent "for some years" and he wished to observe the condition of the natives of India residing there.

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The journey would seem to have been undertaken without any reference to the Government of India. Colonel Miles telegraphed his intention of going to the Ambassador at Constantinople, but went apparently as a matter of course. He never reported the matter until it was a *fait accompli*, and the Turks, as far as the records show, made no objection.

General B., 1879, No. 201.

179. Between this 1879 nothing in the way of travelling appears to have been contemplated or undertaken. In March of the latter year Mr. Plowden asked to be allowed to avail himself of the general permission which had been given to Colonel Nixon by the Government of India five years before as he (Mr. Plowden) considered it desirable on general grounds for the Resident "to show himself occasionally on the frontier."

Upon this the Secretary noted that he "should be disposed to encourage any travelling which can be accomplished in safety and without giving umbrage to the authorities, who are probably suspicious."

And Mr. Plowden was accordingly informed that there was "no objection to his making an experimental tour in the direction indicated."

180. Between June and September 1881, Mr. Plowden carried out his project and travelled from Baghdad to Kermanshah and thence to Mosul.

Secret, January 1882, Nos. 666-670.

The greater part of this journey, however, lay in Persian and not in Turkish territory. But we can find nothing to show that the Ottoman Government objected to the Resident's movements. In his letter forwarding a report of the Kermanshah-Mosul journey, Mr. Plowden made mention of a recent trip to Kerbella and Najaf, and this, as in Colonel Miles' case, appears to have been done as a matter of course without reference to higher authority or objections being raised by the Porte.

Pros. quoted above.

182. In April 1884, Mr. Plowden submitted to the Government of India a forecast of the political tours he intended to make during the year on the Turko-Persian frontier south-east of Baghdad, and to Mosul and the surrounding country to the north and north-west.

A., Political E., June 1884, Nos. 699-700.

183. These proposals received the sanction of the Government of India and of Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. He was also supplied with certain scientific instruments for use during the tour.

A., Political E.

184. Mr. Plowden, however, does not appear to have started on his travels until April 1885, and had only proceeded a short distance up the Tigris, when the *Comet* grounded and he returned to Baghdad on the 7th May.

External B., Pros. June 1885, Nos. 16-17.

The Ottoman Government protested against the movements of the *Comet*. See Pros., July 1885, Secret E., Nos. 252-255 (see paragraph *post*).

185. Mr. Plowden left Baghdad for India in June 1885. In September 1885, Colonel Tweedie, in referring to the correspondence of 1884 above noticed submitted that it seemed—

General A., July 1885, No. 85.

"scarcely desirable in present circumstances and with the winter so near to take up the summer tour in Persian territory which Mr. Plowden had in contemplation" and he proposed submitting for it a visit to Kerbella and Najaf.

186. On receipt of the approval of the Government of India he forwarded his proposals for the consideration of Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and in reply was ordered to postpone his departure "till the receipt of further instructions." These instructions were to the following effect:—

External A., October 1885, Nos. 169-170.

Telegram No. 1846-E., dated 20th October 1885.

"That in view of the strong political objections raised by the Porte, Colonel Tweedie is requested to abandon his proposed journey to Kerbella and Najaf."

Enclosure No. 1 to Colonel Tweedie's No. 701, dated 22nd December 1885.

External A., March 1886, Nos. 10-13.



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187. This prohibition considerably disturbed the Resident, and he sent his views on the desirability of the British Consul-General being allowed to travel in Turkish territory both to Sir W. White and to the Government of India:

In his letter No. 700, dated 22nd December 1885, to Sir W. White he adduced four arguments in support of his contention:—

"I.—The right of the British Consul-General at Baghdad to move freely about the vilayat having always hitherto been asserted and maintained would not its relinquishment represent and be attended with a marked change in the General and political status of Great Britain in this locality?

"II.—In Kerbella, three marches, and Najaff, four marches, distant from Baghdad, upwards of six thousand of Her Majesty's Indian subjects permanently reside, while the shrines there situated are visited by many thousands more of the same class from all parts of India in the course of every year. For the protection of so many subjects of Her Majesty, instead of pressing for the establishment of a British Vice-Consulate, we have moderated our views to the nomination, without salary or recognised official status, of a member of their own community, to act, as far as his personal influence can be carried, as an arbitrator in their disputes, a medium between them and the Consulate-General, and a representative of their interests in the local offices and tribunals. This arrangement is at best but a compromise. Its adequacy essentially depends on its being closely and personally supervised by Her Majesty's Consul-General, resident at Baghdad, and if that official is now to be restrained from going to those two spots as often as his presence there is required, then we may see, in the occurrence recently at Kerbella of the outrageous crime to which the marginally noted reference relates, a sign in one direction only of the consequences which are to be apprehended.

"III.—If Her Majesty's Consul-General be debarred from going to Kerbella, the circumstances of which are as above stated, how can his right of visiting Mosul be insisted on: Mosul being twelve, instead of only three, marches distant, containing but few subjects of Her Majesty and equipped with a Vice-Consulate of its own, while if his visiting Mosul likewise be interdicted, how can he exercise over the Vice-Consulate there that supervision which, under the constitution of the two offices respectively, he is required by Her Majesty's Government to maintain?

"IV.—Supposing the personal reach or scope of Her Majesty's Consul General here to be thus for the first time restricted to Baghdad and Basrah, will not his position generally, and more especially in relation to the Government of India, be altered and his usefulness diminished?

"3. I respectfully trust Your Excellency will not deem me inclined to magnify a point as to which difficulty has arisen. I do not forget that every thing has to be dealt with according to its relative, and not merely its intrinsic, importance. But from my point of view, and with reference to the interests entrusted to me, it seems so essential that the freedom of movement which Her Majesty's Consul-General here has always possessed should be maintained intact, that I venture to hope Your Excellency will consider me to have only done my duty in submitting, with much deference and respect, the present representations."

188. The British Ambassador addressed a *note verbale* dated, 8th June 1886, to the Porte stating Her Majesty's Consul-General had represented that in

External A., October 1886, Nos. 109-112.

order to acquit himself in a proper manner of the duties he is called upon to perform, it is necessary for him from time to time to visit the Consulates under his orders and to watch the interests of British Indian subjects under his jurisdiction and requesting that instructions might be sent to the authorities of those places to afford him all proper assistance.

189. The Porte answered that the Governors-General of Baghdad, Basrah and Mosul had been invited to afford the Consul-General every assistance he might require within their jurisdictions.

190. Colonel Tweedie started on his tour on 19th October 1886 and a report of his extended tour has been published.

External A., January 1887, Nos. 90-94.

He wished to extend his tour also to the Arab littoral with a view to make himself acquainted with the localities and persons within Turkish territory on that coast and to enable himself to deal more effectually with ? case which might arise in that territory. It was thought in the Foreign Department that such questions were more within the province of the Political Resident, Persian Gulf. Colonel Tweedie was therefore told by telegram, dated 4th December 1886, that he should consult Colonel Ross with reference to his proposed tour on the Arabian littoral.



191. Major Talbot, Political Resident, Turkish Arabia, proposed to make a short tour in November 1888 to Kerbella and Najaf and in reply to a reference made to the British Embassy at Constantinople he was told that there was no objection to the proposed tour.

192. In September 1897 Lieutenant-Colonel Loch, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, proposed to go on an extended tour (1) from Basrah to Hayil, El Joff and back; (2) from Baghdad to Mosul and back *via* Kerkook; (3) from Baghdad to Kermanshah and along the borders of Luristan and Bakhtiari country to Ahwaz and back to Baghdad.

193. In submitting this proposal to the Foreign Office, Sir P. Currie observed (letter No. 3, dated 27th January 1898):—

"The second of these tours (to Mosul and Kerkook) appears to me unobjectionable.

"With regard to the third, I would observe that a great part of the proposed route is in Persian not Turkish territory. It is, I believe, usual for Consular officers to travel officially outside the country in which their post is situated, unless some special reason, which is not alleged in this case, exists.

The first tour that to Chail and El-jof suggests more serious considerations. British officials have no doubt a perfect right to visit that district, but it is equally certain that the proposed journey would attract the attention and arouse the suspicions of the Ottoman Government, and in all probability give rise to accusations of British intrigues. As Your Lordship is aware from my despatch No. 782 of 22nd November last, and from Lord Cromer's reports, the Sultan was recently much perturbed by the rumours that Prince Aziz of Egypt was proceeding to Nejd accompanied by an Englishman."

194. The Foreign Office concurred in these views, and while sanctioning to the second of the proposed tours, desired that the others should be abandoned.

(v) Turkish objections to the Political Agent going up the Tigris on the *Comet* north of Baghdad, 1885.

195. In April 1885 Mr. Plowden started on a tour up the River Tigris on board the *Comet*, but he had proceeded only a short distance, when the *Comet* grounded and had returned to Baghdad. The Ottoman Government protested against the movements of the *Comet*.

196. In a note, dated 11th July 1885, Lord Salisbury expressed the hope that no opposition would be made to the stationnaire at Baghdad ascending the River Tigris for the purpose of conveying Her Majesty's Consul-General to parts of his Consular district provided due notice was previously given to the local authorities. This note was accepted by the Porte without any demur.

(vi) Objections of Porte to the visit of the Consul-General at Baghdad on board the *Comet* to Samarah, 1894.

197. In April 1894 there occurred a serious disturbance at Samarah, in which it was reported that the lives of several British Indians were in danger. Colonel Mockler on hearing of this, proceeded on board the *Comet* to the place—after giving the necessary notice to the Vali, who raised no objection.

The Porte, however, took exception to Colonel Mockler's proceedings in ascending up the river by the *Comet*, Lord Kimberley in reply drew attention to the note addressed by Lord Salisbury, dated 11th July 1895. The note had been accepted without a demur and Her Majesty's Government were under the impression that a request so reasonable in itself



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the Consul-General of all blame and would not object to the Consul-General occasionally using the stationnaire for the purpose of visiting parts of his Consular district on the Tigris above Baghdad.

198. This last request was objected to by the Porte on the ground that to comply with it would be cited as a precedent by other Foreign Consuls who would claim similar privileges for the vessels of their respective countries.

(vii) Complaint by the Porte against Messrs. Lynch and Company's steamers discharging other than mail bags at the Baghdad Consulate, 1888.

199. In March 1888 Her Majesty's Ambassador received a *note verbale* from the Porte complaining of the proceedings of the Lynch Company's steamers in discharging at the British Consulate other objects besides mail bags before proceeding to the Custom House wharf.

200. The Political Resident at Baghdad was directed to obtain the explanation of Messrs. Lynch and Co., who replied—

"In reply we beg to inform you that when our steamers stop opposite the Residency on their upward voyage nothing but the mail bags are landed there.

"The only exceptions for this rule have been on one or two occasions. Indian official and other passengers, guests of the Resident, with their baggage have been allowed to land."

On this the Political Resident observed (letter dated 25th April 1888) :—

"For the landing in exceptional cases of invited and expected guests in mail boats, or in a *Comet's* boat specially sent to bring them off mail, steamer, at small landing place (where mails are landed) close to Consulate-General, I, and my predecessors before me, must be held responsible. Such guests are, as a rule, official persons, or perhaps travellers of rank and consideration. To let them be carried past the Consulate to the Customs House would be to give them but a poor idea of the attention and hospitality awaiting them in this Ottoman city. The privilege now referred to is at all events one of old standing. It depends, I respectfully venture to remark, on the spirit of mutual comity underlying, happily, the relations generally which from time immemorial up to now have subsisted between two Governments. That it has never been used otherwise than with moderation and judgment no one here can possibly state. Nay, it has been used but too sparingly; sometimes through one's wish not to strain it; at other times owing to steamer coming in unexpectedly; and guests one was on the look-out for being therefore taken past the Consulate, as it were accidentally. To latter category belonged the incident necessitating the references to Your Excellency. On that occasion Surgeon Leahy of Her Majesty's Indian Medical Department on reaching Baghdad to assume duties of Officiating Resident Surgeon, was, to my great regret, owing to steamers coming in before her time, not landed at Consulate but carried on the Customs House, where, notwithstanding perfect openness, and desire to comply with rules, on his part, Regie Department pounced, it will be remembered, on his cheroots, preferred officially to the Vilayat, and unfounded, and afterwards refuted, and practically retracted, charge against him of intent to smuggle or defraud, and comported itself generally in a way little to be looked for under a civilized Government and in a friendly country. This was by no means a solitary instance. It is painful to one to set down harsh judgments, or use strong terms, of a great public department of the city where his lines have fallen officially. But truth constrains me to state to Your Excellency that in the course of these last few years the conduct of the Baghdad Customs House officials towards Englishmen (in several instances Englishmen of rank) who have passed through their hands has, leaving far behind the stage of mere obstructiveness, been so high handed and discourteous, that in this I deferentially submit we are bound to see one reason more why, while continuing to use only when necessary the privilege so long enjoyed by us of landing, equally with embarking, guests of the Consulate at the Consulate's proper wharf, we should not allow that privilege to be taken away from us.

201. The Porte was not satisfied with the explanations furnished and maintained that the irregularities complained of were of frequent occurrence, Messrs. Lynch however assured us that there was no ground for the allegations made and Major Talbot corroborated the statement.

When the explanations were sent to the Porte, the following note was addressed by the foreign Minister to our Ambassador (dated 12th February 1889):—

[S646FD]



Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères a eu l'honneur de recevoir la note verbale que l'Ambassade de S.M.B. a bien voulu lui adresser le 7 Decembre dernier, No. 157, au sujet du débarquement au Consulat-Général d'Angleterre à Bagdad d'objets passibles de droits douane.

L'Administration Générale des Contributions Indirectes à laquelle cette pièce avait été communiquée tout en exprimant ses remerciements pour les explications y contenues, fait justement observer que les effets personnels des fonctionnaires jouissant de la franchise douanière ne sont admis à bénéficier de cette immunité et ne sont délivrés que sur la présentation de la déclaration prévue par le règlement. Toute exception à cette règle étant de nature à donner lieu à des plaintes légitimes de la part des Autorités douanières, le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères prie l'Ambassade de S. M. B. de vouloir bien inviter son Consulat-Général à Bagdad à l'observer rigoureusement à fin d'empêcher à l'avenir tout mal-entendu. Aussitôt qu'elle voudra bien informer la Sublime Porte de la transmission ces instructions, des ordres seront donnés à la douane de Bagdad pour qu'elle ait de son côté à veiller attentivement à la pleine et entière application des privilèges accordés.

202. In drawing attention to this note, Sir W. White requested the Resident to conform to the Turkish Customs House Regulations at present in force (despatch dated 14th February 1889).

(viii) Refusal of the Porte to permit importation to Basrah of loaded cartridges required by Assistant Political Agent for sporting purposes, 1891.

203. Lieutenant Stratton, Assistant Political Agent, Basrah, had some cartridges sent out to him from India for sporting purposes during the Christmas week, and obtained from the Vali a pass for their transit to that port. The Customs authorities at Baghdad declined to allow the cartridges to be conveyed to their destination, and obtained orders from Constantinople to return the consignments to the port of shipment.

204. Colonel Tweedie brought the matter to the notice of Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople; but His Excellency informed Colonel Tweedie by telegram that the "cartridges being of metal and full, their entry is forbidden by regulations."

205. Lieutenant Stratton represented to Colonel Tweedie that the action of the Turkish authorities ignored the Treaty of Commerce.

206. What he meant by this he explained in a subsequent communication :—

"I beg to refer to Article XV of the "Treaty of Commerce and Navigation" between Great Britain and Turkey, ratified at Constantinople on 9th July 1861, the last paragraph of which is as follows :—

"Fowling-pieces, pistols and ornamental or fancy weapons, as also small quantities of gun powder for sporting reserved for private use, shall not be subjected to the stipulations of present article.

"In regard to the telegram from His Excellency Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, I may mention that the cartridges under reference are ordinary *shot* cartridges in *paper* cases.

"In the records of this Consulate I have found a document purporting to be an injunction, evidently based on the terms of the Treaty of Commerce above referred to, from the Turkish Minister of Customs at Constantinople to the Customs Master at Baghdad, dated 10th Sbaaban 1279, corresponding to 30th January 1863, in which the latter is instructed to offer no opposition to the entry of purely sporting weapons and ammunition. This paper was forwarded to this Consulate under your office endorsement No. 12, dated 21st February 1881.

"In 1887 a gun and some cartridges addressed to Mr. Robertson, the late Consul here, were detained by the Basrah Custom House for a considerable period, but were finally released by order of the Foreign Minister. The correspondence in this case begins with Mr. Robertson's telegram to you, dated 30th April 1887, and ends with his telegram No. 285, which appears to have been sent at a date posterior to 18th July 1887.

"Please also refer to correspondence by telegram between Colonel Mookler and yourself, dated 24th and 28th March 1887, regarding a rifle and ammunition which were at first detained by Custom House, but finally released.

"With the terms of Article XV of the Commercial Treaty of 1861, the injunction from Minister of Customs to Customs Master at Baghdad, the two precedents above quoted, and a pass for the 2,000 cartridges from His Excellency the Vali of Basrah, to support me, I considered myself safe in importing them.



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"The prohibition is admittedly—even by the Customs authorities in Baghdad, *vide* second paragraph of your letter to His Excellency Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador—most unreasonable, and I beg that the tenor of this letter may be communicated by telegram to His Excellency with a view to the removal of so irksome a restriction.

"It is hardly necessary to say that I was unaware of any order forbidding the entry of metal or loaded cartridge cases into the Turkish dominions, and no such order is traceable in the Consulate records."

207. A reference was made to the British Embassy on Lieutenant Stratton's representation, and the following was the reply (dated 22nd July 1891):—

Secret E, September 1891, Nos. 144-147.

"With reference to Your Lordship's despatch, Consular No. 39 of the 4th instant, I regret to report that Her Majesty's Embassy cannot succeed in obtaining permission for the importation at Basrah of sporting cartridges required by Her Majesty's Consul there for his private use.

"Equally fruitless efforts have on several previous occasions been made, not only by Her Majesty's Embassy, but also by other foreign missions here, to procure in favour of sportsmen a relaxation of the strict regulation under which the entry into Turkey is prohibited of all loaded cartridges.

"The privilege cannot be claimed by us as a right, for even the lapsed Treaty of 1861 only provided for the entry into Turkey of 'small quantities of gunpowder,' and is silent on the subject of loaded cartridges.

"As regards the entry even of small quantities of gunpowder intended for sporting purposes, I may remark that the Turkish Ordinance of 7th January 1863, quoted by Mr. Consul-General Tweedie, was superseded by a later regulation of 1870, to be found on page 418 of *Aristarchis' Legislation Ottomane*, Volume 3, abrogating all previous regulations, and that the authorities have for many years past been allowed, in spite of the Treaty of 1861, to prevent gunpowder for any purposes being brought into Ottoman dominions.

"The hardship of being prevented from importing loaded cartridges falls quite as heavily on Her Majesty's Diplomatic and Consular servants at Constantinople as it does upon Her Majesty's Consuls in Turkish Arabia, but I understand that the former satisfy their requirements fairly well by importing (as everybody can do) empty cartridge-cases, and buying gunpowder of Turkish Government manufacture."

(ix) Question of the status and jurisdiction of the Resident in Turkish Arabia.

(a) Question raised in 1874.

208. Colonel Herbert was a Resident that found himself often in disagreement with the Valis of Baghdad, Redif Pasha. One of the awkward questions that arose between them was regarding the status of the Resident at Baghdad. The Valis wished to know the number and names of the dragomans and other native employes attached to the British Consulate-General, in order that they might be properly registered and recognised as privileged persons according to Consular regulations.

Secret, October 1874, Nos. 62-68.

209. By these regulations, which were accepted by the various foreign representatives, the native staff of a Consulate is limited to four dragomans and four guards, although the number may be in exceptional cases increased on an understanding to that effect between the Porte and the diplomatic representatives at Constantinople.

210. As Colonel Herbert possessed a very large staff of native employes and servants, when he was officially requested to furnish him with a list of their names, he refused on the plea that they were all paid by, and borne upon, the office establishment of *Political Agent under Her Majesty's Government of India*. On the Vali repeating his request, Colonel Herbert again declined to send in a list, informing the Vali that he would refer the matter to his superiors for instruction.

211. Colonel Herbert thereupon addressed the British Embassy (despatch No. 21, dated 9th March 1874) on the subject and contended "that the office of the Resident preceded that of Consul at Baghdad, and that the post being recognised by the Foreign Office and consequently at Constantinople only in its Consular capacity loses, in the eyes of those with whom it is of much



importance, the Political Agent should possess much influence, its *diplomatic and political character*." He therefore suggested that the appointment under the Secretary of State for, and the Viceroy of, India might be recognised by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by Her Majesty's Embassy and the Sublime Porte. In arguing on this question Colonel Herbert laid special stress on Lord Aberdeen's instructions to Major Rawlinson under date the 14th July 1844.

* Paragraph above.

212. Lord Derby after consulting Lord Salisbury informed the British Embassy—

"that the Secretary of State for India in Council is of opinion that it would be *inexpedient* to raise any question as to your status as *Political Agent in Turkish Arabia*. It is considered that the requirements of the case in reference to your public establishment would be met by the excess over the number fixed by the consular regulations being sanctioned by the Porte in the manner provided for in them".

213. The Government of India expressed themselves as follows in their despatch to the Secretary of State No. 149, dated 18th August 1874:—

Political, August 1874, Nos. 150-152.

"With reference to this question, we would remark that since the year 1798 the Government of India has been represented by a Diplomatic Agent at Baghdad, whose denomination has been sometimes Resident, and sometimes Political Agent, and that although the Sublime Porte has never formally recognised any other officer than a Consul or Consul-General, and although the treaties between Great Britain and Turkey contain no stipulations on this subject, the position of the Political Agent of the Government of India has been formally and officially recognised by the Local Government at Baghdad. From this fact, and from the continuance of the office for three quarters of a century without any objection on the part of the Turkish Government, we consider that the acquiescence and consent of the Sublime Porte may be fairly presumed to have been accorded to the arrangement.

"The distinction of the Consular from the diplomatic functions is valuable, and should not, in our opinion, be obliterated in the manner suggested by Colonel Herbert. We would express a hope that the position hitherto enjoined for so long a period by the Political Agent may not be disturbed."

(b) *The question raised in 1884.*

214. In 1884 the Porte seems to have refused to extend the jurisdiction of certain of Her Majesty's Consulates in the Ottoman Empire, and Lord Dufferin asked Mr. Plowden to furnish him with information on the following points:—

- (1) the districts for which Mr. Plowden and the Vice-Consuls under his jurisdiction hold Berats;
- (2) what sub-division had been made in the Vilayat of Baghdad and on what dates;
- (3) whether any serious inconvenience would arise from the refusal of the Sublime Porte to grant additional Berats for the Consuls and Vice-Consuls for the newly-created Vilayat.

215. We might quote the reply of Mr. Plowden *in extenso* as it deals with the three questions fully and clearly.

No. 691, dated Baghdad, 20th August 1884.

From—TANVOR-CHICHELE PLOWDEN, Esq., Political Resident in Turkish Arabia and Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Baghdad,

To—Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

I regret that the information on record in my office is not sufficient to enable me to answer as fully and as explicitly as I could wish the questions in Your Excellency's circular of the 5th July.

2. With regard to the districts for which the Consul-General at Baghdad and the Vice-Consuls subordinate to him respectively hold Berats, I find that as regards my own Berat, "Baghdad" only is mentioned, but in that of Sir H. Rawlinson, the first British Consul-General at Baghdad, the expression used is "Baghdad and its environs". I have not seen of



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mentioned is "Basrah." I have, however, a copy of the Berat granted in 1764 to Mr. Garden, the East India Company's Resident at Basrah, in which he is recognized as British Consul for transacting the Company's affairs in the city of Basrah, "or other places thereto belonging or dependent thereon." The Vice-Consulate at Mosul has only been in existence between 40 and 50 years, and, though I have no copy of the Vice-Consul's Berat, I gather from correspondence in my office that "Mosul" is the only place mentioned in it.

3. But although the Berat of the Consul-General at Baghdad only mentions "Baghdad," it should be remembered that the Vilayat of Baghdad comprised at one time the entire country from Diarbekir to Basrah, and that until quite recent times the Baghdad Vilayat included both Mosul and Basrah. There was in fact only one official designation, *viz.*, Baghdad, for this extensive tract of country, and at any rate there has never been any question whatever of the right of Her Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad to exercise superintendence over the affairs of Basrah and Mosul so far as these might come under the cognizance of the British Vice-Consul at those places. At Basrah the work was of a mixed character, and concerned both British trade and British relations with the people of the country, notably, of course, the different Arab tribes. At Mosul, however, I don't suppose there is a single British subject and little, if any, British trade. It has always been a post of observation, and the Vice-Consul's principal business has been the supervision and protection of the local Christians, who are of course Turkish subjects.

4. With respect to the question as to recent changes in the Vilayat of Baghdad, I beg to inform Your Lordship that since the beginning of 1879 Mosul has been a separate Vilayat, but that both the present Vali of Baghdad, Taki-ud-din Pasha and his immediate predecessor, Abdul Rahman Pasha, are supposed to have entertained hopes that this arrangement would be cancelled and the province restored to the Vilayat of Baghdad. I have no information as to the exact boundaries of the Vilayat of Mosul, especially as to the northern and western limits, but southwards it reaches to within about twelve hours' journey of the city of Baghdad, and on the east it is bounded by Persia. Basrah has from time to time been made a separate Vilayat, but generally the arrangement is maintained only for a few years. Thus from 1875 until the spring of 1880 Basrah was a separate administration, but was then restored to Baghdad. About three months ago it was again constituted a Vilayat, and Talib Pasha was appointed Vali. His appointment is, however, understood to have been cancelled, and the Vilayat remains in charge of a temporary incumbent. Ali Riza Pasha, who is, I believe, an Admiral in the Turkish service, and who commands the Naval Depot at Basrah. The new Vilayat includes the Mutessarifliks of (1) Basrah, (2) Nejed and El Hassa, (3) Nasariyah, the centre of the Montefik country, and (4) Awarah on the Lower Tigris.

5. With regard to Your Excellency's third question, my opinion is that, if a favourable opportunity should occur, it would be very desirable to revise the Berat of the Consul-General at Baghdad and those of the Vice-Consuls at Mosul and Basrah. The Berat of the Consul-General should, I think, specify that his jurisdiction includes the Vilayats of Baghdad, Basrah and Mosul, and those of the two Vice-Consuls, the Vilayat of Basrah and Mosul respectively. At the same time, as a matter of fact, the Consul-General at Baghdad has for years past dealt with business of all kinds arising within the area of the three Vilayats, and has been in the habit of travelling anywhere he pleases without let or hindrance. So also the Vice-Counsel at Basrah has never considered his powers of intervention limited to the town of Basrah, nor has any exception, so far as I am aware, been taken to his proceedings on ground of want of jurisdiction. I think also, though I cannot speak with the same certainty, that the Vice-Consul at Mosul has enquired into matters affecting the Christian inhabitants of the country other than those residing within the town of Mosul. Therefore, if the right of the Consul-General at Baghdad or of either of the two Vice-Consuls named to take action in any particular matter were called in question on the plea of absence of jurisdiction, it is probable that an adequate answer could be framed showing that such action was admissible by sufferance, usage and prescription. Nevertheless, a definite settlement of the question by a revision of the Berats in some such way as I have suggested would, I think, be satisfactory.

(c) The question raised in 1887.

216. In his despatch No. 422, dated 18th September 1887, Colonel Tweedie complained to Sir W. White about the discourtesy shown by the Vali of Basrah in not having paid an official visit to him on the occasion of his recent presence at Baghdad. Sir W. White replied (despatch dated 14th September 1887):—

"(1) You as Consul-General at Baghdad are not accredited to Vali or Vilayats of Basrah.

"(2) The Vali of Basrah was not obliged to return your second visit, which was merely a visit of adieu at Basrah.

"(3) As the Vali of Basrah was merely on a visit at Baghdad, he had no official position there as far as you were concerned, and an exchange of visits would be merely optional."

[S646FD]



217. Thereupon Colonel Tweedie took up the question of the Resident's status. He contended that the Resident is primarily Political Resident in Turkish Arabia on behalf of the Government of India; secondarily, a Consul-General of Her Majesty's Government to the Pashalic of Baghdad; that ever since the latter title was given to him, the Ottoman Government had shown a tendency to ignore the status of the Political Resident and merely treat him as a Consul-General; that as the dominions of the Baghdad Pashalic had been recently diminished by the separation of Basrah into a distinct vilayat, so the duties and the responsibilities of the Consul-General were becoming gradually abridged and restricted. The effect was that the Resident had lost influence in Turkish Arabia. Instead of an officer who could make his influence felt over "that large portion of Arabia, including the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, over which Ottoman sovereignty has been more or less established," the tendency was to regard him as merely a Consul for the Vilayat of Baghdad. He was therefore of opinion that British interests and British prestige, especially at this time, required—

"vigorous unfettered Political Agent in the Government of India's sense, pervading with his person, his influence and his money, every portion of the Ottoman Empire lying within reach of the Persian Gulf."

He pointed out how, when Basrah was dependent on Baghdad, the Consul-General could (a) bring his influence to bear through the Baghdad Government on Basrah questions; and (b) personally proceed to Basrah, as from a headquarters to an outlying province; whereas he was now only a post office between the Consul at Basrah and Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

218. In these circumstances the questions raised by Colonel Tweedie were—

- (a) Is such in future to be accepted official status, quoad Basrah, of the Political Resident, Turkish Arabia, and Consul-General, Baghdad?
- (b) If not, what steps are now called for, to save from disintegration the official position to which he stands gazetted, primarily by the Government of India, and collaterally in connection with Her Majesty's Foreign Office.

219. Sir W. White, in forwarding the correspondence to Lord Salisbury (despatch No. 80, dated 17th December 1887), expressed his opinion as follows:—

"The position and office of a Foreign Political Resident in an independent country like the Turkish Empire is most anomalous, and its very origin, unrecognised as it is by the Sublim Porte, is for me a matter of pure conjecture.

* * * * *

"So far as Her Majesty's Embassy is concerned, Colonel Tweedie is a Consul-General and nothing else, nor has he ever been recognised by the Sublime Porte in any other capacity. His Burat and Firman are same as those accorded to other Consular officers; and he enjoys the same privilege as other Consular officers.

* * * * *

"Any attempt to obtain his recognition as a Political Resident would inevitably rouse the strongest feelings of jealous resentment on the part of the Imperial Government which could only be allayed, if at all, by re-assuring explanations of the duties and position of such a functionary."

In view, however, of the persistence to which holders of the office of Consul-General at Baghdad revert to the position and status properly appertaining to them as Political Residents, and the fact that they are gazetted as such by the Government of India, he proposed that either—

- (a) the position and duties of the British Political Resident in Turkish Arabia might be defined, with a view to an attempt being made to obtain their recognition by the Porte, or
- (b) that the advisability of abolishing an "empty title" might be considered.



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220. On the India Office being consulted, Viscount Cross drew the attention of the Foreign Office to the correspondence of 1874 and having regard to the opinion then expressed by the Government of India as to the desirability of making no change in the constitution of the Residency, deprecated any such steps as those suggested by Sir W. White. Viscount Cross, however, proposed to consult the Government of India.

221. The Marquis of Salisbury then enquired whether, by the recent separation of the Government of Basrah and Baghdad, the usefulness of the Consular Officer in the latter place had not been injured. Sir W. White answered in his despatch dated 13th January 1888 :—

"The Sublime Porte does not recognize the jurisdiction of a Consular Officer outside of the single Vilayat in which he is appointed to reside, for which he holds a Burat exequatur; and Her Majesty's Embassy has never succeeded in obtaining any deviation from this hard-and-fast rule since it was laid down.

"Under these circumstances, Her Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad has no official position in the Vilayat of Basrah; but as we have at that place a Consul who corresponds with and acts under Colonel Tweedie, I do not consider that the former's usefulness is impaired, though his official prestige may perhaps appear less in his own eyes than that of his predecessors.

222. The Marquis of Salisbury then addressed the following important despatch to the British Embassy (dated 20th March 1888) :—

"Colonel Tweedie is probably not aware of the objections that would certainly be raised by the Porte to the recognition of this title, inasmuch as, according to diplomatic precedent, it might be taken to imply that the chief authority of the district in which the Consul-General resides has a semi-independent position similar to that of the former Princes of Servia or Roumania or of the present Khedive of Egypt or Prince of Bulgaria.

"So long as the Political Agent was the representative not of the British Government, nor a branch of that Government, but of the East India Company, this objection did not apply with the same force.

"There can be no doubt, however, that in former times the Governors of the distant provinces of the Empire did, in fact, hold a position of far greater independence than is now the case. The progress of centralization in the administration of the Ottoman Empire has of late years been very marked; and there is a continual tendency to limit the authority of the provincial Governors and to bring them into more complete dependency on the Government at Constantinople. There is, as your Excellency has more than once noticed, a no less marked increase of jealousy of foreign interference of the privileges and immunities of the foreign Consulates, and of the rights of protection which they have acquired by agreement or usage.

"These symptoms which Colonel Tweedie seems to imagine to be personal to himself are equally observable in other parts of the Turkish dominions; and no advantage would be gained by endeavouring to claim the formal acknowledgment of a title which, while it properly marks Colonel Tweedie's position in the Indian service, is not in accordance with general international usage.

"It may, perhaps, be questioned whether the British Political Agent at Baghdad has ever held that acknowledged position as a diplomatic representative which Colonel Tweedie seems to imagine once attached to the office; and whether the consideration and influence enjoyed by some of his predecessors have not, in great measure, been the result of the personal good will and respect of the Ottoman authorities.

"There can, however, be no question as to the importance of the interests which are entrusted to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad in the capacity as Agent of the Government of India. They were the original causes of the creation of the office, and are the main reason, at all events, of its continuance. In the protection of those interests, and in discharge of the duties connected with them Colonel Tweedie will, I am convinced, always have, as heretofore, Your Excellency's full support and assistance whenever he may require them.

"Colonel Tweedie should understand that the position which he holds and the immunities he enjoys, as Her Majesty's Consul-General differ widely from what are accorded to Consular officers in most European countries, and would be considered as belonging only to a diplomatic appointment. But considerable moderation and judgment are necessary in the exercise of rights which took their origin in concession and comity, and which it is often in the power of the territorial authority to defeat in practice, even while they are acknowledged in principle. An attempt to assert them too ostentatiously and to procure their extension is sure at the present moment to excite suspicion and jealousy both at Constantinople and on the spot, and to occasion increased hostility and obstructiveness in the transaction of business."



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223. The Government of India in their No. 107, dated 30th June 1888, observed :—

"We have no doubt that Her Majesty's Government will take any steps which may be thought necessary to guard against the possible risk of general decrease of British influence in Turkish Arabia owing to the contraction of the geographical limits of the *vilayats* to which its consuls are accredited. As far as Indian interests are concerned, we are of opinion that they can be sufficiently protected by the Political Resident without any further recognition of his title by the Sublime Porte.

"Lord Salisbury's letter of the 20th March 1888 to Her Majesty's Ambassador and Plenipotentiary at Constantinople appears us to meet the requirements of the case, and we concur with your Lordship in not considering it necessary to move further in the matter."

(d) *The question raised in 1903 and orders given for adoption by the Resident in future of only the title of His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad.*"

224. The question arose in 1903, when Colonel Newmarch having addressed the Foreign Consuls, at Baghdad on the occasion of His Majesty's birth-day, the French, German and Russian Consular officers sent him identical letters, requesting that he should not employ the title of Resident as well as of Consul-General in addressing them. The reasons which led him to use the dual title on the occasion are explained by him in his letter No. 770, dated 18th November 1903, to the Government of India :—

External A., May 1904, Nos. 157-167.

"In the day when Mr. (now Sir Trevor) Plowden was Resident and Consul-General at Baghdad, he always employed the dual title in his official letters, but in those days the only Consuls here were the French and Russian.

"There are several letters on record here from him to two successive French Consuls, M. Peretie and M. DeSarzee, and to one Russian Consul M. Eberhard, in which he used the dual title and they took no exception to it, though in their replies they only addressed him as Consul-General.

"After Mr. Plowden's departure the practice of using the dual title appears to have been dropped.

"Since June 1903, I have begun to again use it, though not in my letters to the Turkish authorities. I have not had occasion to write to the French or German Consuls officially of late, and therefore I have not used the dual title to them until now. I have however had occasion to write two letters to the Russian Consul-General on the 13th October, 1903 and the 2nd November 1903 and I employed the dual title in those letters, but he took no exception to it, though in replying he addressed me only as Consul-General.

"These facts led me to suppose that there would be no objection on the part of my colleagues to the continued use of the dual title, and therefore in addressing them on the occasion of His Majesty's birthday I used the dual title to all of them, viz. to the Consuls-General of Russia and Persia, to the Consul of Germany, and the *Vice Consuls* of America and France. An additional reason for my using the dual title on this occasion, was that I thought I was celebrating the birthday of His Majesty, not only as King, but also as Emperor of India, and that I was therefore acting in a special way in a dual capacity."

225. In reply to his communication, Colonel Newmarch was in demi-official letter, dated 4th January 1904, referred to the correspondence of 1888 and told—

"It is a pity, you should have revived the practice, which has apparently fallen into disuse of describing yourself as Resident, when writing on your consular capacity. Please abandon the practice in future."

226. On the 14th January 1904, the Secretary of State telegraphed to the Viceroy referring to Colonel Newmarch's despatch and standing—

"British Ambassador, Constantinople, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs both think it desirable that title Political Resident shall not be used in communication with Ottoman authorities and Consular Body."

227. The Government of India informed the Secretary of State in reply that Colonel Newmarch had been instructed by us not to use title of Resident when writing in Consular capacity as soon as we received information.

228. Colonel Newmarch addressed then on 17th February 1904, the following letter to the three Consul Officers at Baghdad who had objected



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to his using the title of Resident :—

"I have the honour to reply to your letter No. , dated 7th November 1903, regarding the official designation to be employed by me in addressing you.

"As there were many precedents for addressing your predecessors in Baghdad with the dual subscription of Resident and Consul-General, and as no exception had been taken to this mode of subscription before, I was not aware that there was anything remarkable in it, nor did I anticipate any objection to it from you.

"On receipt of your letter under reply, however, I took the opportunity of ascertaining from my Government what was the correct mode of subscription and I have now been informed that in addressing you I should only subscribe myself as Consular-General.

"In future, therefore, you will be addressed by me only in my capacity of Consul-General."

229. The Government of India approved of Colonel Newmarch's action (Foreign Department letter No. 1187-E.A., dated 16th April 1904).

(x) Obstruction of a pathway from Baghdad Residency to the Tigris, 1890-93.

230. There was a direct pathway from the Baghdad Residency to the bed of the Tigris, the use of which had been enjoyed by the Residency for over 50 years, which was closed in 1890, by a neighbour, who had purchased the plot of ground through which the path led. The owner of the Consulate house and grounds, Nawab Ikbāl-ud-Dowla, managed to keep the pathway in question until his death in 1887. In 1888 the plot of ground over which the pathway runs was purchased by a native of Baghdad, and the right of way enjoyed for over half a century by the Consulate was contested by the purchaser.

231. This was a clear case of easement, which could be established in a Court of Justice, that was determined to do justice, but it was useless to expect this from a Turkish Court, especially as there was reason to believe that the Turkish authorities secretly supported the opposition to the claim of the Consulate. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople appears also to have interested himself in the affairs, as a part owner of the land, was a registered Russian subject.

232. There was a movement to purchase the pathway in question, but this was frustrated by the opposing elements the Consulate had to face. It was also proposed that the pathway should be kept open until the dispute was settled in a Court of Justice, for which purpose it was demanded that the Consulate should file a suit. This would likely lead to endless and fruitless litigation unworthy of the British Consulate.

233. In these circumstances it was decided as the most advisable measure to construct a pathway within the property indisputably belonging to the late Nawab at a cost of £200 out of his personal estate. There was protest raised against this diversion of these funds by some of the heirs. A compromise was then arrived at under which the charges were to be shared equally between the Government of India and the estate of the late Nawab (see letter from Mr. Godley, Under Secretary of State to the Foreign Office, dated 31st May 1892).

(xi) Certain alterations in ceremonial observance in Baghdad on the Birthdays of Her Majesty the late Queen Empress, and His Majesty the Sultan 1889.

233A. In his despatch No. 18, dated 18th April 1889, Major Talbot reported the circumstances, which led to his paying the representatives of the Ottoman Government at Baghdad an official visit in uniform on the occasion of the anniversary of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan's birthday, instead of the recent practice of sending a dragoman to represent Her Majesty's Consul-General. The facts reported were as follows:

[SG46FD]



"I beg to report the following circumstances for Your Excellency's information and I trust approval.

2. Your Excellency is aware that for some years past, owing to the action of the Ottoman authorities, the Consuls here have not attended in person the official receptions held in celebration of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan's accession and birthday, but have been represented by their dragomans; the Wali similarly sending his dragoman to represent him at our receptions on the like occasions. It appeared to me, however, that this procedure need not be followed by Consuls *inter se*, and on the occasion of the Fête Nationale of the French Republic soon after my arrival here I paid an official visit in uniform to the French Consul. The Persian Consul, whom I had consulted, would have done the same but for a pressing engagement.

3. On the anniversary of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan's accession, which occurred shortly afterwards, the French Consul and I observed the existing rule of sending our dragomans to represent us at the official reception, as we had no reason to suppose that the Ottoman authorities would be willing to introduce any change in the custom they had adopted of late. The Persian Consul, however, without consulting us, did attend in person, and on the occasion of his own Sovereign's birthday, I happened to meet at his reception His Excellency the Wali in full uniform. It appeared to me that this afforded a good opportunity of restoring the more friendly practice which had prevailed until within the last few years, for His Excellency could hardly refuse to pay the French Consul and myself the same official compliment that had been rendered to the Persian Consul.

4. Accordingly, on receipt of an official intimation from the Wilaiat, that a reception would be held on Wednesday, the 17th instant, being the anniversary of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan's birthday, I suggested to the French Consul, with whom I had previously discussed the subject, that we should express our wish to attend it, on the understanding that our visit would be returned in uniform on Her Majesty the Queen-Empress's birthday and the Fête Nationale. M. Pegnon quite agreed in this view, and our dragomans were sent to make the proposal to His Excellency Nusrat Pasha, who was to preside in the absence of the Wali on tour. His Excellency lamented the abrogation of the former custom which he attributed to the late Wali Taki-i-ud-din Pasha; and remarked that as his Government was on friendly terms with our Government, it behoved its officials to be so also with us. He therefore expressed his pleasure at our proposed visit, and guaranteed that it would be returned by His Excellency the Wali in full uniform on Her Majesty the Queen-Empress's birthday and on the Fête Nationale of the French Republic. I accordingly attended the official reception yesterday and was received with much cordiality by His Excellency Nusrat Pasha, who informed me that he should telegraph to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan that I had offered my congratulations in person. The French and Persian Consuls also paid a similar visit, and in the evening we all three dined with His Excellency Nusrat Pasha and witnessed the illuminations in honour of the occasion.

233B. Sir W. White expressed his entire approval of the Consul-General's action in the matter.


On the 24th May 1889, it being the birthday of Her late Majesty, a public reception was held after sunset

External A., July 1889, Nos. 192-200.

(being the month of Ramzan) in the open

air at the British Consulate and was attended by—


- (a) the Governor-General of Baghdad and Mushir Nusrat Pasha of Constantinople, at the time on special deputation at Baghdad;
- (b) the French, Russian, American and Persian Consuls;
- (c) the Armenian, Chaldean and Syrian clergy;
- (d) all the European British subjects and other Europeans in Baghdad; and
- (e) an unusually large concourse of both British Indian subjects and the Christian and Moslem natives of Baghdad.



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At Basrah the late Queen's birthday was held in the usual manner, with the exception that in consequence of its falling in 1889 in Ramzan, no official reception was held. (Consul-General's despatch to the Embassy, No. 276, dated 8th June 1889.)





CHAPTER VIII.

Objectionable or irregular conduct of certain Political Officers and office establishments.

(i) Impropriety of certain of Colonel Herbert's proceedings, 1873-74.

234. In 1873-74, several questions arose in which the Political Agent, Colonel Herbert, and Redif Pasha, Vali of Baghdad, were found at variance, of which the following were the principal ones :—

- (1) The official status of Colonel Herbert generally.
- (2) The propriety of his proceedings in connection with a salute fired in his honour by the *Comet*.
- (3) The right of the *Comet* to navigate the rivers of Mesopotamia.
- (4) The claims of natives of Bahrein, residing or domiciled in Turkish Arabia to British Consular protection.

235. In dealing with these questions Colonel Herbert displayed little tact, and his conduct towards the Turkish authorities was so irritating that there arose between them and Colonel Herbert a feeling of much unfriendliness. The Secretary of State thought that there was so much of Colonel Herbert's inability to cope with the difficulties of his position that it would be desirable, in the interest of the Public service, that he should be transferred under the new Rules of the Indian Political Service, to some other position for which he might be better fitted (Secretary of State to the Government of India, No. 20, dated 31st July 1874).

236. The Government concurring in this opinion resolved to transfer Colonel Herbert to another appointment (Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 185, dated 16th October 1865), but urged the desirability of effecting a speedy removal also of Redif Pasha, whose tone towards the Residency was extremely discourteous and would not be likely to improve even after Colonel Herbert's transfer.

(ii) Appointment by Colonel Nixon of Acting Assistant Political Agent at Basrah on his own authority, 1877.

237. The Political Officer at Basrah is subordinate to the Political Agent Baghdad, and is entitled Assistant Political Agent. He used to draw his pay from the Government of India and his appointment rested with the Viceroy up to the year 1899. This official was, after appointment by the Government of India, invested with the rank and powers of a Vice-Consul by the Foreign Department of Her Majesty's Government. In 1877 the Office fell temporarily vacant owing to the transfer of Mr. Robertson, its incumbent, to officiate as Political Agent Maskat; whereupon Colonel Nixon, the Political Agent, Baghdad, without consulting the Government of India offered the appointment of Vice-Consul to a Mr. Carter, and on his accepting it, recommended him for the appointment to Lord Derby with the following remarks :—

"If approved, I would beg Your Lordship will intimate your sanction to the Indian Government from whom pay is drawn and promotions appear now to be made."

In other words Colonel Nixon sought by working through the Foreign Office in England to force the hand of the Governor-General of India. When [S646FD]



this extraordinary proceeding came to the knowledge of the Government of India, Colonel Nixon was told by telegram—

"Viceroy is surprised that you should have taken upon yourself to appoint a successor to Mr. Robertson without previous reference. Submit explanation, and meanwhile inform Mr. Carter that his appointment is provisional only."

To this telegram the following reply was received :—

"Please explain to Viceroy that Mr. Carter was informed at outset that appointment was contingent on approval of Government. Correspondence sent by post on 14th instant."

238. The explanation of Colonel Nixon was that he had proposed the appointment of Mr. Carter as Vice-Consul in accordance with the circular of Lord

Derby dated 6th November 1876. Colonel Nixon observed.—

"My position here is somewhat peculiar for while my desire is to act in strict accordance with the wishes of the Indian Government, still it must be remembered that I have also to act in subordination to the English Foreign Office and our Ambassador at Constantinople."

239. The circular in question is quoted below :—

Dated Foreign Office, London, 6th November 1876.

From—SIR JULIAN PAUNCEFOTE, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

To—British Vice-Consul, Baghdad.

With reference to the circular despatch addressed to you by direction of the Earl of Derby on the 19th August last, in which you were informed that it is not competent to Consular Officers to perform by deputy the Notarial Powers conferred on them by the Acts 18 and 19 Vic., Cap. 42, I am directed by His Lordship to acquaint you that he has decided, after consultation with the Law Officers of the Crown to provide in the following manner against the inconvenience which may consequently arise during the temporary illness or absence of a Consular Officer.

The Acts confer Notarial Powers on certain Consular Officers therein designated, and among others, on "Pro-Consuls." The distinction between an Acting Consul and a Pro-Consul would appear to be that while the former is empowered to discharge all the functions of a Consul during the absence of that officer or any vacancy of his office, a Pro-Consul has power only to discharge certain duties thrown upon him by his principal, who, though present, is unable at the moment to perform them in person. The appointment of Pro-Consuls for the purpose of the Act would, therefore, meet the requirement of the case, but, as it can only be conferred by the Secretary of State, or under his express authority, Lord Derby has decided to grant that authority to you, and you are empowered by these instructions to appoint formally, on behalf of the Secretary of State a Pro-Consul for the purposes of Section 1 of the Acts 18 and 19 Vic., Cap. 42, whenever, in your opinion, the necessity for such an appointment shall arise.

It must be distinctly understood, however, that this appointment is to be conferred on the following conditions :—

1. It will give no claim whatever to salary or promotion in the Consular service.
2. It will be revocable at any time by the Principal Consular Officer at the post, or by the Secretary of State.
3. Its functions will be strictly limited to the exercise of the special powers conferred on Pro-Consuls by the Act.

I am to request your attention to the following instructions :—

The appointment of a Pro-Consul will not be allowed where there is a Vice-Consul in addition to a Consul, and on this account the Consul and Vice Consul should never both be absent from their posts at the same time.

No salary being attached to the office of Pro-Consul, it will be expedient, as a general rule, to confer the appointment on a salaried clerk attached to the Consulate.

The appointment of Pro-Consul shall in all cases take immediate effect from the date thereof, but whenever a previous reference to the Foreign Office can conveniently be made, it is desirable that the sanction of the Secretary of State to the appointment should be obtained. Where this course has not been followed, the appointment should be immediately reported to the Secretary of State, with a statement of the circumstances under which it was considered necessary.



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The authority to appoint a Pro-Consul hereby granted to Consuls may also be exercised by Vice-Consuls where there is no resident Consul, and the terms "Consuls" and "Vice-Consul" in this despatch shall be deemed to include any acting Consul or Vice-Consul.

A form of appointment of a Pro-Consul is annexed to this despatch for your guidance.

Form of appointment of a Pro-Consul.

In Her Britannic Majesty's Consulate.

(Town)

I (A B), Her Britannic Majesty's ^{Consul}_{Vice-Consul} (or British Vice-Consul) at (town), on behalf of Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and by virtue of the authority in me vested, do hereby appoint (C. D.) to be British Pro-Consul at (town) for the purpose of administering oaths, and taking affidavits or affirmations, and of performing all and every notarial acts and act under the powers conferred on Pro-Consuls by the Acts 18 and 19 Vic., Cap. 42, and subject to the conditions laid down in regard to such appointment by a circular despatch of the Right Hon'ble the Earl of Derby to Her Majesty's Consular representative abroad, dated the 6th day of November 1876.

In witness whereof I have hereunder subscribed my name, and affixed the seal of this Consulate.

(Consul or Vice-Consul.)

240. The action taken by the Government of India will be seen from the correspondence printed below :—

No. 2078-G., dated Simla, the 28th July 1877.

From—T. H. THORNTON, Esq., D.C.L., C.S.I., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—COLONEL J. P. NIXON, Consul-General and Political Agent, Turkish Arabia.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 25, dated 23rd June, and previous correspondence, on the subject of your recent nomination of a Mr. Carter as successor to Mr. Robertson, late Assistant Political Agent and Vice-Consul at Basrah, who has been recently transferred to Muscat as Officiating Political Agent.

2. The explanation contained in your letters above quoted is not considered satisfactory by the Government of India. The substantive office held by Mr. Robertson, before his transfer to Muscat, was that of Assistant Agent. The salary and allowances attached to that office are defrayed by the Government of India, and all appointments thereto, whether officiating or permanent, rest in His Excellency the Viceroy in Council and no other authority. It is true that the Assistant Political Agent for Turkish Arabia usually receives from the Foreign Department of Her Majesty's Government the rank and powers of Vice-Consul, but his Vice-Consular appointment carries with it no stipend, and is secondary to his substantive one.

3. Accordingly in nominating Mr. Carter as successor to Mr. Robertson, and recommending him for appointment as Vice-Consul, without the previous sanction of the Government of India, you exceeded your own authority and ignored the authority of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council.

4. The Governor-General in Council is glad to learn from your letter under acknowledgment that the apparent disrespect involved in your proceedings was unintentional; but while acquitting you of intentional disrespect, His Excellency in Council is constrained to regard your proceedings as wanting in intelligence and care.

5. Apart, however, from the manner of his nomination, His Excellency in Council deems it undesirable on many grounds to confirm Mr. Carter in the office of Assistant Political Agent at Basrah; he will accordingly hold office until such time as he is relieved by an officer appointed by His Excellency in Council, and I am to add that on further consideration His Lordship in Council is not prepared to appoint your son to the office.

Telegram, No. 2090-G., dated 30th July 1877.

From—Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—COLONEL NIXON, Baghdad.

Your letters explaining circumstances of Mr. Carter's appointment as Assistant Political Agent, Bussorah, received. Mr. Carter's appointment not confirmed; he will be relieved by Captain Fraser, Assistant Political Agent, Bushire. More by post.



Telegram No. 2091-G., dated 30th July 1877.

From—Viceroy, Simla,

To—Secretary of State, London.

Colonel Nixon, Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, has provisionally appointed a Mr. Carter to officiate as Assistant Political Agent, Bussorah, and recommended that he be invested with Consular powers. This nomination was made without consulting Government of India, and is not approved by us. We have given the appointment to Captain E. A. Fraser now Assistant Political Agent, Bushire, who has been directed to relieve Mr. Carter at once.

241. Colonel Nixon thereupon having applied for the necessary Consular powers to Captain Fraser, the Foreign Office appointed him to act as Vice-Consul at Basrah.

(iii) Complaint preferred by Colonel Nixon, Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, against Mr. Robertson, Political Assistant and Vice-Consul at Bussorah.

242. In August 1877, as we have seen, Captain Fraser was appointed Political Assistant and Vice-Consul at Bussorah during the absence of Mr. Robertson deputed to Maskat. In November the Government of India directed Colonel Nixon to order Captain Fraser to Bombay, where his presence was required, and to arrange temporarily for the work at Bussorah pending Mr. Robertson's return which might be shortly expected. Colonel Nixon thereupon directed a Mr. Carter to act as Vice-Consul until Mr. Robertson should arrive. At the same time without saying one word to the Government of India he wrote to the Ambassador at Constantinople, to whom he is subordinate in his capacity of Consul-General at Bagdad, complaining of Mr. Robertson's contemplated return. He wrote—

"It will be in Your Excellency's recollection that Mr. Robertson was removed for promotion in the Political Department under the Government of India as Political Agent at Muscat. It is now proposed to send him back. I regret this necessity, as Mr. Robertson's unconciliatory disposition does not render him of that aid to this office which I ought to expect. I would refer Your Excellency to the despatch from Sir H. Elliot on this subject, copy annexed dated 16th July 1875, and would suggest that Mr. Robertson be transferred permanently to the Government of India or receive Consular employment elsewhere. I am in doubt whether he can return to this appointment without undergoing the formula of re-appointment but Your Excellency will be able to decide the question. I shall, of course, do my best to work with Mr. Robertson if he be sent back, but he will always be to me a source of weakness instead, of strength."

243. There was reason to suspect that by this inaccurate description Colonel Nixon must have intended to mislead Mr. Layard. He could not have been ignorant of Mr. Robertson's true position, or that that officer was already "permanently under the Government of India." For on the 28th July *preceding Colonel Nixon has been censured the opportunity being also taken to explain to him the facts of the appointment at Basrah, which was placed in the Political list and gazetted accordingly on the 16th October.

244. In this letter to Mr. Layard Colonel Nixon referred to previous correspondence of 1875 with Sir Henry Elliot regarding Mr. Robertson. It is unnecessary to discuss now the precise cause of complaint. Suffice it to say that Sir H. Elliot in forwarding the papers to Lord Derby declined to support Mr. Robertson's proposed removal. Lord Derby fully agreed, that no sufficient reasons warranting such a step had been adduced, but on the ground that Mr. Robertson showed a tendency to raise unnecessary difficulties with the Turkish authorities, he directed that that officer should be warned. Except that this warning was deemed necessary, there is nothing in the correspondence of 1875 which need tell against Mr. Robertson.

245 On receiving Colonel Nixon's letter, Mr. Layard forwarded it to Lord Derby, simply asking for instructions. The latter passed the matter on to the India Office, suggesting with reference to the correspondence of 1875 that—

"It would probably be for the benefit of the public service that Mr. Robertson should not be re-appointed to the post of Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Bussorah."

* See para. 240 above.



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246. Lord Salisbury, however, took a very different view. He considered that Colonel Nixon's proceedings* both in 1875 and recently were open to grave objections. He pointed out that Mr. Robertson's substantive appointment was Assistant Political Agent under the Government of India by whom he was paid, and that his appointment as Vice-Consul was merely *ex-officio*. If Mr. Robertson was unfit to be Vice-Consul, *a fortiori* he was unfit to hold the superior post of Political Assistant. Hence Colonel Nixon's complaint should have been addressed not to the Ambassador at Constantinople but to the Government of India. Lord Salisbury then observed that it was now for the first time that he had become aware of the fault found with Mr. Robertson in 1875, and he apprehended that the Government of India were in a similar position, which was the case.

247. As regards the immediate complaint against Mr. Robertson, Lord Salisbury pointed out the absence of any definite charge or even of any complaint by the local Turkish authorities, and saw no grounds for taking in 1877 a step which Lord Derby did not consider justified in 1875. He advised that Mr. Robertson should be temporarily appointed Vice-Consul at Basrah pending enquiries which he would direct the Government of India to institute. If these enquiries showed any substantial objection to Mr. Robertson, it would rest with that Government to make other arrangements, which would be duly reported to Lord Derby. Accordingly Lord Salisbury wrote to the Government of India:—

"It does not appear to me that anything has been established against Mr. Robertson which would justify his removal from his appointment; but it is desirable that enquiries into the matter should be instituted by your Government. The duties of the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, and his subordinates, are at all times of a delicate nature, but, under existing circumstances, it is especially necessary that the appointments in that country should be held by officers of tact and judgment, who may be relied upon to co-operate cordially with one another."

248. So far as Mr. Robertson was concerned, it was not clear what enquiries were necessary. The affair of 1879 was a thing of the past and besides had been investigated. The only definite charge now made by Colonel Nixon was that Mr. Robertson's disposition was "unconciliatory." On the contrary the Government of India had reason to move to find fault with Colonel Nixon's administration. On more than one occasion Colonel Nixon's conduct at Baghdad had called for unfavourable notice. In November 1876 Colonel Nixon was severely reprimanded for his conduct towards Captain Warner (deceased), then Commanding the *Comet*. He was told that the tone of his correspondence with that officer was "arrogant and offensive," and that his proceedings would have been unjustifiable except in circumstances of the gravest provocation. In the case of Koolsoonissa Begum, a Treaty Ward of Government, his feeble and obstructive action had been unfavourably criticised in the Foreign and Legislative Departments. He had entirely failed to give effect to the wishes of Government.

He had recently ignored the Government of India in the recent appointment of Mr. Carter.

249. The Government of India therefore thought that time had come for removal of Colonel Nixon from Baghdad; if not, compel him to retire from Government service.

250. The following telegram was addressed to the Government of India on 5th June 1878:—

"I propose sending Political Officer of standing to relieve Colonel Nixon, and enquire into complaints against Mr. Robertson. Colonel Nixon could have vacated his appointment last year under 55 years rule, but obtained two years' extension upon special representation of Foreign Office. Soon afterwards he received censure for ignoring authority of Governor General and has now again ignored it. His retention is certainly not advantageous to Indian Government. Therefore unless special reasons exist to the contrary, we wish to cancel remainder of extension."

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251. The Secretary of State replied that he did not wish to fetter the discretion of the Government of India.

252. Colonel Nixon was also asked to explain his conduct. The purport of his explanation and the views of the Government of India, thereon, and the action taken, will be clear from the following letter addressed by the Government of India to Colonel Nixon :—

No. 2078-G., dated Simla, 3rd August 1877.

From—A. C. LYALL, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, Baghdad.

I am directed to acknowledge your No. 22, dated 6th June, wherein you reply to the telegram from this Department, No. 1483-G., dated 5th June. The order cited desired you to explain why you addressed Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople in your letter, dated 11th December last without the knowledge of the Government of India, which letter contained suggestions adverse to the orders of the Governor-General in Council, regarding the appointment to Busrah of Mr. P. Robertson, a gazetted officer of the Political Department.

2. You explain that you desired to effect Mr. Robertson's removal in the interest of the public service, that on the 13th November you wrote demi-officially on the subject to Mr. Aitchison, who replied on the 15th January, informing you that Mr. Robertson could not be removed. You state, as your reason for addressing the Ambassador at Constantinople, that one of Mr. Robertson's predecessors had been promoted from Busrah to Diarbekr, and that you hoped that a similar transfer might now be made in the Consular Department if Mr. Robertson could not be provided for in India. And you affirm that you have always supposed that Mr. Robertson's appointment as political Agent was made in virtue of his being Vice-Consul at Busrah.

3. I am to say that the Governor-General in Council cannot accept this letter as in any way satisfactorily explaining your proceedings which are in question. You were asked why you made the reference to Constantinople without the knowledge of the Government of India, and your reply is that you addressed the Foreign Secretary demi-officially on the subject of the reference. But you did not wait for Mr. Aitchison's answer, nor did you report to the Government of India your letter to Mr. (Sir A.) Layard, or the object with which it was written. Moreover, your letter to Mr. (Sir A.) Layard contained a suggestion that Mr. Robertson should be transferred permanently to the Government of India; and on this point your proceedings are not intelligible. You are understood to have suggested this upon the supposition that Mr. Robertson was appointed to be Assistant Political Agent in virtue of his being Vice-Consul at Busrah, though as to this you observe that you may be in error. This is, indeed, precisely the same error by which you were misled when in 1877 you recommended to the English Foreign Department a successor to Mr. Robertson; and in the orders marginally cited your mistake was very carefully pointed out, consequently the Government of India can only infer these orders have been either disregarded, or very inexplicably misunderstood.

4. His Excellency the Governor General in Council is of opinion that it would be ineffectual either to explain a second time the impropriety of referring elsewhere than to the Government of India for orders regarding appointments under this Government, or to pass a second censure on you for the error. It appears certain that you find great difficulty in keeping separate your relations with two quite different superiors, and in maintaining the necessary distinction. Having regard, therefore, to the material inconvenience and confusion in public business which are caused by your inability to comprehend the position which you and your subordinates hold in Turkish Arabia and your double functions with two Governments, His Excellency in Council has determined that you should be transferred from Baghdad to an appointment in Ir.



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Baghdad was useful in the then state of affairs, Lord Salisbury, however, informed the India Office that he would offer no objection to any course the Government of India might wish to pursue in the matter (Foreign Office to the India Office, dated 29th July 1878).

255. When the decision of the Government of India was communicated to Colonel Nixon, he offered a very humble apology expressing regret for his conduct (letter dated 3rd September 1878). The apology was duly accepted by the Government of India and he was informed that the orders passed for his transfer were rescinded (letter No. 2975-G., dated 2nd November 1878).

General A., November 1878, Nos. 3-7.

(iv) Claim of Makbul Hossein to the property of the late Sahebzadi Begum.

Malpractices of the Office establishment attached to the Turkish Arabia Political Agency.

256. In the month of August 1876, the Government of Bengal forwarded* a letter from the Officiating Commissioner of the Patna Division, asking that a copy of any objection which might have been filed in the Court of an official known as the Mirza Babu at Baghdad, against the claim of one Makbul Hossein in respect to the property of Sahebzadi Begum of Gya, who had died at Mecca, might be obtained and sent to the Government of Bengal, as it was required in the Government interests in the suit of Her Majesty's Secretary of State *versus* claimants to the property of the late Baralee Begum and Sahebzadi Begum.

General A., March 1877, Nos. 8-16.

* From Government of Bengal, No. 2533, dated 10th August 1876.

257. In Foreign Department unofficial No. 1857-G., dated the 25th of August 1876, Colonel Nixon was desired to furnish the required information. His letter No. 30, dated 14th October 1876, submits a copy of the proceedings in the case, from which it appears that Rani Saheba, *alias* Sahebzadi Begum, died on the 4th of June 1875 at the shrine of Kerbulla after having in accordance with a practice seemingly "*regularly recognised by the rules of the Sheeahs*,"† left her property to Bibi Beajumme, her nurse and foster mother.

† See paragraph 2 of Colonel Nixon's letter No. 30, dated 14th October 1876.

258. After Rani Saheba's death Makbul Hossein filed a petition claiming to be her brother. The claim was investigated by Nawab Ahmed Aga, the Native Agent, who reported that the petitioner was not the deceased lady's brother, and as her property had been disposed of before her death, nothing could be done in the matter,‡ and Makbul Hossein went away to India. Here in so far as he is concerned the case ends, the papers relating to him, pages 4 to 7 of enclosures to Colonel Nixon's letter No. 30, dated 4th October 1876, and extract paragraph 1 and A to A, paragraphs 2 and 3 of that letter, may be sent to the Government of Bengal, with reference to its docket No. 2533, dated 10th August 1876.

‡ Vide paragraph 3 of Colonel Nixon's letter of 14th October 1876.

But in connection with the case Colonel Nixon charged certain members of his Office establishment with having—

1. Instigated the bringing of a false charge against Nawab Ahmed Aga.
2. Exerted their influence to aggravate and foment the ill-feeling which had existed between the late Political Agent (Colonel Herbert) and the Turkish officials.
3. Entrapped unwary pilgrims from India for the purpose of fleehing them.

259. The particulars of the first accusation are as follows :—

The bequest to Bibi Beajumme was accompanied by an injunction that she should give a portion of the property to Mirza Jullalloodeen Bukht of Sahibgunge in Bengal, a nephew of the husband of the testatrix. Bibi Beajum-



mee duly informed him that the property would be transmitted through the Consulate, he, however, deputed a Vakeel to Baghdad, named Kaja Fyzoollah, and this man, on the 5th July 1876, took possession, in the presence of Bibi Beajumme and Colonel Nixon, of the property which had been left to his employer. He then went to Nawab Ahmed Aga's house; and on the evening of the following day (6th July) complained that the property had been forcibly taken from him by the Nawab, who, on the 19th of July, met the accusation by a countercharge, accusing the Vakeel of having made a false statement and requesting that he might be punished.

260. The matter was investigated by a Court composed of—

1. The Political Agent (Colonel Nixon),
2. Surgeon-Major Colville,
3. Mr. Raitt, 1st Officer of the *Comet*,
4. Nawab Ikbāl-oo-Dowlah,

the result being that the Native Agent was exonerated of the charge preferred against him, whilst a conviction came over the Court that a plot had been laid by the Armenians in the Agency Office for the downfall of the Native Agent, and that Mr. Johannes Thaddeus, the Head clerk of the Agency Office, being prompted thereto by a combination of jealousy and interested motives, had instigated the complaint. This gentleman had known of Kaja Fyzoollah's complaint and spoken to his brothers on the subject some time before it came to Colonel Nixon's notice, and yet had not reported it; he had also acted as interpreter to the Court and remained silent, saying nothing until it transpired from the evidence that he had been in secret communication with the complainant on the subject of his alleged loss; it was also elicited during the enquiry that he had bullied Mirza Koochick, the Agency Moonshee, and a person, named Hashim Ali, who had accompanied Fyzoollah Khan to the Nawab's house, for giving "evidence that did not suit his views." The Moonshee declared in his evidence—

"The English clerks are enraged with me for not giving evidence to convict Nawab Ahmed Aga," and again: "The English clerks have threatened to get me turned out of the Office for not giving evidence."

261. Whilst several of the witnesses asserted that Kaja Fyzoollah said he had been put up to make a "false complaint" by Beajumme, one witness, named Elias, a Kuwass of the Residency adding that Fyzoollah had stated that he had been induced to complain falsely by a "number of people."

262. To find a motive for Mr. Thaddeus' alleged misconduct and for the connivance therein of his brothers, it is necessary to enter somewhat into detail in regards to the *personnel* of the Baghdad Agency Office establishment.

263. On taking charge in December 1874, Colonel Nixon found the chief duties in the hands of five Armenians, *viz.*—

- | | | |
|-----------|---|---|
| Brothers. | { | 1. Mr. Michael Minas, Native Agent. |
| | | 2. Mr. George Thaddeus, Dragoman. |
| | | 3. Mr. Johannes Thaddeus, Head Clerk and Deputy Postmaster. |
| | | 4. Mr. Yakoob Thaddeus, Accountant. |
| | | 5. Mr. Gabriel Thaddeus, Treasurer and Post Office clerk. |

264. Finding that Mr. Michael Minas was long over age, Colonel Nixon wrote to Mr. Aitchison (Foreign Secretary) about him, and then heard for the first time that an order* had been issued for Mr. Minas' retirement on the 25th August 1874. A search had to be made in the Agency Office before this letter was produced. Colonel Nixon believed that it had "been intentionally concealed."† But, be this as it may, Mr. Minas was removed on 30th August 1875,‡ and Colonel Nixon, considering that the state of the relations which had existed between his predecessor § and the local Turkish authorities demand-

* No. 1121-G., dated 8th June 1872.
General B., June 1872 No. 195.

† Paragraph 8 of his letter No. 30, dated 14th October 1876.

‡ General B., November 1875 No. 41.

§ *Id.*, Colonel Herbert, Colonel Nixon's predecessor.



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ed a radical change in his office establishment, procured the appointment of Nawab Ahmad Aga, a Mussulman gentleman, to the post of Native Agent.

"Although, says Colonel Nixon, nothing was said this appointment seems to have caused great dissatisfaction to the English clerks who have enriched themselves enormously by having kept all matters *in their own hands* for so many years, viz., since 1844."*

265. Colonel Nixon's recommendation as to how Mr. Thaddeus and his brothers should be dealt with will be mentioned further on. With regard to Kaja Fyzoollah's alleged loss he observed that it was "perplexing as it is inexplicable," see paragraph 3 of his judgment, but, at the commencement of his finding, he says:—

"From the evidence it is quite clear to me that Kaja Fyzoollah has either made away with the property handed over to him, * * * or else he has carelessly lost it, or sent it secretly to his master."

266. And with regard to the request of Nawab Ahmed Aga that Fyzoollah should be punished, for bringing a false charge, Colonel Nixon wrote—

"Under the rules† of the Consular Court, paragraph 300, there is no punishment awarded for libel. If he (the Nawab) wishes for redress, he will therefore have to prosecute Kaja Fyzoollah in India."

† These rules are recorded as Political, March 1874, No. 75.

267. The second charge against the Armenians was not so well supported as the first; in fact it rested on Colonel Nixon's suspicions and observations, and not on actual evidence. "On my arrival here," he wrote—

"I had a feeling that all the quarrels between the British Agent and Turkish officials had been fomented and aggravated by the Armenian office people, their great wealth enabling them to do what others could not undertake with impunity. Their object being also to foment discord to divert attention from their own acts."

268. Colonel Nixon accordingly watched the proceedings of the Armenians narrowly, but as, to use his own words, they "are combined and very astute and cunning," he seems to have failed to procure any evidence confirmatory of their having acted in the manner stated.

The third and last charge, entrapping and filching pilgrims, rested upon evidence taken in the Political Agent's Court.

269. During an absence of Colonel Nixon to Bussorah, two ladies of Sir Salar Jung's household, named Nujoom-ool-nissa Begum and Rumzanee Begum, arrived at Baghdad, and in accordance with advice they had received from a merchant in Bombay, named Hadji Ali, sent for the Agency Moonshee to whom they made over a hoondee for Rupees 4,000 and a note for Rupees 1,000 with a request that he would get them cashed and then remit the money to them at Kerbulla. The ladies after making several applications to the

Moonshee succeeded in getting Rupees 2,000,‡ but experiencing further difficulties in getting a settlement they returned to Baghdad and made a personal demand for the money. The Moonshee took them to Mr. Johannes Thaddeus who (1) informed the ladies in explanation of his interference in the matter that the hoondee could not have been cashed without his agency; (2) offered them Rupees 1,700 in liquidation (in so far as he was concerned) of the Rupees 2,000 still due on the hoondee; and (3) referred them to the Moonshee for the balance of Rupees 300, and also for the amount of the one thousand rupee note. The ladies declined to take the Rupees 1,700, and the money not even then being forthcoming threatened to bring the matter into Court, on which the Head Clerk begged them not to mention his name and promised to pay up §

‡ This was sent to them in three instalments of Rupees 1,000, Rupees 700, and Rupees 300.

§ See the depositions of the ladies, pages 29 to 31 of printed papers.

270. The ladies "not fearing the office people were brave enough"|| to complain to Colonel Nixon and eventually the case did come into Court, when both ladies declared that the clerks had got rich and obtained lands by robbing pilgrims from India; they also threatened to complain to His Excellency the Viceroy.¶

¶ See their depositions.

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127. Mr. Johannes Thaddeus declared before the Court that he had only received Rupees 3,700, when the hoondie was cashed, and by way of accounting for the deficiency of Rupees 300 he said the Moonshee and a Jew, named Yusoof George, on whom the hoondie had been drawn, had stated that the money had been previously paid. Mr. Thaddeus nevertheless made the deficit good, saying that he was to obtain a refund of the Rupees 300 from the Moonshee.

272. The Moonshee said he had lost the thousand rupee note, and he petitioned to have the amount deducted from his salary by instalments. A sum of Rupees 542 was afterwards recovered from him and paid to the ladies, leaving a balance of Rupees 458 still due to them.

273. Colonel Nixon disbelieved Mr. Thaddeus' statement that the hoondie could not have been cashed without his agency.

"At all events," he says—

"His proceedings were most reprehensible, inasmuch as he acted without my knowledge and had been corresponding about this money without informing me—a most daring proceeding on his part." And he adds:—

"The distressing conviction comes to my mind that the Head Clerk and the rest of the English Office had been in the habit of using the Moonshee as a tout to entrap unwary pilgrims from India who visit the shrines in the neighbourhood, and that the loss of the Rupees 1,000 would have been made good if the Moonshee Mirza Koochick had not given evidence on the trial of Kaja Fyzoollah contrary to that which he had first conspired to give." * * * * *

"I believe the rupees one thousand to have been embezzled."

274. Colonel Nixon has suspended the Moonshee "for losing the property" pending the orders of Government. With regard to the other persons concerned, he wrote:—

"Notwithstanding the profound secrecy which is maintained by the union of the four brothers, so much has transpired that I earnestly solicit that the English establishment of this office may be broken up and a new set of men sent from India."

275. Colonel Nixon then recommended that Mr. George Thaddeus, the Dragoman, who was *old and feeble*, should be pensioned, and that Mr. Yakoob Thaddeus, the Accountant, and Mr. Gabriel Thaddeus, the Treasurer and Post Office Clerk, should be transferred to similar appointments in India.

276. With respect to Mr. Johannes Thaddeus, the Head Clerk, Colonel Nixon solicited orders as to whether he is to be retained in the service. He had served 32 years, and is, Colonel Nixon says, entitled to pension. In paragraph 11 of his letter No. 30, dated 14th October 1876, Colonel Nixon directly accuses him of duplicity in connection with Kaja Fyzoollah's case, and of being concerned in the *embezzlement* of the property of the Hyderabad ladies.

277. Colonel Nixon further recommended that the Deputy Postmaster at Baghdad should be a separate official. He had written to the Director General of Post Offices on the subject, and he explained that a feeling of insecurity prevailed which had been increased by an English gentleman from Bussorah, reporting that letters were sent to him from Baghdad to be posted at Bussorah.

278. Finally, Colonel Nixon thought it right to state that the "Office people" had very good testimonials from Sir Henry Rawlinson, who appointed them in 1844 after having taken them from Bombay personally from Sir Arthur Kemball, and also from Colonel Herbert, but he adds:—

"I am confident that it is not in the interest of Government that they should remain longer in office in Baghdad. At all events I have formed an opinion of them from what has transpired and cannot bring myself to repose trust in them for the future."

279. The orders of the Government of India were given in their letter No. 572-G., dated 7th March 1877, to the Political Agent:—

"In reply I am to say that the Governor-General in Council considers that the circumstances connected with the false charge preferred against Nawab Ahmed Aga, and the fraudulent dealings with Begums Rumzani and Nujum-ul-nissa are so discreditable to the employees of




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your office as to demand the exemplary punishment of the chief offenders. The persons most gravely implicated in these matters are the Head Clerk, Mr. Johannes Thaddeus, and the Munshi, Mirza Kuchick. You have suspended the latter, and as to the former, you enquire whether he should be retained in Government employ, pointing out at the same time that he is entitled to pension. I am to observe, however, that pensions are intended to be the reward of long and approved service, and are not to be given to persons who are officially reported to have been concerned in embezzlement. In the opinion of His Excellency in Council dismissal from the service of Government is the appropriate penalty for the misdoings of all these persons. And I am to request that effect may be given to this decision in the case of Mr. Johannes from the date of receipt of these orders; and in the case of the Munshi from the date of his suspension.

It appears from your letter that the Thaddeus family have secured a monopoly of the appointments in your office, and that a change in this arrangement is extremely desirable. You should, therefore, report whether Mr. George Thaddeus is entitled to pension under the prescribed rules; and if this be so, he should be directed to retire at once. With regard to Mr. Yakub Thaddeus and Mr. Gabriel Thaddeus, it is not possible to provide them with appointments in India, and they may be allowed to remain in their present position pending further orders which will be communicated hereafter.





CHAPTER IX.

Miscellaneous.

(i) Question of Disposal of Consular Fees at Basrah, 1883.

280. This question was raised by Colonel Tweedie in January 1883 in a demi-official letter. Colonel Tweedie thought that these fees should be declared public assets, and credited to the Government of India as contribution to the salary of, and provision of quarters for, the Consul. He brought up the point in connection with the question of the rent of the Consulate buildings at Basrah which has been separately considered.

281. The Foreign Department were not inclined to interfere with the arrangement in force whereby the Consul at Basrah realized for his own use about Rs. 100 a month from the Consular fees, but it was decided to ascertain the amount and nature of the Consular fees retained by the officers at Bushire, Maskat and Zanzibar. This was done on the 30th April 1883, and the replies received showed the following results:—

Bushire.—The levy of Consular fees commenced on the 1st January 1880, since which time they have amounted in all to Rs. 892-7-6, being an average of about Rs. 297-8 per annum, the whole of which have been retained by the Consul-General under authority from Her Majesty's Government.

On the appointment in February 1883 of Mr. Lucas to the post of Vice-Consul at Bushire, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gave authority for him to retain all fees legally leviable in his Consular capacity.

Maskat.—The Consul at this place retains all fees except judicial fees which he credits to the Indian Government. His authority for such retention is contained in the Order of Council of 1st May 1855 and page 133 of the 1879 edition of the instructions to Consular officers which says—

"Vice-Consuls stationed at places where no superior officer resides, may, unless otherwise directed, appropriate to their own use the fees which are leviable under the Order in Council of the 1st May 1855."

The officer at Maskat realized under the above authority, an average of about Rs. 716-14 a year, being fees collected chiefly in respect of matters appertaining to shipping and merchandize and notarial acts connected therewith.

He used to furnish the Home Government with periodical returns of the fees levied and retained, but in 1881, the Foreign Office authorities dispensed with it. The Council observed that the fee of 2½ per cent. allowed in respect of the management of the property of a British subject not being a seaman, dying intestate, was not, as a rule, earned without immense labour on the part of the administrator.

Zanzibar.—Under Act 6, George IV, Chapter 87, and the Orders in Council of June 1851, and May 1855, the Consul-General at this place retained all fees levied on account of—

- Merchant Shipping;
- Registration;
- Probate and Administration;
- Miscellaneous;
- Political Agent's Court, Slave Trade Jurisdiction;

which during the five years 1878—1882 amounted to about Rs. 47,522, giving an average of Rs. 9,505-9-7 per annum. It was not shown that any fees were credited to the State.

(ii) Major Mockler's appointment as Acting Consul at Basrah and Procedure to be followed in case of minor Consular appointments in the Persian Gulf and Turkish Arabia, 1884.

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282. In their despatch to the Secretary of State, dated 12th May 1884, the Government of India asked for the approval of Her Majesty's Government to Major Mockler's appointment as Acting Consul at Basrah, as he had already received a Royal Commission for the Maskat Consulate. It was at the same time explained that, as the transfers of officers of our Political service, both in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere, were at times unavoidably so frequent, it hardly seemed necessary for us to apply for Royal Commission in each case.

A., Political G., June 1884, Nos. 9-10.

Our despatch was communicated by the India Office to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with a view to the necessary action being taken in regard to Major Mockler's appointment. The usual authority was accordingly given by Earl Granville, authorizing Major Mockler to act as British Consul at Basrah; but His Lordship pointed out certain irregularities in regard to the Basrah appointment, which are explained by the fact that the Government of India had not been explicit enough as to the nature of the powers required for each Consul, whether acting or not. Earl Granville therefore requested that the Government of India should, in future, be more particular to state precisely the character of such appointments, as the process of obtaining the necessary Commissions from the Turkish or Persian Government, is often very lengthy and troublesome, and ample notice should therefore be given in the cases of officers appointed permanently as Consuls: whereas the authorization of officers to act as Consuls temporarily is within the powers of the London Foreign Office. Lord Kimberley commended these remarks to the consideration of the Government of India.

283. The irregularity referred to in the London Foreign Office letter was in regard to Mr. Robertson's Commission as Consul for Basrah, for whom originally a *Berat* was obtained as permanent Consul. On receiving our despatch of April 1883, a fresh Commission was obtained for Lieutenant Ramsay, as he was designated by us as "Assistant Political Agent, Basrah," and we asked Her Majesty's Government to obtain "Consular" powers for him. The inference drawn by Her Majesty's Government was that Lieutenant Ramsay had been appointed *permanently*, thus succeeding Mr. Robertson. On this it appears that the latter's Commission was cancelled, and a fresh one obtained for Lieutenant Ramsay instead. Lord Granville in the circumstances wished to know seeing that Major Mockler's appointment was only that of an *acting* Consul, whether Lieutenant Ramsay's Commission as *permanent* Consul should be cancelled, and a fresh Commission obtained for Mr. Robertson, who, it was thought, was still the permanent incumbent of the Basrah Consulate. Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India drew attention to this enquiry of Lord Granville, and requested "further information."

A., General G., April 1883, No. 107.

284. The reply of the Government of India was (Despatch No. 40, dated 13th October 1884:—

"With reference to the irregularities pointed out by Earl Granville in regard to the Basrah Consulate, we have the honour to explain, for Your Lordship's information, that the pay of our Political Officers being generally personal, and not local, every incumbent of a Political appointment, whose name is permanently on the graded list, holds that appointment permanently in theory; but that practically frequent changes and transfers are rendered necessary by the exigencies of the public service.

Under these circumstances, although the practice above described may be attended with inconvenience so far as Consular work is concerned, occasional changes at Basrah cannot be avoided. We shall, however, endeavour to prevent such changes from occurring oftener than necessary, and we shall henceforth, if Your Lordship sees no objection, confine our requests to asking for acting Consular commissions for our Political Officers in the Persian Gulf and Turkish Arabia. At the same time, it seems convenient that some officer in the Political service should hold a permanent *Berat* from the Ottoman Porte for the Basrah Consulate, and we see therefore no objection to allowing the Commission to stand in the name of Lieutenant Ramsay."

General A., November 1885, Foreign Department letter to Political Resident, Turkish Arabia, No. 1139-G, dated 27th January 1886.

285. The instruction then given by the Foreign Office were:—



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"It is necessary that there should always be a commissioned officer regularly appointed to a Consular post, who holds the *Berat* or exequatur of the Turkish or Persian Government before an officer can be authorized to act temporarily therein. So long as this condition is observed, the actual post can ordinarily be filled by an acting Consul, for whom a letter of authority furnished by the Secretary of State is sufficient. The constant changes of officiating officers can thus be met with without the necessity of obtaining a new Exequatur."

(iii) Question as to the channel of correspondence between Basrah Consulate and the Foreign Office, 1885-88.

286. In 1885, a misunderstanding having arisen owing to the British Consul at Basrah, Colonel Mockler corresponding direct with Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the presumption that he was Consul, Colonel Tweedie drew the attention of the Government of India and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to the undesirability of any change being allowed to occur in the relationship long existing between the Basrah and Baghdad Consulates.—(Letter to the Government of India, No. 658, dated 4th December 1885.)

287. Colonel Tweedie drew also attention to a letter dated 7th May 1884, addressed by Mr. Plowden, then Resident, to the Chief Clerk, Foreign Office, in which it was pointed out Colonel Mockler was quite mistaken in supposing that Basrah was made a Consulate in 1879. In that year on the recommendation of Colonel Nixon, which was supported by the Government of India, Mr. Robertson, at that time Vice-Consul at Basrah was appointed *Her Majesty's Consul* at that place, with a view to increasing the weight which his official communications may have with the Turkish authorities, but it was stipulated at the same time that he should "remain as heretofore under the jurisdiction of Her Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad." The effect, therefore, of the arrangement of 1879 was to leave Basrah a Vice-Consulate, but to give the Indian officer for the time being holding the appointment the personal rank of Consul.

288. The Foreign Office informed Colonel Tweedie that Colonel Mockler should be told that despatches from *Her Majesty's Consul at Basrah* should be forwarded to the Foreign Office through the Consulate-General at Baghdad. (Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Colonel Tweedie, No. 2, dated 22nd April 1886.)

289. In January 1888, Colonel Tweedie complained that Her Majesty's Consul received instructions direct from *the Foreign Office*, and not through him.

290. The Consul-General at Baghdad and the Consul at Basrah were then informed that for the future all correspondence between the Foreign Office and the Consulate at Basrah should pass through the Baghdad Consulate under a flying seal. (Foreign Office to Consul-General at Baghdad, No. 2, dated 29th February 1888.)

(iv) Medical arrangements at Basrah and Baghdad.

291. *Basrah*.—There was a surgeon attached to the old Residency at Basrah, and from the statement in Chapter III (section III) there can be no doubt that the arrangement continued at any rate up to the year 1802.

292. In 1800, Mr. Harford Jones, the newly appointed Resident at Baghdad, became seriously ill, and having no European medical officer in the Residency, requested Mr. Manesty, Resident at Basrah, to despatch the surgeon attached to the Basrah Residency to Baghdad. But as Mr. Manesty felt himself unable to comply with the request, Mr. Harford Jones had to proceed to Basrah, no easy feat in those days especially for a sick man, and put himself under the treatment of the doctor there.

293. Soon after the Basrah and Baghdad Agencies were amalgamated and in 1812 the "Resident was designated Resident in Turkish Arabia" with option to reside at Basrah or Baghdad. The Resident selected Baghdad as a more



suitable place for his permanent residence. The result was that Basrah was deprived of its surgeon.

294. Basrah is the port of Turkish Arabia and has been long the headquarters of four or five European firms. It is an unhealthy station compared with Baghdad. Yet for nearly three quarters of a century, it was allowed to remain without a competent medical officer. The urgency of a need of proper medical aid was not brought home to the Government of India, until the death of Mr. Robertson and his two children of cholera in August 1889. Captain

External A., August 1890, Nos. 106-125.

- (1) Messrs. Gray Mackenzie and Co.
- (2) Messrs. Durby Andrews and Co.
- (3) Messrs. Lynch Brothers.
- (4) Persian Gulf Trading Co.
- (5) Messrs. Hotz and Co.

Ravenshaw, then in his letter No. 7, dated 7th June 1890, to Colonel Tweedie, strongly urged the need of some arrangements being made for at once for providing Basrah with a good medical man. The several firms in Basrah also submitted a representation in the matter and offered to pay a contribution to meet the cost.

295. Colonel Tweedie submitted the correspondence with a strong recommendation and also brought to the notice of Government that Captain Ravenshaw having had a fall had been laid up with an injury to his knee joint, had wired for Doctor Bowman to be sent. But Colonel Tweedie wired back to say that Doctor Bowman could not leave and but that he could send the apothecary of the Comet (who was not wanted) or if Captain Ravenshaw preferred he could visit Baghdad or Bushire (which he could not do, being unable to leave his bed). So Baghdad had its revenge for Basrah's migracious conduct when Mr. Harford Jones fell ill at Baghdad in 1800, and was referred the attendance of the surgeon of the Basrah Agency in 1890.

296. It was now clear that Basrah needed a doctor of its own, and while the Government of India's Medical Department was at its wit's ends to find a Civil Surgeon for the place, the mercantile community found a competent medical man in Dr. Marcus Eustace, M. A., M. D., etc., etc., with whom they entered into an agreement for his services for two years at Basrah on payment of certain annual allowances from the several European firms.

297. The Government of India were also asked by the firms for financial support, and sanctioned an allowance of Rs. 100 a month to Dr. Eustace for medical attendance on Government servants at Basrah. (Telegram No. 1527-E., dated 22nd July 1890).

298. Dr. Eustace agreed to render medical assistance to Government servants at Basrah, whether attached to the Consulate or passing through the port, and to do all other work required from him by Government, whether medico legal or sanitary, without charging for medicines or boat hire, for the sum mentioned.

The agreement was to terminate on three months' notice on either side (agreement, dated 30th July 1890).

299. Dr. Eustace gave a notice to terminate the arrangements with the Agency in January 1892. Thereupon Major Jennings urged the necessity of providing Basrah with a permanent medical man. He stated that the permanent European residents of Basrah numbered 17 gentlemen and 6 ladies, while the visits of 60 or 70 steamers a year left a floating British population of officers and crews of the ships numbering at times even 100 souls, at a time, having no medical man to attend upon them. (Major Jennings' to Resident, No. 126, dated 27th February 1892.)

Colonel Moekler supported the recommendation of Major Jennings (letter No. 144, dated 8th March 1892).

300. The Government of India found then Dr. P. R. Hay Jagannadham, M. D. (Edinburgh), prepared to take up the practice offered in Basrah on the same terms as Dr. Eustace and directed that the same arrangement might be made with him. (Foreign Department letter No. 1350-E., dated 20th July 1892.)



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301. Dr. Jagahnadham having resigned in 1894, an agreement was entered into with Dr. Dobbyn for medical attendance on the Basrah Agency under the sanction of the Government of India. (Foreign Department letter No. 551-E., dated 12th March 1894.)

302. The Government of India also sanctioned as a permanent arrangement a standing fee of Rs. 100 a month to a properly qualified practitioner for medical attendance on Government servants at Basrah and directed that it would not be necessary on the appointments of future incumbents to refer the matter to Government for sanction. (Foreign Department letter No. 551-E., dated 12th March 1894.)

303. Dr. Dobbyn gave a notice of termination of his agreement on 31st December 1895, and it was reported that the British merchants at Basrah were endeavouring to secure the services of another doctor.

(v) Kashim Pasha and his relations and friends.


304. Kasim Pasha *alias* Kasim Zuhair Chebbi of Basrah was a wealthy influential landholder of Basrah, friendly towards the English at Basrah who rendered many a useful service to them. He was particularly useful when the British India Steam Navigation Company's ship *Cashmere* was plundered in 1870, and received on that occasion a present from the Government of India, as well as their official thanks. In 1886 he fell out with the Vali of Basrah, and Basrah was relieved of his presence by his being called to Constantinople. There he was detained in honourable confinement with the rank of member of the State Council, for his consolation.


305. Esau bin Kirtars, a friend of Kasim Pasha, was anxious to obtain his release, and asked to be furnished with a letter of recommendation to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, Colonel Ross suggested that he might be given a *private* letter of recommendation for he doubted whether any open support would help Sheikh Esau, rather the contrary. A letter of introduction was accordingly given to Sheikh Esau signed by the Secretary, Foreign Department, for being presented to the Secretary of the Embassy. While a demi-official letter of recommendation was written and despatched by post to the Embassy.


306. Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires allowed interview to Sheikh Esau, but could hold no hopes of being able to forward the object of his visit, as he considered his intervention would do more harm than good. When Esau returned he saw Colonel Ross at Bushire, and informed him that the Sultan was exceedingly prone to be worked up by an insane jealousy of England and that Kasim Pasha's enemies imbued His Majesty with the idea that he was intriguing to hand over Basrah to the English. Kasim Pasha appears to have been well treated at Constantinople. His late enemy and rival Nasir Pasha, Chief of the Montefiks was also a political detenué at Constantinople, Sheikh Esau succeeded in bringing about a reconciliation between the two.

Kasim Pasha's son Ahmed Bay appears to have got involved in debts— with the result that the family declined in influence. Three elder brothers of Ahmed Bay died of drunkenness.

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CHAPTER X.

British Navigation Rights on the Euphrates and Tigris.

(i) Early British Navigation of the Rivers of Mesopotamia.

A British factory appears to have been established at Basrah as early as 1639-40, since when East India Company's merchant men frequently visited that port. In 1661 a Treaty* was entered into between Great Britain and Turkey, of which the following clauses have a bearing upon the rights claimed by the British to free navigation on the Mesopotamian rivers:—

"IV. All English ships or vessels, small or great, shall and may at any time safely and securely come and harbour in any of the seas and ports of our dominions, and likewise may from thence depart at their pleasure, without detention or hindrance of any man."

* * * * *

"XXII. The English nation and all those that come under the banner of their vessels, small and great, shall and may navigate, traffic, buy, sell, and abide in all parts of our dominions, and except arms, gunpowder and other such prohibited commodities, they may load and carry away in their ships whatsoever of our merchandizes at their own pleasure without the impeachment or trouble of any man, and their ships and vessels may come safely and securely to anchor at all times, and traffic at all times in every part of our dominions, and with their money buy victuals and all other things without any contradiction or hindrance of any man."

2. No permanent Agent appears to have been appointed at Basrah till the beginning of the 18th century. When one was appointed about 1724 A.D., he was called Resident at Basrah and placed under the control of the Agent in Council at Gombroon. In 1763 the Gombroon Agency in Council was transferred to Basrah. In 1783 a Native Agent was appointed at Baghdad to transact the East India Company's business with the Pasha, and forward intelligence and packets to Basrah.

3. In 1798 a British Agent of the Company was permanently located at Baghdad.

4. There must have been considerable traffic between Basrah and Baghdad to necessitate the establishment of a permanent Agency at Baghdad, as well as Basrah. The river traffic was, it appears, carried on by means of country boats owned or hired by the East India Company and British merchants, flying the British flag.

5. In 1810, the Basrah and Baghdad Agencies were consolidated and in 1812 the Agent in charge both the agencies was ordered to be called Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, with liberty to reside either at Basrah or Baghdad as occasion might require and with authority to depute his Assistant to either of the places.

6. In 1831 the Secret Committee ordered that the Political Agent should fix his residence chiefly at Baghdad. As yet the British merchant or naval ships do not appear to have gone up beyond Basrah or Kurna on the Shat-el-Arab, and as the incident mentioned below would show, country boats under the British flag were used for journeying by the river.

7. In 1830 one Robert Baikie, Assistant Surgeon, Madras establishment, while on his way from England to India, passed down the river Tigris to Basrah in a boat belonging to the British Residency at Baghdad under the British flag, was detained in the way by an Arab Sheikh and forced to pay a heavy duty for his baggage, which he was not liable to pay under the Treaty. This formed subject of a Memorial dated 13th March 1831, to the Bombay Government claiming redress. A copy of this petition was sent to the Political Agent at Baghdad, but with what result it does not appear.

(ii) Ormsby's Surveys of the Euphrates and Tigris, 1826-32.

8. In 1826-1832 Lieutenant H. A. Ormsby of the Indian navy was engaged in a survey of the coast of Syria, and of the Mesopotamian rivers Tigris and Euphrates.

*Note.—This is printed as Appendix A to the *Turkish Arabia Trade (1646-1846)* and as Appendix B to the same is printed the Treaty of 1675, in which the former is confirmed with additions. The Treaty of 1675 is confirmed in the Treaty of 1809 (5th January). A consolidated edition of both the treaties is printed as Appendix No. 1 Turkish Arabia to *Aitchison's Treaties (1892) Vol. XI.*



His elaborate report and maps were sent to the Bombay Government and by them despatched to the Court of Directors. The Governor of Bombay (Lord Clare) expressed great satisfaction at the work done by Lieutenant Ormsby in the face of the greatest difficulties. The Government of India also expressed their satisfaction at the surveys and stated:—

"The addition of this knowledge obtained to the geography of an important tract of country will doubtless be valuable and cannot but be of high interest, independently of the specific objects in connection with navigation by steam, with a view to which the information has been collected." (Letter from the Government of India to the Bombay Government, No. 54, dated 2nd January 1832.)

9. It must be noted that in the survey of the rivers Lieutenant Ormsby had, in the absence of a steamer, to contend against the greatest difficulties. He and his party had to travel on horseback or other means of conveyance and whenever they had to take a passage on the river, country boats had to be resorted to with all the inconveniences attending them.*

(iii) Chesney's Euphrates and Tigris Expedition, 1834—37.

10. In the year 1834 an expedition† was organized under the patronage of King William IV, which as briefly stated by the American author Hilprecht in his *Explorations in Bible Lands* had the following purposes in view:—

- (1) to survey the northern part of Syria,
- (2) to explore the basins of both the rivers Euphrates and Tigris, and to survey the adjacent districts,
- (3) to test the navigability of the former river, the Euphrates,
- (4) to examine in the countries adjacent to these rivers the markets the expedition might be thrown into contact.

"The Suez canal not yet existing, England" remarks Hilprecht "jealously watched by France and Russia, advanced this important step, apparently in the hope of stirring the national energy and enterprise by the results to be achieved to such an enthusiasm as to lead to establishing regular railway or steamer communication with the Far East by way of the Euphrates Valley and to restoring life and prosperity to a region renowned for its fertility in ancient times and generally regarded as the seats of the earliest civilization."

The Parliament sanctioned a grant of £20,000 for the expedition.

11. The following letter of Lieutenant R. A. Chesney on the state of the country between Syria and the Persian Gulf at this time will be read with interest—


Bombay Political Department, Volume 645 of 1835.

Letter from Lieutenant R. A. Chesney, dated 8th September 1834, to Lord Palmerston:—

"In opening a communication between England and India through Arabia there will in the first place be a land journey of 187 miles from the Mediterranean at Scanderoun to Bir on the Euphrates and a subsequent one of 1,100 miles along the river from that town to Kourd or Basrah that whole being through the dominions of the Porte.

It is unnecessary to observe to Your Lordship that the Sultan's real authority is very limited in this portion of his territories, but his unreserved support will always have great moral so long as the Moslem religion shall exist and therefore the Firman of the Porte is of essential consequence in the outset of an undertaking the success of which must depend mainly on the effective support of the Pashas of Baghdad and Egypt during the proposed negotiations with the Arab Chiefs who in fact possess the real power of assisting or annoying the progress of the expedition.

The district of Aleppo gives the Pasha of Egypt the uncontrolled power over the country between the Mediterranean and the river along which his authority extends nearly 200 miles further in consequence of occupying at present the disputed Landjaes of Orfa and Racca and there can be little doubt of obtaining the Pasha's efficient support throughout their important portion of the line the moment the Sultan has given his nominal sanction.



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Below Rana the Pashalic of Baghdad commences and it extends from thence to the Persian Gulf. Ali Pasha himself when at Aleppo had formed plans for opening the Euphrates what he proposed to the Porte more than once and actually obtained the necessary sanction for so doing in the early part of 1833 at which time he was enthusiastic in the cause and unless there may have been foreign intrigue used at Baghdad he will probably prove that he is so at this moment by acceding to the request Colonel Taylor has been instructed by Mr. Grant to make and thus again obtain through the Pasha the sanction of the Porte for the introduction of steam along the Euphrates.

It fortunately happens that the whole of the Arab tribes are included either in the Government of Egypt or that of the Pasha of Baghdad and the hearty recommendation of the latter will go far to remove any suspicion which the Sultan might be inclined to entertain especially about the requisite stations for steamers, one of which is absolutely indispensable at each extremity of the line to the extent in the first instance of a small basin for the vessel and a Vice-Consulate establishment surrounded by a simple wall merely enough for defence against the Arabs, yet so chosen that it might be capable of being strengthened in case of war so as to resist for a time the *coup de main* descent of an enemy along the river."

12. On the 20th November 1834, King William IV granted the following commission under his Royal Sign manual to Captain F. R. Chesney, constituting and appointing him with the rank of Colonel, Commander of the expedition.

"William the IV, by the Grace of God, King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, to all and singular to whom these presents shall come greeting: Whereas it has been represented to us that great advantages are likely to result not only to the commerce of our own subjects, but to that of other nations, and particularly to that of the subjects of our good ally, the high and mighty Emperor Sultan Mahomed Han II, Chief Lord and Commander of the Eastern Empire, from the establishment of a direct communication between the Mediterranean Sea and the possessions of our Crown in the East Indies, for the effectual accomplishment of which object it is proposed, among other things, to navigate by the means of steam vessels the River Euphrates flowing through the dominions of our said ancient and good ally: Now know ye that we moved by these considerations, and relying upon the friendship of our said good ally, have determined to sanction the employment of a certain number of scientific officers with the requisite number of artificers and other workmen for the purpose aforesaid, and having moreover full confidence in the zeal and ability of Colonel Francis Rawdon Chesney, an officer of our Royal Regiment of Artillery, we do hereby constitute and appoint him the said Francis Rawdon Chesney to be the Commander of the expedition as above described, and we do strictly charge and enjoin him to use his best endeavours to ensure the success thereof, and further, constantly to bear in mind our express command that he do cultivate to the utmost of his power the best understanding and friendship with the authorities of our said good ally in the districts through which the aforesaid expedition will pass, and that he do conciliate the good-will and friendship of the inhabitants of the same, not doubting that when this our present commission shall have been communicated to our said good ally, he will cause corresponding instructions to be given to his own servants, out of due regard for the friendship and alliance so happily subsisting between our two Courts. In witness whereof we have signed these presents with our Royal hand. Given at our Court at Brighton, the 28th day of November in the year of our Lord 1834 and in the 5th year of our reign.

"By Her Majesty's Command,
(Sd.) WELLINGTON.

"To COLONEL FRANCIS RAWDON CHESNEY, COMMISSION, ETC."

13. On the 29th December 1834 the Sublime Porte, on the application of the Right Hon'ble Lord Ponsonby, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, granted the following firman, authorizing the navigation of the Euphrates River by the two steamers belonging to the British Government about to be placed on that river:—

"Translation of an Imperial Firman of protection for the English steam vessels destined to navigate the River Euphrates, dated 29th December 1834, to Their Excellencies the Vizirs, Pachas of three tails, to the illustrious Mirimirans Pachas of two tails, to the learned Judges, to the Waivodas Captains of ports and other Magistrates of places situated on both banks of the Euphrates, Health,

"On receiving the Imperial command you will know as follows:—The Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Great Britain at Constantinople, Lord Ponsonby, one of the most illustrious personages among the Christian nations, has presented at our Sublime Porte an official note, by which he intimates that the British Government requires permission to cause to navigate by turns two steam boats on the River Euphrates, which flows at a small distance from the city of Baghdad, for the purposes of facilitating commerce.

"We in consequence issued to our very illustrious Governor of Baghdad and Bussorah, Ali Reza Pacha, an order to furnish our Sublime Porte with information of the proposed navigation.

"Although the answer of the Pacha had not arrived, the Ambassador made representations on this point, informing our Sublime Porte, and the British Government awaited our reply.

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"For this reason we have and do permit two steam boats to navigate the Euphrates by turns, and this navigation is to continue as long as, conformably to what has been represented to us, it may prove useful to the two powers, and no inconvenience result therefrom, and it is to this purpose that an official rule has been transmitted to the British Ambassador.

"A firman, couched in the same terms, has been addressed to the Pacha of Baghdad and Bussorah.

"These commands mean that you should act in the mode above-mentioned and for this end the Firman is written.

"You, therefore, Vizirs, Mirimirans, Judges, and other Magistrates being informed that you are to be in harmony with my Imperial will, you are to be cautious to act in conformity thereto, and to be aware of contravening that which is prescribed by this Imperial command."

14. With reference to the above firman, the Pacha of Baghdad, on the 11th February 1835, issued the following "Booyooroldi" to the Turkish officers on the Euphrates, directing them to afford their protection to the expedition under Colonel Chesney, and to render all assistance in their power for the furtherance of its objects:—

"To those informed of this our address the Mutesellims, Zhabits of districts and villages and Shaikhs of tribes on both banks, the Arabian and Mesopotamian, of the Euphrates from Oanah to Bussorah, be it known—

"That the cause of writing this "Booyooroldi" (order) is that, as at this time, two steam vessels have arrived, appertaining to the *English Government*, in which are persons bearing this our order, who are passing for the purposes of trade by permission of the Sublime Porte; having also many letters, it is incumbent on you to protect and favor them to assist in supplying their wants, and to abstain wholly from impeding them. If, therefore, ye are certified of this, it is your duty on the arrival of the above-mentioned individuals at and on their passage by your stations, to protect and defend, and that neither any one of you, or other, impede them in any way, and should your aid be necessary to them, that you assist and serve them in their wants, and unite, in forwarding them on their passage going and coming in peace and safety, without excuse or delay.

"And for this purpose we have written, published, and forwarded this Booyooroldi if it please God; when you receive it, and are informed of its contents, it will be requisite that you use your utmost exertions in the accomplishment of them, and act according to the order, and thus it shall be suffice."

15. Colonel Chesney left England on the 10th February 1835, with the several members and workmen composing the expedition under his command, and arrived at "Port William" on the Euphrates on the 18th July following, when he commenced putting together the two iron steamers *Euphrates* and *Tigris*, the materials for which had been forwarded by His Majesty's Government *via* the Mediterranean. The completion of both of these vessels, and their having commenced the survey of the Euphrates and Tigris, was communicated by Colonel Chesney to the Hon'ble the Court of Directors in a letter dated the 19th March 1836, from which the following is an extract:—

"Being quite sure that no event which concerns our Indian Empire, however remotely can be indifferent to you as private individuals, whilst it is certain of attracting all the attention it may deserve from you as a great governing body, I do myself the honor of using the very earliest opportunity in my power to acquaint Your Hon'ble Court that the two steamers *Euphrates* and *Tigris* are now descending the great river, surveying carefully as they drop down, under every possible advantage, both vessels being completely manned, armed and equipped; with their boilers, engines, and machinery quite as safe, and even more perfect in their working details than when sent out of the maker hands at Liverpool."

16. On the 21st May 1836 the *Tigris* steamer was upset in the Euphrates River during a heavy squall and foundered. By this melancholy accident Lieutenant Cockburn, of the Royal Artillery, Lieutenant Lynch of the 26th Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry, 12 Europeans, consisting of sailors, engineers, &c., and six natives were drowned. Several ineffectual attempts were made to raise this vessel.

17. On the 18th June 1836 Colonel Chesney addressed the following letter from on board the steamer *Euphrates* to Sir John Cam Hobhouse, President of the Board of Control:—

"I have the honor to inform you that this vessel reached the junction of the rivers Euphrates and Tigris during the afternoon of this day, so memorable for ever in the annals of England. We are now about 43 miles from Bussorah, and have completed the survey and descent of the splendid river Euphrates, which ends here; onwards is the Shat el Arab, which is rather a branch of the sea than a river in the ordinary acceptation of the word. The officers and men



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are all in good health and the best possible spirits, having arrived here without any serious difficulty or annoyance."

18. The *Euphrates* then ascended the Tigris as far as near the ancient city of Opis. Descending down that river, it made an attempt to ascend the Euphrates river, but upon entering the Lameun marshes of Babylonia, the engine of the steamer broke down. Every effort to repair it failed, and the steamer was let down the current of the river to take its own course assisted occasionally by sails. Meanwhile Russia had aroused the suspicions of the Porte against the British being allowed the right of internal navigation, and as the funds of the expedition were getting exhausted, the British Government decided to spend no more money upon the expedition.

19. On the 23rd January 1837 the Euphrates expedition was by order of His Majesty's Government broken up, and the *Euphrates* steamer was made over to the East India Company, on the understanding that such an amount should be paid for her as a Committee of Survey might deem her to be worth.

(iv) The East India Company's Euphrates Flotilla—1837-1844.

20. On the 18th April 1837 the Hon'ble the Secret Committee forwarded, for the information and guidance of this Government, copy of a letter that authority

Page 425, Volume 793 of 1837.

had on the same day addressed to the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India in Council, intimating that they had appointed Lieutenant (now Commander) Henry Blosse Lynch, of the Indian Navy, then in England, to the command of the *Euphrates* steamer and of any other steamers which might subsequently be employed on the *Tigris* and *Euphrates* rivers. The Secret Committee at the same time forwarded copy of the following letter which they had on the same day addressed to Lieutenant Lynch, directing him to proceed to Baghdad for the above purpose, and containing instructions for his guidance after his arrival at that place:—

"You will proceed with all convenient speed to Baghdad. On reaching that city you will report your arrival immediately to Colonel Taylor, the Hon'ble East India Company's Resident, and will act under the advice of that gentlemen until you shall receive your definite instructions from the Governor-General of India in Council. You will inform Colonel Taylor of our wish that you should be put in command of the *Euphrates* steamer and of any other steam vessel or vessels that may be employed on the *Tigris* or the *Euphrates*. Previously to the receipt of your instructions from India, you will make all necessary arrangements respecting the stores of the late expedition under Colonel Chesney, and the wreck of the *Tigris*, and you will take care that any engagements entered into with the Arabian tribes or other authorities in reference to those objects shall be strictly fulfilled. You will in concert with, and under the guidance of, Colonel Taylor enter into friendly communications with the tribes frequenting the rivers of Mesopotamia, and will endeavour to establish with them such relations as may be serviceable to the interests of Great Britain, and may add to the facilities for a speedy and regular transmission of mails between the Persian Gulf and the coast of Syria.

"You will be furnished with a chart of the Euphrates, executed by the late expedition, and you will complete the surveys of that river and the *Tigris*, making such astronomical, geographical and statistical observations as the more direct objects of the service may permit. You will report to us, and to the Indian Government, on all subjects connected with the service in which you are employed, and will exercise a sound discretion in obeying the letter and spirit of your instructions.

"The Governor-General of India in Council will be requested to defray the expenses you may incur in the recovery of the property of the *Tigris*, and in the fulfilment of the engagements of the late expedition, of which you will keep a separate account, in order that they may eventually be reimbursed to the East India Company by His Majesty's Government."

21. In June 1839 the Hon'ble the Secret Committee sent out from England (in frame work, *via* the Cape) three additional iron steamers for service on the *Euphrates* and *Tigris* rivers, named the *Assyria*, *Nimrod*, and *Nitocris*; the ship in which the materials for these vessels were forwarded from England



arrived at Basrah on the 22nd December 1839. The Secret Committee addressed to the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India in Council the following instructions in regard to these vessels:—

"When the three steamers, which were shipped on the *Urania*, shall have been put together and equipped and manned for service, it is our desire that they, together with the *Euphrates* steamer, should be subject to the same control and superintendence as we have already assigned for the *Euphrates*. It is not our wish that the Superintendent of the Indian Navy should originate any orders as the particular duties on which four steamers on the *Mesopotamian rivers* should be employed; and we desired Lieutenant Lynch and the officers and others under his command may be considered as acting under the advice of Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, the East India Company's Agent in Turkish Arabia, subject to such directions as may be given by you. Copy of this letter was, on the 20th January 1840, forwarded to the Superintendent of the Indian Navy, Lieutenant Lynch, and the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, for information and guidance."

22. The three new vessels, above alluded to, were put together immediately on their reaching Basrah, and from that period until May 1841 the steam flotilla on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers consisted, inclusive of the *Euphrates*, of four vessels, the whole being placed, in conformity with the above orders of the Secret Committee, under the charge of Commander Lynch. In May 1841 the Secret Committee directed that the *Euphrates* and *Nimrod* should be removed by the Government of India for service elsewhere (Despatch dated

Volume 14 of 1841.

4th May 1841).

23. An idea of the movements of the steam flotilla about this time may be formed from the following extract of Colonel Taylor's letter dated 3rd February 1841 (No. 4) to the Bombay Government:—

"Lieutenant Campbell, in charge of the steam flotilla, is expected here daily in return from a rip to Hit, and Amah, preparatory to an attempt at ascending the Euphrates on his arrival there.

The steamers are, for the present, moving, in turn up and down the Tigris which will by degrees produce better pilots than the natives of the country."

24. We have to note how the steam flotilla used to move up and down the *Tigris* without any serious objection from the Turkish authorities.

25. An account of the surveys done by means of the steamers on the Tigris and Euphrates is given in Chapter XII (i).

26. A second *Firman* dated August 1841 was obtained for the protection of this new arrangement which, be it noted, had, like the first Euphrates expedition of 1834, for its object among others the survey of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and the adjacent country. It recited the previous *Firman* under which permission had been granted to the British Government to place two steamers on the *Euphrates* for the purpose of facilitating commerce and stated that the new *firman* had been sought to secure the protection of the *Commandant* of the two steamers in question in the execution of his business. It then directed as follows, "ainsi, lorsque vous aurez soin que les susdits bateaux fassent comme par le passé le service de la rivière à condition qu'il y ait point un inconvénient quelconque et l'entreprise soit profitable aux deux parties."

27. No contemporary record of this second *Firman* can be traced in our records. The above account of this second *firman* is taken from Mr. Plowden's

* Secret, May 1832, Nos. 221-242 (No. 222).

letter dated *28th March 1881. From

a marginal note of his, Mr. Plowden appears to have obtained a French translation of the original which is in the

NORZ. - In this connection we might read the following:—

Vizirial letter to the Pasha of Aleppo, relative to the navigation of the Euphrates by English steamboats, September 13, 1842,

(Translation.)

Your Excellency knows that two English steam-boats are navigating in the River Euphrates for commercial purposes. The British Embassy has now given a "tacit" to say that, in consequence of the shallowness of the waters in this season, the steamers were under the necessity of stopping till the river becomes navigable again at Bels, a place within the limits of the Pashalik of Aleppo; that as it has become necessary for the crews to land on the shore, it is desirable that per mission should be given to them to land temporarily, and that they may be assisted and protected.

At the same time, you have stated in a despatch we have received from Your Excellency that, owing to the Arabs of that neighbourhood being a set of unreasonable people, it will be difficult, were the crews of the steamers aforesaid to receive any harm from them, to put a stop to it. Your observation is, in fact, just, and the Embassy does not deny it.

Nevertheless, acting on this occasion with that prudence and that excellent judgment which distinguish you, and in conformity to the sincere and perfect friendship existing between the two Governments, Your Excellency will permit the landing and the staying of the crews in that place for a certain time. You are instructed to employ all possible means to prevent any kind of mischief being done to them, and I wrote this letter, on receiving which Your Excellency will, I hope, act conformably to it.

18th Regt, 1827.

Hortale's Treatise, Vol. XIII, p. 339.

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archives of the British Embassy; the name of the Commandant is given this original, but it was illegible. Evidently the name was of Captain Lynch, who had been appointed Commandant of the steamers on the river. Conceivably the Turkish authorities base on this fact their assertion that the concession to the Euphrates and Tigris Company rests on an old firman granted to Messrs. Lynch & Co. The whole arrangements of 1834 and then that of 1837 were concerns respectively of the British Home Government and the East India Company (which, be it noted, had now ceased to be a commercial body), having for their purpose a survey of the rivers and the country, and taking measures for facilitating commerce rather than carrying on commerce. The steamers were armed boats, not trade vessels. The firmans of 1834 and 1841, were accordingly grants made to the British Government, and not to private individuals.

28. It must further be noted that the expedition of Colonel Chesney, and then that of Captain Lynch, were for the survey of both the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, while the firmans refer only to the Euphrates. This might be accounted for by the fact that the Tigris had already been for many years used for navigation purposes by the East India Company's boats (built in Turkish Arabia) and tacitly recognized both by the Turks and Arabs as a commercial waterway to foreigners, while the Euphrates on account of the constant disturbances of the Arab tribes had long been practically closed to navigation and had yet to recover its ancient position as the great commercial artery between Syria and the Persian Gulf. And the main objective of the British enterprises of 1834 and 1837 was, it must not be forgotten, the Euphrates rather than the Tigris. Yet the British steamers ascended up the Tigris several times and surveyed that river as well as the Euphrates without any objection from the Turks. For an account of the Surveys see chapter XII (i) post.

29. In May-August 1842, the three steamers, *Euphrates*, *Nimrod* and *Assyria* were under the orders of the Government of India withdrawn for service on the Indus.

30. The remaining steamer the *Nitocris* on continued Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Lieutenant Felix Jones, who succeed Captain Lynch in 1843, commanded the *Nitocris*, until 1846, when it was taken to Bombay for repairs.

31. In 1844 the Government of India sanctioned an allowance of Rs. 100 per mensem for payment as presents to Arab Sheikhs whose friendship he had to cultivate during his survey work, and for other incidental purposes connected with the survey and visit to the Sheikhs (Government of India letter No. 276, dated 8th February 1844, to the Bombay Government).


(V). The question as to the utility of maintaining an armed steamer (*Nitocris*) on the Tigris—1845.

32. At this time the question was raised by the Government of India as to the utility of maintaining an armed steam vessel on the Mesopotamian rivers. We have on our records an important report of Sir H. Rawlinson on the point (No. 10, dated the 22nd February 1845), which bears quotation:—

"It is impossible, it appears to me, to reduce this question to a mere pecuniary calculation, for, although the outlay upon the one side be direct and tangible, yet the return which that outlay brings is, for the most part, incidental and a matter of opinions rather than of proof. The only immediate advantage that we desire from the presence of a steamer on the rivers of Mesopotamia refer to the protection of our merchants and to the security and extension which are thereby given to our commerce, within the last few years three independent British houses of agency have been established at Baghdad, and other parties encouraged by the prosperous condition of the trade are about to enter on the same field of enterprise. The insecurity of the rivers and the rapacity of the Arabs who live on the banks presented in former times serious obstacles to the introduction of our manufactures into the Pashalik of Baghdad, but those evils have now almost disappeared and it is matter of notoriety that we owe the change to our exhibition of strength upon the Tigris and Euphrates and to the friendly relations which we have established with the Montefik, the Beni Lam, the Zobeid and the other great Arab tribes upon the banks, rather than to any increased efficiency on the part of the Turkish Government or to any real improvement in the character of the Arabs.

"Whilst a single steamer continues to ply upon the river, the Arabs are reminded of our strength, and they respect not only British boats, but those also of our Turkish allies, but were that steamer to be withdrawn, they would assuredly revert to their old habits of plunder; and the river trade would be entirely at their mercy.

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"But the chief benefits which attend the presence of a steamer upon the Tigris are as I have mentioned incidental and their importance or otherwise depends upon a general view of Eastern policy which I am neither competent nor would it be becoming in me to discuss. *It strengthens the hands of the British Agent in the most effectual, and at the same time in the least ostentatious, manner possible; it enables him to vindicate the rights of those under his protection; it assists his mediation between the Turkish and Persian authorities; it places him in the most favourable position for maintaining the dignity of the British Government and it acquires for him local influence to an extent which, without such a means of support, would be altogether unattainable.* The French Government has been unceasing in its endeavours for many years to supersede British influence in Asiatic Turkey, and that it has not more successfully availed itself of the vantage ground which it enjoys, as the declared protector of the Catholics of the East is owing, I think as much to our continued exhibition of strength in this quarter and in the Persian Gulf, as to the late success of our arms in Syria, and to the presence of our fleet in the Mediterranean. The right of navigating the rivers of Mesopotamia with armed steamers, it may also be observed, was obtained with some difficulty by a special firman from the Sultan; and so long as the right continues in active exercise, no attempt is likely to be made at its abrogation; but should the privilege be once voluntarily abandoned, should we resign the navigation of the rivers into the hands of another power, it would be necessary, in the event of a possible desire for the resumption of our right, to make a second application to the Porte; and I cannot doubt that in the spirit of isolation which has for some time governed the Ottoman Council, and which leads the Turkish Government to exhibit day by day a more determined resistance to measures of European intervention, such an application would be received with much distrust, and would occasion serious embarrassment at Constantinople.

"The Honourable the Governor in Council will I doubt not perceive that it hardly comes within my power to discuss the question whether if a steamer be kept upon the Tigris, the expense attending such a measure should be borne by the Home or by the Indian Government; but I trust I shall be excused for observing that the same argument of the absence of any direct bearing upon the interests or security of India, applies to the entire establishment of the Political Agency of Turkish Arabia, to the Residency of Bushire, to the maintenance of a squadron in the Persian Gulf, and to the Mission at the Court of Tehran. All of these establishments are unquestionably extra-Indian, yet India has been hitherto charged with their expenses.

I have only to add that the steamer *Nitocris* forms an integral part of the Gulf squadron; that she is principally employed upon the same duties as the other vessels of the squadron, namely, in protecting our commerce and maintaining our naval ascendancy, that she is a river boat and can only be made use of upon the Indus, or on the waters of Mesopotamia, and the question therefore of her continuance upon, or her withdrawal from, this river would seem to depend entirely on the possible existence of any more urgent occasion for her services in the other quarter."

33. Sir H. Rawlinson also referred to the approaching territorial settlement between Persia and Turkey through the joint mediation of Russia and England, and pointed out that the services of the *Nitocris* would be likely to be required by the joint Commissioners for surveying the delta of the Euphrates and Karun with a view to fix a line of demarcation.

34. Sir H. Rawlinson again addressed the Bombay Government in his letter, dated 15th March 1845, extracts from which are printed below:—

3. By the establishment of wood stations along the course of the river, the Commander is brought into regular and most friendly communication with the Arab tribes who reside upon the banks. He is visited by several of the Chiefs on every occasion of his ascent or descent of the river, and by a judicious distribution of trifling presents he is enabled to maintain a connection which, if it answered no other purpose than that of pre-occupying the ground, would still not be without its value. The rapidity also with which by the monthly visit of the steamer to Bussorah intelligence reaches Baghdad of the state of affairs in the Chal country has frequently been found of the greatest use in supplying timely and correct information to Her Majesty's Ministers at Constantinople and Teheran and to the Commissioners employed at Erzerum whilst the occasional transport of Turkish officers of rank between Baghdad and Bussorah lays the Local Government under obligations to us, which materially assist my official intercourse with the Pasha. I attribute it, indeed, in a great measure to the presence of a steamer at Baghdad, that, whereas in all the other provinces of the Turkish empire occasions of dispute between the Local Government and the resident British functionary are of most frequent and embarrassing occurrence, I have not been called upon in a single instance since my appointment to this Agency to claim the interference of the Ambassador at Constantinople in the support of our interests, or the vindication of our national rights.

4. The true point of view—at the same time in which, I think, the maintenance of an armed steamer on the Tigris should be regarded—is as a part, however fractional and remote, of our great system of universal maritime ascendancy. Our flag is at present supreme (by



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sufferance be it allowed yet it is still supreme) on the waters of Mesopotamia. If it be one lowered, another flag will replace it, and we shall then be excluded from the navigation of the Tigris and the Euphrates, as we have been shut out of the Danube, and as we are threatened with exclusion from the Nile.

* * * * *

35. Sir H. Rawlinson also submitted a statement showing how the *Nitocris* was employed since the breaking up of the flotilla, from which the following extract is taken :—

Left Baghdad for Basrah with Commander Lynch, and the papers, charts, etc., connected with the late Flotilla, and a packet for the Resident at Bushire and Post Master General at Bombay, communicated with the Chief Sheikh of the large tribe of Beni Lum Arabs, arrived at Basrah on November 20th, communicated with the H. C. Schooner *Emily*, and received stores from the Baghdad Residency.

Left Basrah for Baghdad with a packet and a native officer of the Basrah Residency ; arrived at Baghdad December 11th, 1842. Conveyed to Baghdad at the request of Colonel Robertson one servant of Mr. Cotsey, his wife, etc., and at the request of the Governor of Basrah one Turkish officer.

Left Baghdad for Basrah with His Lordship the Bish of Malabar and Canara passenger for Bombay, and a packet for Bombay and Bushire, arrived at Basrah on the 13th January and left for Baghdad on the 18th; arrived at Baghdad and landed the packet on the 23rd January. The Commander visited the recently captured City of Kerbella and forwarded a plan of it, this Colonel Taylor, to His Excellency Sir S. Canning, Ambassador at Porte. Conveyed to Basrah a Turkish officer and to Baghdad 2, Turkish officers, one Turkish soldier and an Arab. His Excellency Ahmed Pasha of Sulemanieh visited the vessel under a salute.

36. We can judge of the multifarious duties on which the *Nitocris* was employed from the above short extract in which we find it—

- (a) carrying packets from Baghdad to Basrah and back, on which duty it was generally engaged ;
- (b) conveying Residency officers and their families ;
- (c) conveying Turkish officers ;
- (d) conveying a Bishop on his way to India ; and
- (e) survey work.

27. On April 2nd, 1846, the *Nitocris* left Baghdad northwards as reported in Sir H. Rawlinson's letter to the Bombay Government, dated 1st April 1846, with the following instructions from him to Captain Felix Jones :—

"I do not consider it necessary to furnish you with any detailed instructions as to your proceedings on the upper Tigris, but it may be advisable to inform you that the object which I have in view in directing you to attempt the ascent of the river is of the same general character as that which is attained by your monthly passage between Baghdad and Basrah. The right of navigating the rivers of Mesopotamia by vessels of war having been conceded to us by a special Firman from the Porte, it is desirable to retain that right in active exercise wherever there may be sufficient water for the steam vessel which bears our flag. In a political point of view indeed it must be of more consequence to show the British flag occasionally at Mosul than at Basrah, for at the latter port the immediate vicinity of our squadron in the Persian Gulf must always secure for us a due share of consideration which the remoteness of the former place causing our influence to be partially and indirectly felt has frequently led to our interests being disregarded as well by the local authorities as by other classes of the community. You will understand therefore that the higher you ascend the river the better, and that if you should succeed in steaming your vessel as far as the town of Mosul you will achieve an object of considerable importance. As I wish indeed that the present ascent of the river should be definitely connected with the place, I think it would be advisable in the event of your being debarred by want of water or other obstacles from anchoring your vessel at the Mosul bridge, that you should at any rate proceed in person to the city, thereby leading the inhabitants to believe that the steamer is in their immediate neighbourhood. Upon this, however, as well as upon all minor matters, I may safely confide upon your own tried discretion.

You will also, of course, cultivate a friendly intercourse with the Chiefs of the Obeid, Azzah Tye, and Shammer tribes, and although I cannot authorize a lavish expenditure of presents to such parties, I hope to obtain the sanction of Government to a certain excess over your average disbursement on this head, in order to meet the exigencies of the occasion.



You must be guided by the state of the water in determining the period of your return to Baghdad, always bearing in mind, that as we are in daily expectation of receiving intelligence as to the arrangements which may be made for conveying the vessels for repair to India, you will not be authorized by any considerations whatever to protract your departure so long as to risk your being obliged by the fall of the water to remain during the hot weather, on the upper Tigris."

38. An account of the surveys done by the officers of the Indian Navy in Mesopotamia is given in Chapter XI (i).

(VI) British mercantile shipping on the Tigris and replacement of *Nitocris* by *Comet*, 1845-52.

39. The British merchants had long been accustomed to trade with Baghdad from Basrah, but in 1840 two firms were established at Baghdad who carried on the trade with Basrah in country boats, some of which belonged to the firms and sailed under the British flag.

40. This primitive method of conveying goods entailed much delay and was attended with dangers from attacks from Arabs. There was therefore a movement to introduce steamers on the river Tigris. But this was thwarted by the opposition of the Pasha of Baghdad. Further difficulties arose as to the dues payable by British owned vessels.

41. The following two reports sent by Major Rawlinson to the British Embassy deal at length with these matters and are worth being quoted, as they throw much light on the navigation of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates at the time and before.

Dated Baghdad, the 3rd September 1845.

From—MAJOR RAWLINSON,

To—SIR STRATFORD CANNING.

An application was made to me by the authorities of this place some months ago for the realization of certain duties, which were stated to be owing by various parties at Baghdad enjoying English protection, either British or Russian subjects, or in virtue of their employment in the Government service.

I objected to the demand at the time, on the ground of the long period during which British dependents at this place had been exempted from similar liabilities and I imagined that the plea had been admitted. It appears, however, that the authorities deemed it their duty to refer the question to Constantinople, and having received instructions, in reply to levy the objectionable taxes on all parties indiscriminately, they have again addressed me on the subject, and have intimated that unless I can produce an order for special exemption, they must at once proceed to a realization of the amount. Under these circumstances, I do myself the honor to present Your Excellency with a memorandum of the claims, and to subjoin a few remarks in explanation of them.

About twenty-four years ago, a tax named "talibiyeh" was instituted at Baghdad upon the river craft, in order to supply funds for the repair of the bridge, but as it was understood to be an irregular exaction, it was not attempted to be levied on boats in the hands of British subjects. The tax becoming productive was shortly afterwards diverted from its original purpose, and incorporated in the established services of Crown revenue, the exemption of British subjects from its operation being at the same time tacitly conceded.

That exemption it is now proposed to abrogate, and it becomes necessary, therefore, to examine the principles which may be involved in the application of the tax. The river boats belonging to British merchants at Baghdad are employed in two different species of traffic. During the favourable season they convey native produce to Basrah for exportation and return with cargoes of British goods, while at other times they are made use of to supply the town with firewood, salt and other articles of daily consumption, which are found on the banks of the Tigris. The "talibiyeh" duty is applied in different proportions to every trip which such a boat may make, it is calculated in reference to distance and tonnage, and may, be assumed therefore to be levied on the cargo rather than the vessel. If such be the case then the tax must be considered in its application to native produce intended for internal consumption as an oppressive levy, but one of which our merchants cannot complain as long as the most favoured classes of Turkish subjects are equally subject to it; while in regard to the trade with Basrah it can hardly be regarded otherwise than as an infraction of the treaty, inasmuch as it is in excess of the 12 per cent. leviable on exports and 5 per cent. upon imports.



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I would not, in the present state of our relations with the Porte, have troubled Your Excellency with the discussion of this question had the voyage of the *Kerbela* promised to be an isolated, or even an unusual circumstance; but not only is the schooner in question destined, as I have before observed, for permanent employment on the waters of Mesopotamia, but I have also within these few days been consulted with regard to our right of ascending the rivers by three different British mercantile houses, Messrs. Mills and Co., Messrs. Hector and Co., and Messrs. Lynch and Co., each of which parties are, it appears, independently, and more or less actively, engaged in preparing iron steam vessels expressly for the navigation of the Tigris, the object being to supersede the present dilatory and uncertain method of bringing goods from Basrah to Baghdad by sailing or tracking the river boats.

42. Sir Stratford Canning took the matter up and the action taken by him is described in his despatch printed below to the Earl of Dufferin.

No. 45, dated Constantinople, the 18th March 1846.

From—SIR STRATFORD CANNING,

To—THE EARL OF DUFFERIN.

An attempt has been made by the Pasha of Baghdad to forbid the navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates by British merchant-vessels otherwise than under the flag of the country, and to levy duties upon them hitherto confined to Ottoman subjects. The accompanying extracts from the despatches addressed to me upon this subject by Her Majesty's Consul at Baghdad will supply the particulars to Your Lordship's more complete information. They may also serve to exhibit Major Rawlinson's own view of the subject as relates more especially to the duties.

Looking to the future extension of our trade, and knowing the character of Najib Pasha I could not but feel the importance of regulating the questions he had raised by means of a direct understanding with the Porte, and before any new commercial enterprises had confirmed the jealousy which he is ever ready to entertain.


In order to effect so desirable a purpose, it was necessary for me to consult the fair interests of the Porte, and not to leave room for any question as to our doubtful right of conveying merchandize in our own vessels, and under our own flag, beyond the customary port of entry at Basrah. Thus circumstanced, I should have hesitated to enter upon such delicate ground without the advantage of the special instructions, had not the principles by which I was to be guided received Your Lordship's sanction, and that of the Board of Trade, on a former occasion. In the spring of 1842, Major Rawlinson's predecessor at Baghdad referred to me certain points of difference which had arisen between him and the Pasha, and for the discussion of which he was anxious to be prepared. I stated my opinions agreeably to Colonel Taylor's request, and having submitted them subsequently to Your Lordship, had the satisfaction to find that they were approved.

With these recollections to guide me, I applied to the Ottoman Minister for the removal of those obstacles which Najib Pasha had raised to the free navigation of our vessels on the waters under his jurisdiction, and when difficulties arose. as to meeting my wishes to their full extent, I proposed an arrangement, which by means of some discussion between the interpreters, after much delay, was finally accepted, and laid before the Sultan. His Highness' assent is not at all likely to be withheld, and as soon as it is given, the necessary instructions will be transmitted to Najib Pasha, and communicated to Her Majesty's Embassy.

The substance of the agreement is this: British vessels, qualified to navigate as such, will be allowed to pass up and down the rivers without obstruction under their own flag, paying for the merchandize on board according to the Treaty of Balta Liman, and staying to carry on the internal traffic at their pleasure. British-owned boats or vessels built in the country and employed in the internal trade will pay duty on the same terms, but will not be allowed to bear the national colours. Those vessels which pass up the rivers beyond the port of entry will pay an anchorage duty of 5 Turkish piastres on each vessel, a charge considerably less than half the amount levied under that denomination on British vessels here.

I trust, my Lord, that by making this arrangement I have permanently secured to our merchants the right of navigating the waters of Mesopotamia under the protection of their own national flag as high as the draught of the vessels which bear it will allow, while the charges to be levied on their merchandize are only those which we could not, with any show of justice or shadow of propriety, refuse. With respect to the country-built boats, which Major Rawlinson describes as having enjoyed the use of British colors for many years, I can only submit that they have enjoyed that advantage illegally as regards the laws of the United Kingdom, and that although I should be glad, for the sake of appearance, to spare their owners the fancied humiliation of a change, I cannot forget that they are now to be exempted from every charge other than that upon the goods on board, and I trust also that there will no longer be any distinction between steamers and sailing-vessels.

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It is further necessary that I should point out to Your Excellency that the "talibiyeh" duty leviable at Baghdad varies altogether in principle from the taxes which are imposed upon vessels navigating the river by the Arab Chiefs upon the banks, and which formed the subject of a reference made to Your Excellency by my predecessor in 1843. Those taxes, amounting on each trip to about 1,500 piastres, Your Excellency considered to be in a certain degree legitimatised by long usage, by their application to the vessel rather than to the cargo, and by their forming a perquisite of the Arab Chiefs, for which, in event of their suppression, the Turkish Government would be bound to afford indemnification. The present tax, on the contrary, is novel in its application to British boats; it bears directly upon the cargo, and it accrues immediately to the Government in excess of the legitimate dues, and without producing any advantage to the merchant either in regard to security or accommodation.

If Your Excellency concur in the view of the case which I have adopted, you may perhaps think it advisable to procure a Vizirial letter to the authorities at Baghdad, sanctioning the application of the "talibiyeh" tax to British boats when they have cargoes of native produce intended for internal consumption, but confirming the exemption from its operation, which our merchants have hitherto enjoyed, when they load their boats with native produce for exportation, or with British goods and manufactures.

Dated Baghdad, the 25th November 1845.

From—MAJOR RAWLINSON,

To—SIR SEATFORD CANNING.

A schooner, named the *Kerbela*, has not only been built at Bombay by a merchant of that place expressly for the navigation of the rivers of Mesopotamia, but the vessel has actually arrived at Basrah, from whence her owners have transmitted to me a copy of their register (transcript of which is annexed), and have claimed the right of ascending the Tigris under British colors and free of all demands from the Arabs who line the banks.

Before sending any answer to Basrah, I have, of course, addressed His Excellency Najib Pasha on the subject and I have been informed in reply that, although His Excellency questions the right of any British vessel to navigate the river, except on under special Firman from the Porte, he will not, pending reference to Constantinople, place an absolute interdict upon ascent of the vessel in question; but, at the same time he demands (and apparently he makes the demand under authority) that she shall not hoist a British flag above the port of Basrah. With regard to the demands of the Arabs he observes that if the vessel be in the condition to resist them, she is at liberty to do so; but, as his own authority over the tribes who inhabit the marshes is merely nominal, and as their power to impede the passage of any vessel not impelled by steam is undoubted, the owners of the schooner, he adds, must take upon themselves the responsibility incurred by any opposition upon their part to establish usage.

In conformity with the opinion recorded by Your Excellency in your despatch to my predecessor under date the 28th April 1842, I shall recommend the Captain of the *Kerbela* to raise no question at present respecting the payment to the Arab Chiefs, to whose good-will he must be indebted, for the possible accomplishment of the ascent of the river; but, after Turkish boats possessed by British owners, or owners under British protection, have been hitherto permitted for a period of 40 years to navigate the river under British colors, I have a strong repugnance in the case of a British boat to acknowledge the right of the Baghdad Government to demand the substitution of a Turkish flag. As the concession of this point, indeed, appears to be equivalent to a concession of our national right of navigating the Mesopotamian rivers for the purpose of trade, I think it better that the vessel in question should incur a loss by demurrage at Basrah, pending an answer from Your Excellency to my present despatch, than that, by appearing under Turkish colors, she should afford a precedent for the renewal of a demand, of which the property is certainly doubtful, and which Your Excellency, after due consideration, may be prepared to resist.

The real question at issue appears to be, whether Baghdad can be considered a port? I referred this point on a previous occasion to Mr. Consul-General Cartwright, and he was clearly of opinion that if a vessel built and laden at an Indian port could enter the River Euphrates, pass Basrah, without breaking bulk or paying duty and land her cargo at Baghdad, the latter place might then be held to be the port of the Tigris, as Sook-es-shukh might be considered the port of Euphrates and Basrah that of the united rivers.

Hitherto we have had no instance of a vessel importing cargo direct from India to Baghdad (nor even of a British merchant-vessel appearing in the Tigris), but *Kerbela* is a case in point adapted to river, as well as to a navigation. She can proceed without breaking bulk from Bombay to Baghdad, and if by so doing she can be admitted to have verified the claim of Baghdad, to be considered as the port of the Tigris, then, of course, neither she nor any British vessel can be legitimately required to strike the national flag on ascending the river above the town of Basrah.



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But should I be mistaken in these respects, it is open for your Lordship to object to the present arrangement, and as much objection would no doubt be founded upon a sound view of our rights, there could be no great difficulty in correcting my error. A copy of the instructions destined for the Pasha of Baghdad shall be forwarded to Your Lordship by the next opportunity.

43. In April 1846 the British Ambassador obtained from the Grand Vizier the following order addressed to the Governor of Baghdad:—

Lettre du Grand Vizir au Pacha de Bagdad en date du 2nd Avril 1846.

TRANSLATION.

J'ai pris connaissance du contenu De la Eépêche arrivée il y a quelque temps de la part de Votre Excellence relativement aux droits que payent les bâtiments et les barques qui naviguent sur le Tigre et l'Euphrate.

En même temps, Son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre résident à Constantinople a représenté dans un *Faier* que les bâtiments Anglais peuvent faire le Commerce dans les deux fleuves susmentionnés, en payant les droits établis par le *Traité*, et ila demande qu'une dépêche conçue dans ce sens, fût, écrite à Votre Excellence.

Cette question ayant été referée au surintendant de l'Hotel des monnaies, Son Excellence a fait la dessus un Rapport dont la teneur suit.

Le transport de marchandises d'une place à une autre sur les deux fleuves susdits et sans sortie à la mer, est un commerce intérieur, ainsi sous quelque pavillon que les navires et les barques fassent ce genre de commerce, il faut qu'ils payent dans ce cas, les mêmes droits qui l'on perçoit des Patrons des barques, sujet de la Sublime Porte. On percevra des bâtiments marchands qui venant sous pavillon Anglais des Pays Etrangers, entrant dans l'un des fleuves avec un chargement de produits de la Turquie pour exporter et retournent à la mer les droits fixés par le *Traité* et le *Tarif*, après quoi on prendra des bâtiments marchands Anglais aussi qui fréquentent le Tigre et l'Euphrate, de même qu'on le prend des bâtiments marchands des Puissances Etrangères qui viennent dans les ports de l'Empire Ottoman, et d'après l'exemple existant, un droit d'ancrage qui, comme nous apprenons consiste en cinq piastres par bâtiment.

Sur le Rapport ci-dessus auquel l'Ambassadeur Britannique a donné son adhesion, l'affaire a été soumise au Sultan pour consulter le bon plaisir de Sa Majesté Impériale, qui a ordonné de vous faire savior par une dépêche qu'il faut mettre à exécution tout ce qui est nécessaire a cet égard.

En conséquence, je vous écris et vous envoie cette dépêche afin que Votre Excellence mette ses soins à ce que l'on prenne des barques de commerce Anglaise qui, comme il a été dit plus haut, seraient désormais occupés à faire le commerce intérieur sur les deux infleuves susdits, des droits conformes a ceux que l'on prend des barques des sujets Ottomans: et à ce que l'on ne prenne sur les chargements des bâtiments Anglais qui viennent de dehors, et qui vont dans un pays étranger, que les droits de douane établis, et qu'un droit d'ancrage consistent en cinq piastres. Votre Excellence aura soin de ne rien faire prendre de plus.

Le 6 Rebiul Akhir 1262.

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
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44. In forwarding this order in translation, Sir Startford Canning, in his Despatch, dated 4th April 1846, referred to his Despatch of 25th March 1846 explaining the nature of the arrangement arrived at. He had written on the 25th March 1846 as follows:—

"British-owned vessels will continue to navigate the waters of Mesopotamia under their national colours equally whether they are engaged in the foreign or in the internal trade, and they will pay upon the merchandise which they convey the amount of duties respectively applied to in each case by the Convention of Balli-Liman.

In the event of their being employed above the usual ports of entry in the internal traffic of the country, they will be liable to the anchorage duty which is always paid here and which is sanctioned by the capitulations, but instead of paying 12 piastres as levied upon each vessel in the harbour of Constantinople, they will only pay 5 piastres.

There is no question of any difference between steam boats and sailing vessels.





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(vii) Navigation of the Tigris by mercantile steam ships and question of retention of the "Comet," 1859—71.

50. In the year 1859, Messrs. Lynch and Company contemplated placing a steamer on the Tigris to run between Baghdad and Basrah, and based their right upon the correspondence of 1846 dealt with in the preceding paragraphs.

‡ No. 53, dated 18th October.

Colonel Kemball, to remove all doubts upon the matter, referred† Sir H. Bulwer, then Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, to Sir Stratford Canning's despatch of the 25th March 1846 and to the Vizirial letter dated 2nd April 1846, and enquired whether the latter document constituted a sufficient authority for British merchants to engage in the navigation of the rivers of Mesopotamia, or is a firman or other special sanction necessary.

Sir H. Bulwer in his despatch No. 1, dated 13th February 1860, replied as follows: "The Vizirial letter alluded to could not be considered as conferring any permanent right: such a document, giving in fact merely a temporary permission, might be revoked at any moment by another document of similar character. Nor do I deem it safe, unless the Porte were willing to give some special sanction to that effect, that the Company would be justified in engaging their capital in the navigation of the rivers of Mesopotamia." He added, however, that his enquiries whether the Porte would be inclined to make such a special grant had resulted in an expression of opinion by the Turkish Foreign Minister that if Messrs. Lynch and Company were to apply for a firman or concession to establish a line of steamers to run between Baghdad and Basrah, the Porte would not be averse from an arrangement of this nature.

51. Upon receipt of Sir Henry Bulwer's despatch, Messrs. Lynch and

*Colonel Kemball to Ambassador, No. 11, dated 21st March 1860.

Company submitted through Colonel Kemball an application for a firman "granting them the requisite sanction to navigate the rivers of the country with British registered steam vessels;" and Colonel Kemball further intimated that Messrs. Lynch and Company intended to commence operations with one steamer, and, if the speculation succeeded, to increase the number of their vessels.

52. In reply to the application of Messrs. Lynch and Company the Grand Vizir issued the following letter to the Governor of Baghdad:—

Translation of letter from the Grand Vizir to the Pasha of Baghdad.

The British Embassy having recently made certain communications for the purpose of obtaining a renewal of the orders which were sent concerning the British steamer and boats authorised by Her Majesty to ply on the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, it has appeared from the register that permission having on a former occasion been applied for by it to station two steamers on the river Euphrates at Baghdad and to run them by turns for the purpose of facilitating trade, two firmans, dated respectively the end of Shaban 1250 and the beginning of Rejeb 1257, were addressed to the late Governor-General of Baghdad, Ali Riza Pasha, authorizing the permanent station of two steamers on that river, provided it were proved and established that the advantage resulting therefrom would be mutual, and that no sort of inconvenience would ensue. Further that, in virtue of a report received respecting the dues payable by vessels and boats navigating the Euphrates and Tigris, and in



You will be so good as to act according to the above rule.

(Sealed) MEHEMED.

3rd REJEB 1277.
15th January 1861.

53. Messrs. Lynch & Co. accordingly despatched the *City of London* for service on the Tigris.

54. The authorities at Baghdad were, however, opposed to the establishment of steam navigation, and in July 1862 the Ambassador at Constantinople obtained the issue of a new Vizirial letter, the terms of which were identical with those of the letter of 1861. We shall

Mr. Plowden's memo. in Secret, May 1882, Nos. 221-272.

quote below as to the proceedings of 1864 the summary of Mr. Plowden in the collection noted in the margin.

In 1864, when the intention of the Company to place a second steamer on the Tigris in connection with the Indian Mail Service became known, Manik Pasha renewed his objections.

See Colonel A. B. Kemball's letter dated 7th September 1864, to Sir H. L. Bulwer and subsequent correspondence.

Political A., November 1864, Nos. 180-181.
Political A., December 1864, Nos. 263-264.

And the persistency with which they reiterated this statement apparently ended in securing its undisputed acceptance. They have, in fact, induced people to regard the British Government and a local British firm as identical entities, and to apply to the operations of that firm on the Tigris a sanction granted to the British Government for the Euphrates; and having shown that the terms of that concession allowed only two steamers, and that two steamers—the *City of London* and the *Comet*—were as a matter of fact already stationed on the Tigris, there was no other conclusion possible but that the firm in question had no right to bring out what was described as a third steamer. One statement in this argument, that the *Comet* belonged to the Euphrates and Tigris Company, was immediately assailed; and it having been proved that this vessel belonged to the Indian Government, the new steamer brought out by the Company, the *Dejleh*, was permitted to run. The Porte, however, gained one important advantage from this discussion. The little mis-statement about the *Comet* diverted attention from the substantial issue, and gave them the opportunity to discard without detection the correspondence of 1846. Consequently after that misstatement had been set right, with the result that the Company attained their immediate object in view—withdrawal of opposition to the *Dejleh*—nobody thought it worth while till the year 1883 to traverse the far more important assertion that the Company's right to navigate the Tigris rested on a specific firman applicable to the Company alone and restricted to two steamers.

Colonel Kemball, having learned that Namik Pasha contemplated opposition to the *Dejleh*, drew His Excellency's attention to existing arrangements whereby British merchant steamers were at liberty to navigate the Tigris without any limit as to number of vessels, and asked him to specify his objections.

Namik Pasha replied that in the Vizirial letters preserved in his archives it was clearly laid down that the British Government was permitted to run only two steamers on the Tigris, and to run them by turns; and as two steamers were now present, he was unable to perceive on what grounds a third steamer could be claimed. Manik Pasha's view was firmly supported by his own Government; and the correspondence which ensued was persistently conducted by the Turks on the basis that only two steamers were admissible; that there was no distinction between the Company's steamers the *City of London* and the Government steamer *Comet*; and that no third steamer could be allowed. And the British authorities appear to have been so far convinced of the soundness of the Turkish case, that they seem to have agreed to withdraw the *Comet* to make way for the Company's new steamer, the *Dejleh*. This stage of the controversy terminated with Ali Pasha's note, dated 1st October 1864, a copy of which was forwarded to Colonel Kemball in a despatch from Her Majesty's *Chargé d'Affaires*, No. 17, dated 3rd October.

This note, in deciding the question at issue, commenced with a statement that Her Majesty's Embassy had asked the Porte—

"Qui des ordres soient transmis au Gouverneur Général de Baghdad à l'effet de ne pas s'opposer à la navigation sur le Tigre du nouveau bateau à vapeur que Messieurs Lynch et Co. feront venir de Londres dans le but de remplacer le "*Comet*" un des deux bateaux sous pavillon Anglais qui ont l'autorisation de naviguer sur le dit fleuve.

It is not clear whether Ali Pasha quoted correctly the English memorandum; but as shown by Mr. Plowden it will be obvious from the statements in the foregoing paragraphs that the words italicised altogether misrepresent the true position of affairs. Ali Pasha's note proceeds—

"Vous savez, Monsieur le *Chargé d'Affaires*, que l'autorisation accordée à cet effet comporte outre la réserve stipulée pour le cas où des inconvénients locaux seraient signalés



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dans sa mise à exécution, la condition expresse que le nombre des bateaux à vapeur destinés à cette navigation sera définitivement fixé à deux. Comme ils'agit aujourd'hui de remplacer un des deux bateaux qui font déjà le service le Gouverneur General de Baghdad a reçu l'ordre de ne pas s'opposer à l'arrivée du nouveau bateau à condition que celui qu'il est destiné à remplacer quette immédiatement le fleuve et que sous aucun prétexte aucun bateau à vapeur sous pavillon étranger en dehors des deux qui y sont autorisés ne puisse stationner ou circuler dans les eaux du susdit fleuve."

It will be perceived at once that Ali Pasha recites as applicable to merchant steamers on the Tigris conditions contained in a document which relates solely to the navigation of the Euphrates by two steamers the property of the British Government.

55. Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires (Mr. Stuart) sent the above note to Colonel Kemball with his despatch No. 17, dated 3rd October 1864, and observed:—

"You will perceive that the Governor General of Baghdad has been instructed to permit the arrival of the new English steamer,* upon condition that the one which it is destined to replace should leave the Tigris, immediately, but to prevent all other steamers bearing a foreign flag from stopping or circulating in the waters of that river upon any pretence whatever."

56. In order to understand the full import of the word "foreign" we should read here a report, dated 7th September 1864 sent by Colonel Kemball to the British Embassy about an attempted French enterprise on the Tigris:—

"I take this opportunity to mention to Your Excellency that for some time past a French Company has proposed also to navigate the Tigris with steamers carrying the national flag, while Namik Pasha supposed that no limit would be assigned to the number of English vessels. His Excellency seemed disposed to encourage such a speculation, but latterly, to the disappointment of the parties concerned, His Excellency has stated that the privilege conceded to Her Majesty's Government, both being in its origin and in its nature exceptional, it could not be arrogated by any other nation. The reply of the French party to this argument is, that, however valid the exception in the case of the public vessels of a foreign State, it could not be extended to the merchant vessels of the State, without conferring a general right under "the most favored nation" clause; and acting upon this view of the case, they have now referred the question for decision to Constantinople."

57. Colonel Kemball in commenting upon the note of Ali Pasha, observed:—

"Presuming that the resolution of the Porte restricting to two the number of river steamers of whatever denomination bearing the English flag which may be permitted to navigate the rivers of Mesopotamia has been admitted by Her Majesty's Government, I will, by the first opportunity, transmit to the Government of Bombay a copy of Your Excellency's despatch No. 17 of 3rd October 1864, with enclosure, in order that arrangements may be made for the immediate withdrawal to India of the Residency despatch boat *Comet*, as well as the *Satellite*, which vessel had been sent to Basrah to relieve the *Comet*. I would, however, beg respectfully to remark to Your Excellency that the assumption of Ali Pasha to the effect that the additional vessel, called the *Dijleh*, belonging to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, was destined to relieve the *Comet*, is certainly erroneous, the former vessel being the property of a trading company, the latter of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India to withdraw the *Comet* in order to make way for the *Dijleh* should the Porte decline to allow more than two vessels under a foreign flag to navigate the Tigris."

58. The British Embassy then pressed this clear view of the case upon the Porte. Permission was at first given to retain the *Comet* temporarily for the protection of the working parties engaged in constructing the telegraphs between Basrah and Baghdad. Subsequently the position of the *Comet* was further discussed and the fact established that it was an armed vessel belonging to the British Government and not a private trading vessel.

59. In September 1868 the Government of India was informed by the Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, that the *Comet* which had been condemned so far back as 1862, was then in a most dangerous condition, as the cost of putting the vessel into thorough repair would be excessive, it was considered preferable to carry out the original intention of replacing the *Comet* by another boat of the same size and capacity. Accordingly a recommendation was made to Her Majesty's Government that if the proposal was not considered objectionable, the consent of the Turkish Government should be obtained to the arrangement (Despatch No. 168, dated 7th October 1868).

60. Finally the Secretary of State intimated in his despatch No. 166, dated 10th August 1869, that the Porte had given its consent to the employment of a



new vessel belonging to *La Marine Royal* on the rivers of Mesopotamia, in place of the *Comet* in the following *note verbale* dated 13th July 1869:—

"En réponse à la note verbale de l'Ambassade de S. M. Britannique en date du 23 Juin, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de l'informer que la S. Porté consent au remplacement par un autre navire du bâtiment de la *Marine Royal La Comete* se trouvant sur le rivières de Mesopotamie, et qu'elle a transmis des ordres en conséquence au Gouverneur-Général du Vilayet de Baghdad."

61. In February 1870 the Governor-General in Council reviewed the correspondence which had taken place regarding the employment of a new vessel on the rivers of Mesopotamia in lieu of the *Comet*. While recognising the importance of having a Government vessel on those rivers, His Excellency in Council considered it unnecessary, in consequence of the increased facilities for navigation, to replace the *Comet* by a vessel of similar size, which would cost Rupees 61,200 to purchase and Rs. 3,039 a month to maintain. His Excellency in Council was of opinion that a small steam launch worth Rs. 10,000 or 12,000, with an establishment costing Rs. 6,000 a year at the utmost, would suffice for the use of the Baghdad Residency (Resolution dated 23rd February 1870).

62. A copy of this Resolution was sent to the Marine Department for consideration.

63. A copy was also forwarded to the Officiating Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, who earnestly solicited reconsideration of the subject. He said that the only way in which the navigation of the rivers

Political A., February 1870, Nos. 231-43 (No. 243).

No. 8, dated 7th April 1870.

Political A., June 1870, Nos. 268-270.

was facilitated was that vessels could now pass up and down in perfect freedom from attack by hostile Arab tribes. But the natural difficulties remained the same, while the presence of an increased number of Turkish boats was the strongest possible reason for the replacement of the *Comet* by a vessel of equal importance. The Turkish authorities were doing their best to drive the vessels of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company off the river. Should they succeed, the British and Indian community of Baghdad would necessarily depend on the Government vessels attached to the Residency, and she would be the only available means of keeping up the postal communication with India.

Another point deserving of serious consideration was the moral support afforded by the presence of a Government vessel at Baghdad to British commercial enterprise in that country. This support, Colonel Herbert observed, was very great. Only in 1869 when a portion of the country was in a state of rebellion and an attempt at insurrection was made in the town, the *Comet* was looked to as a means of escape in case of need.

Colonel Herbert also pointed to the probability that before long the high road connecting England and India would pass through Baghdad, "a country which will produce cotton of excellent quality, which possesses a soil and climate that give promise, that as it advances it may supply many of the wants of England and Europe, and which offers a most promising field for the investment of agricultural and commercial capital." He was of opinion that a steam launch such as that proposed by Government would not meet the necessity of the case. He therefore trusted that the Governor-General in Council would allow no consideration to induce the adoption of



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65. Meanwhile Sir Henry Elliot, in submitting Colonel Herbert's despatch above alluded to, had endorsed his arguments strongly and pointed out that "if the present opportunity is lost for replacing the rotten vessel by a sound one, it is not likely to be recovered," (Despatch No. 25, dated 21st May 1870.) The Secretary of State held the same view (Despatch to the Government of India, No. 69, dated 23rd June 1870.)*

66. The Government of India still adhered to their views as expressed in their Resolution, dated 23rd February 1870, but decided in deference to the views of the Secretary of State to replace the *Comet* by another vessel of similar size.

None of the vessels at the disposal of the Marine Department of the Government of India was found fitted for navigation of the rivers in Mesopotamia. The Secretary of State was therefore requested to direct that the necessary steps might be taken for the construction of a suitable new vessel, the cost of which was estimated at Rs. 61,200, and the charge of maintenance at Rs. 3,039 per mensem.

As the reasons for replacing the *Comet* affected rather the English than Indian interests, it was suggested that the charges should be borne in equal proportions by the Imperial and Indian revenues (Despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 86, dated 23rd May 1871).

67. It was not till 1880 that the Secretary of State was pleased to take up this question.

(viii) Opposition of the Porte to the proposed replacement of the steamers of Messrs. Lynch & Co.—1874-75.

68. In 1874 Lynch and Company applied on behalf of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to replace the *City of London*, which would be turned into a store ship, by a new steamer together with a steam launch. Immediate advantage was taken of this request to revive the old theory that the British Government and the above-mentioned Company were identical; that only two steamers carrying the British flag were allowed on the Tigris; and that, owing to the presence at one time of the *Comet*, the *City of London* the *Dejleh* and a small steam launch, the authorized number had been exceeded, and that consequently compliance with the Company's application was out of the question.

69. Colonel Herbert, to whom this note from the Porte was referred for verification, explained once more the real position of the *Comet* and disposed of various other misstatements which the note contained.

70. These explanations were accepted, and the status of the *Comet* was once again clearly defined in Sir H. Elliott's despatch dated 29th May, and in Safeit Pasha's note dated 31st March 1875. But, remarks Mr. Plowden in his memorandum in Secret, May 1882, Nos. 221-242, the old mistake was repeated, that the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company ran their steamers on the Tigris under a special firman granted to Messrs. Lynch and Co. which limited the number of vessels to two steamers.

71. The note of Safeit Pasha dated 31st March 1875 is quoted below :—
Daté Sublime Porte, 31 Mars 1875.

De—SAFEIT,
A—M. l'Ambassadeur.

Le Ministère Imperial a reçu en son temps la note que V.E. a bien voulu lui adresser le 2 Juillet 1874, No. 112, relativement aux bateaux à vapeur de Messrs. Lynch et Cie. affutés au service de la navigation au Tigre.

Conformément au désir exprimé par l'Ambassade de S. M. Britannique la S. P. consent à ce que l'un des deux bateaux que Messrs. Lynch et Cie. emploient en vertu d'un Firman Imperial pour le service des passagers et des marchandises sur le Tigre soit provisoirement remplacé par un autre sans que le nombre des navires autorisé par le susdit Firman puisse être augmenté.

Messrs. Lynch pourront en outre employer un bateau mouche dans des circonstances exceptionnelles et en cas de baisse des eaux du Tigre.

* It must also be noted that the Bombay Government also strongly protested against the Resolution of the Government of India. After reviewing the facts, they stated—
Political A., December 1870, Nos. 421-42-A. "His Excellency believes that it will be difficult in the face of the opposition of the Turkish Government, and possibly of other powers, to restore to England her privileges of once surrendered on account of considerations of economy."

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Pour ce qui est du bâtiment de la Marine Royal la *Comet*, il continuera, connue par le passé à rester sur les rivières de la Mesopotamie suivant l'entente précédemment établi.

J'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de V. E. cette décision de la S. P. qui a été déjà communiquée télégraphique au Gouverneur-Général de Bagdad.

72. The upshot of the negotiations of 1874-1875 was on the whole a distinct advance, on which the Company could make a stand in the future in their continuous struggle against the machinations of the Turkish authorities.

73. The result of the negotiations was telegraphed as follows by Sir A. Elliot on 31st March to the Foreign Office :—

"The Porte authorises Messrs. Lynch to replace one of their old steamers by a new one and also to employ the steam launch in exceptional cases and when water is low. The objections about the *Comet* are withdrawn and the vessel may remain at Bagdad."

74. The concession granted in 1875 was utilized by Messrs. Lynch in replacing both their vessels the *City of London* and *Dejleh* by the *Blosse Lynch* and the *Khalifah*, respectively. Both the new vessels were larger than those whose places they took. It must be noted that the Vizirial letter laid no limitation as to size, and the Turks did not think of raising any objection on this score in 1875, as they did later on in 1883, when a new ship was brought to replace the *Blosse Lynch*.

(ix) Question of our navigation rights in 1880-82. Right of British ships to tow barges.

75. In March 1880 Messrs. Lynch and Company (acting as Agents for the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company) complained that the Vali of Basrah had objected to the S. S. *Khalifah* towing a barge, and had declared that he could not allow another barge to leave, except under sanction from Constantinople. Messrs. Lynch and Company added that they had given notice six months before of their intention to employ barges; that one barge had now been in use for three months, while the other had made several trips.

76. It soon transpired that the ground taken by Zabib Pasha, then Vali of Basrah, was the old one, that Messrs. Lynch and Company were only entitled to run two steamers on the Tigris, and that, as barges were not expressly mentioned in the Firman which regulated the matter, their use could not be permitted, except under sanction from Constantinople. The Porte fully supported this view of the case, and when ultimately, under considerable pressure, the barges were permitted to run, the sanction was made to depend upon the continuance of the famine then prevailing in Mesopotamia, and this view was maintained not only in a letter, dated 13th February 1881, from the Vali to Mr. Plowden, but also in the Ottoman note dated 11th December 1881. This note, however, differs from those which had preceded it in one very important particular. Whereas in former notes—see, for instance, Ali Pasha's note dated 1st October 1864, and Safeit Pasha's dated 31st March 1875—the Firman, which is said to define Messrs. Lynch and Company's rights, is described as relating to the Tigris, its provisions are in the note of 1881 applied to the Euphrates.

77. In his despatch, dated 4th February 1881, the British Ambassador (Mr. Goschen) asked Mr. Plowden to confer with the Agent at Bagdad of the Tigris and Euphrates Navigation Company and to report what further arguments based on usage or otherwise could be brought forward with the Porte on the question of the navigation of the Euphrates and Tigris. Mr. Plowden submitted a long memorandum, portions of which have already been quoted, explaining the precise position on the following points :—

- (1) the rights and privileges of the British Government in respect to the retention of vessels upon the Tigris and Euphrates;
- (2) the rights of the British merchants in general to navigate for commercial purposes either one or both these rivers;



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(3) the especial rights of the Tigris and Euphrates Steam Navigation Company.

78. After reviewing the correspondence above referred to up to the year 1875 he observed :—

"The propositions which I venture to think are established by the correspondence dealt with in the preceding paragraphs are—

- (1) That the *British Government* has under the Firmans of 1834 and 1841, which have been confirmed by the Viziral letters of January 1861 and July 1862, the right, subject to certain special conditions, to navigate the river Euphrates with two steamers "for the purposes of trade."
- (2) That under the arrangements of 1846, also confirmed in the Viziral letters of 1861 and 1862, *British merchants* are at liberty to navigate the Tigris and the Euphrates under the British flag and *without any restriction as to the number or description of the vessels employed*, subject to the payment of the stipulated dues.
- (3) That the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, represented by Lynch & Co., have no Firman granting them an exclusive privilege to navigate Tigris with two and only two steamers. Their rights really depend on the arrangement of 1846, and so far are neither greater nor less than those which may be claimed by any British merchant."

79. As regards the question of the barges, Mr. Plowden observed :—

"The letter from the Local Agent of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, referred to in paragraph 2 of this despatch, deals with the particular question of the right of the company to two barges. Mr. Blockey's argument is, first, that the company (or rather Lynch & Co., to whose rights the company had succeeded) has for years employed country boats in the river trade, and that these boats have, when occasion required, been towed by the steamers, and that no objection has been made. If they may tow boats laden with cargo, why may they not tow barges? Again, the right to have two steamers necessarily implies the right to use them in any and every way in which a steamer can be ordinarily used; it is absurd, Mr. Blockey contends, to say that the company's steamers may be employed to carry cargo but not tow it. I think these arguments are entitled to consideration. And in support of Mr. Blockey's assertion as to the frequent use of barges on the Tigris, I may cite the example of the Turkish steamers on that river.

80. Mr. Plowden concluded his report with the following remarks :—

"In my endeavour to suggest an answer to the question propounded in Your Excellency's letter, I have hitherto drawn only upon the correspondence on record in my office, which specially relates to the navigation of the Tigris and the Euphrates. I beg further to cite Article XXIII of the Capitulation and Article VIII of the Treaty of Commerce of 1861. Article XXII, which is confirmed by Articles I and II of the Treaty of 1861, empowers British subjects to buy, sell and trade in the Sultan's dominions and to "load and transport in their ships every kind of merchandise at their pleasure without experiencing any the least obstacle or hindrance from any one."

Article VIII provides "all articles which are or may be legally importable into the dominions and possessions of Her Britannic Majesty in British vessels, may likewise be imported in Ottoman vessels without being liable to any other or higher duties or charges, of whatever denomination, than if such articles were imported in British vessels; and reciprocally, all articles which are or may be legally importable into the dominions and possessions of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Ottoman vessels, may likewise be imported in British vessels without being liable to any other or higher duties or charges, of whatever denomination, than if such articles were imported in Ottoman vessels. Such reciprocal equality of treatment shall take effect without distinction, whether such articles come directly from the place, or from any other country.

In the same manner, there shall be perfect equality of treatment in regard to exportation so that the same export duties shall be paid, and the same bounties and drawbacks allowed, in the dominions and possessions of either of the Contracting Parties, on the exportation of any article which is or may be legally exportable therefrom, whether such exportation shall take place in the Ottoman or in British vessels, and whatever may be the place of destination, whether a port of either of the Contracting Parties or of any third Power.

I submit that a plain and fair construction of these two Articles confers on British subjects the right to engage in trade, internal and foreign, anywhere in Turkey; to load merchandise and transport it in their ships from one part of the Sultan's dominions to another part; and to employ under identical conditions British merchant vessels in any part of the Turkish Empire in which Ottoman vessels may be employed, just as reciprocally in British dominions Ottoman vessels may go wherever British vessels may go. The terms of these Articles are comprehensive and make no reservation in favour of the Tigris or Euphrates or any other river. And as it is a fact that Ottoman merchant steamers ply up and down the Tigris, it seems to me that British vessels are also entitled to navigate these rivers for purposes of commerce.



(x) Replacement of the *Comet* 1880-83.

81. The Secretary of State, as we have noted, did not reply for several years to the proposals made by the Government of India, and it was only in 1880 that it was finally decided to build a new vessel to replace the *Comet*, the Home Government contributing £3,000 towards the cost of building. Meanwhile the Turkish Government had several times asked for the removal of the *Comet*, being under the impression that it originally belonged to Messrs. Lynch and Company, and maintaining that this firm could not have more than two steamers on the rivers of Mesopotamia. The Ambassador at Constantinople succeeded, however, in proving that the Porte made a mistake in supposing the *Comet* to belong to a private firm, and they consequently withdrew their objections.

Proceedings, May 1875, No. 223.

82. In 1882 it was considered absolutely necessary to replace the *Comet*; and as the new ship was not ready, a vessel, the *London*, was hired for temporary use, but she foundered in the Shat-el-Arab before reaching Baghdad. Later on it was found that the new vessel constructed at Bombay had been made too large for use on the Tigris. Consequently a second vessel had to be built which was ready in 1888.

83. In October 1882, it was proposed to send the Resident a steam launch for use till the ship could be made ready; but no suitable launch could be found, and the matter was momentarily allowed to drop.

84. In March 1883, Mr. Plowden sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State strongly urging the necessity of replacing the *Comet* early. He thought that the best opportunity for bringing the vessel to Baghdad would be his return to that place in August, and he proposed that no further communication should be made to the Turkish Government. If they objected after the arrival of the vessel, they might be referred to the permission given in 1869. The Secretary of State forwarded this memorandum to the Government of India for opinion.

A., Political E., October 1883, Nos. 198-206.

85. That the rivers of Mesopotamia were still unsafe was amply proved by the attack made in 1880 on the mail steamer *Khalifah*. Two men were killed and one wounded, and the Turks have as yet been unable to bring the perpetrators of the robbery to account.

A., Political E., May 1883, Nos. 72-78.

A., Political E., August 1883, Nos. 377-379.

86. In April 1883, Colonel Tweedie reported that disturbance thickened round Amrah on the left bank of the Tigris, and that the Turkish authorities would find it difficult to restore order, though they protected their mail steamers by placing strong guards on board.

87. The new vessel was built at a cost of Rs. 93,494-10-5, the original estimate being Rs. 70,000. It was armed with two Nordenfelt guns of the lightest description. Permission was obtained from the Porte to take the ship up the Tigris on condition that the old one left the river first. The latter was dismantled at Baghdad itself, and a new boat entered the river in October 1884.

(xi) (1) Proposed replacement of *Blosse Lynch* with a new steamer.

(2) Turkish opposition to navigation of the Tigris by British ships, 1883.

88. In May 1883, Messrs. Lynch and Co. wanted to replace an old steamer (*Blosse Lynch*) by a new one; but as the new ship (*Mejidieh*) was said to be somewhat larger than the vessel formerly employed, the Wali of Baghdad informed the Resident that Messrs. Lynch and Co. could have only two steamers, and that these must always be replaced by ships of the same size. It was then proved that the tonnage of the new steamer was somewhat less than that of the former boat, but then the Turkish authorities, acting under instructions from Constantinople, pretended that the steamers were not allowed to run on the Tigris, but only on the Euphrates.

Secret E., August 1883, Nos. 342-443.



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89. On the 14th June the Wali asked the Resident to prevent the steamers of Messrs. Lynch and Co. from entering the Tigris. Colonel Tweedie replied that this was a matter of serious importance, which could not be settled locally, and that he would report the case to Government. On receipt of his telegraphic report, the Embassy at Constantinople at once addressed the Porte on the subject, but no immediate orders were issued, and the Wali threatened to stop the steamers by force. As the question was to be decided at Constantinople, the Government of India did not interfere beyond calling the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the case, and suggesting that the case of the *Comet* should be negotiated at the same time.

90. On the 28th June the steamer *Mosoul* was prevented from shipping her cargo, and the Agent of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company was informed that the steamers would not in future be allowed to load or discharge. On the same date the Wali informed the Resident that a telegram from Constantinople prohibited English steamers from entering the Tigris. In reply, the Resident once more referred to the negotiations going on at Constantinople, and asked for delay pending final orders. To this the Wali replied as follows :--

"In reply to your letter No. 54 of 28th instant, I have the honour to repeat intimation already made to you that, as Lynch and Company's privilege applies to Euphrates only, the Ottoman Government have finally prohibited their keeping steamers on the Tigris, and that it is therefore impossible to further the views stated in your letter.

"2. Previous letters have informed you that Lynch and Company have permission to run two steamers on the Euphrates, but not on the Tigris.

"Their steamer *Méjidiéh*, which came up to Baghdad from Basra on this occasion having reached Baghdad before issue of final orders, will be permitted to discharge her cargo. But I take this opportunity to inform you that final orders have been given to the Captain of our steamer at Gurna, and others; that henceforward it is requisite that no cargo should be given to Lynch's steamers; also that, should they desire to run on the Tigris and come up again to Baghdad, it will be necessary to obstruct (stand before) them and give them no way to enter the Tigris."

91. Colonel Tweedie then called the Wali's attention to the serious consequences which might ensue if he enforced his orders, and to the inconvenience which would be caused by stopping steamers carrying the English mail. To this the Wali replied that he merely carried out the orders he had received, and that the mails could easily be carried by Turkish steamers.

92. The following letter from the Agents of Messrs. Lynch and Co. will show the measures subsequently taken by the Wali :--

Dated 6th July 1883.

From—The Manager, Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company,
To—COLONEL W. TWEEDIE, Officiating Consul-General, Baghdad.

We have the honour to report, for your information, that at noon yesterday six Zaptiehs were placed on board the S. S. *Méjidiéh* and forcibly prevented her taking any cargo or passengers on board, or holding any communication with anybody other than the ship's own crew. At all the usual landing places Zaptiehs were also stationed for a similar purpose. Towards evening the crew were prevented from taking their provisions on board preparatory to starting for Busra this morning, and many of them were ill-treated, as also were five carpenters in our pay and employed by us to work in Busra. These latter, after being placed on board by one of your Cavasses, were again turned out of the ship by Zaptiehs, and eventually went on board, as you are aware, with your kind permission, in the mail boat from the Residency. The Commander's luggage was stopped going on board, and in fact, though we made no attempt whatever to take a single package or passenger, we were subjected all day to such annoyances by the Zaptiehs that, although all employed on board our steamers have strict orders to avoid any breach of the peace, no matter what happens, we are in constant fear of somebody losing their temper and doing something which we should all very much regret, and which might prove the spark to ignite the intense excitement caused by the action of the Turkish authorities towards our steamers.

We have the honor to bring to your notice the action of the local authorities towards our Steamer *Méjidiéh* which has just left for Busra.

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Having been verbally informed by the customs authorities that the above vessel would not be allowed to take in any cargo, we wrote to the Custom House Master on 3rd instant to know if such was the case, and, if so, the reason for his prohibition, as we had duly discharged the steamer and otherwise conformed with existing regulations. To this letter we received no reply, though we made application for it.

As we act here as Agents for this Company, we felt bound to protect ourselves by giving the usual notice of our intention to ship cargo, and asking permission for it to be passed through the customs. This "Irzabal" was returned to our clerk with the answer that it could not be accepted, but any written reply was resolutely refused. Native merchants also were prevented from shipping anything by our steamer, Customs Officer being sent to accompany all goods cleared through the customs on board the Turkish steamer *Phrat*. As described elsewhere, passengers were also forcibly prevented from going on board our steamer, so consequently she left this morning with Her Britannic Majesty's mails, quite empty and so light that she is dangerous for navigation.

Under these circumstances, we beg to enter, for such action as you may deem fit, the strongest protest against this unjustifiable treatment of our steamers which have plied on this river for upwards of twenty-one years, during which time they have always carried any Turkish Government despatches free of charge for which we have stopped at all stations on the river. Customs receipts from Busra, Coot, and Amarah, amounting to large sums, have also been regularly conveyed without expense, and in short, we have always done all in our power to reciprocate the privilege accorded to us by the Ottoman Government, and which is now threatened to be suddenly wrested from us.

We are under heavy contracts with merchants here for conveyance of cargo to Busra; and have chartered sea steamers to carry it thence to its destination; for which, full or not full, we shall have to pay; and the most serious complications will arise, for which and for all other loss sustained by the Company in consequence of the action herein complained of, we have no doubt the Directors will eventually put forward a claim to damages, and these claims, we venture to hope, will receive the full support of Her Majesty's Government.

93. Colonel Tweedie sent a short official protest to the Wali, but without any apparent result. He was, however, of opinion that this contest with the Turkish authorities might cause a popular rising in Baghdad endangering the life and property of all the Europeans in the town, and he consequently conferred on the subject with the Russian and the French Consuls. The Russian Consul did not consider that there was any danger, and refused to move in the matter, but the French Consul adopted Colonel Tweedie's views, and promised to address the Wali on the subject.

94. The Wali enforced his orders more and more strictly. The steamers from Basrah were not allowed to touch land anywhere between Kurna and Baghdad, not even at their own coaling stations. On their arrival at Baghdad guards were placed on board, and when the mail steamer arrived on the 14th July, neither crew nor passengers were allowed to land. On the following day Colonel Tweedie wrote as follows with reference to these events and to their effect on public feeling and English prestige:—

Extract from Diary for week ending 15th July.

15th July, 6 a. m.—26. Steamer *Khalifah* is leaving Baghdad, having just dropped down from anchorage, and anchored opposite Residency to wait for mails. I have detained her this week up to latest safe date (Sunday), hoping hourly situation would open. Rumours were rife yesterday that she was to be stopped by violence; but if the authorities had been really prepared to do so, they would not have said so much about it.

27. It is not impossible that Her Majesty's Government may think first of the injury to trade (which money compensation can easily make up) caused by these proceedings; and only afterwards of the blow now daily being inflicted on our visible (and invisible) power in the presence of all Her Majesty's native Indian subjects here, and others. In the eyes of these practical (*sic*) and untutored people, it simply looks as if war had broken out between England and the Porte, and the hostilities had for three weeks been all confined to one side. Of course this is a wrong view, but nowhere do appearances go for more than here.

28. Last night I sent the Consular dragoman to His Excellency the Wali to remonstrate with him, at the last moment, in a friendly rather than official spirit indirectly, and as opening might occur, on his whole proceedings; but particularly and expressly on his having detained on board our two steamers now here the parcel-mails of the Government of India, thereby reducing me to the necessity of sending back to-day to Busra mails for aught that is known containing documents or other articles sent to me by my Government. On all points he was



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firm and determined, though courteous, and what he said about the parcel-mails merely was that he would compel them to go down to Basra and be brought up here again on board a Turkish steamer.

30. As regards these mails, the circumstances reported in this diary will enable the Government of India to decide what, if any, orders should be issued from time to time to the Indian Postal Department touching the continued sending them on towards Baghdad at all.

31. Already, as I am credibly informed, the Ottoman navigational bureau has, on the strength of our trade having been stopped and all the traffic diverted for a short time into its hands, greatly raised its rates for freight, much to the disgust of some of the very capitalists and traders who have been conspiring to bring about the present *coup*. The truth is, if the navigation of the Tigris between Basra and Baghdad were, by any possibility, to fall within the power of Turkish maladministration and rapacity, it would gradually collapse. No capitalists having large ventures would hold themselves very long at the mercy of so uncertain a Government as this. And the trade of the country would subside to its pristine channels, namely, small native crafts run by people too poor and obscure to think of anything better than getting on as best they could; now submitting to extortion; now evading it through bribery or cunning; and leading, generally, the precarious lives to which Asiatics are as a rule habituated.

95. Circumstances remained unaltered till the 4th August when Colonel Tweedie telegraphed that the Wali had received orders from Constantinople to suspend measures obstructing the Tigris navigation.

96. A telegram, dated 20th August, announced that all restrictions on navigation had been removed, and that the steamers were running satisfactorily.

97. We shall follow now the discussions that took place between the British Embassy, the Foreign Office, the Resident and the Porte, as the result of which the Turkish authorities removed the restrictions on the navigation of the British steamers on the Tigris.

Secret E., August 1883, Nos. 342-143.

98. The objection first raised by the Turks was that the *Mejidieh*, which was meant to replace the *Blosse Lynch*, was a larger vessel than the latter. In answer to this the British Embassy placed before the Porte the relative dimensions of the two vessels, which were as follows:—

			Length. Feet.	Breadth. Feet.	Tonnage.
Mejidieh	215	35	373
Blosse Lynch...	225	29	383

99. From this statement it would be seen that the length and tonnage of the new steamer are less than those of the old steamer, whilst the slight increase of breadth was provided to obtain a smaller draught of water.

100. It was also pointed out that the restriction as regards the number of vessels permitted was carefully attended to, and no advantage was being taken of the latitude allowed as regards the size by the Vizirial* letter of 31st March 1875, in which no restriction is placed in this respect.

* Paragraph 71, ante.

101. We may note then the memoranda written by Mr. C. M. Kennedy and Mr. T. C. Plowden on the subject. Mr. Kennedy briefly traces the history of the British connection with the Mesopotamian rivers, over which we have gone already, and Mr. Plowden discusses the real bearings of the facts on the questions at issue. Mr. Plowden's review ought to be read and is quoted below:—

"There are two questions under consideration. One, the right of British merchants in general to trade on the Tigris in British registered vessels flying the British flag. The other, the conduct of the Ottoman Government in stopping by force two British steamers engaged in trade on the Tigris under the British flag, and carrying British mails.

The Firman of the 29th December 1834 has not, it appears to me, any bearing upon the matter. It was issued in connection with Colonel Chesney's project for establishing communication with India *via* the Euphrates, for which the House of Commons had voted £20,000. The Firman of August 1841 is, I think, also irrelevant. The Chesney expedition was broken up in 1837, but the two steamers employed in it were retained on the Euphrates under the command of Captain H. B. Lynch, and the Firman of August 1841



was issued to secure for him from local authorities such aid and protection as he might require.

If, then, the Firmans of 1834 and 1841 are to be regarded as irrelevant, upon what basis can the claim of British merchants in general to trade on the Tigris in British registered vessels flying the British flag be said to rest? The answer is, that claim rests—

- (1) Upon usage for many years prior to 1846.
- (2) Upon the terms of the arrangement of 1846; which arrangement was confirmed and renewed by the Porte in 1861 and 1862.
- (3) By the usage of the last twenty years.

As to usage prior to 1846 Rawlinson, writing in 1845, says that "Turkish (*i.e.*, country built) boats possessed by British owners, or owners under British protection, have been hitherto permitted for a period of forty years to navigate the river under the British flag". Again, in an agreement signed in 1823 by Daud Pasha, then Vali of Baghdad, the following clause occurs, which shows that vessels the property of British merchants were then employed in navigating the Tigris between Baghdad and Basrah:—

"Clause 6. No tax except one previously well defined and arranged shall be levied on boats, the property of British subjects and protégés, *such, for instance, as pass between Baghdad and Basrah*; nor shall the property of merchants being British subjects or protégés arriving at Baghdad, otherwise than is usual on the arrival of the same at Basrah, enter the custom-house contrary to stipulation and covenant.

Next, as to the arrangement of 1846; I think it was something more than an understanding. There were in 1846 two questions under discussion. One was precisely the question now under consideration, *viz.*, the right of the British merchants to navigate the Tigris (and the Euphrates) under the British flag; the other, the dues which such merchants should pay. The correspondence shows that the facts that British vessels were employed, and had for a long series of years been employed, in navigating the Tigris, was admitted; but the Najib Pasha, then Vali of Baghdad, "questioned the right of any British vessel to navigate the river, except under special Firman from the Porte." The result was a compromise. Sir Stratford Canning waived the right of British vessels other than those qualified to navigate as such, *i.e.*, registered vessels to fly the national flag on the Tigris, and the Porte gave in respect to these vessels, and under certain conditions as to dues, its formal sanction to the continuance in future of the usage of the past. This settlement was described by Sir Stratford Canning as an agreement; it was submitted to the Sultan; and, as stated in the Vizierial letter of the 2nd April 1846, received His Majesty's assent. The definite character which attaches to this agreement is however evident, not only from Sir Stratford Canning's despatches of the 18th and 25th March and 4th April 1846, and from the Vizierial letter of the same year, but also from the Foreign Office letter of the 17th February 1860, written under Lord John Russell's orders to Lynch and Company, and from the Vizierial letter of the 15th January 1861, which speaks of "a renewal of the orders which were sent concerning the British steamers and boats authorized by His Majesty to ply on the Tigris and the Euphrates."^{*}

I submit, therefore, that the arrangement of 1846 is, and was understood at the time to be, a formal agreement issued under the direct authority of the Sultan, whereby the usage of the past was acknowledged, and its further continuance sanctioned under certain definite conditions agreed to by both parties.

There remains the question of the manner in which the right of British vessels to navigate the Tigris has been exercised during the last twenty years. It is a fact which cannot be denied, that for the whole of this period two British steamers have maintained a weekly service on the Tigris between Baghdad and Basrah for the conveyance of cargo, passengers and British mails. But it is also true that difficulties have from time to time been raised by the Turks and in the correspondence connected therewith the weak point of the case may perhaps be thought to lie. In this correspondence the Turks, starting with the assumption (based on the *Euphrates* Firman of 1834) that two, and only two, British steamers were allowed to navigate the Tigris, declared that the British Company—which owned the steamers was employing or intended to employ more than two steamers. As noticed by Mr. Kennedy, the British Company in question, for reasons of its own, was not averse to the idea that only two British steamers were allowed to navigate the Tigris, and the Turkish objections were met, not by pointing out the fundamental error in their argument, but by showing that, as a matter of fact, only two steamers were being employed by the Company. In other words, the Turks were told that, assuming only two British steamers are allowed on the Tigris, that number and no more are being actually employed in the navigation of the river. It may be unfortunate that this line of argument was followed, but the fact remains that the steamers were placed on the Tigris, and have been maintained on that river ever since, in pursuance of the agreement of 1846, renewed and confirmed in 1861 and 1862 with special reference to them. Moreover, if it were really the case that owing to this correspondence the agreement of 1846 had become invalid, it might be expected that the Porte would urge this plea. But it has not done so, and surely it is not for the British Government to raise the question. On the contrary, if the telegrams in the papers are true,

^{*} All the references have been quoted or cited above in Sections (vi) and (vii) except Lord Russell's letter of 17th February 1860, which cannot be traced.



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the Porte has recognised the validity of the agreement of 1846, for it has formally annulled the Vizirial letters which gave effect to it. Either these letters were valid or they were not; if they were not valid, it was not necessary to annul them.

Moreover, what is the position of the Turks under this same correspondence? They acknowledge in it the right conferred by Firman of a British Company to maintain two—and two only—steamers on the Tigris. Afterwards they shift their ground, and say that the right conferred by this same Firman refers only to the Euphrates. What, then, becomes of the original contention, that the right was limited to two steamers on the Tigris? Obviously, it was a wrong contention. Hence, on their own showing, the Turks have placed a limit, which they had no right to place on the number of British steamers navigating the Tigris. Further, on their own showing the Firman on which the Turks have hitherto relied relates only to the Euphrates, how then do they account for the presence of British steamers on the Tigris? The only possible answer is under the agreement of 1846.

102. On the 5th of July 1883 the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs addressed a note to Musurus Pasha protesting against the proceedings of the Turkish authorities in stopping the navigation of the Tigris by the British shipping. It was pointed out that our ships had been enjoying the privilege of navigating the river for many years—a privilege which was confirmed by the arrangements of 1846, 1861 and 1862.

103. Protests were also lodged at the Porte, and ultimately on 3rd August a temporary suspension of the prohibition of the navigation by the one ship was ordered. We shall quote below the despatch of the Foreign Office to the British Ambassador about this temporary suspension:—

No. 131, dated Foreign Office, London, the 4th August 1883 (Commercial).

From—EARL GRANVILLE, K.G., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
To—H. WYNDHAM, Esq.

The Turkish Ambassador called on me yesterday and gave me the inclosed telegram, stating that the Porte had decided on revoking for the present the measures taken by the authorities at Baghdad with regard to the navigation of the Tigris by Messrs. Lynch and Co.'s vessels.

This decision was however subject, as His Excellency explained, to three conditions:—

1. That it was not to be considered as in any way prejudicing or derogating from the rights claimed by the Porte in regard to the navigation of the Tigris.
2. That the question of those rights and of the extent and nature of the privileges conceded to the Company should be examined and discussed between the two Governments.
3. That there should be no question of claims for compensation on account of what had taken place.

I told Musurus Pasha that he had mentioned this last condition to me in our previous conversation on the subject, and that I had told him that it was not one to which we could agree.

Musurus Pasha admitted that I had objected to it, but said that he had told his Government that he believed it might be admitted, and added that he feared if it were declined the Porte would drop the negotiation altogether.

His Excellency called upon me again this afternoon and reverted to the subject.

I repeated, as regards the third condition, that I had already objected to it. I could not, I said, admit the incompetency of Her Majesty's Government to examine whether there were any private claims for compensation which ought to be met. My own impression was that, although great inconvenience had been wantonly caused by the arbitrary conduct of the Vali, there did not at present seem, on



105. The following memorandum of a conversation between the Turkish Ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote and Lord E. Fitz-Maurice, dated 15th August 1883, discloses the arguments of the Porte on the question :—

"Musurus Pasha began by saying that the Firman of 1834 applied to the Euphrates only, and gave an exclusive privilege to Lynch's Company for two vessels, and two only. When, in reply to this, it was pointed out to him that the Firman said nothing about Lynch* and his Company, but spoke of the British Government, he said there was another Firman, dated 1842, in which Lynch was expressly mentioned and identified with the grant of 1834. This Firman is not known at the Foreign Office, but I understand that it is known to the British Embassy at Constantinople. The Turkish Ambassador then proceeded to follow up this same line of argument, and tried to run together the Vizierial letters of 1846 and 1861 with the Firmans of 1834 and 1842 and to limit the grant made by the former by reference to the terms of the latter.

It was, in reply, pointed out to him that the Vizierial letter 1846 did not mention the Firmans of 1834 and 1842, but related to a distinct matter, and that the Vizierial letter of 1861 only mentioned them in the preamble. This letter, however, it was agreed, was a difficult document to follow, as it spoke of Baghdad as being on the Euphrates." Musurus Pasha said it was signed by a man who knew nothing, and could not sign his own name, and that it was merely confirmatory of the letter of 1846, to the terms of which we then went back.

His Excellency thereupon proceeded to argue that the despatch of Sir Stratford Canning of the 25th March 1846 was not a fair or accurate version of the terms of Vizierial letter of 1846. The recital, in the fourth paragraph of the letter, of an extract from the report of the Superintendent of the Hôtel des Monnaies was, he said, without binding force, and the only words of grant were those contained in paragraph 5, which differed from those in paragraph 4, and were intended to grant less. The words were :—

'En conséquence je vous écris et vous envoie cette dépêche afin que votre Excellence mette ses soins à ce que l'on prenne des barques de commerce Anglaises, qui, comme il a été dit plus haut, seront désormais occupées à faire le commerce intérieur sur les deux fleuves susdits, des droits conformes à ceux que l'on prend des barques des sujets Ottomans et à ce que l'on ne prenne sur les chargements des bâtiments Anglais qui viennent du dehors et qui vont dans un pays étranger, que les droits de douane établis, et qu'un droit d'ancrage consistant en 5 piastres.'

These words, he said, were not fairly represented in the despatch, the words of which are as follows :—

'British-owned vessels will continue to navigate the waters of Mesopotamia under their national colours equally whether they are engaged in the Foreign or in the internal trade, and they will pay upon the merchandize which they convey the amount of duties respectively applied to each case by the convention of Balta Liman.

'In the event of their being employed above the usual ports of entry in the internal traffic of the country, they will be liable to the anchorage duty which is always paid here, and which is sanctioned by the Capitulations but instead of paying 12 paistres as levied upon each vessel in the harbour of Constantinople, they will only pay 5 paistres.'

The only privilege, accorded, according to His Excellency, was to British-owned "barques" to navigate the Tigris and the Euphrates for the purposes of internal trade upon payment of equal dues with the "barques" of Ottoman subjects and to British vessels generally, to pay no more than the customary dues and anchorage due upon entering or leaving any port of entry in the river Basrah, he said, being intended, and not Baghdad, the latter, in his opinion, not being a port of entry.

I am not prepared to deny some force to this argument. There can be no doubt that terms of Sir Stratford Canning's despatch are a very loose rendering of the terms of the Vizierial letter, and that the latter, not the former, is our title-deed. I am also quite prepared to admit, as already stated, that the Firmans of 1834 and 1842, assuming the latter to exist, are not to be extended so as to cover the present question, though, conversely, I would claim that the letter of 1846 is not to be limited."



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intrigue at the bottom of this affair, which has coincided with the appearance of a Russian Consul at Baghdad, where there is not a single Russian subject and no Russian trade. Mr. Wyndham distinctly states that Russian action is suspected and it would obviously be very convenient to Russia not to find the British flag on the Tigris whenever she makes her next move in Armenia.


The Vali of Baghdad is Mahomed Taki Eddin Pasha. I am informed by Mr. Alvarez that he is known as holding fanatical opinions in religious questions."

106. Mr. Wyndham brought further pressure to bear upon the Porte, with the result of the telegram of 20th August 1883 quoted above (paragraph 96).

106-A. As bearing on this question we shall extract the following passage from letter dated 22nd August 1883 addressed by the London Chamber of Commerce to the Foreign Office :—

"The question appears to be one not only affecting important established interests, but also bearing materially upon the status of the British flag in eastern countries. The Commercial progress of Russia in Armenia and northern Persia further adds, in this Chamber's opinion, to the necessity for carefully retaining all rights this country may possess in Mesopotamia and Southern Persia, and of extending them, whenever possible, rather than of accepting limitations which may be considered by native races as indicating a preponderance of influence other than that of the Government of this country."

107. This view needs to be borne all the more in mind in these days, when Germany, a more powerful rival of England commercially than Russia, is straining every nerve to acquire a predominant position in Turkish Arabia, and is perhaps strongly supporting every movement of the Turks to oust the British influence, which has been built up with so much patience and perseverance during the last two centuries.





CHAPTER XI.

The British Postal Service on the Tigris from Basrah to Baghdad and the Turkish attempts to abolish it.*

108. Foiled in their attempts to drive the British shipping enterprise on the Tigris, as above narrated, the Turks directed their efforts against the British influence by trying to deprive them of their long established right of carrying mails between Basrah and Baghdad.

(i) History of the British Postal Service in Turkish Arabia from early times to 1867.

109. Before describing these events we must trace the origin and previous history of this postal service. We shall first give general history of the postal service in the Persian Gulf, and then proceed to trace the growth of the postal service on the Tigris between Basrah and Baghdad.

110. In the earliest times, the Political Agencies appear to have been dependent, for communication with India, on the occasional visits of Indian Navy vessels from Bombay, but from an early date in the 18th century postal communication of a desultory kind was maintained between Basrah and England *via* Aleppo and Constantinople. In the last years of the century regular fortnightly communication was established between Bombay and Basrah, by means of the cruisers of the Bombay Marine, while between Basrah and Aleppo, under the supervision of the Company's Agent, a regular dromedary post was kept up, and from Aleppo a horse-post to Constantinople. It is interesting to learn that in 1789 Lord Nelson, after the battle of the Nile, communicated the intelligence of his victory to the Bombay Government by this route.

111. In 1833 the desert post was closed, as despatches forwarded over land were sent in the Company's cruisers *via* Cossim on the Red Sea and Cairo.

112. In July 1836, Colonel Chesney submitted two letters to the Commissioners for Affairs of India, afterwards duly communicated to the Secret Committee on the opening of a line of postal communication to India by way of the Euphrates.

The first letter dated 16th July 1836, contains the opinions of Colonel Chesney and his officers on the advantages and disadvantages of the Euphrates as a line of communication with Europe and on the commercial advantages likely to result from the navigation of the Euphrates by steam. Colonel Chesney was decided in his opinion that the Euphrates was navigable throughout the year with proper sized vessels and that there was ample supply of fuel along the banks of different kinds. His officers generally concurred in this view.

113. The second despatch, dated 17th July 1836, expresses the opinion of Colonel Chesney on the political advantages we should derive from the navigation of the Euphrates as a check to the progress of Russia or the Pasha of Egypt in that quarter.

114. At this time Mr. Farren, the British Consul-General for Syria, was maintaining a Dromedary Post between Damascus and Hit as well as a communication by post between Beyrout and Damascus, while a regular communication by steam had been established between England and Beyrout. The question then was whether a postal line by this route as far as Baghdad and thence by the Tigris with the Persian Gulf would not be easier and more economical. Colonel Chesney's optimistic opinion as to the navigability of the Euphrates was in striking contrast with the fate which his steamer *Euphrates* met with in ascending that river, and another great difficulty was the disturbances among the Arab tribes on that river, which were much more frequent and of a more violent character than those on the Tigris.

115. The further question was whether, as between England and India, the route by way of Suez and Alexandria would not be the safest, quickest and cheapest of the three.

* For portions of this Chapter I am indebted to Mr. O'Shea's Memorandum on British Post Offices in the Persian Gulf and Turkish Arabia, 1838, revised by Mr. F. Whympers in June 1905.

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116. It is foreign to the purpose of this précis even to summarise the voluminous correspondence on these questions. We have only to note the final decision. The Red Sea route was finally adopted as the best one by the Parliamentary Committee of 1834. The Persian Gulf route was proposed by the Bombay Government as an alternative route during the certain seasons.

117. The Secret Committee, however, negatived this proposal. The following despatch of the Secret Committee, dated 31st March 1837, shows what their views were :—

"We have received a letter from the Governor in Council at Bombay, dated the 16th December 1836, in which he informs us that he has taken measures for establishing a regular communication between Bombay and this country in alternate months by Mohammerah, Damascus, and Beyrout, leaving the other alternate months open for any communication that may be established by the Red Sea and Suez, and that, subject to your approbation, he has appointed Mr. Hector, Agent for Dromedaries and Superintendent of the Mails through Syria on the line between Mohammerah and Damascus, on a salary of Rs. 300 per month.

The Governor in Council also recommends that the Steam Packet from Malta should, in the alternate month, in which the Damascus route is used, touch at Beyrout previously to Alexandria, in order that the despatches from India might be forwarded with the least practicable delay.

We do not concur in either of these proposals, and are happy to find by a letter from Colonel Taylor at Baghdad, dated the 13th February last, that he had made arrangements for carrying into effect the former instructions of the Governor in Council at Bombay, in which our letter of the first of December concurred, for establishing a line of Dromedaries between Beyrout and Basrah, by authorising Mr. Farren to place relays between Beyrout, Damascus and Hit, while he effected the same between Hit and Mohammerah."

118. The following despatch of the Secret Committee, 2nd December 1837, shows what further steps were taken :—

SECRET.

Dated East India House, London, the 2nd December 1837.

From—HON'BLE J. R. CARNAC and HON'BLE J. L. LUSHINGTON,
To—The Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council.

The Governor in Council at Bombay in letters which we have recently received from them have expressed considerable disappointment at the mails for India not having been forwarded by the way of Beyrout and the Persian Gulf, as well as by Alexandria and the Red Sea, and has recommended to the Court of Directors that during the unfavourable season for the line of the Red Sea the mails for India should be forwarded to Beyrout and the Persian Gulf.

2. You are aware that in pursuance of an arrangement between Her Majesty's Government and the East India Company, the mails for India have been, and are to be forwarded monthly by the route of Alexandria and the Red Sea. This arrangement came into operation on the 1st July last, and will account to you for no mails having been subsequently forwarded by Beyrout and the Persian Gulf, although duplicates of our despatches have been transmitted by that route as well as by the Red Sea.

3. No alteration can be made in the arrangements which have been announced to you by the Court except in concert with Her Majesty's Government and in pursuance of an instruction which you will in such a case receive from the Court. In the meantime we hope that measures will have been adopted on your part for the regular transmission of the mails at the times which have been fixed.

4. You have already been supplied by the Court of Directors with tables of the dates at which the steamers may be expected to reach Alexandria and Beyrout and the times fixed for the departure of the steamers with the return mails from India from those places. It will therefore be in your power so to regulate the despatch of the mails from India as to ensure their arrival on or before the dates fixed for the departure of the steamer from Alexandria for Malta and to ensure a degree of precision in the transmission of the mails which hitherto has been unattainable.

5. In regard to the Dromedary Post between Beyrout and the Persian Gulf, we are of opinion that its maintenance is of importance as the medium of a regular communication between this country and Baghdad and also with Persia by that route as well between India, Baghdad and Persia by means of the cruisers, by regularly visiting the Persian Gulf to watch the pirates. The times of the arrival and departure of these vessels might, in our opinion, be so regulated as to ensure the regular transmission of any despatches which may be forwarded from India or Europe by that route, and at little or no additional expense beyond the amount already necessarily incurred in the maintenance of your correspondence with Baghdad and Persia.



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6. Whenever you may have a sufficient number of steamers for the duties of the Gulf as well as for those of the Red Sea, the despatches by the former line may be forwarded with a degree of precision and certainly that is not attainable by sailing vessels, but it would be contrary to our wish, as well as inconsistent with the arrangement into which the Court have entered with Her Majesty's Government to divert for the duties of the Gulf, the steamers which are required for service in the Red Sea, although if a steamer could occasionally be employed on the duties of the Gulf, without detriment to the service of the Red Sea, an opportunity would be afforded to you of communicating both with Persia and Baghdad, and also with this country rapidly by that line.

7. It is our intention to transmit to you duplicates of our most important despatches by the route of Beyrout and the Persian Gulf, and to guard against accident it might be as well that you should also forward to us by the Persian Gulf duplicates of the most material of your despatches sent by way of the Red Sea.

119. In 1839 the Court of Directors of the East India Company sent out to Basrah three iron steamers for use on the Tigris, specially constructed for river navigation, and a letter service was established between the Vice-Consulate* at Basrah and the Consulate General at Baghdad. In 1843-44 the Dromedary Post was re-established across the Syrian desert from Baghdad to Damascus, and from Damascus *via* Beyrout communication was maintained with Constantinople and England, and except when opportunities occurred for the despatch of mails by sea to Bombay by an Indian Navy vessel, letters from Baghdad and Basrah for India were sent by the desert route *via* Damascus and Beyrout through Egypt; and from Bushire *via* Tehran and Alexandria.†

120. As late as 1862 British merchantmen were seldom seen in the Persian Gulf, which bore a bad name as the haunt of pirates on account of the intricate navigation of the Arabian littoral. Opportunities, therefore, for the despatch or receipt of mails by sea were few and far between. For some years the Bombay Government had urged on the Secretary of State for India the necessity for a regular steamer service between Bombay and the Persian Gulf, and in a letter to the Government of Bombay, dated the 3rd March 1862, the Secretary of State wrote:—

"I learn from the Government of India that in their opinion the charge for the Police for the Persian Gulf may be much reduced if a regular line of mail steamers be established for running from Karachi to Busra touching at Maskat, Bunder Abbas and one port on the Mekran Coast. The mere fact of a steamer, it is added, running to and fro, may have a sensible effect in stopping piracy * * * * * I am willing to sanction the establishment of a line of steamers for postal purposes between Bombay and the Persian Gulf calling at Karachi, limiting the number of annual trips to eight."

121. On receipt of this letter a notice was issued by the Bombay Government inviting tenders for—

- (1) Mail Service between Bombay and Karachi and *vice versa* twice a month in connection with the arrival of mails (from England) to commence on and after the 1st July 1862.
- (2) Mail Service eight times in the year between Bombay and the Persian Gulf *via* Karachi and *vice versa*.

122. The contracts were undertaken by the British India Steam Navigation Company and a regular six-weekly service established between Bombay and Basrah.

123. In the same year the Secretary of State accepted an offer from Messrs. Lynch & Co., the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, to run a six-weekly or monthly steamer, as might be required, on the Tigris between Basrah and Baghdad, in connection with the British India Steam Navigation Company's Ocean line to Bombay, on a subsidy of £2,400 a year

124. The establishment of through communication between India and the Persian Gulf naturally gave rise to a demand for properly organized post offices.

Opening of Post Offices.
For a short time packets of letters were forwarded from Bombay and Karachi to Basrah and ports in the Gulf and distributed by the local Agents of the British India Steam Navigation Company, who also collected letters for despatch. At the different ports at which the steamers touched the Captain or

* See Colonel Rawlinson's Despatch No. 12, dated 26th December 1843, consultation dated 9th March 1844, Nos. 23—24.

† For the subsequent history of the Dromedary Post, see Chapter XII (iii), pages 169—171.



one of the officers carried on shore mails addressed to the port and handed them over to the Agents. At the same time notices were posted up intimating the hour at which the steamer would leave. Long before the mail was landed people collected at the Agent's office to receive their letters. One or two persons read out addresses to an assembled crowd and letters were thus delivered. Some of these letters were prepaid with Indian postage stamps, but the bulk was either unpaid or insufficiently paid, and no attempt was made to realize postage due. Numbers of loose letters were taken on board the steamer just before her departure and merchants who had cargo to ship carried their open letters on board and after receiving the bill of lading enclosed it and handed the letter to the Captain or one of the ship's officers. The necessity for properly organised postal arrangements was keenly felt and representations were made to this effect by the Political officers in the Gulf to the Postal authorities in India and to the Government of Bombay.

125. The first post offices in the Persian Gulf were opened in May 1864 at Bushire and Maskat, and at various intervals from 1864 to 1884 post offices were established at Bander Abbas, Linga, Guadur, Jask and finally at Bahrein. Post offices in Turkish Arabia were established at a somewhat later date than the first post offices in the Persian Gulf.

126. In 1867 an inspecting officer of the Bombay Circle was sent to examine and report on post offices in the Persian Gulf and having completed his examination of those offices proceeded to Basrah and Baghdad. He found the Consular postal arrangements at the latter places wanting in most respects, and with the consent of Sir Arnold Kemball, Consul-General, Baghdad, who promised his cordial support, post offices were opened at Baghdad and Basrah on the 1st January 1868. At Baghdad the duties of postmaster were undertaken by a senior clerk of the Consulate General and at Basrah by the Vice-Consul with the aid of a Munshi.

127. The post offices in the Persian Gulf were first placed under the control of the Bombay Postal Circle, but in 1869 they were transferred to the Sind Circle and placed under the Chief Inspector of Post Offices, Sind, who was then designated Chief Inspector of Post Offices, Sind and the Persian Gulf. In 1879 they were finally re-transferred to the Bombay Circle and placed under the Postmaster General of Bombay.

128. For some years the post offices worked under the supervision of the Political authorities and at the principal places the duties of postmaster were performed by officials of the respective Political Agencies, who received in remuneration for their services an allowance from the Post Office revenues. In time, however, the development of correspondence and increase in the different branches of postal work necessitated the appointment of separate postmasters, and a degree of independence sprung up which was due almost wholly to the great distance of the offices from departmental control.

(ii) Basrah Post Office, 1868-1888.

129. On the 1st January 1868 an experimental post office was opened at Basrah on a consolidated allowance of Rs. 50 per mensem. On the 1st April following, at the request of the Consul-General, Baghdad, the allowance was raised to Rs. 75 per mensem. On the 1st June of the same year the experimental period was extended and in July 1869 the office was established as a permanency under Government of India, Financial Department, No. 2446, dated 30th November 1869.

130. The duties of postmaster were at first undertaken by the Vice-Consul, but in December 1870 the work had increased to such an extent that a



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separate postmaster was employed and the following establishment sanctioned :—

	Rs.
Postmaster	75
Munshi	10
Peon	10
Contingent allowance	10
Total	105

131. The office was maintained on this scale until 1878 when the pay of the Munshi and peon was raised to Rs. 15 and Rs. 12, respectively. In 1884 the office underwent final revision, viz. :—

	Rs.
Postmaster	60
Local allowance	30
Munshi	25
Postman	12
House-rent	10
Total	137

132. The history of the origin of the Basrah post office has much in common with that of the Baghdad Office and is described in detail in the next section.

History.

It may, however, be briefly recapitulated here. When Turkish Arabia was visited by an Inspecting Officer of the Bombay Circle in 1867, the Consular postal arrangements were found to be very defective. Basrah was in regular connection with Bombay and the ports in the Persian Gulf by means of the British India Steam Navigation Company's mail steamers and with Baghdad by the mail steamers of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company; but the manner of exchanging mails was very primitive and postal work was confined to the despatch and receipt of ordinary letters which in most cases paid no postage. Sir Arnold Kemball welcomed the idea of a properly organized post office both for Baghdad and Basrah, and at the latter place the Vice-Consul undertook to perform the duties of postmaster on a monthly allowance from the post office which would enable him to employ a small office establishment. The office was opened on the 1st January 1868 and continued in charge of the Vice-Consul until December 1870, by which time public confidence being well established, the work had increased to such an extent that the Vice-Consul was unable to give it sufficient attention and a postmaster with a proper establishment was appointed from India. When the Vice-Consul was relieved of charge of the post office, the office still continued to be held in a room in the Vice-Consulate, but as no accommodation was available on Consulate premises for the postmaster's residence he lived in a Khan in the town, and partly for his own convenience, partly to serve the public, he put up a letter-box, made a "window delivery" of letters, sold postage stamps, and, in short, established in his dwelling an informal post office, or one to which sanction was never accorded.

133. In 1872 the Consulate was removed to a building situated on the Shat-el-Arab, about two miles from the town of Basrah, and with it the post office. As the new Consulate, like the one vacated, afforded no quarters for the accommodation of the postmaster, he continued to live in the town and the office in the postmaster's dwelling in the town, now that the Consular post office was so far removed from business quarters, became of considerable importance and was looked upon locally as a recognized institution.

134. The procedure in regard to the disposal of mails was briefly as follows :—On the arrival of the steamer, mails for the Consul, European merchants and others living in the vicinity of the Consulate were delivered at the Consular post office and those for Arab merchants and others living in the town of Basrah were carried by the postmaster to the town post office and there distributed.

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In like manner letters posted in the letter-box in the town were carried to the Consular post office by the postmaster for despatch.

135. In 1882 a Postal Superintendent from the Bombay Circle visited Basrah for the purposes of inspection, and anxious to extend the usefulness of the post office in the town, placed a pillar letter-box in the Kassim Aga Bazaar, forgetful that our post office was Consular and that such an act was therefore unjustifiable. For some time previous to this the British Indian post offices in Turkish Arabia had been viewed with disfavour by the Ottoman Government, and in this very year a demand had been made by the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs at Constantinople for the suppression of the post offices at Baghdad and Basrah, and in the correspondence which followed between the local Government and British Political authorities the town post office at Basrah and the pillar letter-box were, as having an existence apart from the Consular post office, specially quoted as an infringement of the right Turkey possessed in common with other nations of making her own postal arrangements.

136. The town post office, which had no place in the books of the Indian post office and appears to have been unknown till 1882, was far removed from Consular supervision and should never have been allowed to grow up, but having been in existence for upwards of thirteen years could not, for political reasons, be removed on the sudden demand of the local Government. The correspondence which took place on this subject between the Vali at Baghdad and H. B. M.'s Consul-General for Turkish Arabia is dealt with in the next section, but it may be mentioned as a measure adopted by the local Governor at Basrah that in July 1883 Turkish Gendarmerie were placed at the town post office to prevent people using it. The matter was at once taken up by the British Consul and the soldiers withdrawn by the Turkish Governor.

137. The town post office owing to its informal character and its distance from Consular supervision was a source of anxiety to the Indian Postal authorities and to the Political officers on the spot, and it was determined that the earliest opportunity should be taken to close the so-called post office and to remove the pillar letter-box.

138. In 1883 the Consul while riding through the bazaars stopped opposite the pillar-box and made an open enquiry as to whether it was much used, and receiving a reply in the negative, had the box dug up and carried to the Consulate. But it was not till March 1887 that an opportunity occurred for the abolition of the town post office. The difficulty lay in obtaining quarters for the postmaster near the Consulate, but a suitable place having been found in March 1887, the pretext for maintaining the town office no longer existed and it was closed.

139. This step, however satisfactory from a postal and political point of view and however pleasing to the Turkish Government, was a severe blow to local merchants and traders, and a petition was submitted by them through the Superintendent of Post Offices, Persian Gulf and Turkish Arabia, to the Postmaster-General, Bombay, praying for its restoration.

140. During the imposition of quarantine at Basrah, which is nearly all the year round, mails are landed, in charge of the postmaster and mail officer of the incoming steamer, at the quarantine station and fumigated, before being taken to the post office. The quarantine station was originally three miles from Basrah and considerable delay occurred before mails could be taken to the post office, although a steam-launch belonging to the Agent of the British India Steam Navigation Company was employed on this service. In 1885 the station was moved to within a few hundred yards of the British Consulate, and very little delay since then took place in conveying mails to the post office.

141. In regard to parcel mails, there have been difficulties with the Customs authorities from time to time as at Baghdad, though in a lesser degree, and the question of parcel mails at Basrah has frequently come under discussion. The treatment of parcel mails in 1888 at Basrah was as follows.

Quarantine.

Parcels.



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142. Parcel bags were sent formally addressed "On Her Majesty's Service" to Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Basrah and were delivered at the Consulate in which the British Indian post office is situated. After the mails were opened the parcel bags were taken to the Custom-house, and were made over by the Postmaster to the Custom-house authorities and delivered by the latter to the addressees on production of a pass signed and sealed by the postmaster. The subsequent history of this question is given in section (ix) below.

(iii) Baghdad Post Office, 1868-1884.

143. On the 1st January 1868 an experimental post office was established at Baghdad at a monthly cost of Rs. 75 and sanctioned as a permanency in Government of India, Financial Department, No. 657, dated 30th June 1869. In 1870 the office underwent revision and in June of that year the establishment stood thus:—

	Rs.
Postmaster	80
Clerk and munshi	20
Peon	8
Contingent allowance	10
Total	118

144. The pay of the officials, though debited to the post office, was drawn in the office of the Consul-General, of which the post office formed part, and their pay was treated as an allowance for postal work.

145. The introduction in 1877 of the Indian Inland Parcel Insurance system resulting in a large despatch of specie by this means from Baghdad to Bombay, and later, in 1879, the introduction of the Money Order system, added to the constantly increasing work in all branches of the post office, necessitated a complete revision of the establishment, as the Consular clerk in charge of the post office was unable to devote sufficient time to the postal branch of his work. In May 1879, therefore, an official of the Indian Post Office was appointed postmaster on a salary of Rs. 60 per mensem, which was supplemented by an allowance of Rs. 20 from the Consulate General in return for services rendered in the office of the Consulate. The establishment then stood thus:—

	Rs.
Postmaster	60
Clerk*	30
Postman	12
Contingent allowance	10
Total	112

* Clerk in the office of the Consul-General, pay Rs. 50.

146. In July 1883 Mr. A. U. Fanshawe, Postmaster-General of Bombay, brought to the notice of the Director General of the Post Office of India that for some time past the postmaster had been found unable to do anything beyond the work of the post office and that the clerk of the Consulate, who received Rs. 30 per mensem from the post office, assisted the postmaster on mail days only for about an hour in sorting letters. He proposed a complete revision of the post office establishment and asked that the allowance to the clerk should be withdrawn and that the Political Department should no longer contribute Rs. 20 towards the pay of the postmaster. In sending up this proposal Mr. Fanshawe wrote:—"It will be fully understood, however, that the postmaster is to remain in immediate subordination to the Consul-General and be attached to his office." The proposal was sanctioned in August 1883 by Mr. F. R. Hogg, the Director General, but at the request of the Consul-General who fully approved of the change, was held in abeyance pending a reference to the Government of India regarding compensation for the withdrawal of the allowance of Rs. 30 paid by the post office to the Consular clerk, Mr. Thaddeus,



who had been connected with the Post Office from its origin. The revision was given full effect to from May 1884. The establishment then stood thus :—

	Rs.
Postmaster	70
Local allowance	30
Munshi	25
Postman	12
Contingent allowance	10
House-rent	10
Total	157

(iv) Basrah-Baghdad Postal Service, 1867—1880.

147. In 1867 Mr. Vears, an Inspecting Officer of the Bombay Circle, was sent to report on the postal arrangements in the Persian Gulf, where British Indian post offices had been in existence since 1864, and after completing his inspection of these offices he proceeded to Basrah by the British India Steam Navigation Company's ocean mail steamer and thence to Baghdad by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company's river mail steamer. Mr. Vears reported that the local Consular letter service was very unsatisfactory. The arrangements then existing were something as follows :—A mail bag containing letters for Basrah and Baghdad closed by the Bombay post office for the Vice-Consulate at Basrah, besides letters dropped into the letter-box on board of the mail steamer at intermediate ports on her way up the Gulf, were made over to the Vice-Consul at Basrah and distributed by him. In like manner letters for despatch collected at the Vice-Consulate and those received from Baghdad in a letter bag were made over by the Vice-Consul to an officer of the mail steamer on her return voyage. The service was confined to ordinary letters, and although Indian postage stamps were available, most of the letters were unstamped, and on the whole arrangements were so irregular that some proper organization was urgently needed.

148. Sir Arnold Kemball, Consul-General, Baghdad, and Political Resident, Turkish Arabia, whom Mr. Vears consulted, was anxious that post offices should be opened experimentally at Baghdad and Basrah and promised every support. At Basrah the Vice-Consul undertook the management of the post office on an allowance which enabled him to keep a clerk for the purpose, and at Baghdad Sir Arnold Kemball arranged that the duties should be performed by a clerk of the Consulate-General, aided by a munshi, both of whom should receive an allowance from the postal revenues.

149. No political difficulties appear to have arisen or to have been anticipated, and at the time no Turkish postal service existed. In a letter to the Postmaster-General of Bombay, dated 28th November 1867, Sir Arnold Kemball wrote :— "I am aware of no obstacle to the proposed arrangement and you may count on my best aid." He stated further that the trade of that region was susceptible of great development and that the proposed post office would materially aid in giving it an impetus.

150. All preliminary matters having been arranged the post offices opened for work on the 1st of January 1868. Mail boxes and bags consigned to the English post offices at Basrah and Baghdad were landed unchallenged by the Ottoman Custom-house at the private steps of Vice-Consulate and the British Residency, respectively, and in a letter dated Baghdad, 25th January 1868, Sir Arnold Kemball notified officially to Namik Pasha, then Governor-General or Vali of the Viliyat of Irak, that a steamer mail service with Bombay had been established and that pending further notice Turkish official covers between Bombay, Basrah and Baghdad would be carried free of postage. The departments named

1. Executive Council.
2. Accountant General.
3. Customs Master.
4. Military officials.
5. Telegraph Department.
6. Governor of Basrah.
7. Quarantine Department.
8. Superintendent of Marine.

in the margin were specified as those to which the privilege of franking would be accorded, and it was added that any which the Vali might subsequently name would be included in the list. Sir Arnold Kemball stipulated that official covers from the privileged departments should be franked with the seal of the despatching department, and that all private letters and all



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not strictly official should be excluded. This arrangement was accepted. In a letter, dated the 3rd February 1868, Namik Pasha replied that he had issued orders which would ensure only official letters being sent under cover of a frank for Bombay, Basrah, Baghdad and ports on the Tigris. The Indian Postal authorities approved of the arrangement in regard to Turkish official covers made by the Consul-General, but considered that places outside Turkish Arabia should not have been included, though the concession at the time remained unaltered.

151. The office of postmaster was held by a clerk of the Residency who carried

1. Bombay.	5. Bundra Abbas.	} By steam- er.
2. Karachi.	6. Linga.	
3. Guaduz.	7. Bushire.	
4. Maskat.	8. Busrah.	
9. Kermanshah.	} By runners to Kerman- shah and thence by mounted couriers in communication with the British Legation at Tehran.	
10. Hamadan.		
11. Isphahan.		
12. Tehran.		

Distance	Baghdad to Kermanshah ... 200 miles.
	Kermanshah to Tehran ... 280 "
	480

on the duties in addition to his own. Mails were closed for the places named in the margin and a regular delivery of letters made in the town of Baghdad, while those for the distant suburb of Kathimian were kept in deposit till called for. Letters for Kerbella, about 60 miles from Baghdad, the scene of the martyrdom of Hussein grandson of the Prophet, were sent out to the care of the Honorary Native Agent there by a monthly messenger paid from the Oudh Endowment Fund. In 1878 weekly communication with Kerbella was kept up, but regular despatches had eventually to be abandoned and letters were sent out as opportunities occurred. There has always been a considerable number of letters, money orders and other articles from India for Kerbella, as besides the yearly pilgrims who return to their houses, numbers of Indian Mahomedans settle there to spend the remainder of their lives near the shrine of the saint and are in constant correspondence with their friends in India.

152. On board of the river steamers Indian postage stamps were sold and letters delivered at Kut-el-Ahmarah, Kut, Ali Garbi, Kurna at the junction of the Tigris and the Euphrates, and at any places at which the steamers touched for which there were letters to be delivered. Stamped letters were also received on board the steamers for delivery at or despatch through Baghdad and Basrah.

153. The opening of a post office and through communication was an immense boon to Baghdad, and the Consul-General writing on the subject shortly after the service had been established, considered that "facility and security afforded to the commercial communities would develop trade." This prediction was early verified by the rapid growth of business in every branch of the post office. Jewish and Armenian merchants, however, took advantage of the Indian Parcel Post to import raw silk and other materials for the manufacture of fabrics and ornamental waist-belts for which Baghdad and Najef enjoy some reputation. When this was discovered by Sir Arnold Kemball, Consul-General, the question of the Ottoman Customs dues was at once taken up by him. He considered it of the very gravest importance that the Turkish authorities should be able to place implicit confidence in the understanding though there was no actual stipulation, that the post office would be used as a medium for transmission of the mails only. Parcels formed an integral part of an Indian mail and the post office was established on the principles of the Indian Post Office Department, but the Consul-General suspended the despatch of parcels through the post and it was not restored until arrangements had been made, with the approval of the Vali, for the proper protection of the Turkish Customs revenues. The parcel post was suspended for about three months and the arrangement entered into with the Customs Department was as follows:—Parcels received by mail were kept in the post office and intimation sent to addressees. On a parcel being claimed the owner was sent with it accompanied by a Residency Kavas to the Custom-house where delivery was made with the necessary formalities. Export parcels were not accepted at the post office for despatch unless covered by a Custom-house pass. The mode of delivery described above continued for about fifteen years, during which period nothing appears to have occurred to interrupt the harmony that existed between the Residency post office and local Ottoman Officials.

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(v) Turkish opposition to the British Postal Service, and attempt to replace it with their own Postal Service, 1881-1884: Turkish steam service on the Tigris.

154. Early in 1881 the first signs of an intention to interfere with postal arrangements began by a demand from the Custom-house authorities that a Customs messenger instead of a British Residency Kavas should accompany the addressee of a parcel to the Custom-house. This change was agreed to by the Consul-General without demur as the innovation was trifling and there were no grounds on which to object. This however was merely the beginning of a system of obstruction which resulted in (1) a complete alteration in the mode of delivering parcel mails introduced by Sir Arnold Kemball in 1868, (2) the stoppage of a house to house delivery of letters in the town, (3) the closing of the town post office as Basrah, the existence of which has already been explained, and interference in other matters which will be dealt with below.

155. In 1882 the subject of the Post Office in Turkish Arabia was taken up at Constantinople by the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs and a demand made that the post offices at Baghdad and Basrah should be closed and the desert post abolished. In reply to this demand the Ambassador merely referred to the recognition accorded by the Sublime Porte in the preceding year to the dromedary post between Damascus and Baghdad [see Chapter XI (iii)] and the demand at the time was withdrawn, a promise being made that the suppression of British Indian posts in Turkish Arabia would not be pressed.

156. Early in 1883, however, the Director-General of Ottoman Posts and Telegraphs complained to H. M.'s Postmaster General that foreign correspondence carried to Baghdad by the English dromedary post and specially marked "Par Poste Ottomane" was delivered by the British post office at Baghdad and subjected to a surcharge of 2 piastres per three grammes. The complaint was referred to Mr. F. R. Hogg, the Director General of the Indian Post Office, and it was explained to H. M.'s Post Master General that the desert post was quite apart from the British Indian post office at Baghdad, and that mails carried by it were dealt with entirely in the office of the Consul-General and that the charge referred to was not postal. This complaint was followed by a representation to the Embassy at Constantinople from the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs that great inconvenience was caused by the English Postal Service between Baghdad and Damascus running side by side with the Ottoman line and by the existence of post offices in Baghdad and Basrah. In reply to this H. M.'s Chargé d' Affaires referred to the recognition accorded in 1881 by the Sublime Porte and to the promise made to the Embassy in July 1882.

157. In June 1883, as we have noted above [Chapter IX (xi)], on the pretext that the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company were about to run a third steamer on the Tigris, the Turkish Governor at Basrah and the Commodore of the Turkish Fleet in Turkish Arabia issued orders to prevent the English mail steamer entering the Tigris from Basrah. It was finally settled in an amicable manner with the Sublime Porte by the Embassy at Constantinople that the *status quo* with regard to the steamers to and from Baghdad should be maintained.

158. While these negotiations were going on the following notice was posted in Baghdad, dated 20th August 1883, and at the same time the Vali demanded that the town post office and pillar letter box at Basrah should be removed at once:—

" Notice.
" For better administration of Basrah post office a central post office has been opened in River Navigation Office in Baghdad.

" Packets will henceforward be closed for Basrah, Garna, Amarah, and Kut twice a week, namely, on Mondays for conveyance by Turkish, and on Thursday by Lynch's steamers (E. & T. S. N. Co. and letters, ordinary and registered will be received up to 6 P. M. on those days.

" It is therefore necessary for all having letters to take them to above mentioned post office. Should any person send or accept letters not duly stamped with Turkish stamps, he will be fined from one to five Turkish *tiras* according to circumstances."

159. This notice was important as regarded Lynch's steamers as no mails closed by the Turkish post office would be or were ever accepted by the Commanders. The threat contained in the last paragraph of the notice was in one or two instances actually enforced and caused some consternation among local residents, as merchants and even Ottoman Government officials almost



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unanimously preferred using the English post office to the Turkish post office for the transmission of valuables and letters of importance.

160. While the local Government at Baghdad continued to preserve a very hostile attitude towards the British post office, the authorities in Constantinople were not idle. On the 11th September 1883, the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed H. M.'s Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople demanding "the suppression of the service with regard to the transport of letters and correspondence between Basrah and Baghdad by Messrs. Lynch and Company's steamers. It is perhaps needless to say that the demand was not complied with but the whole question of the post office in Turkish Arabia was reviewed by Mr. T. C. Plowden, Consul-General, Baghdad, and Political Resident, Turkish Arabia, in despatches Nos. 56 and 139, dated 5th and 10th December 1883, to H. M.'s Ambassador at Constantinople, and to the Government of India. The questions dealt with in these despatches may be taken collectively under the following heads:—

- (1) The notice issued by the Vali of Baghdad.
- (2) The town post office at Basrah and the pillar letter-box in the Kassim Aga Bazaar of that town.
- (3) Carriage of local letters for river stations on the Tigris and carriage of Turkish official letters free of postage.
- (4) A representation made by the Vali of the refusal of the Basrah British Post Office to accept closed mails for despatch from the Turkish post office at that town.
- (5) Position of the British Indian post offices at Baghdad and Basra.
- (6) Yearly inspection of those offices.

161. Mr. Plowden was of opinion that the notice issued by the Ottoman authorities was objectionable because "they have no jurisdiction over Lynch and Company's steamers and cannot compel them to carry Ottoman mails for Basrah and intermediate ports either on Thursday or any other day. Secondly, because the intimation in respect to carrying letters not stamped with a Turkish stamp is directed against the operations of the British Post Office, whose mails Lynch and Company's steamers carry, and is probably intended to serve as a basis for prosecuting the Commander or Purser of these steamers for carrying letters stamped with British Indian stamps.

162. With regard to the town post office and pillar letter-box at Basrah, Mr. Plowden stated that the latter had been removed and that the town post office would be closed on the first opportunity.

163. Local letters for intermediate river stations, the Consul-General was of opinion, should not be carried and that the post office should refuse to accept Turkish official letters free of postage.

164. With regard to the refusal of the Basrah post office to accept closed mails for despatch by the ocean mail steamers from the Turkish post office, the Consul-General stated that in a letter to his address, dated 29th August 1883, the Vali of Baghdad complained that the post office at the British Consulate in Basrah, in opposition to the regulations of the International Postal Union, had refused to accept from the Turkish post office letters for India and other foreign countries unless stamped with English (British Indian) stamps. In disposing of this complaint Mr. Plowden wrote:—"It is true that the vessels carrying the mails are dependent on the Government of India, but the postal service is between two British offices, the Bombay office and the British Consulate at Basrah, and there is no reciprocity between the Bombay office and any Ottoman office.

165. The position of the two post offices at Baghdad and Basra was Mr. Plowden pointed out, the same as that of the post offices at Smyrna and Beyrout, except that the latter were managed on English rules and the former on the Indian system. He represented that considerable trouble had been caused at Basrah by the post master corresponding direct with Turkish officials and generally adopting a line of conduct independent of the Consulate. He submitted that as the offices were purely Consular post offices, they should be in every respect subordinate to and under the control of the Consul-General at Baghdad and his Assistant at Basrah, and that the Inspecting Officer of the Indian Postal Department, who visited the offices for inspection purposes should report to him (the Consul-General) any irregularities for such action as might be deemed expedient.



165-A. With regard to the capacity of the Turkish Government to undertake the postal service on the Tigris, we have on our records a memorandum drawn up by Dr.* Bowman sent to Mr. Wyndham by Colonel Tweedie on 13th July 1883, which is quoted below:—

Memorandum regarding the steamers plying between Baghdad and Basrah under the name of the Oman-Ottoman Administrationally.

The Oman-Ottoman Company, purely a Government concern, had its foundation in the steamers *Baghdad* and *Basrah* which prior to 1869, were entirely used for Government purposes, viz., transport of troops, dispatches and the subjection of the numerous Arab tribes on the Euphrates and Tigris. During Namyk Pashah's administration of the Wilaiat of Baghdad, he ordered the three steamers, *Mosul Phrat* and *Resafa* to be built at Antwerp.

They arrived here in 1869, and have since been added to by the steamers *Telafa* and *Meskna* which complete the fleet of seven vessels.

Political A, November 1870, No. 170.

2. Since 1869 commencing under Medhat Pasha's administration, these steamers have been chiefly used for commercial purposes: but owing to the want of proper supervision in the form of officers and engineers, they have all fallen into a state of inefficiency and disrepair. To give examples I may point out that the *Baghdad* has been for two months lying at Amrah disabled; the *Mosul* was laid up in a Basrah from August 1882 until June 1883, and the *Resafa* which has been stationary for some time at Baghdad, owing to defects in her boiler tubes, has this day, in the absence of any other available steamer, been brought down to the Custom House to receive cargo for Basrah. As a further example, the *Muskenah* left Basrah on Sunday, the 8th instant, twenty-four hours before the English Company's steamer *Medjidieh*, which latter vessel passed the Turkish steamers within twenty-four hours steaming; in fact, owing to the inefficiency of these steamers, and want of 'management,' there is no certainty as to their arrival or departure.

3. Regarding the management of these steamers; during the time I was Acting Consul at Basrah in 1879, they were under the direction of the Commodore of the Imperial Ottoman Navy; but before and since they have been under numerous directions. At present a certain Sarri Effendi is Chief Manager. (In passing I may mention this official has held various appointments in this Paskalik; one of the most important of which was that of Mutasarif of Amrah: in connection with which, he was suspended and imprisoned for about eighteen months, charged with misappropriation of Government monies: on his release, he was unemployed for some time until appointed to his present charge by the new Governor-General Taki-ud-Din Pasha.) The direction of the Company's affairs has never been really efficient, and the steamers are almost always without coal (except what they can borrow from the English Company), and have constantly left Baghdad with only sufficient wood to carry them a short distance down the river; trusting entirely to chance to take them further on. All the employees are several months' pay in arrears; and the administration is on the whole in debt nearly £ 10,000 principally due to Messrs. Asfar and Company of this city and Basrah for coal supplied by the French Steam Navigation Company plying between Marseilles and Basrah. This cannot be due absence of receipts or revenue; because during 1879 Messrs. Lynch and Company, the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, tried to add to their carrying power by employing barges, to be towed with their steamers, and which barges were amply employed every voyage for some months until stopped by order of the Sublime Porte. For over three years, these barges have been employed on the Tigris; and during this time, to my personal knowledge, there has frequently occurred a serious accumulation of cargo in Basrah, owing to the insufficient carrying capacity of the steamers, both Turkish and English, on the river, which clearly in my opinion proves that the present bankrupt stage of the Oman-Ottoman steamers is due more to maladministration, and which the above circumstances tend to show, than to want of cargo: as since the opening of the Suez Canal commerce between Europe and Turkish Arabia has increased to an enormous extent, and is still rapidly increasing: in confirmation of this, I may mention that a firm of Baghdad Jewish merchants have recently applied for, and obtained from the Sublime Porte, a concession to run steamers between this and Basrah, under the Turkish flag! and I believe the scheme has so far advanced that the steamers were ordered to be built at Antwerp; proving that, notwithstanding the presence of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company in addition to the Oman-Ottoman, there is still ample employment for yet another line; and I may add that during the last few years several applications have been made to the Sublime Porte by merchants of various nationalities to secure a similar concession.

166. The Government of India (Foreign Department No. 1002-C., dated 23rd April 1884, to the Political Resident replied that it was undesirable just then to alter existing arrangements for the carriage of Turkish official letters by British mail steamers outside Turkish Arabia and in regard to the other questions dealt with by the Consul-General, forwarded a report on the subject

* From Colonel Kennell's report, in despatch No. 28, dated 5th August 1863, it appears that the steamers were originally intended by Namyk Pasha for communication between Hilla and Belis or Kalao Joher. The idea was to extend Turkish control over Euphrates Arab tribes.



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made to the Director-General of the Post Office by Mr. A. U. Fanshawe Postmaster General of Bombay.

167. Mr. Fanshawe stated that it had been the policy of the Indian Post Office, so far as he had to give practical expression to it, to treat the Post Office in Turkish Arabia and also in the Persian Gulf as entirely dependent on the British Political and Consular authorities, and that if a degree of independence not quite consonant with this policy had been allowed to grow up at Basrah, it had been mainly due to the fact that the Assistant Political Agent there had dissociated himself from control of the post office. It will have been noticed that similar views to those expressed by Mr. Plowden had already been given effect to by Mr. Fanshawe in 1881 when disposing of the proposal of the Assistant Political Agent at Maskat, for the revision and transfer of the post office from the Assistant Political Agent's office to the charge of a separate postmaster, and these views were at the time endorsed by Mr. F. R. Hogg, the Director-General, and accepted by the Government of India. Mr. Fanshawe now further stated that if the staff of the post offices were formally attached by order of the Government of India to the office of the Consul-General at Baghdad and of the Consul at Basrah there could be no objection on the part of post office. This subordination to the Consulate at Baghdad was understood in the post office and it rested with the Political authorities to insist on closer subordination at Basrah.

168. The Postmaster General considered that there was no necessity for the formal technical reports of the Superintendent of Post Offices in the Persian Gulf and Turkish Arabia to be sent to the Consul-General, but it was arranged that a report dealing with points which called for attention locally at Basrah and Baghdad should be submitted to the Consul-General. With regard to the town post office at Basrah the Postal authorities in India had already approved of its being closed and the actual closing only awaited the Resident's decision as to the most opportune time.

169. With reference to the carriage of local letters Mr. Fanshawe wrote:—"On this point there is no doubt that the present procedure, now that it has been challenged, must be given up. It provided a convenience for British subjects and others, but has no special advantage to the Post office." He further reported that with the concurrence of the Consul-General the following notice would be issued in Baghdad:—

I.—The British post office only undertakes to carry letters between its own post officers.

II.—Letters postal in the letter-box of the British post office addressed to Kut-el-Ahmarah, Ahmarah or other Turkish town except Basrah will be transferred for disposal to the Turkish post office.

III.—Distribution of letters will be made on the premises of the British post office. Letters not applied for within 21 days will be treated as unclaimed.

IV.—No portable letter-box will be carried on the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company's steamers.

170. The free carriage of Turkish official correspondence had originally been conceded by Sir Arnold Kemball and its withdrawal was of course a matter for diplomatic settlement. If it were decided that the privilege should be withdrawn, the Resident had merely to give the necessary intimation to the Vali of Baghdad while the post office would be guided by the Resident's orders. The carriage of local letters was not at the time given up and reference to it will be found again later on, but town delivery was stopped and the distribution of letters confined to a "window delivery" at the post office in the Consulate.

171. Matters were again taken up at Constantinople in 1884, and for the better understanding of what follows, it should be mentioned that at the International Postal Convention held at Paris in 1878 the Ottoman Delegate urged the suppression of all foreign post offices in the Turkish dominions, but the question was rejected as a diplomatic one not within the province of the Conference. In April 1884 the Ottoman Minister for foreign Affairs submitted to the British Embassy at Constantinople a memorandum drawn up by the Director-General of Ottoman Posts and Telegraphs upon the subject of the Baghdad and Basrah postal service. The memorandum dealt with Turkey's participation in the Postal Convention of 1878, which it was urged cancelled all anterior

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arrangements and gave to Turkey the postal rights and privileges possessed by other nations who had joined the Postal Union. It was stated further that the Ottoman Postal Administration was prepared to take over the entire management of the posts in Turkish Arabia and in right of the convention the suppression of the post offices at Baghdad and Basrah and the abolition of the Syrian Desert post was demanded. The memorandum also set forth that under Articles 3 and 4 of the Paris Convention, Messrs. Lynch & Co. were bound to carry gratuitously all Turkish mails between Baghdad and Basrah and part of paragraph 8 of Article 4 was quoted in support of this view.

172. In replying to the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs the Embassy

Ibid No. 457.

at Constantinople pointed out that a perusal of the whole of paragraph 8 of Article 4 of the Convention showed that the concluding portion directly contravened the proposition, as it provided that for distances under 300 nautical miles payment should be made at the rate of 2 francs per kilogramme of letters and 25 centimes per kilogramme of other articles. In drawing up his memorandum the Director-General of Ottoman Posts had assumed that the distance between Baghdad and Basrah was 250 nautical miles, which is probably the actual distance from point to point in a direct line, but by the tortuous course of the river, the distance is over 500 miles, and it was shown, therefore, that under Article 2 of the Convention Messrs. Lynch & Co. would be entitled to the higher rates of 15 francs per kilogramme of letters and postcards and 1 franc per kilogramme of other articles. The Ottoman proposals were, however, rejected on the broad ground that *there would be a loss of facility for commerce between India and Turkish Arabia, which the British post office at Basrah and Baghdad secured, chiefly from the inevitable imperfections of the Turkish Postal Service.*

173. In dealing with the same question the Government of India represented to the Secretary of State:—

Despatch No. 44, dated 6th October 1884.

"There can be no question that the maintenance of our post offices, thus restricted in their operations, is conducive to the interests of commerce and to the convenience of a large number of British subjects in India. The monthly receipts from the two offices are estimated as at least Rs. 1,300 a month, and are expected to increase. On the other hand, we have no confidence whatever in the efficiency of any service that the Turkish authorities might substitute for that which now exists, and which was introduced with their consent and has extended only in response to the commercial demands upon it. We cannot therefore be indifferent to the menaces, which threaten the interruption of a safe and cheap communication between Turkish-Arabia and India. If our post offices are closed at Baghdad and Basrah, the parcel post would cease in the absence of any special convention, and the rates of postage on letters, which are now carried at the ordinary inland rates, would be raised to the union rates of three annas for the half ounce.

"Under these circumstances, we trust that Her Majesty's Government will find occasion to make such representations to the Ottoman Porte on the subject as shall ensure the continuance of the present system of postal communication, until at least a more substantial guarantee for its maintenance by the Turkish authorities has been obtained than is contained in the demands communicated to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople."

174. Although all questions affecting the very existence of the British Indian post offices at Baghdad and Basrah were the subject of diplomatic discussion at Constantinople, the local administration did not in any way relax the course of obstruction upon which it had entered in 1881, and every obstacle was thrown in the way of the working of the English mail steamers on the Tigris. In June 1884 on arrival of the river mail steamer at Ali Gharbi the Commander sent his launch to land passengers and cargo and deliver a few local letters. On the launch going alongside of the bank the clerk of the Turkish Telegraph Office and several other persons demanded the letters from the purser's servant who had been sent with the launch to deliver them. The servant refused to give the letters up except to the addresses and was obliged therefore to carry them back to the steamer. The steamer proceeded on her way, but on arrival at Kut, to quote from the Commander's report.

"Zaptiehs (Turkish Gendarmes) were placed of each of my gangways and every person leaving the ship was searched by them for any letters they might have and several merchants informed shippers that the Zaptiehs had orders to seize any person who in future attempted to deliver letters there which did not bear Turkish stamps.



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176. The matter was reported to the Embassy at Constantinople and an assurance obtained from the Sublime Porte that no further interference would be allowed.

177. The results of the recent correspondence and orders were summed up by Mr. Plowden in his despatch No. 441--
External A., February 1885, No. 24. 48, dated 12th June 1884, to Lord Dufferin:--

"The present position of the general question appears to be as follows: My despatch No. 56, dated 5th December 1884, submitted five matters for your Excellency's consideration, viz.:--

- (1) The objectionable character of the new provisional arrangement relating to the Anglo-Indian parcel post.
- (2) The closure of the branch post office in the town of Basrah.
- (3) The withdrawal of the privilege of franking heretofore accorded to certain Ottoman officials
- (4) The relinquishment of the carriage of local letters by the steamers of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.
- (5) The conveyance of Ottoman mail bags in British ocean-going steamers.

With regard to the first of these matters Your Excellency has already asked the Porte to issue instructions directing the authorities at Baghdad to revert to the original arrangement established by Sir Arnold Kemball and Namyk Pasha in 1863, and both the Government of India and the Director-General of Indian Post Offices entirely concur in the expediency of this course.

There is also complete unanimity of opinion in respect to the second, the third and fourth matters; that is to say, the Government of India and the Indian postal authorities agree to the abolition of the town post office at Basrah; to the withdrawal of the franking privilege; and to the relinquishment of the carriage of local letters by Lynch Co.'s steamers, and I shall be prepared to take the necessary action for carrying out these measures whenever Your Excellency thinks that the proper time for doing so has arrived. I hope also that the result of them will be the removal once for all of every reasonable pretext for interference by the Ottoman authorities with the British Indian post.

In respect to the last matter—the exclusion of local letters—it is proposed to give notice in the Indian Postal Guide and at the British post offices at Basrah and Baghdad—

- (1) That the British post office only undertakes to carry letters between its own offices.
- (2) That letters posted in any British post office for Kut-el-Amara, Amara or other towns in Turkish Arabia except Fao, Basrah, or Baghdad will be transferred for disposal to the Ottoman post offices.
- (3) That the distribution of letters will be made on the premises of the British post offices in the Consulates of Baghdad and Basrah; and letters not applied for within 21 days after receipt will be treated as unclaimed.
- (4) That the letter-boxes on board the mail steamers of the Euphrates and Tigris Company will be removed and the Agents directed not to accept or deliver any letter or mail bag except from or to the British authorities at Basrah and Baghdad.

With regard to the remaining matter—the conveyance of Ottoman mail bags by British ocean-going steamers—Your Excellency has decided to await representations from the Porte, and the Government of India is also unwilling to disturb existing arrangement. No immediate action is therefore required."

(vi) Turkish demands for abolition of the British Postal Service in 1885-87.

178. In 1885 when a demand was made by the Porte for the abolition of Foreign post offices on the ground that Turkey was a Postal Union country, the instructions from His Majesty's Government to the Minister at Constantinople were--

"Should there be any attempt on the part of the Turkish authorities to revive the question or to demand the suppression of the British post offices (in Turkish-Arabia you should represent to the Porte that Her Majesty's Government cannot consent to abandon the present system of postal communication in Turkish Arabia, at any rate until a thoroughly efficient service is set on foot and maintained by the Ottoman authorities."



179. Notwithstanding this the question was revived early in 1887 by the Director General of the Ottoman Posts through the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, and in reporting on his demand for the abolition of our post offices, Colonel Tweedie, Consul-General, Baghdad, addressing the Government of India urged that one strong reason against our submitting to have our posts taken out of our hands and entrusted to the bureaux of the Ottoman Government was the impossibility, in the light of experience of reposing any confidence in the efficiency of the Ottoman bureaux. He states:—

"In commenting on the Ottoman Postal Department one writes from actual experience, not from mere prejudice. So centralised is that department that, however, perfect it may appear (on paper at Constantinople) it is impossible for it to be anything in outlying places than the individual qualities of its Superintendents may there admit of, for when the merest clerk at say Beyrout or Basrah gives way to maladministration, there is too often no one nearer than Constantinople with the power of supplying check or remedy."

180. Colonel Tweedie was further of opinion that if the proposals then brought forward by the Ottoman Postal Department were to be favourably considered, not only would the commerce of Iraq, both Native and Foreign, receive a heavy blow, but among other results the residency at Baghdad would be left without any assured means of sending out or receiving its correspondence from India, Constantinople and London.

(vii) Turkish demand for abolition of the British Postal Service 1888.

181. In May 1888 the Porte again pressed for the abolition of the British Postal Service between Baghdad and Basrah. Colonel Talbot, Resident at Basrah, was asked to report on the capacity of the Turkish authorities to establish an efficient postal service between the two places. His report No. 605, dated 6th December 1888, is an interesting document and is quoted at length below:—

"3. The so-called postal service maintained by means of the Oman-Ottoman steamers dates from August 1883 and was one of the measures designed by the Baghdad Government for driving the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company off the river, which is doubtless the ulterior object of the present demand. The mails sent by it consist merely of official papers for the subordinate officials of the two Wilaiats, local postage being double International rates; the public entrusts its private correspondence either to friends travelling by or to employees of the steamers, and the latter make no secret of their often carrying more than the Government mails. By the arrangement referred to in the correspondence ending with Your Excellency's Despatch of the 6th June 1885, which arose, I may remark, out of the admitted irregularity of the Oman-Ottoman steamers, *vide* Wali's letter of 25th January 1885, the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company still continue to carry the Ottoman Government mails whenever tendered, and have done so quite recently though not as frequently as they did. The customs Department, however, which in some respects manages its affairs independently of the Wilaiat, still often avails itself of the assistance of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company. It will be seen from the above remarks that the organisation of the Turkish river postal service is extremely lax, and does not meet requirements either of the Government departments or of the general public.

4. The Embassy archives probably contain a memorandum* by Dr. Bowman sent unofficially by Colonel Tweedie to Mr. Wyndham on 13th July 1888, in which he described the inefficient condition and corrupt management of the Oman-Ottoman steamers. For facility of reference I append a copy of that paper. Of the steamers then forming the flotilla, the 'Busrah' is no longer employed, the 'Tilafa' was burnt four years ago and is lying useless at Busrah. The newest of them, the 'Maskanah,' of 50 H.P., built at Trieste in 1871, is also dismantled and said not to be worth repair. The approximate date of building, horses power and carrying capacity of the four steamers now running as compared with those of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company are given in the subjoined table.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

	Date.	H.P.	G.C.
Medjidieh	1883	100	400 tons.
Khalifah	1880	100	550 "



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Oman-Ottoman Steamers.

Mosul	1866	80	190 tons
Phrat		50	100 "
Resafa		50	100 "
Baghdadi	1859	40	30 "

The 'Resafa,' after having been under repair at Busrah for nearly a year, made her first trip to Baghdad last week, and is said to have leaked a great deal on her way up. They are manned by natives of the country, one of the commanders is a Turk, two are former Arab quartermasters of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigations Company, and the fourth is a Prussian, formerly an A. B. of the old 'Comet.' The Engineers are men previously employed by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company as engine-drivers. All alike are uncertificated untrained men as we understand the terms.

5. From all that I can learn, these steamers are no better found and equipped than they were described to be in 1883, since when no additions have been made to their numbers; and being even then old they have since had five more years wear and tear. Repairs are frequently required and chiefly from want of funds take long in execution; as the case of the 'Resafa' shows, they are often of a perfunctory nature, though doubtless costing the Government far more than the real value of the work done. No newer machinery save what have been indispensable to admit of their running at all has been supplied to them; their engines and boilers are very old and liable at any time to break down, while, as little or no spare gear is kept in stock, any one of them might be incapacitated from running for months together until the necessary pieces of machinery could be procured. On several occasions the steamers run short of fuel, when, but for the courtesy of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, they would have been at a standstill until they could have cut wood if any happened to be in the district or got up coal from Busrah. Of late coal has been supplied to them for cash or as a set-off against freight charges of equivalent value by Messrs. Gray, Mackenzie and Company, and Darby Andrewes and Company, of Busrah: indeed were it not for the support of the latter firm which has a branch at Baghdad and ships exclusively by these steamers, their difficulties in the matter of fuel would be greatly increased.

6. About three years ago the then Manager, Sirri Effendi, was provided with another post and the control was handed over to the Turkish Naval authorities at Busrah with an Agency at Baghdad. The present Commodore, Hassan Beg, does not bear the character of being an honest man, which the Agent at Baghdad, Hafiz Beg does; and the administration is probably far from pure; still, since the management has been in the hands of the Naval authorities, the steamers have run more regularly than before and without many accidents or delays. This, however, is attributable both to the fact that three or often four steamers, as against the two of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, have been employed and also to the state of the river, which for the last two years has been exceptionally good. It has still to be proved what they could do if the river fell low as in previous years. They start every Wednesday morning but as an instance of occasional irregularity, caused in this case by the Balam festival, I may mention that only a fortnight ago the "Phrat" with a barge in tow did not leave Baghdad till about 5 A.M., Friday morning, and two hours before the "Khalifah" which arrived at Busrah at 2 P.M. on Monday morning, discharged and took in cargo and on her upward voyage met the "Phrat" which did not reach Busrah till the following Thursday. The 'Mosul,' 'Resafa' and 'Phrat' carry small cargoes probably because there would be great risk not only to the cargo, but to the steamer itself, if an attempt was made to load them. Consequently, whenever they have any quantity of cargo to carry up or down they take a barge in tow: a privilege which the Ottoman Government refused to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company. The 'Baghdadi' is only of use to tow a barge, and, then is very slow. Just now the Oman-Ottoman steamers are carrying very little cargo up river and make fairly good passages up, but the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company's steamers, though always full and deeply laden, generally overtake the Turkish boat leaving before them, and not seldom arrive a day or two before her. In the spring when the river was high and navigation easy, the Turkish steamers with barges in tow often took 4 and 5 days down and 11 or 12 days up, as against 2½ days down and 3½ days up stream taken by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company's boats.

7. It must be obvious, I think, from the above considerations that the Oman-Ottoman steamers are quite unfit to undertake a regular mail service between Baghdad and Busrah, and that from their age and owing to the little care that has been taken of them, it is not likely that they can maintain even their present degree of efficiency for any length of time. In considering this question, however, we have to look ahead not merely to the next few years during which the present steamers may continue to run, but to the distant future, and to what will take their place when quite past work. For many years past the Ottoman Government has not placed a single new vessel on the river at its own expense, hoping possibly to be able to get rid of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company and then to purchase their steamers cheap. Of late efforts have been made to float a Company,

Numerous applications were registered at Baghdad, but the intending shareholders made it a primary condition of risking their capital that the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company's steamers should no longer run. On their representing this at

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Constantinople, an answer is said to have been sent remarking on the difficulty of carrying that point, and urging them to subscribe without pressing it. For the present, nothing further has been done here in the matter; but recent rumours point to two steamers, to run between Baghdad and Mosul as a private speculation of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan being shortly despatched. Once here they might not improbably be used to supplement the present service between Baghdad and Busrah, and the larger scheme might be again pushed forward on its becoming an object to the Ottoman Government to prove that the river service could and would be made more efficient than it is. I presume, however, that some better guarantee than this immature project affords would be required.

8. If it is decided that the Porte's request must be eventually granted, one reason for postponing compliance with it during the present contract would be the propriety of the Ottoman Government recognising by such a concession the services which the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company have rendered to it in these outlying provinces as postal carriers for so many years. The chief reason, however, is the impossibility of admitting that the present steamers could be depended upon with any certainty for a lengthened period to make connection with the British India Steam Navigation Company's mail steamers at Busrah, even if a promise were given, which we should have no means of enforcing, that barges should not be towed. The bulk of the correspondence from Baghdad and Busrah is with India and other foreign ports served through India, and the Ocean mail steamers on the Persian Gulf line are bound under heavy penalties by their contract with the Indian Government, which largely subsidises them, to perform their voyages within a stipulated time. The question therefore is that of the conveyance of the mails, not merely between Baghdad and Busrah, but between Baghdad, Busrah and India. Consequently a better organized and equipped river service than is perhaps needed for purely local purposes might be fairly insisted upon by the other Union Administration concerned, viz., that of British India, before undertaking the transmission by sea to and from Busrah of what would become Postal Union, not merely its own inland, correspondence. Such an organisation could not be created without an expenditure of money, which would for long absorb the anticipated gain to the Ottoman Treasury from the proposed change of system; and if created, it would be long also before confidence in its thorough and permanent efficiency could be established.

9. The general question on which Your Excellency desires my views has been so fully discussed in its various aspects by my predecessors that I can add little to the arguments with which Your Excellency is already familiar.

* * * * *

That the surrender of this privilege would be followed at no distant date by a refusal to allow the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to trade on the Tigris may be taken as certain, for the Company's position rests on the same basis of usage; and if this is set aside in one instance it will be so in another, specially in a question which the Ottoman Government has so much at heart as the withdrawal of those steamers. Our communication with India would then be at the mercy of an administration over whose proceedings we could have no practical control, and from the sheer inefficiency of the means employed to keep it open might be often altogether interrupted for indefinite periods. Apart from other political considerations on which I need not dwell. His Excellency Sir Edward Thornton's despatch of 6th July 1886, informing Colonel Tweedie that in point of safety and certainly the Bombay route was preferable for all but urgent correspondence, is a significant commentary on the real measure of efficiency of the Turkish Postal service; and I cannot but fear that, just as has happened in the case of the desert line, by which letters for the continent and England can no longer be sent, the Ottoman Government after obtaining possession of this service would introduce conditions prejudicial to its usefulness.

10. There is one point in which the substitution of a Postal Union for a British Indian service would seriously effect the interests of British Indian subjects in Turkish Arabia, whether permanent residents or temporary visitors to the neighbouring shrines, viz., the withdrawal of the Money Order and Parcel System. According to the information in my archives, India is not a party to the Postal Convention on these subjects, and consequently the means which British Indian subjects of all classes now possess of safely and cheaply remitting funds to and from India by money order would be withdrawn. Some, though less inconvenience would result from a discontinuance of the parcel system for the British India Steam Navigation Company will take nothing as freight at a lower charge than 5 rupees, and probably the Ottoman Customs dues would also suffer to a certain extent. I feel some diffidence in making the following suggestion as I am not sure how far it might be practicable. The Turkish Ambassador in London pleads for a liberal interpretation of the "parcours gratuite," under Art. IV of the Postal Union Convention of 1878, as applied to the 500 running miles between Busrah and Baghdad. By the same Article and subsequent detailed Regulations the only "service extraordinaire" for which special expenses are arranged between the administrations interested is the acceleration on land of the Indian Mail. The Ocean service to and from Busrah, however, is exclusively and largely subsidised by the Government of India which pays the British India Steam Navigation Company an annual subsidy of nearly



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4½ lakhs of rupees, distributed, in proportions which I have no means of ascertaining over seven postal lines, two of which connect Busrah with India. It might be possible before assenting to the introduction of the International Postal system to propose a modification of Art. IV requiring Turkey to contribute towards the expense of a Postal service by which her subjects so largely benefit, when the Ottoman Government might perhaps shrink from the cost which such a proposal, if carried, would entail, and withdraw the present demand."

181-A. What answer upon this was given to the Porte cannot be found but it must have been such as to silence the Porte for some years.

(viii) Turkish attempt at abolishing the British Postal Service, 1894.

182. In 1894, the Turkish Director-General of Posts proposed that all correspondence on arrival at Basrah from India for addresses in Turkish Arabia including Baghdad should be made over as closed mails to the Turkish Post Office in Basrah, and that all letters for India from Baghdad should be collected and conveyed to Basrah by the Turkish Postal authorities, and there handed over in closed bags to the British Post Office for despatch and conveyance to India at the cost of the Indian Government. In the opinion of Colonel Mocker (letter to the Postmaster-General, No. 416, dated 27th July 1894) such a proposal meant that we should no longer carry or deliver any mails between or at Basrah and Baghdad.

183. The rule adopted by the Resident after consulting the Postmaster-General for the guidance of the Post Master at Baghdad was "that he will be ready to accept and forward to their destination all letters which the Turkish Post Office may send him coming from Turkey or other foreign countries addressed to towns in India, etc., except letters from Baghdad, Basrah or Fao, which unless bearing British Indian stamps, he will consider as unfranked letters."

184. The existing procedure appears from article 192, Section III of the Postal Guide:—

"192. The Indian Government maintains post offices at Basrah and Baghdad. It does not, however, undertake to deliver articles posted for Kot-el-Amarah, Amarah Killeh, Kerbelah, Mosul, or other towns in the Turkish Empire in Asia: such articles will be transferred to the Turkish Post Office for disposal."*

(ix) Question of delivery of postal parcels at Baghdad and Basrah.

185. This question has been one which the Turkish officials have seized upon to subject the British service to all sorts of petty obstruction.

186. When the post office was first established at Baghdad the carriage of parcels as well as letters was undertaken as a matter of course. The office had, however, only been open a very short time when in 1863, the Consul-General, Sir Arnold Kemball, discovered that local traders were using the parcel post for the importation of dutiable articles and thus evading the payment of Customs dues. He suspended the transmission of parcels through the Baghdad post office while the following proposals were submitted to the Vali or Governor-General at Baghdad:—(1). No outgoing parcel was to be received unless covered by an Ottoman Custom-house pass. (2). Incoming parcels were to be delivered with the letter mail at the Consulate General, but no parcel delivered to the addressee except through the Custom-house, which was to be allowed full liberty to inspect the manifest. There is nothing on record to show that these proposals were accepted, but as the interchange of parcels between Baghdad and other offices was resumed and the procedure proposed by Sir Arnold Kemball adopted at Baghdad, consent must have been obtained.

187. The procedure was briefly as follows in regard to incoming parcels:—Closed parcel bags were landed at the Consulate with the letter mails. The parcels were retained in deposit and intimation sent to addressees. On a parcel being claimed it was sent by the addressee, accompanied by a Residency Kavas,

* In March 1904 the Porte addressed a note verbale to the British Ambassador complaining of the transport of letters by British mail steamers between Busra and Baghdad and of the affixing of British stamps to the envelopes. Major Newmarch pointed out that the practice of carrying letters between Busrah and Baghdad in British mail steamers after being posted in the British Post Offices at those places was an old one and the British Porte could not be expected to carry letters bearing Turkish stamps or no stamps, though as a matter of courtesy merely, a Turkish mail bag was still carried to and from the various ports on the river at the sole risk of the Turkish authorities.



to the Custom-house where delivery was effected with the necessary Custom-house formalities. In 1881 this arrangement was slightly modified, the authorities requiring that the addressee should be accompanied to the Custom-house by a Customs messenger instead of by a British Kavas.

188. In July 1882 with a change in the management of the Custom-house came an important alteration in the mode of delivering parcels and parcel mail bags at Baghdad. A new Superintendent of Ottoman Customs having arrived from Constantinople one of his first acts on assuming office was to write to the Agents of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company direct instead of by the usual channel through the Consul-General, complaining that "your steamers under the name of post bring numbers of parcels containing valuable merchandise and without bringing the same to the Custom-house wharf carry them straight to the British Consulate and land them there without the knowledge of the Customs officers." He further desired the Agents to instruct the Captains of their steamers "to touch at no place and land no part of their cargo, whether considerable or trifling, without the knowledge of the Customs authorities." To make this perfectly clear it is perhaps necessary to explain that the British Residency and Consulate General is situated on the river bank and has its own private landing. The Custom-house wharf is about half a mile up the river beyond the Residency and the English mail steamer from Basrah on her way up to the wharf stops opposite the Residency for a few minutes, while her mails are taken on shore in a boat. She then proceeds on her way to the Custom-house. The Agents replied to the Superintendent of Customs this custom had been in force for twenty years and that the parcel bags formed part of the letter mail and were received by the Company's steamers at the Consulate at Basrah in sealed bags for delivery at the Baghdad Consulate-General. The Agents at the same time referred the matter to Colonel Tweedie, Consul-General, Baghdad, and a provisional arrangement was entered into with local Ottoman authorities, while the matter was referred by Consul-General to the Embassy. Endeavours

External A., November 1885, Nos. 27-38. were made to obtain a return to the mode of delivery introduced by Sir Arnold Kemball in 1868, with the consent of Nanuk Pasha, but the altered procedure, the details of which are as follows, was insisted upon.

189. Parcel and letter mail bags together were landed at the Residency and after the letter mail had been opened and distributed, the seals of the bags were removed, but the bags with the contents untouched were carried in charge of the postmaster to the Custom-house. At the Custom-house the contents of the bags were removed by the postmaster in presence of an Ottoman official, a list of the parcels was made by the postmaster who signed the list and affixed to it an Ottoman Revenue stamp. The list was then made over to the Customs authorities along with the parcel and a copy of the list prepared in Turkish by a Custom-house clerk and signed and sealed by the Assistant Superintendent of Customs and given to the postmaster as an acknowledgment. The parcels were left at the Custom-house and delivery effected there on addresses producing a pass signed by the postmaster. Unclaimed parcels were surrendered to the postmaster for return to senders.

190. There were, however, further difficulties raised by the Turkish Customs authorities, and the Porte expressed fears that the revenue of the Government was defrauded by various subterfuges and after prolonged negotiations Her Majesty's Government and the Porte agreed upon a *modus vivendi*.

External A., August 1889, Nos. 460-67.
External A., September 1889, Nos. 231-236.
Secret E., January 1890, Nos. 39-61.
Secret E., January 1890, Nos. 9-24.
Secret E., January 1891, Nos. 61-76.

Sir W. White's Despatch to the Resident, dated 16th September 1891.

Secret E., February 1892, Nos. 287-309.

191. The procedure at Baghdad was henceforth to be assimilated to that in force at Constantinople, viz. :-

"1. Before the arrival of each ship containing parcels a list showing the number, weight, value, etc., should be supplied to the Custom House.

2. A customs official may be allowed to go on board the steamer in the company of the Post Office Agent, and after landing, the boxes are to be taken by those two officials to a room or office specially prepared for that purpose, and entirely separate from the letter post office and opened in the presence of the Turkish official, who should then give a receipt and take the parcels to the Customs-house, whence they will be withdrawn in the usual way as all the other goods. If a Turkish official fails to attend within a reasonable time, the boxes of parcels are to be taken opened and handed to the Custom-house against the receipt.



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Such was the arrangement made in Constantinople. You will perceive that the Turkish official by this means is not permitted within the letter post office; such a procedure would not be considered advisable."

192. Colonel Mockler made the following observations and suggestions in regard to the new procedure prescribed in his letter No. 685, dated 18th November

Ibid., No. 299.

1891, to the Government of India:—

The special points in which the new procedure will essentially differ from the present are:—(1) the presence of a Turkish Customs official at the first opening of the parcels mail bags after their being landed from the ship bringing them; (2) the furnishing to a Customs official of invoices or lists showing the number, weight, value, etc., of each article contained in each bag before the seals of the bags are broken; (3) the duty of conveying the bags to the Customs House by the Customs officials after giving receipts or signing duplicate invoices.

At present the parcels bags are opened, without any Turkish official being present, by the Postmaster who compares the contents of the bags with his lists, and who then takes them to the Custom House where a receipt for the parcels produced is made out in Turkish, signed, and delivered to the Postmaster; the actual delivery of the parcels to the addressees being made on the production by them of delivery orders from the Postmaster, and payment of duty, which latter procedure will still be followed.

With regard to rule of procedure (1) in the Ambassador's despatch under reference which directs that "before the arrival of each ship containing parcels a list showing the number, weight, value, etc., should be supplied to the Custom House," I would point out that it is impossible (unless parcels are detained in the Indian Post Offices for a week after they are posted which would be very inconvenient and unfair to the public) that such a list, lists or invoices can be furnished before the arrival of the ship (as regards Basrah and Baghdad), because the parcels are despatched together with the invoices; such invoices also, it may be noted, under the Inland system, contain only the official numbers or numbers of each parcel, nothing as to contents, weight and value. I am submitting to the Ambassador at Constantinople that if "before the breaking of the seals" of the parcel bags duplicate invoices be handed to the Customs official deputed to receive and take charge of them, such procedure should satisfy all requirements.

In any case it will be necessary for instructions to be issued to the Indian Postal authorities to order despatching Post Offices to send invoices in duplicate for each bag of parcels showing number of parcels in each bag, official number of each parcel, weight of each parcel, declared contents and declared value of each parcel, such invoices being either put into the letter bags or preferably into separate "coloured" bags marked "Invoice."

193. The last proposal of Colonel Mockler was sanctioned by the Government of India (Foreign Department letter No. 149-E., dated 25th January 1892, to

Ibid., No. 309.

Colonel Mockler).

194. In March 1895 the Basrah Customs Master insisted on examining postal parcels in the Custom House, in the first instance. Colonel Mockler drew attention

External A., December 1895, Nos. 92-97.

of the Consul at Basrah to the new procedure laid down as regards Baghdad and instructed him to have it adopted at Basrah.

195. One of the abuses that grew in the customs houses at Baghdad and Basrah, who received charge of the postal parcels, was that when addressees were

Undelivered parcels at Baghdad and Basrah.
External A., October 1893.

not found or could not or would not receive them, they were detained for indefinite periods without being returned to their senders. The Turkish Customs Masters tried to make out that all unclaimed parcels at Baghdad were made over to the British Post Offices for return to the sender, except those parcels containing worn clothes, which were returned direct to their "place of origin." The Turks moreover claimed to inspect all undelivered parcels before being returned.

196. In his letter to the Embassy No. 476, dated 8th July 1893, Colonel Mockler, however, showed that there were at the Baghdad Customs Office several parcels, which had been received as far back as January 1892; among which there was only one containing "worn apparel." He, moreover, explained to the Embassy the difficulty there would be in returning parcels that had been opened for inspection, for neither the sender nor the British Post Offices would be bound to accept parcels, whose seals had been broken and whose contents had been meddled with.

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197—198. The Nadhir on 27th April 1893 refused to give up to the post office the undelivered parcels, as he, he said, had received no instructions from Constantinople.*

(x) Insurance of Parcels to Baghdad.

199. The post offices in the Persian Gulf and Turkish Arabia have always been treated as part of the Indian Inland post and when the postal insurance system was introduced in India in 1877 it was extended to these post offices. At Baghdad, Jewish and Armenian traders eagerly availed themselves of the insured parcel post for the exportation of specie. The total declared value insured rose from Rs. 26,677 in 1878-79 to Rs. 14,52,362 in 1884 and during 1882-83 it was computed at two lakhs of rupees a month, eloquent testimony to the unbounded confidence placed by the people in the British Indian Post Office. With the exception of an interruption during two months of 1882, while the general question of parcel mails was under discussion, the system continued till its final abolition in 1885 which was decided upon for various reasons.

200. In March 1884 the Agents, Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, addressed the Consul-General, Baghdad, with a view to his bringing to the notice of the Indian Postal authorities their intention that the carriage of specie under the guise of insured post parcels was not contemplated when the mail contract of 1875 was entered upon, and that owing to the constantly increasing value of the specie then remitted to India through the channel of the post office, they (the Agents) had represented to the Board of the Company in London that the extent of the liability if any, which attached to the Company should be settled in the event of any parcel being lost. They further pointed out that the Company was bound to carry specie free of freight only "for the actual use of H. M.'s Government," and that it was never contemplated that specie would be shipped by the post office as mails on behalf of the general public. They pointed out that the loss of specie freight was severely felt by the Company and begged that the insurance system might be abolished in respect to the Baghdad post office.

201. In forwarding this letter to the Government of India, the Consul-General, Mr. T. C. Plowden, brought the whole question of postal insurance under review. He was of opinion from the provisions of the contract of 1875 that the Company could not be made liable for the loss of any parcel containing specie and represented that the transshipment from the river to the ocean steamer at Basrah was attended with great risk. The Company's contention that the carriage of specie in the mails constituted an injury to their trade was just, and on this subject Mr. Plowden wrote:—"I find that for the twelve months ending 31st December 1883 the total value of the insured parcels despatched from Baghdad amounted to Rs. 18,38,062, and that the whole of this sum except about Rs. 10,000 was specie. In consequence of the competition of the Post Office the Company's charge for specie is $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. At this rate the freight on the abovementioned sum (say, in round numbers, 18 lakhs) would amount to Rs. 9,000. But if the post office competition were withdrawn the rate would of course be raised. Thus during the two months of 1882 referred to by the Agents, the Company's charge for freight was immediately raised to $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., a rate which on 18 lakhs would yield Rs. 27,000 per annum. * * *

I think that the Company's complaint of injury to their legitimate trade through the operations of the post office has some foundation and deserves consideration, because the operations in question are not carried on within the jurisdiction of the Government of India, but in the Ottoman dominions where British merchants conduct their business under many special disadvantages and risks." It certainly was a hardship that the Company should have to enter into competition with the post office as well and the

*For later history see Chapter XII, Section (xviii).



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Consul-General suggested that the post office should cease to carry insured parcels, and it may be mentioned that the competition lay between the British post office and the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company only as no specie was entrusted to the Turkish steamers.

202. The contract entered into by the Secretary of State for India in 1875

External A., December 1884, Nos. 146-150.

with the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company expired on the 31st October 1884 and in preparing the new contract provision was made for the carriage by the Company's steamers of "all mails of the Government of India, including Post Office stores and all articles (other than merchandise, specie, precious stones and jewellery) sent by post, as well as the bags or boxes in which they are conveyed." At the same time the Director-General of the Post Office ordered (October 1884) that instructions should be issued to Baghdad and Basrah not to accept specie for transmission through the post and the Bombay and Karachi post offices were also instructed not to accept specie, including precious stones and jewellery for those places. The use was permitted, however, of voluntary insurance of articles, such as books, valuable documents, &c., which could be insured at nominal value, as distinct from compulsory insurance which applies, under Post Office rules, to everything of intrinsic value, such as specie, jewellery, &c.

203. The effect of these orders was to stop the transmission of all specie parcels through the post. This half measure, however, was not found satisfactory, and at the recommendation of the Postmaster General, Bombay, the Director-General prohibited insurance altogether for the Persian Gulf and Turkish Arabia and the following notice was issued:—

"Postal Notice.

"From the 1st July 1885 no insurance will be available on parcels, letters or other articles posted at or destined for the following post offices: Baghdad, Bursa, Bushire, Linga, Bandar-Abas, Muscat, Bahrein, Jask and Gaudur. Articles manifestly containing coin, bullion, precious stones, pearls or articles of intrinsic value will be returned to the senders.—*Simla, 7th July 1885.*"

204. The orders for the abolition of the insurance system were received by the native merchants of Baghdad almost with consternation. The native trade of the city is peculiar and some general remarks on it may not be without interest. Goods are imported from Europe, Australia, China, the Straits Settlements and America, the exports, namely,—dates, hides, wool and cereals, amount to very little and traders are compelled to pay their bills in specie in the shape of the gold and silver currency, of almost every nationality, which finds its way into Baghdad. Owing to the failure from time to time of old established native Banking houses in Baghdad the trader pays his bills in specie through Agents in Bombay and the only means of transmitting the specie were the Post Office and the office of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company at Baghdad. The post parcels of specie were addressed to well-known Jewish firms in Bombay, who settled the traders' accounts by the issue of drafts on the countries in which the bills were due.

205. In Turkish Arabia there is a large circulation of Persian Shami (nominally silver) and Austrian dollars containing a heavy proportion of alloy and it was cheaper to send these as specie freight. The trader, therefore, consigned such money to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company and pure gold and silver to the Post Office in insured parcels which was considered the safest mode of transport. The currency of Baghdad undergoes strange fluctuations. It is made up of the coinage of almost all parts of the world, but the British Indian rupee, Austrian dollar and Persian kraun (silver) by turns flood the market, and at the time of which we write, were got rid of by exportation through the Post Office in insured parcels, till their scarcity induced the trader to hold the balance in hand and sell locally at an enhanced rate.*

* The procedure as to money orders, which is connected with currency, is treated in the *Trade Precis*.



(xi) Mail contracts with the Euphrates and Tigris Navigation Company, 1862-96.

206. The steamer mail service between Basrah and Baghdad was opened in 1862 under an agreement of the Secretary of State with Messrs. Lynch and Co. as representing the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company. The service was then maintained by a six-weekly steamer between Basrah and Baghdad. For several years, besides receiving a Government subsidy of £2,400, the Company enjoyed a monopoly of the river trade, as until the establishment of a Turkish flotilla on the Tigris about 1867, the only competition the Euphrates and Tigris Company had to contend with was that of Arab boats. These boats, some of them of 30 tons burden, took from 30 to 40 days to track from Basrah to Baghdad, while the river steamer performed the journey in from four to five days according to the season of the year.

207. In 1866 the Secretary of State doubled the subsidy of the Euphrates and Tigris Company, making it £4,800 a year in return for a fortnightly service, and of their own accord the Company ran their steamers three times a month, calling at Kut, Ourdi, Koorud, Kut-el-Ahmarah and other villages on the banks of the river, to meet the great passenger and freight traffic.

208. As early as 1869-70 the Turkish Steamer Company made some endeavours to obtain the English subsidy for the carriage of mails, but actual negotiations were never entered into. In connection with this the Consul-General, Baghdad, represented that the Turkish steamers were irregular and the Company ill-managed and not to be relied upon, and that there were strong political grounds why the English Company which had done so much under the English flag to open up the commerce of Mesopotamia should receive the support of Government.

209. In January 1875 a fresh contract was entered into with the Tigris Company by the Secretary of State, to terminate on the 31st December 1884. Messrs.

General A., December 1875, No. 4.

Lynch & Co. undertook to run a steamer three times a month on a subsidy of £3,600 or £1,200 less than the subsidy received under the previous contract. The Ottoman Government had all along steadily refused to allow Messrs. Lynch & Co. to run more than two steamers on the Tigris. It was, however, provided in this contract that the Company were bound to provide a weekly service to Baghdad at the further reduced rate of £2,400, provided they were allowed to run a third steamer, the reason of this clause being that could Government induce the Sublime Porte to consent to a third steamer, the return in passengers and freight would more than compensate the Company for the loss in subsidy and the expense of the accelerated service.

210. A firman for the third steamer was never obtained, but in 1878, without any alteration in the terms of the contract and with the two steamers to which they were limited, the Company established by energy and good management a weekly service which still continues unimpaired.

211. In the following year oblivious of Ottoman obstruction a scheme was being formed for further opening up the waters of the Tigris by English steamers, provided the necessary firman could be obtained from the Sublime Porte. Mr. Lynch, Chairman of the Euphrates and Tigris Company, wrote on the 9th June 1879 in reference to this project:—"The propriety of extending the

General A., 1879, No. 70.

service to Mosul and also opening up communications on adjacent rivers is now occupying the attention of the Company." And on the 13th October following Colonel Miles, Consul-General at Baghdad, wrote:—"The commerce of the Tigris is capable of indefinite expansion and there is no doubt the Company could obtain a vast deal more cargo for their vessels than they get at present had they the means of carrying it. The demand for freight indeed is so much in excess of the supply that they are enabled to charge as much per ton from Baghdad to Basrah and *vice versa* as ocean steamers can obtain from Basrah to London. The firman however was not obtained and the scheme does not appear to have got beyond the stage of discussion.



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212. When the mail contract was about to be renewed in 1884, the

A, Political E., February 1881, Nos. 23-243.
Letter of Mr. J. K. Lynch to the India Office,
dated 23rd May 1883, *ibid* No. 237.

Euphrates and Tigris Navigation Company
claimed that their subsidy should be
raised from £3,600 to £4,000 per annum

on the following grounds:—

"I have the honor, as Chairman of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, to inform you that, in order to meet the exigencies of the postal service, the Company have sent out to Basrah another fine steamer, as an aid to those already on the Euphrates and Tigris, and they beg leave to submit to the kind consideration of the Government the following circumstances which induced them to do so.

It was found in the year 1880 that a ten days' postal service between India and Baghdad did not meet the requirements of the postal service, and consequently by desire of the Government a weekly line was opened by this Company, and an additional clause was added to the then existing contract by which this Company, without further remuneration, undertook, as long as they could do so, with only two vessels to run a weekly service, which they have been able punctually to carry out for nearly three years.

By the arrangements between the Company and the Government, it was contemplated that permission might possibly be obtained for a third steamer to run, and in such case the subsidy to the Company was to be reduced in consideration of the profit to be derived from the third vessel; but the expectation of profit from this source has to be abandoned, because Turkish Government do not permit the third steamer to run nevertheless the Company, from a desire to provide against the risk of interruption to service of the Government have constructed at a cost of £20,000 a new steamer, the *Mejidiak* a first class vessel, which has now arrived and is running, and accordingly one of the steamers previously employed, the *Blosse Lynch* has been taken off; so that the Company have now always one vessel lying idle and ready to take the place of one of the others in case of need, but otherwise wholly unremunerative."

213. As regards the third steamer neither Colonel Tweedie nor the Foreign

Colonel Tweedie's letter No. 99, dated 14th August
1883.
Ibid, No. 241.

Department here could find any trace of an
intimation having been given to the Com-
pany to place a third steamer to meet the

exigencies of the postal service.

214. As a matter of fact the weekly service was kept up by means only of two steamers. And we have seen that the Turkish Government not only objected to a third steamer, but even an old one being replaced. As to the subsidy the Government of India wrote to the Secretary of State:—

"Under existing arrangements, a subsidy of £3,600 is paid annually to the Company and the Company now asks that the amount may be raised to £4,000 from 1st May 1884. In our Separate Revenue Despatches, No. 24, dated 4th August 1873, and No. 19, dated 6th September 1875, we have already expressed our views to the effect that the service between Baghdad and Basrah might be secured at half the cost now incurred. We still consider that a subsidy of Rs. 2,000 a month would be an ample remuneration for the service. We are also of opinion that in the new contract the amount of the subsidy should be fixed in rupees payable in India.

We take this opportunity of representing for Your Lordship's consideration that (as the Indian Post Office does not require the maintenance of this contract for the conveyance of mails in foreign territory) the Indian revenue should not bear the whole cost of the subsidy. We, therefore, submit that the cost should be divided between India and England."

215. An agreement was ultimately entered into on 7th June 1884 with the

External A., December 1884, Nos. 146-159, (No. 157).

Company for a weekly service for 10 years
on a yearly subsidy payable by the Gov-
ernment of India of £3,600 (Rs. 36,000) to be reduced to by £1,200 in case

a third steamer was allowed to ply between Baghdad and Basrah by the Turkish Government.

216. The agreement, dated 6th August 1896 (to take effect from 1st


External A., November 1896, Nos. 172-181.
(No. 179).

May 1894) stipulate for an annual subsidy
of only Rs. 24,000 for a period of 10 years

(that is, up to 30th April 1904). There was no provision for a reduction in case a third steamer was allowed.

For the subsequent history of this Mail Service—see Chapter XII (sections xiv and xvi).

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CHAPTER XII.

Certain interesting facts connected with the British rights on the Euphrates and Tigris.

217. We shall relate now a few interesting events connected with our rights and difficulties in regard to the navigation of the Mesopotamian rivers—especially the Tigris, not mentioned before—

(i) Survey of the Euphrates and Tigris and Mesopotamia, 1837-65.

218. We shall first give a brief account of the work done by the Indian naval ships *Nitocris* and others for the survey of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates and the adjacent country. We shall make use of the account compiled in 1871 by Mr. Clements R. Markham, of the Geographical Department of the India Office. It will be noted that the East Indian Company's steamers were by no means trading vessels, but naval ships mainly used by our Political Agents and other officers for surveying the Mesopotamian rivers—both the Euphrates and Tigris, and for carrying despatches:—

219. The survey of the rivers Euphrates and Tigris, and of that region of Mesopotamia which for its historical associations, its capabilities, and the importance of its geographical position surpasses almost any other country in the world, is mainly the work of the Indian Navy. (a) During upwards of 26 years the accomplished and persevering officers who executed the Mesopotamian survey continued to work in the face of great difficulties and dangers; and for this alone the Indian Navy takes rank among the foremost contributors to geographical knowledge.

220. After the time of Colonel Chesney, his second-in-command, who was nearly lost in the ill-fated *Tigris*, had charge of the survey in Mesopotamia. This was Henry Blosse Lynch, an excellent scientific observer and daring explorer, who had commenced his career in the Persian Gulf survey. In 1837 Captain Lynch, C.B., traversed the course of the Tigris, from its source in Armenia to Baghdad, fixing the chief positions by astronomical observations, and others by cross bearings. He then connected Nineveh, Baghdad, Babylon, and Ctesiphon by triangulation; and, when he completed the Tigris map in 1839, (b) his mind was full of interest in his work, and he exclaimed that the field of operations, instead of diminishing, appeared to extend.

221. In October 1841 Lynch commenced the survey of the Euphrates by measuring a base on the level plain between Balis and Giaber. He had the steamers *Nitocris*, *Nimrod* and *Assyria*, and was assisted by Lieutenants Felix Jones, Campbell, Selby, and Grounds. After ascending the river, it was connected with the Mediterranean by chronometric measurements. (c) Captain Lynch retired from the survey in 1843, and his Assistant, Felix Jones, succeeded him.

(a) In 1826—30 Lieutenant Ormsby, leaving the Indian Navy, had devoted three years to exploring Mesopotamia. His adventures are described by Wellsted in his *Travels to the City of the Caliphs*. (2 vols., London, 1840.)

(b) The map is on a scale of 12 inches to a degree.

See "Note on a part of the River Tigris between Baghdad and Samawah."—*Royal Geographical Society's Journal*, ix, p. 471.

"Note accompanying a Survey of the Tigris from Ctesiphon to Mosul."—*Royal Geographical Society's Journal*, ix, p. 441. Captain Lynch was ably assisted in this survey by his brother, Michael Lynch, whose constitution did not equal his zeal, as he died from the effects of hard work and exhaustion at Diarbeker. This officer had suffered before from the climate of the Maldives.

(c) "Memoir of the River Euphrates in three parts to accompany the map."—*Bombay Geographical Society's Journal* vi p. 169.

Memoir of the country between Baghdad and the Hamreed Hills by Lieutenant Grounds."—*Bombay Geographical Society's Journal*, vol. vi.



222. Felix Jones had already seen service in the Red Sea survey, in the Maldives, in Ceylon, (a) and in the Manaar Gulf, and he had reported upon the harbour of Grane or Koweit in 1839, since which time he had been serving under Captain Lynch in the Euphrates. He was stationed at Baghdad, in command of the *Nitocris* steamer, and had other duties besides surveying; but every year he succeeded in completing some interesting and valuable surveys, although for a great part of the time he was almost single-handed. In such a region, it was impossible to go in any direction without meeting with work well worth the doing, and Felix Jones made the best use of his opportunities. The country, infested by wild tribes of Arabs, was frequently dangerous, and it was necessary to seize upon any chance that offered for exploring and surveying.

223. In 1844 Captain F. Jones accompanied Sir Henry Rawlinson on a journey to collect information respecting the boundary between Persia and Turkey. The results were a memoir and map of a country but little known. In 1846 he made an ascent of the *Tigris from Baghdad to Samarra*, on board the *Nitocris*. (b) In 1848 he undertook a journey to determine the course of the ancient Nehrwan Canal, and to survey the once fertile region which it irrigated, now a desolate and almost impassable waste. His interesting memoir (c) on the Nehrwan Canal, accompanied by a map, gives the history of the work from the days of its construction in the time of the Sassanian dynasty, and minutely describes its vast brickwork dams and sluices. In April and September 1830 Captain Jones surveyed (c) the old bed of the Tigris, discovered the site of the ancient Opis, and made researches in the vicinity of the Median wall and Phycus of Xenophon. In 1852 he made a trigonometrical survey of the country between the Tigris and the Upper Zab, including the ruins of Nineveh, fixing positions by meridian altitudes of the sun and stars, with chronometric differences for longitude. The results of this work are recorded in the beautiful maps of "Assyrian Vestiges," in four sheets, and in a valuable memoir. During 1853 Captain Felix Jones, assisted by young Collingwood, then a Midshipman, completed a map of Baghdad on a large scale, with a memoir on the province, full of statistical information; (c) and in 1854 he sent home his maps of Babylonia. They consisted of three sheets, with a detailed memoir, and included the country from Museyb, north of Hillah, down to the north-west end of the Sea of Nejf. Unfortunately, these maps were lost in the India House. (d)

224. In 1846 Captain Felix Jones compiled a general map of Mesopotamia, from Scanderoon on the Mediterranean to Basrah, which was based on the surveys by Chesney, Lynch, and himself. Captain Jones retired from the Mesopotamian survey to take up the post of Political Resident at Bushire in the Persian Gulf in 1855. He possessed all the knowledge and tact which were necessary for an officer in his position. For the work of the Mesopotamian survey several acquirements were essential in addition to those of a Surveyor; such as an acquaintance with the language and ancient history of the country, tact and judgment in dealing with wild Arab tribes, and capacity for enduring fatigue and privations. All these were possessed by Felix Jones in an eminent degree. In 1857, while he was Political Resident at Bushire, the Persian war broke out. This he had foreseen, and provided for by furnishing to the Government of India an elaborate plan for invasion, containing itineraries through Persia, and guides for the Commissariat Departments of the Army and Navy. This paper obtained for him great commendation under Earl Canning's own hand (e). Assisted by Captain Malcolm Green, he made a survey of the Shat-el-Arab, including the Karun, which enabled Sir James Outram to attack Mohammerah.

(a) While employed here he visited and fixed Adam's Peak and the Horton Plains, descending by the Caltura River, of which he made a survey, in company with Major-General Adams, who fell at Inkermann. They pushed their way over the higher ranges by the Elephant paths, there being then no constructed roads.

(b) *Royal Geographical Society's Journal*, xviii, p. 1. *Bombay Selections* No. xliii, (New Series).

(c) The memoirs and maps by Captain Felix Jones will be found in the *Bombay Selections*, No. xliii. (New Series.) Most of the memoirs were reprinted in the *Transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society*.

(d) On the survey of Nineveh and Babylon he was much indebted to Dr. J. M. Hyslop of the Bombay Army for valuable aid in the field operations, and to Mr. T. K. Lynch, now Consul-General for Persia in London, who entered *son amore* into the work from a love of research alone.

(e) Indian Records, Political and Secret.



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225. Captain Selby took charge of the survey of Mesopotamia in 1855. He had previously done very important service in the spring of 1842, by ascending the Persian Rivers Karun and Dizful in the East India Company's steamer *Assyria*, thus demonstrating their navigability, (a). He had with him in the Mesopotamian survey Lieutenants Collingwood and Bewsher as Assistants. These officers made a trigonometrical survey of the region west of the Euphrates, including the Sea of Nejf, which is fed by that river, and embracing the classic sites of Meshad Aly, Birs Nimrood, Kerbela, Kufa, and Babylong, and the portion of Mesopotamia from Samarra on the Euphrates to a point 10 miles above Baghdad on the Tigris. The former portion was completed and sent home in 1861, with an elaborate memoir by Captain Selby. But both maps and memoirs were lost through some unaccountable carelessness. The original maps and field books have, however, been procured from Baghdad, and the maps have been redrawn by Lieutenant Collingwood, and are to be engraved. Lieutenant Collingwood also surveyed and drew maps of the Shat-el-Arab from Basrah to Makil, and of the course of the old Hindiye Canal near Meshed Hoossein. It is feared that this valuable work is also irretrievably lost, Captain Selby and Lieutenant Collingwood, while tracing the old bed of the Euphrates with great care, and surveying the Bahr-el-Nejf, were exposed to much harassing work among the marshes. They also sent in accurate plans of the irruptions from the Tigris, and showed that, before long, if no efficient steps were taken to check the evil, that river would be as un-navigable as the Euphrates now is.

226. The latter portion of the survey from above Baghdad to Tel Ibrahim, and from Tel Ibrahim to Samarra on the Euphrates, was commenced in October 1862. In the end of that year Captain Selby retired, and Lieutenant Bewsher, who then took charge of the work that had thus been begun, completed it in 1865. The maps (seven in number) have been engraved in two sheets, and Bewsher's memoir (b) contains an interesting account of the ancient canals which can still be traced, and some details respecting the humbler modern system of irrigation. The ability and learning shown in this memoir are proofs that Lieutenant Bewsher would have been a worthy successor of the earlier surveyors; but he died of diseases contracted during the service, and the Government abruptly put a stop to the survey, leaving it incomplete, and with much work still to be done.

(ii) The Coal Depôt at Maaghil.

227. The Coal Depôt at Maaghil was a very old one. The property on which it stood was held by Colonel Taylor, to whom it had descended from Mr. Manesty and from whom it passed to Messrs. Lynch and Co. Its Arab name appears to be Ma'kal, pronounced by the English Margheil or Maaghil. Having been long in English hands, it was also called "*Kut-al-Firenghi*." One of the houses on it was for a long time occupied by the British Consul, but Mr. Robertson removed to Basrah town in 1870. A portion of the property was used as a coal depôt and store house during the Euphrates Expedition and then by the Euphrates flotilla of the East India Company.

228. On the 13th January 1840, Captain Lynch, of the Indian Navy, then in command of the Euphrates Flotilla, reported to the Bombay Government the progress which had been made in putting together four iron steamers which had been sent out by the Hon'ble the Court of Directors, for the purpose of being stationed on the rivers of Mesopotamia, and requested to be made acquainted with the wishes of Government in regard to the "Depôt at Maaghil" at the same time observing "the health of the people may be benefitted in the ensuing heats, by drains and clearings, which I could easily make, but hesitate to take such a responsibility pending the decision of Government as to whether it shall be permanently occupied or not. It is the most convenient place on these rivers both for ocean and river steamers."

229. In reply Captain Lynch was informed on the 5th March 1840, that there was no information on the records of Government regarding Maaghil further than that it was situated about three miles above Basrah on the right back of

(a) *Royal Geographical Society's Journal*, vol. xiv, p. 219.

(b) "On the part of Mesopotamia contained between Sheriat-el-Beytha on the Tigris, and Tel Ibrahim," by Lieutenant Bewsher, I. N.—*Royal Geographical Society's Journal*, xxxvii, p. 160.

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the River Euphrates, and was the private property of Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia ; Captain Lynch was therefore informed that before sanctioning its permanent occupation it was requisite that Government should be made acquainted with its advantages and capabilities, and also of the state of the buildings there, as well as the purposes for which they were adapted. An engineer officer was ordered to be deputed from Karrack for the purpose of examining the place, and Captain Lynch was in the meantime instructed to report the terms on which the buildings could be obtained by Government, and to explain the nature of Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor's title to the property, and the manner in which he had become possessed of it.

230. On the 11th July 1840, the Adjutant-General submitted to Government the report of a committee of military officers, who, in consequence of the ill-health of the engineer officer at Karrack, had been deputed by Lieutenant-Colonel Hughes, Commanding the Field Force in the Persian Gulf, to report on the advantages and capabilities of Maaghil. From this report it appeared that the buildings at Maaghil were well adapted for the purposes for which they were required, but Government before sanctioning their occupation resolved to await the result of the reference which had been made to Captain Lynch as to the terms on which they could be obtained.

231. On the 26th March 1841, Lieutenant Campbell, of the Indian Navy, then in temporary charge of the Euphrates Flotilla, referred Government to the report from the Committee above alluded to, as containing the above information, and also to a previous report which he stated Captain Lynch had addressed to Government in which he had reported the terms on which the buildings at Maaghil could be obtained from Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, whose title to these buildings, Lieutenant Campbell stated, was that of private purchase from his predecessor, Mr. Manesty, besides a considerable private outlay which Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor had made upon the premises. The letter from the Committee however did not, as supposed by Lieutenant Campbell, embrace the information required by Government, and as no report of the nature he mentioned had been received from Captain Lynch, Lieutenant Campbell was directed, on the 24th April 1841, to furnish the requisite information without further delay. In reply Lieutenant Campbell on the 15th October 1841 stated that Captain Lynch had intermediately resumed command of the flotilla, and had forwarded the information required by Government regarding Maaghil. No such information had however reached Government, and Captain Lynch was informed to this effect on the 30th December 1841.

232. In reply Captain Lynch in a letter, dated the 1st March 1842, stated that the report on Maaghil called for by Government had been sent through Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor by the same post as that which had conveyed Lieutenant Campbell's letter of the 15th October 1841 ; Captain Lynch was informed in reply that the report alluded to had not been received, and he was instructed to forward a duplicate, which he accordingly did on the 7th October 1842. In this report Captain Lynch stated that Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor had become possessed of the Maaghil property by purchase, and had constructed the principal portion of the present building, and that on receiving permission from that officer to occupy the premises as a depôt for the Euphrates Flotilla, he understood that they could be obtained for the use of Government either at a fixed monthly rent or by purchase. In the former case Captain Lynch stated that he was of opinion that from Rs. 150 to Rs. 200 per mensem would be a fair rent, but that he had sent his letter to Government under a flying seal to Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, with a request that he would annex a statement of the monthly rent or the purchase money he required for these buildings. Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor in forwarding Captain Lynch's letter stated that the property at Maaghil had cost him altogether Company's Rs. 30,000 and that at Baghdad Company's Rs. 10,000, and he left it to the option of Government either to purchase these buildings, or to allow him a monthly rent for the whole of them, of Company's Rs. 250, he not being liable for repairs. In reply Captain Lynch was, on the 30th November 1842, informed that Government saw no necessity for either purchasing or renting.



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these buildings, the Euphrates Flotilla having intermediately been broken up by order of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India and the whole of the steamers with the exception of one having been withdrawn from the rivers of Mesopotamia, and transferred to the River Indus. Captain Lynch was further informed that as a large quantity of valuable stores belonging to the Flotilla still remained in the Persian Gulf, the Superintendent of the Indian Navy had been instructed to cause them to be brought down as opportunity offered, reserving only such as might be necessary for the single steamer retained on the Euphrates.

233. On the 23rd May 1844, Major Rawlinson who had intermediately been appointed by the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India to succeed Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, as Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, forwarded to Government copy of a correspondence which had recently passed between himself and Lieutenant Jones of the Indian Navy, the officer in command of the *Nitocris* (the steamer left on the Euphrates) on the subject of retaining occupation of the premises at Margheil as a Naval Dépôt. It appeared from this correspondence that Messrs. Lynch and Co., Merchants at Baghdad, into whose hands the Margheil property had passed, had tendered it to Lieutenant Jones of the steamer *Nitocris* for the monthly rent of Rs. 200. Lieutenant Jones informed Major Rawlinson of this offer, and at the same time pointed out the advantages which he considered would be derived from the retention of the property for the use of Government. In reply Lieutenant Jones was directed by Major Rawlinson to make the best terms he could for the premises pending a reference which the latter officer stated he was about to make to Government on the subject. Major Rawlinson at the same time informed Lieutenant Jones that he considered that Rs. 100 per mensem would be a sufficient rent for the entire property, including the house, store rooms, wharf and dock.

234. In forwarding this correspondence to Government, Major Rawlinson stated that notwithstanding a former application on the subject of this property had been distinctly disallowed by Government, on the ground of the dépôt being no longer required, in consequence of the expedition having been broken up, still he begged to bring to notice that a very large proportion of stores had ever since been, and was still deposited at Margheil, being required for the use of the single steamer left on the river. These stores, Major Rawlinson observed, were indispensable for the efficiency of the vessel, and that there was no other locality where they could be deposited with nearly the same convenience and advantage as at Margheil.

235. The Superintendent of the Indian Navy having been consulted by Government on the subject, that officer in reply on the 30th August 1844, stated that he considered it "essentially requisite to the due preservation of the coal, stores and spare machinery required to be kept on the River Euphrates for the service of the stream vessel stationed there, that there should be some place in which to deposit them to protect them from exposure to the weather and plunder, and as there was no other place, so well situated as Margheil, not only as regards convenience of approach, but as to the facilities it possessed for being defended against any attack that may be made on it, and the further advantages of being distant from any large and its consequences, he recommended that Margheil should continue to be occupied."

236. On receipt of this report this subject was submitted by the Government for the instructions of the Government of India, and by order of that authority, Major Rawlinson was called upon to state whether he was of opinion that "the useful services of the steamer were commensurate with the expense attending them." Major Rawlinson's reply to this reference having been forwarded to the Government on the 18th April 1844, this Government was on the 2nd May following, authorised to sanction the payment of a monthly rent of Rs. 100 for the occupation of these buildings.

237. In the accompanying letter Messrs. Remington & Co., as Agents of Colonel Taylor, applied for payment of the sum of Rs. 14,700 on account of rent for these premises from the 1st November 1839 to the



divided by Messrs. Remington & Co. into the two following heads: *1st*—Rent of the premises at Margheil from the 1st November 1839 to the 1st May 1844, being 54 months at Rs. 200 per mensem Rs. 10,800. *2nd*—Rent for a house and garden at Baghdad from the 1st May 1840 to the 1st August 1843, being 39 months at Rs. 100 per mensem Rs. 3,900 : total Rs. 14,700.

238. From the above review of the former proceedings of Government on this subject, it is shown that no sanction was given for the occupation of the premises at Margheil for the use of Government until May 1844, the previous applications of Captain Lynch on this subject having been negatived. It was clear, however, from the certificates which accompanied this letter that these premises have been used as a depôt for the stores of the Euphrates Flotilla from the 1st November 1839. The Bombay Government therefore recommended to the Government of India to permit Colonel Taylor to be reimbursed for

NOTE.—This would for the period calculated by Messrs. Remington amount to the sum of Rs. 5,400.

the use of these premises from that date, at the rate at the time paid for them, under the sanction of the Government of India, namely, Rs. 100 per mensem. This allowance was to include the house and garden at Baghdad, for the occupation of which no authority had at any time been given by Government.

239. The proposal of the Bombay Government was approved by the Government of (vide their letter No. 450, dated 29th May 1847).

240. The lease of Margheil was renewed from time to time since 1847. In 1858 the Government of India authorised the payment of Messrs. Lynch & Co. of a sum of Rs. 2,000 as compensation for damage done to their Quays in the course of the Persian war, when large number of horses and mules and quantity of stores were collected on their property and conveyed thence for the use of the expedition (Government of India letter No. 1676, dated 30th April 1858, to the Bombay Government).

241. In 1869, there was a proposal for the reduction of expenditure in the Agency of Turkish Arabia. On the 20th of January 1878, the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia stated that the only reduction or saving which could be effected in his Agency would be by the removal of the coal store and depôt of Her Majesty's steam vessel *Comet* from Maghil to the immediate neighbourhood of Basrah. Maghil being a place about three miles above the town of Basrah, its isolated position necessitated the maintenance of a guard, at an annual cost of Rs. 751-12-0, together with an outlay for lighter hire.

242. Colonel Herbert recommended that a site should be purchased at Basrah for which, and for the erection of the buildings, it was estimated that a sum of Rs. 10,000 would be required. The total annual cost of the depôt as then kept up was Rs. 2,192. If the establishment were removed to Basrah it was estimated that its annual cost would be Rs. 588 together with Rs. 500 as interest on the sum originally required to provide the site and buildings = Rs. 1,088 per annum. The annual saving would, therefore, be Rs. 1,088 as compared with Rs. 2,192, or Rs. 1,104 annually. This saving would repay the original outlay in nine years, after which the annual cost of the depôt would be Rs. 588, making an eventual saving of Rs. 1,604 a year, while the ground and building would be the property of Government. It was added that sooner or later a change would become necessary, as the river was gradually encroaching on their depôt.

243. The question merged for a time into the large one of the expediency of keeping up a Government vessel at all on the Euphrates, but at length, after consultation with the Military Department, Colonel Herbert was told in March 1872 that it was left to his discretion to make the change, provided he could assure Government that it would result in a reasonable saving of expense.

244. In January 1873 Messrs. Lynch & Co., who or one of whose members own the property, in a letter to the India Office remonstrated against Government giving up, for only a saving of Rs. 100 per mensem, a hold upon a land, which for over a century had been regarded as an English ground and for long associated with the British name and prestige and which the Turkish authorities had

Finance A., June 1870, Nos. 4-8.

Political A., March 1872, No. 78.

Political A., March 1873, Nos. 138-149.



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been but too anxious to deprive the English of. They submitted also a memorandum of Sir H. Rawlinson supporting their opinion.

245. The Secretary of State in his despatch No. 13, dated 14th February 1873, in sending the letter of Messrs. Lynch & Co. to the Government of India wrote:—

"In the absence of information from your Government as to the reasons which have led to the orders in question, I confine myself to expressing a hope that the necessity for maintaining a depôt with frontage on the Euphrates and the especially convenient site for such a depôt afforded by Maaghil have not been overlooked."

246. Meanwhile Colonel Herbert had agreed with one Haji Ibrahim Meymene for the lease for Rs. 100 a year of a building, which he had undertaken to erect suitable for the required depôt at a spot, nearer to the town and the new Government buildings, and connected with both by good roads. Under this new arrangement the Commander of the *Comet* would have a depôt entirely at his own command, and a jetty for his exclusive use, in place of a depôt, which was shared with Messrs. Lynch and Co., and a quay, capable of accommodating only one steamer at a time. As the necessary arrangements had already been made for the removal of the depôt, it was too late to suspend the operations. The Secretary of State was informed accordingly (despatch No. 143, dated 4th August 1873.)

247. The following comparative statement was sent by the Political Resident showing the cost of the old and new depôt at Basrah:—

Amount.			Amount.		
	Rs.	A. P.		Rs.	A. P.
Annual expenses of the old depôt			Reduced annual cost under the new arrangement.		
Rent per annum ...	1,200	0 0	Rent per annum ...	1,200	0 0
<i>Beluch Guards.</i>			Storekeeper per annum ...	180	0 0
Jemadar at Rs. 13-10-4 per mensem ...	Rs. 163	12 0	Doorkeeper per annum ...	144	0 0
Seven men at Rs. 7 per mensem ...	Rs. 588	0 0	Boat hire (say) ...	24	0 0
			Total ...	1,548	0 0
	751	12 0	Saving ...	644	0 0
Storekeeper or Superintendent of Depôt, at Rs. 14-5-8 per mensem ...	172	4 0			
Average annual lighter hire ...	68	0 0			
Total ...	2,192	0 0	Total ...	2,192	0 0

248. The new depôt was occupied on 30th June 1873 and its lease commenced on 1st July.

249. In the Resident's opinion there was no ground for fear that the Turks would deprive Messrs. Lynch and Co. of their Maaghil property, of which they could hold possession under the law protocol of 1869, granting to foreigners the right of holding immoveable property in the Ottoman dominions (Colonel Herbert's letter No. 21, dated 6th May 1873). As a matter of fact the house and ground in *Kut-el-Firengi* continued to be occupied by Messrs. Lynch and Co., and they have not been disturbed from them by the Turks (Resident's letter No. 44, dated 6th September 1873).

Political A., August 1873, Nos. 136-149, (No. 140).

Political A., November 1873, Nos. 91-92.

(iii) The Dromedary Post between Damascus and Baghdad, 1844-1886.*

250. As already stated, the Syrian desert post had, with a period of interruption, been maintained as a Consular post in one form or another for about one hundred years. Although this line had never been in any way connected with

* For previous history see Chapter XI (i), paragraphs 110-119.

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the British Indian post office, the Political Resident at Baghdad was specially allowed by the Government of India in 1844, to levy certain "postage" charges for articles despatched by it, and to meet any deficit in receipts a monthly allowance of Rs. 200 was granted for the proper maintenance of the post.

251. In 1868 when the Indian post office was opened at Baghdad the constitution of the line was as follows :—

Expenditure.

	Rs.
3 trips in the month from Baghdad to Damascus by dromedaries	... 420
Couriers from Damascus to Beyrout	... 40
Allowance to postal clerk at the Residency, Baghdad	... 29
	<hr/> 489

Rates of Postage sanctioned by Government.

To England—					
Letters	1	Dram	5	Piastres.	
"	1½	"	6½	"	} 24 Piastres are equal to 1 Kraun. 2½ Kraun to 1 Rupee. Subject to variations in exchange.
"	1½	"	7½	"	
"	2	"	10	"	
"	12½	"	1	Kraun.	
To Damascus and Beyrout—					
Letters	1	Dram	15	Piastres.	
"	1½	"	20	"	
"	1½	"	23	"	
"	1½	"	26	"	
"	2	"	30	"	
					Distances in miles.
Baghdad to Damascus					500
Damascus to Beyrout					100
					<hr/> 600

252. At this time (1868) Turkish Arabia was wholly dependent for regular communication with the outer world on English enterprise. Writing at the time in reference to the post offices, which were then under discussion, Sir Arnold Kemball expressed himself as follows :—

"The English Damascus post is even more exceptional than the monthly messenger to Tehran as providing the unique means of corresponding directly with Syria (on the average in nine days), with Egypt (in thirteen or fourteen days), with England and Europe (*via* Egypt and Smyrna) in 24 to 27 days, and, prior to the establishment of a mail line between Bombay and Basra, with India in 40 to 45 days when undertaken by my predecessor in 1843-44.

253. Until 1881 the Baghdad-Damascus desert post was never interfered with by the Ottoman authorities, but the continuation of the line, a distance of 100 miles from Damascus to Beyrout, attracted attention much earlier. In 1869 the Governor of Syria at Damascus demanded, at the instance of the Ottoman Postal authorities, that English mails should be sent by the then newly established post line between Damascus and Beyrout. On this subject in 1870 Colonel Herbert, Consul-General, Baghdad, wrote :—

"There seems to be no wish on the part of the Ottoman authorities to attempt the task of carrying the mails between this and Damascus the desert route offering great difficulty, but between that place and Beyrout they have established Postal Service of which they are desirous of obliging us to avail ourselves."

254. At this time the French Consular mails between Damascus and Beyrout were carried by the Ottoman Post Office, but the reason was that the latter employed and subsidized the French Diligence. The British Consulate at Damascus insisted upon maintaining its own communications with Beyrout for the reason which applies equally in other places at the present day, namely, that the Ottoman post could not be relied upon.

255. Till the 1st April 1871, the Government of India contributed Rs. 200 per mensem to the maintenance of the Dromedary post; but from that date the contribution has been entirely discontinued. The reasons for the discontinuance are thus stated in a despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 2 of the 1st March 1871 (Foreign Department Proceedings, Finance A., March 1871, No. 4):—

"We have the honour to state our opinion that this line of communication does not in any way directly benefit the Government of India. The maintenance of the present postal service



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by the Red Sea and Egypt involves a cost of Rs. 2,93,000 to the revenues of India. Irrespective of this route, there are at present two lines of telegraph available, to one of which the Imperial Treasury contributes largely. Should complications in Egypt at any time interrupt the overland route, the present service between Baghdad and Damascus would be quite insufficient for the requirements of the Indian Post Office; and it would be as easy to organise an entirely new service to the extent which the traffic would demand. Under these circumstances we do not consider that the expenditure of Rs. 200 a month on the Dromedary post through Asia Minor is a charge that can with propriety continue to be borne by the revenues of India.

"As regards the Political Agent at Baghdad, it appears to us that this correspondence with England and Constantinople might be conducted with nearly, if not quite, as great speed by way of the Red Sea. We cannot but think that in maintaining a post to connect Baghdad with India, and with the overland mail, the Indian Government does all that can be reasonably expected of it."

256. Consequently the Indian payment of Rs. 200 per mensem was withdrawn, and the Dromedary post appears, since 1871, to have been self-supporting, which it is apprehended, it could hardly be without carrying private and commercial correspondence to some considerable extent.

257. In 1875 the Porte raised objections to the conveyance of private correspondence by this line. The matter was referred to the Government of India and the Secretary of State was addressed as follows in a despatch No. 20, dated 30th September 1875 (Financial Department Proceedings, October 1875, No. 12):—

"We gather that no exception is taken by the Porte to the convenience by the direct line between Beyrout and Baghdad *via* Damascus of local British official correspondence, even of through correspondence (whether official or private) transmitted by sea either from or to Beyrout. But the Turkish authorities object to the utilisation of this line for local private correspondence, which does not exceed 20 covers a month, originating in Syria, and destined for Baghdad, or *vice versa*, because a loss of postal revenue is thereby caused.

"The Turkish authorities may, perhaps, when they learn the trifling extent of this correspondence, withdraw their objection. Otherwise, the best arrangement would seem to be to transfer all private correspondence intended for delivery in Turkish territory to the Post Office in Damascus, which can then levy postage on delivery. Similarly, private covers originating in Turkish territory, and intended for delivery in Baghdad, might be received by the British Consul at Damascus only through the local Post Office which could realise postage in advance.

"The only interest of India in this line lies in the remote contingency of an interruption in the communication through Egypt; but it is very important to the community of Baghdad, whose correspondence with Baghdad, Beyrout, Egypt, and Europe is conveyed by it."

258. In 1881 the Ottoman Government established a dromedary post between Baghdad and Damascus running side by side with the English Consular post and demanded the suppression of the latter. After some pressure, the British post was recognized. But the demand was reiterated on various pretexts until the line was closed in 1886, not, it must be said, in deference to the wishes of the Ottoman Government, but owing partly to a failure of funds locally to there being no longer the same necessity as formerly for its maintenance.

(iv) Proposed construction of a dam across the Tigris, 1879.

259. In connection with the steamer service on the Tigris an instance may be mentioned, in which the navigation of the river had a narrow escape of being seriously interrupted, if not permanently injured. Owing to very little snow having fallen in the mountains of Armenia during the winter of 1878-79, the river did not rise in the following autumn to the usual level necessary to flood the rice fields which border the river banks about the lower reaches, and fears were entertained that the rice crop would be lost. To meet this danger the Vali's Government at Baghdad announced their intention of throwing a dam across the river near Ezra's tomb.

260. This announcement met with loud protests from the merchants of different nationalities in Baghdad. Representations were made to the Vali that commerce would be wholly checked, that the loss of customs revenue would be greater than the value of the rice crop, and that above all the navigation of the Tigris might be permanently injured. In the low season every year the navigation of the river is extremely difficult and in dark nights steamers are compelled to anchor.



261. The Local Government did not seem to have realized in their anxiety to ward off an immediate danger what the consequences would be of throwing an obstruction across the Tigris, which in ordinary seasons on the melting of snow in the mountains rises in twenty-four hours twelve or fourteen feet, spreading over the surrounding country and forming an inland sea, in which the channel of the river is only distinguishable to the practised eye of the Arab pilot. The Vali considered the immediate demands of the agricultural tribes on the river banks of paramount importance, but fortunately when all was in readiness for the construction of a dam, representations by wire made to the Sublime Porte had the desired effect and the work was prohibited by orders from Constantinople.

Political A., November 1879, No. 132.

(v) Movements of the *Comet* north of Baghdad opposed by the Porte, 1885.

262. In 1885, Mr. Plowden was conveyed by the *Comet* up the river Tigris on a tour, which was to extend as far as Takrit, but at a short distance from above that town, she went ashore and got stranded. The tour had been approved of by the Government of India and the British Ambassador. The Porte, however, protested against the movements of the *Comet* on the Tigris above Baghdad. The Marquis of Salisbury explained to the Turkish Minister that the Consul-General had proceeded up the *Comet* to visit one of his consular districts, and trusted that no opposition would be raised again to the *stationnaire* of the Consulate ascending the river for the same purpose, provided notice be previously given to the local authorities.

Secret E., July 1885, Nos. 252-255.
Secret E., October 1885, Nos. 116-125.

(vi) Alleged intention of the Turkish authorities to construct a canal on the Tigris, 1886-87.

263. In their letter No. 18, dated 22nd September 1886, Messrs. Lynch & Co. drew the Consul-General's attention to a large canal which was being dug on the Tigris, which when completed, they feared, would stop all traffic between Baghdad and Basrah and consequently suspend all trade between England and Persia (*sic*) by this route.

External A., January 1887, Nos. 102-115.

264. The following description of the canal is extracted from their letter :—

"The canal in question is about an hour's steaming below Kutu'l Amara, and we enclose herein a sketch of that part of the river, showing the precise position of the cutting, which is to be 10,000 metres long, and is being made 15 metres broad at the top, 6 to 7 at the bed, and 4½ metres in depth, from which dimensions you will see that the canal is on a very large scale. From the drawing inclosed you will understand that the object of the undertaking is to carry the water into an old canal called Dujaila, the land through which this canal passes having been recently purchased for His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and the water intended for irrigation. The entrance to the old canal was originally some distance further down, and was cut in such a manner that the river supplied the canal with water in passing; but the present cutting is made where the whole strength of the current will set right into it. The banks there are composed of soft clay and sand; and just opposite the opening to the canal is a large sand-bank, which will serve to guide the water into the new cutting. The immense rush of water will soon eat away the soft banks, and the river will undoubtedly all flow into the new canal, and thence expend itself in the vast marshes between Amara and the river Euphrates, leaving the Tigris practically quite dry in precisely the same manner as the former, once mighty river, has been reduced to a mere ditch by the cutting of the Hindia canal, which it is now intended to close, if possible, at a cost of something like £100,000. If the new cutting is completed, the new thriving town of Amara, yielding a large revenue to the Government, and the numerous tribes of Arabs on the banks of the river below Kut, will all be completely ruined."

265. The facts were brought to the notice of His Majesty's Government, and the Embassy was requested to communicate with the Porte. We do not know what action was taken or whether the canal was ever completed.



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(vii) Alleged unsuitability of the *Comet* for the services required at Baghdad. Proposed supply of steam launch for the use of the Resident, 1887-90.

266. In May 1887, when the *Comet* grounded during a trip to Baghdad, the Resident represented that she was not suitable for work on the Tigris between Baghdad and Basrah, and suggested having her sent elsewhere and replaced by a more suitable vessel.

267. The matter was then considered in the Military Department and for various reasons it was decided that her services should be retained. The principal reasons were—

- (1) that she could not be sold except at a great loss ;
- (2) that the sanction of Her Majesty's Government would be required ;
- (3) that her services could not be utilised elsewhere.

268. Upon these considerations the Resident was informed that the Government of India had decided not to make any change until further experience and better pilotage had shown whether it was not possible to prevent the mishaps of which the Resident complained.

269. In January 1889 Colonel Tweedie represented that a steam-launch for the Residency would be much more useful and economical than the steamer *Comet*, which was at the disposal of the Resident.

270. In a letter No. 1598-E., dated 16th August 1889, and a demi-official of the same date Colonel Tweedie and Colonel Ross were asked respectively for their opinions on the suitability of the *Comet* for service at Basrah, where possibly it would be more usefully employed if the Assistant Political Agent, Basrah, were also appointed Agent at Mohammerah as had been then proposed. Colonel Tweedie's attention was also drawn to the opinion expressed by Mr. Plowden in his memorandum dated 1st March 1883, from which it would seem that it would not be desirable to remove the vessel from the river Tigris, where she had been stationed since 1884 and where her presence appears to have been needed for the protection of the British communities and generally for the prevention of outrages on British merchant vessels trading on the river.

271. In reply Colonel Tweedie quoted some of his previous remarks on the subject and said—

External A., February 1890, Nos. 74-79.

"From the tenour of all which, it will be apparent how far I have been from advocating the removal of the *Comet* except as a companion measure to Baghdad being furnished with another vessel, built on different lines and administered less as a unit in a great department (Indian Marine) than as a means of carrying out certain reasonable duties in Ottoman waters."

"Our privileges *quo ad* the *Comet* rest, if I am not mistaken, on a stronger and older basis than does the maintenance of Lynch's two steamers now carrying the mails between Baghdad and Basrah. If, as is not impossible, that line of steamers should one day cease to run, then a steamer like the *Comet* would be essential to us as a despatch boat and means of transport merely: two duties she is well fitted for, only at the present time the Lynch's steamers rather supplant her in regard to them."

272. He therefore thought that the *Comet* might be utilized at Basrah and drawn occasionally to Baghdad to maintain our right to keep her on inland water.

273. Colonel Ross thought that the *Comet* could be usefully employed at Basrah in visiting Mohammerah and paying an occasional visit to Ahwaz on the Karun.

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274. The proposal, however, to appoint Consul at Basrah as Political Agent at Mohammerah had to be given up, and he would in the circumstances find little occupation for a big vessel like the *Comet*, while the Resident at Baghdad could not have it at his disposal for a greater part of the year, when wanted.

275. In the circumstances Colonel Tweedie was told demi-officially on 25th January 1890 that the question presented many difficulties and that no action would be taken "for the present."

(viii) Rumoured formation of a new Ottoman River Company, 1892.*

276. In 1892 Messrs. Lynch & Co. informed the Foreign Office in London that active steps were being taken by Turkish officials towards the formation of a Company for the navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates with a capital of about £100,000, their purpose being to employ four steamers. It was intended to afford every facility to the new Company, while the Euphrates and Tigris Navigation Company were hampered by every restriction. The scheme was closely connected with one for irrigating lands on both sides of the Tigris, which had been purchased by the Civil List.

277. The local authorities had recently been threatening to prevent the British steamers from towing barges up and down the river. The agent of the Euphrates and Tigris Navigation Company, therefore, requested the Resident that the restrictions as to the barges might be removed at the same time as the new Company was being formed.

278. An Irade appears to have been issued sanctioning the new Turkish Company, but although two boats were ordered by the Minister of Marine in London, one of them was lost with all hands on the way out and the other was still at Constantinople. As regards the claim of the Messrs. Lynch, it was proposed to amend the *pro memoria* (which permitted *La Campagne Lynch* to employ bi-weekly two steamers on the Tigris and Euphrates which had been added to the Commercial Treaty with Turkey, Article XVI) allowing the use of barges. But it was thought by Sir F. C. Ford that it would be injudicious to raise the question at the time (Despatch from Sir F. C. Ford to the Earl of Rosebery, dated 11th January 1893).

(ix) Messrs. Lynch's application for being allowed the same privileges as enjoyed by the Ottoman steamers, 1893.

279. The Ottoman Company's steamers—it was represented by the Lynch Company in 1893—were allowed to take delivery direct from ocean steamers of cargo, originally shipped for Basrah, but intended for Baghdad, and to pay duty at the latter place, and in case the cargo intended for Baghdad had been landed and taken to the Customs House at Basrah, it was allowed by the Ottoman Company to be cleared without paying duty or giving a guarantee for the payment of duty at Baghdad.

280. When enquiries were made, the Baghdad Customs Master informed the Consulate Dragoman that the Ottoman Company, having made arrangements with shippers in foreign countries, got cargoes shipped to Basrah destined for Baghdad, and on guarantee being given to the satisfaction of the Basrah Customs, carried them with a pass, which they carefully returned receipted within the stipulated time, while Messrs. Lynch had neither entered into such arrangements as above with shippers to get goods for Baghdad shipped to Basrah nor attended to due execution of the formalities required. The privilege in question was equally open to Messrs. Lynch provided they carefully attended to the proper formalities, though the Customs Master was personally opposed to the concession being allowed to any company.

* As to the old Ottoman River steam service see paragraphs 165-A and 181 *ante* of chapter XI.



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(x) Behaviour of the Turkish Police towards the *Comet*, 1893-94.

281. In December 1893 the *Comet* proceeded down to Basrah, and there, under an appointment made previously, got its two old Nordenfelt 45·5 barrel machine guns exchanged for two similar guns Martini-Henry, brought on board the *Lawrence*. As it was also necessary to examine the bottom of the ship, it was hauled up the shore. The Turkish authorities were given every opportunity to see the guns. When the Turkish officers came, the guns had not been mounted, and so the boxes were partly opened and parts of the guns shown to them.

282. Nevertheless when the *Comet* was proceeding up the river, attempts were made by the Turkish Police to stop the ship, and threats offered to fire at three different places. The Commander refused to comply with their demands. It appears that the Vali of Basrah had given orders to the Turkish Police to watch the ship. The order was silly enough, but the way the police carried it out was a demonstration of puerile insolence, which only could be possible in a barbarous country. When representations were made to the Vali, he expressed his incredulity of the report, and the Governor-General of Baghdad expressed his regret at the incidents. Colonel Mockler, in writing to the British Ambassador, expressed his opinion that the matter was too trivial a one to be taken further notice of.

(xi) Navigability of the Tigris, 1899.

283. Of late the difficulties of navigating the Tigris—especially between Kurna and Amara, and between Kot and Baghdad—have been increasing more and more, by the shallowness of the stream, caused especially by the numberless cuts made by the Arabs for absorbing the river into the adjacent fields or by the Sultan's Agents for irrigating the crown lands, as these cuts being made facing the downward flow of the stream they widen rapidly and draw more water than required and convert the country into marshes. In order to prevent this and improve the navigability of the river, the Lynch Company proposed in 1899—

- (1) that pressure should be brought to bear upon the Porte with a view to pay immediate attention to the state of the river, especially between Amara and Kurna and take measures for closing the more dangerous of the cuts and insist on cuts being made so as to face down the stream;
- (2) that an Engineer of the Indian Government (to be paid in equal proportions by the Indian and Home Governments) should be allowed to the Consulate-General to advise as to the works required and supervise them.

284. The Company also wedged in their old claim for distinct permission being obtained to use barges in low water season or preferably to make use of their third steamer.

285. These proposals were referred to the Government of India for opinion.

Ibid, No. 81.

Colonel Loch, who was consulted, discussed in his report dated 25th April 1899 the various measures required for putting the different parts of the river, between Baghdad and Kurna into a properly navigable state and dwelt upon the enormous cost, which such measures would entail, which the Porte would be far from being able to meet. He pointed out that even if the funds for so vast an undertaking were forthcoming and the Sultan were, for the sake of the improvement of the Tigris, to consent to some modification on the irrigation of his crown lands, the Ottoman Government would still have to count upon the opposition of the Arab tribes.



286. In forwarding Colonel Loch's report, the Government of India (Despatch No. 105 (External), dated the 8th June 1899) stated that from that report it appeared improbable the funds required would be forthcoming, and that they deprecated any expenditure from the Indian revenues on the deputation of an Engineer.

287. It appeared from a passage on the Turkish Journal *Sabah* of 11th June 1895 that on account of the impediment the Oman Company's steamers had met with in their passage on the river, the Engineer of the Vilayat had been ordered to make a scientific survey of the river, and upon his reports being received, it was decided to have the rapids cleared and dug out and the Kaimakams of Amara and Kurna were ordered to engage the requisite workmen to carry out the work.

(xii) Permission accorded to Messrs. Lynch to tow barges on the Tigris and subsequently withdrawn, 1899.*

288. In his Despatch dated 6th June 1899 to the Foreign Office, Sir N. O'Connor reported that, as the result of prolonged negotiations with the Palace, the Grand Vizier and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he had been informed by Tewfik Pasha that a Vizierial order had been issued to the Valis of Basrah and Baghdad to allow Messrs. Lynch Company's steamer to tow barges.

289. On the 29th August, however, Sir N. O'Connor telegraphed to the Foreign Office :—

"Her Majesty's Consul at Basrah reports withdrawal of permission to tow barges on Tigris. This is distinct breach of the promise given by the Grand Vizier and reported to Your Lordship in my Despatch No. 787 of June 6th. I told His Highness it could not be admitted, but that I would wait for two days for order to be rescinded before applying to Your Lordship for instructions. His Highness said he would present petition to the Sultan to-night for imperial reminder in sense desired. But he did not seem sure of the result. It may be necessary to put on some local pressure. The opportunity and locality is favourable and the general effect will surely be salutary."

290. The local authorities of Basrah and Baghdad had been informed that the permission to tow barges had been cancelled, but it appeared that there had been no orders to forbid towing barges. So the Company was authorized by the Foreign Office to instruct their agent to continue making use of a barge when there was accumulation of traffic, unless he was officially forbidden to do so in writing.

291. On 13th September 1895 Sir N. O'Connor telegraphed that the Sultan had refused to grant the permission promised. The Grand Vizier proposed a compromise that he should try to induce the Sultan to give the permission for a limited period of three years. Sir N. O'Connor was in favour of holding the Porte to the original promise, but wished Messrs. Lynch being consulted.

292. Messrs. Lynch were in favour of a permanent privilege, though it might be limited for a limited period in a year from 1st July to 31st January. It is not known what further action was taken in the matter.

(xiii) Congestion of traffic between Baghdad and Basrah, 1903.

293. At the close of the year 1902, congestion of traffic between Basrah and Baghdad rose to serious proportions. On the 1st December 1902 there were as many 2,526 tons of cargo lying uncleared in the godowns of Messrs. Lynch & Co. This congestion was further accen-

* For previous history see Chapter X (ix), paragraphs 75—80.



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tuated by the insecurity in the Tigris, which led the Turkish Government to prohibit the transport of valuable goods in sailing lighters. Colonel Newmarch (letter dated 12th December 1902, to Sir N. O'Connor) thought that an extra steamer was absolutely necessary to relieve the congestion, and that this was a suitable opportunity for pressing the Porte for the required permission to employ a third steamer on the river. It does not appear that any move was made by Sir N. O'Connor on this suggestion. Any intention on his part to do anything, would probably have been given up, since on 8th September, 1903 Colonel Newmarch reported "that the congestion has long since ceased and Messrs. Lynch's steamers are at the present time far from fully laden."

(xiv) Unsatisfactory character of the mail service maintained by the Euphrates and Tigris Navigation Company, 1899-1903.

294. There have been of late complaints against the delay in the carriage of mails between Baghdad and Basrah by the British river steamers. It appears that these steamers arrive frequently too late for the British India Steam Navigation Company's mail steamers at Basrah, and hence both the outgoing and ingoing mails are delayed for days at that place. At first there were delays caused also by the British India Steam Navigation Company's steamers. But arrangements have been made since 1899 for accelerating the speed of the steamers and avoiding delays.

External A., August 1899, Nos. 12-15.
External A., October 1900, No. 36.

295. Two causes have been assigned by Messrs. Lynch as mainly causing the delays in their steamers :—

External A., October 1903, Nos. 21-23.

- (1) the unsatisfactory state of the river Tigris at low water ;
- (2) the insufficient accommodation afforded at the Baghdad Custom House for the discharge and loading of cargo, which frequently leads their steamers to lying idly at Baghdad, owing to the only available spot being occupied by the Ottoman steamers are native craft.

296. The Company also laid stress on the services they have rendered to the British trade. Colonel Newmarch in his report (letter No. 346, dated 27th June 1903, to the Postmaster-General) thought that, making every allowance for these causes, there was considerable room for improvement in the service, by adopting less dilatory methods, by employing faster steamers, with electric lights and other modern improvements to enable to navigate during night time. He also proposed that money penalties should be imposed on the Company for failing to connect with the British India Steam Navigation steamers. Colonel Newmarch was of opinion that, though every credit should be given to the Company for the blessings their enterprise has conferred on the British trade, they have had the practical monopoly of the carrying trade and have imposed freights astonishingly high, as high for carriage between Baghdad and Basrah, as between London and Basrah. They have earned high dividends and ought to adopt an improved service by spending a little more money.

297. The Government of India in addressing the Secretary of State expressed concurrence in the remarks of Colonel Newmarch as to the desirability of securing a more punctual and regular service, a point which they submitted for consideration in connection with the renewal of the mail contract which expired on 30th April 1904 (Despatch No. 150, dated 24th September 1903).

Ibid No. 22.

(xv) Opening of an improved Turkish steam boat service on the Tigris, 1904.*

298. In January 1904 it was reported that the Seniye Department (Sultan's Civil List) had purchased the river steamers of the Oman Ottoman Company

* As regards older Turkish steam service see paragraphs 165-A, 181 and 276-278 of this Part.

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with a view to institute a new service on the Tigris and had ordered new steamers. Two steamers had been handed in pieces at Basrah and the work of constructing them was proceeding rapidly, one large was nearly ready for launching. The new steamers are 210 feet long, 33 feet in the beam, and 6 feet 6 inches deep. Their draught when carrying a full cargo, 230 tons and 250 passengers, would be 4 feet 6 inches. After describing them fully, Mr Crow, Consul at Basrah, observes in his letter No. 3, dated 20th January 1904, to Sir N. O'Connor:—

"It will be seen from the above particulars that the new vessels are first class modern boats and in every way superior to anything Messrs. Lynch Brothers have now on the river. They surpass the latter in speed and almost double them in carrying capacity, as steamer and barge combined will carry 405 tons, as against the 250—300 tons carried by the *Mejidie* and *Khalifah*. They are, moreover, fitted with electric light and search-light which will give them an immense advantage in the tortuous navigation of the river. Lynch's steamers at present only travel at night when there is a moon.

"It is evident that the amalgamation of the Seniye steamers with the Oman-Ottoman line which has now four vessels—the *Mosul*, *Frat*, *Resafa* and *Bagdadi* though the last is practically a derlict—will present a most formidable combination against Messrs. Lynch's Company, and the latter will soon have to fight for its very existence on the river. The Seniye can work six boats against their two, and the right of Messrs. Lynch to supplement their weekly carrying capacity with a barge is not unequivocal, and may be called in question any moment. The Seniye will, therefore, be able to have two boats always ahead of Lynch's weekly steamer. This is an important consideration in view of the narrowness and incompleteness of the channel and the total inadequacy of the Custom House wharf at Baghdad, which is too small to berth more than one vessel at a time. Lynch's steamer will probably incur serious delay and their traffic arrangements must necessarily suffer."

299. Mr. Crow anticipated a considerable reduction in the rate of freights and fares from Basrah to Baghdad. He thought that the new element about to be introduced into the competition for the carrying traffic of the river would no doubt be of great public utility.

(xvi) The new mail Contract.

300. With reference to the Government of India's despatch No. 150, dated 24th September 1903 (see paragraph 297 above), the Secretary of State enquired by telegram, dated 8th December 1903, what modifications should be introduced in the new contract with Messrs. Lynch and Company. The Secretary of State was of opinion that clauses 5, 6 and 11 clearly required remodelling so as to ensure enforcement of penalties for unpunctuality in arriving as well as in starting.

301. The Government of India after consulting the Director-General of Post Offices, proposed in their despatch No. 10, dated 14th January 1904, the modifications required for the purpose in view.

301A. The new contract was signed on 30th of March 1905. It is to have effect from 1st May 1904 to 30th April 1914. The subsidy is fixed at the rate of Rs. 24,000 per annum. In the new contract a penalty has been provided for delay as well as for failure to provide efficient vessels, subject, however, to the following condition in either case.—

But nevertheless so that the Company shall not in any case be liable to any penalties under this clause if the default be proved to the satisfaction of the said Government, or of the said Government Officer, to have arisen from accident or circumstances over which the Company or their servants had not and could not have had any control, or to have been occasioned by insufficiency of water in the low season and to have been unavoidable by the Company consistently with the reasonable requirements of their trade.

The words "or to have been occasioned by insufficiency of water" (*et seq*) were added in the new contract at the request of the Company.



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(XVII).—Proposed supply of a launch for the use of the Residency at Baghdad, 1904-05.*

301-B. In October 1904, Major Newmarch represented to Government the need he felt of a steam, electric or petroleum launch for the use of the Residency, especially now that the new Residency buildings† are situated in the extreme outskirts of the town of Baghdad.

301-C. The Government of India concur with Major as to the need for a boat such he suggests and they have ascertained that a suitable motor launch, 30 feet long by 6 feet 3 inches, capable of carrying 12 persons and with a draft of 1 foot 9 inches, can be procured from Messrs. Thorneycroft for £550 delivered in England and £650 at Baghdad.

301-D. His Majesty's Minister at Constantinople has expressed his unwillingness to approach the Porte in the matter; and in reply to a telegraphic communication from the Viceroy, has suggested that the launch should be introduced as part of the equipment of the comet, as otherwise he expects determined opposition from the Turkish Government. But this procedure would not be possible in view of the size of the proposed launch. Further, in writing to the Secretary of State, the Government of India in their despatch No. 174-Exl., dated 14th September 1905, observe:—

"We submit that political significance cannot be reasonably attached to the supply of such a boat as is intended, and that the Resident is fully entitled to the privilege as a mere act of ordinary international courtesy. Attention may be drawn to the fact, reported by Major Newmarch, that a steam launch has recently arrived at Baghdad for the party of German excavators working at Babylon on the Euphrates and Killa Shergot on the Tigris, the use of which has been permitted by the Turkish authorities. We therefore hope that His Majesty's Government will see their way to approaching the Turkish Government and to exercising some pressure on them, if necessary, with a view to permission being given for the importation and use of the launch."

(XVIII).—Recent Postal Affairs,† 1894-1905.

301-E. There is little on our records about the Postal Service since 1894. The following paragraphs are therefore reprinted below from the *Memorandum on the British Post Offices in the Persian Gulf and Turkish Arabia, 1905*.

141. In consequence of representations from the Sublime Porte, the following revised procedure was adopted with effect from the 1st February 1892 and is still in force in regard to delivery of parcels:—

Director General's circular No. 61, dated the 19th December 1891, and letter No. 23-Con. dated the 15th January 1892. For. 2 No. 1

Declarations of contents and value accompany all parcels addressed to Baghdad and Basra; the offices of exchange at Bombay, Karachi and Bushire prepare detailed parcel invoices in triplicate, of which one copy is kept for office record, one is sent to the Baghdad or Basra post office, and the third copy together with the customs declarations, is sent in a cover addressed to "the Turkish Customs Department, c/o the postmaster at Baghdad or Basra." The post offices at Baghdad and Basrah send the closed covers containing the invoices and declarations to the Custom-house immediately after receipt of the mail. After the disposal of the letter mail, the parcel bags are opened in the presence of a Turkish customs officer who then takes charge of the parcels and conveys them to the Custom-house. The Customs Department grants a receipt in the postmaster's copy of the parcel invoice. The postmaster affixes a Turkish revenue stamp of the value of 3 c.



declined to surrender them. The Political Resident at Baghdad addressed H. B. M.'s Ambassador at Constantinople in May 1893, and received a reply to the effect that the Director of Customs at Constantinople had received a report from the head of the Baghdad Custom-house stating that he detained only parcels containing used clothing, these being sent back to the places of origin by the Customs Master himself, while all other undeliverable parcels, of whatever description, were surrendered to the British Post office. The Consul-General wrote again to H. B. M.'s Ambassador reporting that there were 17 undeliverable parcels, none of which had been surrendered. On the 12th August 1893, H. B. M.'s Ambassador informed the Consul-General that the question regarding undeliverable parcels had been submitted to the Council and instructions issued to the Customs authorities at Baghdad to surrender, without further objection, all parcels the return of which was demanded by the British post office with the exception of such parcels as contained articles of which the importation into the Ottoman Empire was either prohibited or subject to restrictions. Postal parcels falling under the latter category were to be treated according to the rules existing as regards similar goods imported by agencies other than the post.

It was not, however, till the 28th December 1893 that the Customs Department made over the unclaimed parcels to the Postmaster under a guarantee in which the postmaster undertook to bring and deliver to the Customs Department within 5 months receipts from the post offices at Bombay, Karachi and Bushire (to which the unclaimed parcels were returned) duly certified by the Turkish Consuls at those places, failing which the postmaster would be liable to pay to the Customs Department the full amount of duty to which the parcels were liable.

143. Information was obtained through the Political Resident at Baghdad that the importation into Turkish Arabia of the following articles was prohibited:—

- (1) Arms and ammunition.
- (2) Poisonous drugs (liquid or dry).
- (3) Worn clothes.
- (4) Articles likely to import disease.
- (5) Figures, other than simple portraits, of royal personages or other notables, whether on cloth, paper, or other material.

144. In May 1898, the customs authorities informed the postmaster, Baghdad, that a new rule had been issued by the Sublime Porte to the effect that all documents presented to the Custom-house should be certified to by the Dragoman of the Valiyat. The Customs Master insisted on this order being made applicable to the bond of guarantee for unclaimed parcels, as well as the receipts returned from Bombay, Karachi, and Bushire. This order meant that each document should bear a Turkish revenue stamp of the value of half-a-lira. The Consul-General addressed H. B. M.'s Embassy at Constantinople and instructions were issued by the Turkish authorities to the Vali of Baghdad, not to insist for the future on a stamped endorsement in respect of the certificate of misent or unclaimed parcels.

145. In July 1899, the postmaster of Karachi reported that he could not obtain consular attestation on a receipt for unclaimed parcels, as there was no longer a Turkish Consul at that place. The attestation of the Turkish Consul-General at Bombay was, therefore, obtained, and the postmasters of Baghdad and Basra were directed to discontinue sending any unclaimed parcels to Karachi or Bushire, but to send them all to Bombay.

146. In August 1899, the Turkish Consul-General at Bombay claimed a consular fee for the attestation or a receipt for unclaimed parcels, which was taken to him. On explaining to him, through a Mahomedan city inspector, that the documents were solely in the interests of the Turkish Custom-houses at Baghdad and Basra, the Consul-General waived his claim.

147. In January 1895, the Consul-General at Baghdad brought to notice that antiquities were being exported by parcel post from Baghdad. As the exportation of antiquities is strictly prohibited by Turkish law, the Consul-General was asked to instruct the postmaster not to accept for despatch any parcel (except those posted by himself or the officers of the Residency) unless they bore the Customs seal in token of



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their having been inspected by the customs officers. It was strongly suspected that the postmaster was aware of the prohibition and had accepted the parcels knowingly. He was just then in bad health and the opportunity was taken to remove him.

148. In September 1896, the Consul-General, Baghdad, found it necessary to direct the Letter No. 4068, dated 13th January 1893, from the Postmaster-General, Bombay, to the Director-General. The Consul-General, Baghdad, found it necessary to direct the postmaster to transfer to the Custom-house all book-packets received by letter mail, in consequence of urgent representations made to him by the Vali of Baghdad to the effect that large quantities of books on which duty was leviable and the contents of which required examination by the Director of Public Instruction were being imported through the post office. In course of time these orders appear to have been lost sight of, and the divisional superintendent, Mr. A. J. Hughes, when inspecting the Baghdad post office in April 1903, reported that objectionable books were being imported by book post. The Consul-General's attention was drawn to the standing orders. That officer, however, deprecated the idea of transferring books to the Customs Department, and at his suggestion it was arranged that all book packets, registered or unregistered, received by the letter mail, Director-General's No. 812-F.P., dated the 14th should be submitted to the Consul-General, and September 1903, to Postmaster-General, Bombay. under his orders delivered to the addressees, or returned to the senders through the Dead Letter Office with the remark "Delivery prohibited."

162. As the procedure in the Baghdad post office is exceptional the following synopsis has been drawn up principally on reports made to the Postmaster-General, Bombay, by Mr. S. P. Vas, late postmaster of Baghdad.

163. The incoming steamer on her way up the river to the Custom-house wharf stops opposite the private landing steps of the British Consulate-General at any hour of the day or night while her mails, letter and parcel are landed. Should the postmaster be absent, the bags are made over to the Native Infantry Guard at the Residency and remain in their custody till the postmaster arrives.

164. No delivery of letters is made to the general public in the town. Distribution is confined to a "Window Delivery." All articles remaining unclaimed at the end of three days are placed in "deposit" and a list is prepared in Arabic and exposed on a notice-board at the door of the post office. As an exception to this general rule, letters for British subjects residing near the Residency and those for H. E. the Vali Pasha (Governor-General), H. E. the Mushir Pasha (Commander-in-Chief), and those for the French, Russian, and Persian Consulates are sent out for delivery by a kavas of the Residency.

165. Letters, etc., addressed to insolvents are made over to the Residency dragoman who delivers those for Turkish subjects to the Tijara Macamasi and those for foreigners to their respective Consulates. Doubtful cases of nationality are disposed of under the orders of the Consul-General.

166. Letters, etc., addressed to prisoners or deceased persons, British or British-Indian subjects, are delivered to the office of the Consul-General. Similar articles for foreigners are disposed of under the orders of the Consul-General.

167. In the office of the Consul-General a list of foreign newspapers is kept up, the circulation of which is forbidden by H. M.'s Ambassador. Any newspaper, Arabic, French or Greek, coming under this category is consigned by the first outgoing mail to the Bombay Dead Letter Office.

168. Since the abolition of "Insurance," attempts are made, particularly by Jews, to smuggle in precious stones and jewellery in registered letters. The procedure in such cases sanctioned by the Postmaster-General of Bombay, and approved by the Resident is that all letters suspected to contain valuables should be transferred to the Custom-house and a report made through the divisional superintendent of post offices, Persian Gulf and Turkish Arabia, to the Postmaster-General, Bombay. The addressee of any suspected article is summoned to attend the post office or appoint an agent to attend on his behalf. The registered letter or packet is opened in his presence and, if found to contain drugs or anything not of intrinsic value, is delivered, otherwise the contents, with the wrapper, are forwarded to the Custom-house and delivered in the same manner as parcels.

169. Service-privileged correspondence between Turkish Government Departments, properly franked, is allowed to pass free of postage between Baghdad and Basra and *vice versa*. All other correspondence is charged at ordinary unpaid postage rates, except such as is addressed to the Vali or Mushir Pasha, which are delivered free. All applications for the refund of postage once charged must be made through the Vali to the Consul-General.



170. The general rule is that all parcels tendered at the post office for despatch should pass through the Custom-house, but it is understood that only such as are declared or suspected to contain dutiable articles shall be so treated.

171. Letter mail bags for Baghdad are labelled "H. M.'s Consul-General, Baghdad," and sealed with a seal bearing the royal arms. Bags from Baghdad for Basra are labelled "H. M.'s Consul, Basra," and sealed with the Consul-General's official seal. All bags for places beyond Basra are labelled and sealed in the ordinary way according to Post Office procedure, but they are enclosed in one or more transit bags which are labelled H. M.'s Consul, Basra," and sealed with the consular seal. At Basra this outer bag is removed.

172. Any unusual occurrence, such as difficulties with the Custom-house, irregularities in the shipment or landing of mails, and the like, is brought at once by the postmaster to the notice of the Consul-General. The postmaster may hold no written communication with Turkish officials, it being the rule that all communications should pass through the Consul-General. The postmaster's dealings with officials are restricted to verbal communication in connection with routine work.

301-F. In March 1904 the Porte addressed a *note verbale* to the British ambassador complaining of the transport of letters by British mail steamers between Basra and Baghdad and of the affixing of British stamps to the envelopes. Major Newmarch pointed out that the practice of carrying letters between Basra and Baghdad in British mail steamers after being posted in the British Post Offices at those places was an old one and the British Porte could not be expected to carry letters bearing Turkish stamps or no stamps, though as a matter of courtesy merely, a Turkish mail bag was still carried to and from the various ports on the river at the sole risk of the Turkish authorities.

External A., February 1905, No. 16.



CHAPTER XIII.

The building of a Turkish Fort at Fao and the establishment of Military posts on the Shat-el-Arab.

302. At the time when the Treaty of Erzeroum between Turkey and Persia in 1847 was drafted by the British and Russian Commissioners, who acted as mediators, the Turkish Government objected to the relinquishment to Persia of the island of Kyzr, on which a portion of the town of Mohammerah is situated, and withdrew their objections on the condition that no fortifications should be erected on the island, or at any point where they could interfere with the free navigation of the river.

303. In March 1848, the Turkish Government submitted to the British Commissioner a proposal for an addition to Article 2 of the Treaty which they desired should be inserted in the Acts of Ratification. The clause in question contained a formal engagement on the part of the Persian and Turkish Governments reciprocally to abstain from erecting fortifications on the banks of the Shat-el-Arab in their respective possessions. The Turkish negotiators consented to sign the Treaty in its original form on receiving an assurance from the British and Russian Commissioners that the wishes of the Porte on these and other points would be supported at Teheran. With some difficulty the British Minister at Teheran obtained the consent of the Shah to the condition as to the non-erection of fortifications, and still further pressure had to be used by the British and Russian Ambassadors at Constantinople before a formal assurance could be obtained from the Persian Ambassador on the subject.


304. The Sublime Porte, however, required further that this assurance should be confirmed and endorsed by the British and Russian representatives and the latter accordingly addressed a joint note to the Porte on the 29th February 1848, to which the declaration of the Persian Envoy was attached, and which contains the following passage:—

"La déclaration de l'Envoyé Persan énonce enfin, quant à la défense réciproque de bâtir des fortifications sur les côtes du Shat-el-Arab, où les possessions des deux états se trouvent opposées les unes aux autres, une résolution du Shah pleinement conforme au désir exprimé par la sublime porte et appuyé à Téhéran par les bons offices des deux Représentants médiateurs, c'est à-dire que le Shah consent à ce qu' aussi longtemps que la Turquie ne bâtira point de fortifications sur la rive droite du Shat-el-Arab, située vis-à-vis du territoire Persan, la Perse à son tour s'adstiendra d'en construire sur la partie de la rive gauche, qui lui revient selon les stipulations du traité."

305. In December 1886, the Governor-General of Basrah informed the British Consul at Basrah that the Turkish Government contemplated building a large fort at Fao, and that active measures were being taken.

306. From a report sent by Colonel Tweedie on 11th March 1887, it appears there had been a talk at Basrah of an intention to build a fort at Fao, and that Turkish officers had frequently visited Fao, since 1883. There is nothing in our records about this movement, and the first report we had was about the mention made to the Consul at Basrah in December 1885 of the project.

307. The fort was to be built in a date plantation by the seaside belonging to the Sheikh of Kowiet, Mahomed-el-Sabah. The Sheikh came to Basrah to protest against this encroachment on his property, but the Vali and the Sheikh do not appear to have come to any understanding about the ground taken for the fortifications. One hundred and sixty soldiers proceeded to Fao in May 1886, with building materials, and the work of building commenced immediately.



External A., September 1887, Nos. 215-228.

309. In the circumstances Lord Salisbury after consulting Mr. Nicolson decided that the matter should be referred to Constantinople (telegram to Mr. *Ibid.*, No. 228.

310. The British Ambassador was then informed by Lord Salisbury that Her Majesty's Government would support any representations which the Shah's Government might make to the Porte in regard to the fortifications at Fa'o. Sir W. White conferred with the Persian Ambassador on the subject. The latter had an interview with the Sultan, whose personal friend he was, and made some preliminary representations in the matter. Soon after, however, the Persian Ambassador left Constantinople on leave and no further move could be expected until his return.

310. The British Ambassador was then informed by Lord Salisbury that Her Majesty's Government would support any representations which the Shah's Government might make to the Porte in regard to the fortifications at Fao. Sir W. White conferred with the Persian Ambassador on the subject. The latter had an interview with the Sultan, whose personal friend he was, and made some preliminary representations in the matter. Soon after, however, the Persian Ambassador left Constantinople on leave and no further move could be expected until his return.

311. In August 1887 Sir A. Sanderson made a representation to Said Pasha the Vazir, but the latter questioned the right of the British and Persian Governments to dispute the Porte's right to build the fortifications in its own territory, and as regards the Treaty of Erzeroum, on which their objection was based, he said he would look it up with the other documents that might exist at the Porte. The Marquis of Salisbury then in his despatch No. 222, dated 7th September 1887, narrated the circumstances under which the engagements were entered into by Persia and Turkey to abstain from building fortifications on either bank of the Shat-el-Arab, and added :

"It follows from the above facts, that the Turkish and Persian Governments stand mutually pledged to one another to abstain from fortifying on either side the banks of the Shat-el-Arab, and that Great Britain and Russia, who were the means of obtaining for the Porte this engagement from the Persian Government, have a direct interest and right to watch over its faithful observance by the contracting party on whose behalf they intervened at the time.

"It is possible that the Minister for Foreign Affairs may be unaware of these facts. Or he may perhaps argue that the engagement being a reciprocal one, the Turkish Government have the option of departing from it with no other consequence than that of leaving the other party free to do the same. Her Majesty's Government cannot admit, in view of the history of the negotiations, that such a connection is valid in international law, or that the Porte can free itself from the engagement which it took to the British and Russian mediators as well as to the Persian Government without previous arrangements with them.

"And setting the legal question aside, Her Majesty's Government being interested in the integrity both of Persia and the Ottoman Empire, and having regard to the fact that British subjects are largely interested, Both in the trade of Basrah and Mahammerah, would greatly regret the construction of opposing fortifications on either bank of the river, which must constitute a menace to its peaceful navigation, and under certain circumstances become a source of danger to the maintenance of good relations between the two countries or between either of them and Great Britain."

312. Under orders of the Military Department of the Government of India, a memorandum, dated 10th April 1888, External A., June 1888, Nos. 293-328. was prepared by Colonel M. S. Bell on the position of the Fao Fort and the effect of the entrance to the Karun being commanded by it. The following extracts from it may be read:—

"The Bahr-ul-Mushir, channel leading to Mohammerah is of doubtful value, and requires to be re-surveyed—see description of it. But even if as navigable as the main channel described, and although it be beyond the range of the guns at Fao, it is the intention of the Turks to which



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we have chiefly to look and, so regarded, a hostile fort at Fao completely fulfils its assumed contemplated objects, i.e., it gives to its occupier the command of the traffic to Mohammerah, whence leads the most direct route to Tehran and the future railway terminus of any line connecting Tehran with the head of the Persian Gulf, and thereby controls British trade with Mesopotamia and Arabistan. Its mere erection and arming is a matter to be deplored, inasmuch as its existence must occasionally cause our remonstrances, unfortunately so often necessary to be met by evasion, and perhaps even with sovereign contempt, and may cause an injudicious commander to bring on serious political complications and stoppage of trade until such time as Britain either strengthened the Persian Gulf gun-boats sufficiently to silence the fort, or until diplomatic action led to an ephemeral agreement likely to be again broken when occasion of resentment arose.

"No Persian boats, worth mentioning, use either channel, and a fort at Fao is less threatening to Persia than one opposite to Mohammerah would be. The Bahr-ul-Mushir channel is always good enough for Persian craft, and old forts exist in more than sufficient numbers, or could be readily improvised to meet all eventualities likely to arise between Turkey and Persia.

"The description given of the Shat-el-Arab from the bar to Mohammerah will serve to indicate that the fort is not built as an express menace to the town of Mohammerah, and therefore as a direct menace to Persia. It is 30 miles below Mohammerah."

313. In submitting this memorandum to the Secretary of State, the Government of India wrote (Despatch No. 82-E., dated 26th May 1888):—

Ibid., No. 324.

"Your Lordship will observe that the Fort commands the main channel of the Shat-el-Arab, and will enable the Turks to block, at least temporarily, all access to the Tigris. It will further give the Turks the command of the traffic to Mohammerah and thereby control British trade with Mesopotamia and Arabistan.

"We are of opinion that the erection of the Fort is prejudicial to British interests; and if Her Majesty's Government do not feel themselves in a position to demand that it should be demolished or abandoned we would at least recommend that strong support should be given to any similar demands made by the Government of His Majesty the Shah of Persia."

314. The India Office strongly endorsed this despatch in communicating with the Foreign Office. A strongly worded remonstrance was then addressed by Lord Salisbury to the Turkish Minister in London (Rustum Pasha), in which a clear account was given of the reciprocal engagements made by Turkey and Persia about building fortifications on either banks of Persia, and the objections to the Turkish proceedings were stated in the sense of Lord Salisbury's Despatch No. 82-E., dated 26th May 1888, above quoted. A similar remonstrance was

External A., March 1889, Nos. 233-233.
Ibid. (No. 249).

Ibid.

addressed by Sir W. White to the Porte at Constantinople.

315. The Porte replied on the 31st July 1888. A translation of the reply is given below:—

"We have perused your note of reply stating that the construction of fortifications at Fao is contrary to the decision arrived at when the treaty of Erzeroum was concluded, viz., that no fortifications should be made on the banks of the Shat-el-Arab and declaring that any modification of this decision must be subject to the consent of the mediating powers. It is needless to explain that the agreement arrived at on this subject was not a reciprocal understanding, but Turkey at that time in her own interests reserved to her own institution the right of constructing fortifications on those banks and brought about the engagement that so long as Turkey should not fortify the right bank of the river, Persia should abstain from building forts on her left bank. Now that Turkey has had forts made, Persia is released from her engagement and is also free to construct forts on her own ground and has no right to object. And this agreement being between the two Governments there is no kind of engagement *vis-à-vis* the mediating powers, and the two Governments aforesaid are not dependent on their consent and the construction of these works is no violation of any treaty between the two countries."

316. As the Turkish Government was determined to proceed with the work of the fortifications Sir H. D. Wolff urged that a British squadron of some strength should visit the Persian Gulf, in order to give an impression of the naval power of England, and Lord Salisbury believed that such a visit would be advantageous in several ways. But at that juncture it would be likely to increase the irritation felt at St. Petersburg on account of the opening of the

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Karun to general navigation, which was regarded there as a concession exclusively to the advantage of England. The Admiralty was therefore requested "that the expediency of sending a squadron to those waters at no distant date may be kept in view, and that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty will consider that arrangements could most conveniently be made for the purpose" (letter, dated 26th November 1888).

317. The Persian Ambassador at the instance of Sir W. White addressed the following note to the Porte on the 26th February 1889, which was followed by exactly a similar memorandum by Sir W. White :—

"It is clear that the construction of fortifications on the Shat-el-Arab is contrary to the convention concluded through the mediation of Russia and England at the time of the exchange at Constantinople of the ratifications of the treaty of Erzeroum, dated 21st March 1848.

"No action contrary to the provisions of the convention can be legitimate without the consent of the two signatory powers of the above mentioned treaty, as well as that of the mediating powers, having been obtained.

"Now this action, in opposition to the said convention, whose provisions are at present in force, has given rise to strong remonstrances on the part of England and Persia, and it is submitted that the fact that no attention is yet being paid to these remonstrances cannot naturally serve to maintain the friendly sentiments which exist between the two countries."

318. The works at the Fort were suspended on account of rains for some weeks at the commencement of the year 1889, but were resumed soon after they cleared.

319. On 5th July 1889, the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, telegraphed to us that the Turks were pushing Fao Fort vigorously. This news was confirmed by Colonel Tweedie and the Director of Persian Gulf Telegraphs.

320. In July 1889, the Consul-General telegraphed to Sir W. White that the works on Fao fortifications had been discontinued, which fact he believed was due to his personal representations to the Porte. The works were, however, resumed soon after.

321. In March 1890, H. M. Ships *Sphinx* (Commander Boldero) accompanied by the *Griffon* and *Redpole* under instructions of the Commander-in-Chief of the East India Squadron, visited Fao.

322. On attempting however to land, Commander Boldero and his party were fired upon by the garrison, whereupon they returned to their ships. The following report of Captain Boldero himself may be read :—

"I arrived at Fao on 10th instant, with *Griffon* and *Redpole* in company. Next morning I attempted to land with Commander Blaxland to interview the officer in command, with a view to visiting the fort; but immediately my boat touched land, the ramparts were manned with riflemen who opened fire on us under the direction of a Turkish officer. I therefore decided to retire to the ship and telegraph to the Admiralty and Commander-in-Chief for further instructions. I also telegraphed to Colonel Ross. I had taken the precaution to have arms and ammunition in the boat; but not wishing to complicate affairs I decided not to return the fire; but had any one been hit, I should certainly have returned it. In compliance with a telegram from the Admiral, I demanded an explanation from the Commanding Officer of the fort; his reply is unsatisfactory; and is that I gave him no official information of my intention to visit the fort, and that the Officer Commanding who is at Basrah gave orders no one was to be admitted to the fort or its approaches and that there was a quarantine. He mentioned nothing about the firing. My orders are to demand an explanation."



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323. Her Majesty's Consul at Basrah reported the facts to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and obtained the necessary permission for Captain Boldero to visit the fort at Fao, which he did on 22nd March 1880. He found then that the embrasures had not been completed, that no shields were in position nor was there any mounting for guns.

324. Meanwhile strong representations had been made to the Porte, and after some prevaricating, the Turkish Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on 10th April 1890, informed Lord Salisbury that the Commandant of the Fort at Fao, who was responsible for the firing on Captain Boldero and his party, was dismissed from his post and condemned to six months' imprisonment.

Secret E., June 1890, Nos. 362-411 (No. 409).
Secret E., August 1890, Nos. 268-274.
Secret E., July 1891, Nos. 373-389.

325. The fortifications were, however, still pushed on. It was also reported that three guns had been landed at Fao.

Secret E., June 1892, Nos. 95-102.
Secret E., September 1892, Nos. 5-61.

326. The works progressed actively in 1892, and on 29th August 1893, Colonel Mockler informed the Foreign Office by telegram:

"Her Majesty's Consul at Basrah reports that 80 men under engineer officers are said to be at work on Fao Fort, also 800 Turkish pounds have been sanctioned for construction of three military posts on right bank of river for protection of navigation and prevention of smuggling."

327. On these repeated reports about the progress of the works at the Fao Fort, Sir A. Nicolson, under instructions from Lord Rosebury, called on the Porte's Foreign Minister on 7th August 1893 and left with him a Pro-Memoria in which Her Majesty's Embassy expressed a hope that the Porte would give orders for the prompt discontinuance of the work in question, for should the fort be completed and steps taken towards arming it, Her Majesty's Government would regard such action as one of hostile preparation which they would be entitled to resent, and which would justify them in taking necessary measures for counteracting.

328. As the works were being still continued, the British Embassy again in November 1893 pressed for the issue of orders for stopping the works. The Embassy received assurance that orders would be issued to that effect. As a matter of fact, the works were not abandoned till May 1894.

329. From the Political Resident's Diary for the week ending 20th April 1895, it appears that no work was going on at the fort about that time.

Secret E., July 1895, No. 18.

330. In April 1896 there was an increase of Turkish soldiers at Fao, but the Turkish Mudir was apparently very friendly towards the British residents (letter of British Consular Agent at Fao, dated 9th April 1897).

Secret E., 1897, Nos. 6-11.

331. It must be noticed that throughout the controversy the Persian Government showed the utmost indifference possible, and left the whole burden of fighting for the rights of Persia on the Shat-el-Arab to the British Government.

332. The supremacy of one nation over a channel which divided two States, and which is the sole outlet of navigable rivers partly in one state and partly in another, would be as incompatible with the sovereign right of the other state as it would be a menace to the commerce of other nations over these waterways. From this point of view alone, if not from Treaty rights, the British Government would be fully justified in thwarting the Turkish intrigues on the Shat-el-Arab.

Military posts on the Shat-el-Arab.

333. It might be mentioned here that while building the Fort at Fao, the Basrah Consul's Diaries—ending 22nd July 1897, 25th October 1893, and 29th January 1894. Turks also established three military guard posts on the river, viz.:—

Secret E., June 1894, Nos. 70-172 (Nos. 86, 102, 161).

Zain—opposite Faliah.



Kut Khest—half way between Mohammerah and Dowasir.

Shamshumiah—below Abdul Khasib. Each post was to hold one lieutenant and twenty soldiers. They were meant for the protection of navigation and smuggling and were alleged to have been constructed on representation of the British Embassy. But as will be seen from the account of the piracies in Chapter XII, they served little the purposes of protecting the traffic on the river.

334. The buildings are of kiln bricks of one storey each, defensible for musketry having loopholes on roof around which there is parapet.

335. The Turks had also once a project in hand to build a fort opposite Mohammerah, but it has apparently not been carried into effect. (See Sir H. Drummond Wolff's Despatch No. 116, dated 9th April 1890, to Lord Salisbury).

Secret E., June 1890, Nos. 326-327.

Project for the construction of a road between Basrah and Fao, 1900.

In his letter, dated 24th August 1900, the British Consul reported that Mohsin Pasha had spoken to him of a project he had in view to construct a direct road between Basrah and Fao, to enable the easy despatch of soldiers and munitions of war to the latter place in case of an emergency. There appeared to be the following difficulties in carrying out the project:—

External B., October 1900, No. 84.

- (i) Appropriation of land from private properties with date plantations, which the owners would not easily part with. To meet this difficulty Mohsin Pasha proposed to introduce the corvée system obtaining elsewhere in the Turkish Empire
- (ii) The construction of a large number of bridges over the creeks, which would cost an enormous sum.



CHAPTER XIV.

TURKISH PRETENSIONS TO JURISDICTION OVER THE SHAT-EL-ARAB AND MOHAMMERAH.

(i) Turkish Jurisdiction on the Shat-el-Arab.

336. The river Shat-el-Arab from its mouth on the Persian Gulf up to a point little above Mohammerah supposed to be the Khanyan creek separates the Persian from Turkish territory, and as such the sovereignty over it is joint between the two powers; above this point to the Kurnah at the confluence of the two rivers Tigris and Euphrates both its banks are Turkish.

337. The joint and equal rights of navigation of Persia and Turkey over the Shat-el-Arab so far as it lies between their territories is guaranteed also by the Treaty of Erzeroum.

338. The Treaty of Erzeroum of the ^{10th}/_{31st} May 1847, between Turkey and Persia, contains the following stipulation:—

"ARTICLE II.

"Le Gouvernement Ottoman s'engage formellement à ce que la ville et l'échelle de Mohammerah, l'île de Kizr, le lieu d'ancrage, et aussi les terrains de la rive orientale, c'est-à-dire de rive gauche du Shat-el-Arab, qui sont en la possession des tribus reconnues comme relevant de la Perse, soient dans la possession du Gouvernement Persan en pleine souveraineté. Outre cela, les navires Persans auront le droit de naviguer en pleine liberté sur le Shat-el-Arab, depuis l'endroit où ce fleuve se jette dans la mer, jusqu'au point de contact des frontières des deux Parties."

The town and port of Mohammerah, and the island of Khizr, with the anchorage, as well as so much of the eastern bank of the Shat-el-Arab as is occupied by tribes confessedly belonging to Persia, are to remain in the possession of Persia, besides which Persians will enjoy the complete liberty of navigating the Shat-el-Arab, from its mouth to the point of contact of the two frontiers. Soolumaneeyeh will remain in the possession of Turkey. In regard to Nohab, the Persian Government settles that all the mountainous portions with the pass of Kerrond on its eastern part will be retained by it, and the plain of Nohab, which forms the western portion, will be given over to Turkey.

339. The words "so much of the eastern bank of the Shat-el-Arab as is occupied by tribes confessedly belonging to Persia" apparently leave a loophole for intrigues by the Turks on the eastern bank. The history of the Turkish and Persian dominion on the delta of the Euphrates, Tigris and Karun is involved in obscurity. There is in our records a carefully drawn up memorandum dated 6th January 1844 printed as Appendix A to this Précis treating lucidly of the early history of the Kaab tribe and their nominal dependancy upon Turkey in the first instance and then on Persia, their respective rights of territory of the two Powers and the modern history of Mohammerah, which was sent to the British and Russian Commissioners at Erzeroum, and throws much light on Article II of the Treaty of Erzeroum.

(ii) Rights of British naval ships to ascend up the Shat-el-Arab.

340. The British naval ships as well as merchantmen have for over a century been visiting Basrah, which has always been regarded as a sea-port open to all nations. There was formerly a coal depôt at Maaghill, until 1873, when it was transferred to the new premises near the Consulate.*

341. In 1854 a succession of frigates ascended up the Shat-el-Arab, and one of them at least proceeded up as far as Kurna—as appears from the following report of Sir H. Rawlinson to the British Embassy, dated 21st March 1854:—

"Your Lordship is probably aware that the Bombay Government is now occupied with measures for carrying out a sustained naval demonstration in the Persian Gulf, with a view of supporting our influences at Tehran and of deterring His Majesty the Shah from again yielding to the persuasions or menaces of Russia.

"No sooner had the *Auckland* steam frigate returned from Basrah to Bombay about the middle of February than the *Akbar*, a vessel of the same class, was despatched to occupy her place and the *Ajdaka*, a still larger vessel, was to follow on the 1st of March, two other frigates being also, I believe, under orders for the same destination during the months of April and May. The appearance of these large vessels in quick succession at Bushire, Karrack and Basrah and the notoriety that an expeditionary force is also held in readiness in Bombay

See Chapter XII (ii), paragraphs 227—249.

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for service in the Persian Gulf has already produced a powerful impression both in Persia and in Turkish Arabia; of the effect of this impression at Tehran Your Lordship will be informed by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at the Court of the Shah; here it has been of the greatest advantage in repressing those insurrectionary symptoms, which were called into activity by the rumours of a Persian invasion, and which, if they had gained any head, would have held out the strongest inducements to the Shah to put his threatened invasion in execution.

"The *Akbar* on her recent visit to the Euphrates proceeded up the river with the Governor of Basrah on board, as far as Kurna; and I met with repeated proofs during the trip which I have just made in the *Comet* to communicate with the steam frigate that her presence had satisfied the Arabs of our intention to interfere actively in this quarter, if hostilities should arise with Persia, and of the consequent inutility of their offering further opposition to the Turkish authorities."

342. In this naval demonstration the British had the tacit consent and hearty welcome of the Turkish Government.

343. In 1859 the British fleet ascended up the Shat-el-Arab and captured Mohammerah, using Maaghil for coal and store depôt, without any objection having been raised by the Turks.

344. Apart from these warlike expeditions our naval ships have been constantly visiting Basrah for conveying despatches and other purposes. But none of our naval ships appear to have ascended up the river beyond Basrah up to 1874 except the *Akbar* in 1854 and the armed boats of the Euphrates and Tigris Survey and the *Nitocris* and its successor *Comet*, under especial arrangements with Turkey.

345. In 1874 a correspondence took place between the Turkish Governor of Baghdad and Her Majesty's Consul-General in connection with the visit of a

Secret, October 1874, Nos. 62-68.

British ship-of-war (*Philomel*) to Kurna, the Vali having protested against her visit to that place.

346. The Consul-General, replying to the Turkish complaint, said:—

"It has always been supposed that the Shat-el-Arab is a free river, and practically it certainly is so, and can scarcely be otherwise, Kurna being a chief depôt for the exportation of dates; sea-going craft under foreign flags are in the habit of there taking in their cargoes, etc."

347. The Governor of Baghdad replied:—

"It needs no comment that the part from Basrah to Kurna is not a free river, but the Turkish side with its dependencies to the point below Basrah on the Shat-el-Arab, and specially both banks above Basrah being the real possession of the Ottoman Government, the entry of foreign merchant vessels and specially vessels of war into a river such as this, of which the fountain head and outlet are situated within the dominions of the Ottoman Government, unless it be with the consent and acquiescence of the Government, is according to rules inadmissible."

348. Here a distinction appears to have been made between the navigation of the portion of the river above Basrah and of the lower portion; and it may probably be intended to convey the impression that although the lower part, where Turkey owns the right bank only, may be free, this is not the case as regards the upper part where Turkey owns both the banks of the river.

349. In 1881 the Turkish Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Artin Effendi, made a communication to M. Marinitch, of which a memorandum was forwarded to the Foreign Office with Lord Dufferin's Despatch No. 587, dated 20th July 1881:—

Secret, May 1882, Nos. 243-255.

Daté Pera, le 15 Juillet 1881.

MEMORANDUM.

Le Mustechar du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères m'a donné communication d'un telegram de Bagdad par lequel le Vali informe la Porte que d'après les registres de la préfecture maritime de Bussorah il résulte que les navires de guerre étrangers n'ont remonté le fleuve que jusqu'à Courna après en avoir sollicité et obtenu au préalable l'autorisation nécessaire.

Par Ordre du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères S. A. Artin Effendi prend la liberté de recommander à l'Ambassade Royale de vouloir bien faire en sorte que les navires de guerre Anglais s'abstiennent de remonter le fleuve au dessus de Courna afin d'éviter toute cause de conflit.

(Signé) MARINITCH.



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Sir E. Hertslet noted on this :—

"This notice would appear to have reference to the navigation of the Tigris by foreign ships-of-war rather than to the navigation of the Shat-el-Arab.

Mr. Marinitch's memorandum says that foreign ships-of-war have hitherto only gone up the river (which no doubt means the Shat-el-Arab) as far as Kurna after having applied for and obtained the necessary authorization. (This statement, however, is open to doubt.) And it then prays that the British Ambassador will take measures to ensure that British ships-of-war "s'abstiennent de remonter le fleuve au dessus de Courna afin d'éviter toute cause de conflit." Le fleuve here mentioned must, I think, mean the Tigris and not necessarily the Euphrates also, as the Shat-el-Arab is only so called from Persian Gulf as far as Kurna; the river above Kurna to the eastward being the Tigris and to the westward the Euphrates, Kurna being actually situated on the Tigris.

"The Turkish authorities would appear to have a perfect right to issue this notice with regard to the Tigris, provided a similar notice has been sent to other Governments; but in fact, when a discussion arose in 1874 respecting the right of British ships-of-war to navigate the Shat-el-Arab, Sir H. Elliot addressed a note to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he said—"I have the honor to request that if at any time the S. P. should wish to propose new regulations, or to alter a practice that has prevailed, in reference to the presence of ships-of-war in any part of the Sultan's dominions, due notice of it may be given to Her Majesty's Government, who will not fail to give such instructions as will ensure from the Commanders of British ships-of-war every respect for the rights of the S. P."

350. Mr. Plowden referring to the Porte's memorandum thought the word "Courna" had been wrongly substituted for "Basrah," since if the phrase "au dessus de Courna" was correctly copied, Artin Effendi would appear to have conceded the whole question at issue: it is hardly possible for men-of-war of the class that visit Basrah to ascend the river to any appreciable distance beyond Kurna, and none so far as he was able to ascertain had ever attempted to do so.

351. Mr. Plowden referred also to the proceedings of our ships-of-war in 1854 and 1874 and added that for the protection of our commerce it was not only desirable that our ships-of-war should be permitted to proceed as far as Kurna, but that a gun-boat of the Royal Navy should be substituted for the *Comet* for patrolling the upper course of the Tigris. As to this question see Chapter IX.

352. On this occasion Her Majesty's Government directed that the British vessels of war should not proceed beyond Kurna.

(iii) Objection of the Porte to the presence of British ships-of-war at Basrah, 1883—1886.

353. In 1883 enquiries were made by the Porte as to the reason for the presence of a British ship-of-war in Basrah waters. Lord Granville then informed

Proceedings, September 1883, Nos 172-173.

Musurus Pasha :—

"In deference to the wishes of the Sublime Porte, British ships-of-war do not proceed further up the Shat-el-Arab than Kurna, but Her Majesty's Government are not aware of any regulation precluding such ships from visiting Basrah."

354. In the Turkish Arabia Diary for week ending 18th December 1885 mention was made of two gun-boats, the *Osprey* and the *Philomel*, being at Basrah. The

Secret E., February 1886, Nos. 57-59.

reason given for their presence there was that at Basrah there were greater facilities for obtaining fresh provisions than at any other station in the Persian Gulf.

355. Government of India received from Colonel Tweedie a copy of a telegram to his address from Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, in which Sir W. White said that the Porte was anxious for information as to the reason for the presence at Basrah of two British gun-boats. To this telegram Colonel Tweedie replied that Sir W. White might safely assure the Porte that its anxieties were groundless, and that the gun-boats at Basrah could only be there "for the sake of moving about a little."

356. In this correspondence another point, namely, that regarding the right of British Resident to travel about the Pashalik and surrounding countries, is touched upon; but this question was being dealt with separately.

357. In addition to his reply by telegram, Colonel Tweedie took opportunity of laying his views before the Ambassador at Constantinople, and in forwarding



copies of this correspondence to the Government of India addressed a long demi-official to the Secretary, Foreign Department, on the same subject.

358. Colonel Tweedie pointed out that the Porte had quite recently received the views of Her Majesty's Government on the gun-boat question, and quoted Lord Granville's despatch to Musurus Pasha quoted above :—

"In deference to the wishes of the Sublime Porte, British ships-of-war do not proceed further up the Shat-el-Arab than Kurna, but Her Majesty's Government are not aware of any regulation precluding such ships from visiting Basrah."

359. In his demi-official to the Secretary, Colonel Tweedie expressed the opinion that as "a rule and in the absence of special circumstances, one gun-boat at Basrah is enough at one and the same time." And he thought that the intense alarm which "the sight of the British gun-boat caused to the Usmanli mind at the present period is of itself a kind of reason for not making the spectacle too familiar a one."

(iv) Number of guns allowed to be carried by foreign vessels in the Shat-el-Arab, 1893.

360. The Turkish authorities further showed anxiety to restrict the privilege which all merchant vessels have been enjoying from time immemorial to carry four guns when ascending up the Shat-el-Arab to protect themselves against pirates. When this privilege was expressly granted and the number of guns was limited to four, it is not possible to say. But the Turks now wished to put a stop to the privilege. With this view the following communication was addressed by the Vali of Basrah to the British Consul at Basrah on 23rd September 1893 :—

"According to a verbal communication of your Dragoman, guns and ammunition of Indian vessels arriving from India and others, which were for protection, are taken by the Mudir at Fao and on returning they have to pay money. I have communicated with the said Mudir on the subject, who has replied by telegram that there is a decision that every vessel be allowed to carry four guns only and the remainder kept by the Government on a receipt until return of the vessel, and that this arrangement is for prevention of sale of the extra guns by the crews to the inhabitants. I beg, therefore, that you will be good enough to instruct those concerned and prevent them from keeping with them any extra guns than required and also from selling any ammunition to inhabitants."

361. It appears that the Turks formerly used to provide escort ships in certain parts of the river to protect them against pirates. When this practice ceased it is not known, and possibly when this sort of protection was withdrawn ships were allowed to carry four guns. No papers can be traced on this point.

362. Probably the Turkish authorities apprehended that the privilege of carrying guns would be abused, or possibly they were anxious to exercise more than ordinary supervision on the Shat-el-Arab with the object of extending their rights over the river, limited by the Erzeroum which accounts for the precautionary measures taken by the Vali of Basrah.

(v) Levy of Customs dues by the Turks on imports and exports at Mohammerah, 1893-94.

363. In October 1893 the British Consul at Basrah received a complaint from a Nakoda of a British Indian *baghla* that on arrival in the Shat-el-Arab with a cargo of charcoal for Mohammerah, he was stopped by the authorities at Fao, and after undergoing 24 hours' quarantine the Customs authorities visited his ship and asked him where he was bound for. On informing them he was bound for Mohammerah a paper was given to him which he was ordered to sign; this the man naturally had to do though he did not know the contents of the document. He was told he must produce this document before the Customs authorities at Dowasir. On arrival at Dowasir his vessel was visited by Customs officials, and on his saying he was bound for Mohammerah he was allowed to go, no notice being taken of the document he had received at Fao.

Secret E., May 1894, Nos. 307-346.
See the Consul's letter dated 13th October to the Vali of Basrah.



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364. The *baghla* landed her cargo at Mohammerah and loaded with dates in the River Karun above Mohammerah, and then proceeded to Fao direct. The Nakoda received a document from the Muaz-es-Sultanah at Mohammerah, and also an endorsement on the document received at Fao. On arrival at Fao, where the Nakoda had been made to deposit his sail as security, the officials informed him the certificate of the Muaz-es-Sultanah was insufficient and that he must return to Dowasir to obtain a proper certificate. The Nakoda returned to Dowasir with the *baghla* and demanded the necessary certificate; the authorities at Dowasir, however, declined to listen to him or to do anything to arrange the matter. The Nakoda, therefore, came to Basrah and complained to the British Consulate.

365. Thinking there had been some mistake, the Consul made a representation to the Mudir of Customs, who informed him that, "as Mohammerah was a Turkish port, he had received orders to take customs duty on all cargo landed there."

366. These facts were duly brought to the notice of the Vali of Basrah by the British Consul. His reply dated 18th October 1893, was that on a reference to the Mudir of the Basrah Customs, he had learnt that "Mohammerah is counted as a part of the Turkish dominions and that the transactions of its imports are to be dealt with similarly as in other parts of the Turkish dominions."

367. A similar reply was given to the Persian Consul at Basrah to a representation made by him to the Vali.

368. The Shah of Persia requested the British Government through Sir F. Lacellas would remonstrate with the Porte. The Foreign Office thereupon wired to Sir A. Ford on 10th November:—

"Claim of Governor of Basrah is entirely contrary to the Treaty of Erzeroum, we cannot admit report of Turkey to levy duties in Shat-el-Arab on goods for Mohammerah which might affect British as well as Persian trade on the Karun.

"You should make strong representation to Turkish Government. If your Russian colleague is prepared to join in accordance with arrangement recorded in despatches to Bulwer and Elliot of May 16th, 1865, and September 4th, 1869, you should act with him."

Ibid (No. 338).

On the 10th November 1893. Sir F. C. Ford telegraphed to the Foreign Office—

"I consider the question of Mohammerah as settled. His Excellency told me that the Turkish Government laid no claim whatever to the possession of that place. As regards the question of levying duties on goods destined for Mohammerah, His Excellency informed me that it is still under consideration and formed the subject of negotiations with the Persian Ambassador here."

369. When this news was communicated to the Shah, His Majesty addressed Sir F. Lacellas an autograph letter thanking the British Government for their action.

Ibid (No. 340).

370. The following report of Sir F. Lacellas, dated 3rd December 1893, will be read with interest:—

Ibid (No. 333).

"In a conversation which I have had with my Russian colleague on this subject, Mr. deButzow informed me, as a curious piece of diplomatic history, that in 1848, within a year of the signature of the Treaty of Erzeroum, the Chargé d'Affaires of England and Russia at Constantinople waylaid the Persian Ambassador who was on his way to his post, and induced him to sign an explanatory note (note explicative) to the effect that the treaty did not confer upon Persia the possession of Mohammerah. Subsequently when the Commissioners were sent for the delimitation of the frontier, which was never carried out, the Turkish representative admitted that the Persian Ambassador had no authority to sign such a document which, therefore, could not be considered as being of a binding character. Mr. deButzow, however, was inclined to think that the existence of this document may have encouraged the Turkish authorities in the Gulf to put forward a claim to consider Mohammerah as Turkish port.

"This view is rather strengthened by a conversation which I have had with the Turkish Ambassador, who told me that when he held the post of Chef des Contentieux at Constantinople he had seen the document in question, but that he was not aware that its validity had ever been repudiated by a Turkish authority.

"It was, however, evident that an explanatory note could not override the authority of a treaty, and now that the Porte had declared to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople that Mohammerah was to be considered as a Persian possession, the question was definitely settled."

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The Persian Government, moreover, when they learnt the facts entirely repudiated the addition as unauthorised.

371. On 24th January 1894, Sir F. Lacellas telegraphed that the Governor of Mohammerah had reported that the

Ibid (No. 343).

Turkish authorities were still levying customs duties on Persian and British ships from Mohammerah.

372. On 31st January 1894, Sir A. Nicolson sent to the Foreign Office a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Block, which is quoted below:—

Ibid (No. 345).

MEMORANDUM.

With reference to the question of duties levied on goods for Mohammerah and the Karun River, I have already reported verbally that the Custom House authorities here, and whom the matter was referred by the Grand Vizier, have been for some time past in communication with the Customs of Baghdad and Basrah. All the necessary information have been received and a Commission has been formed at the Custom House, which, after five sittings, is now drawing up a report embodying its views. This report may be expected to reach the Grand Vizier in some five or six days. I am unable to state exactly the nature of the report, but Bertram Effendi, the Under-Secretary of the Customs and President of the above Commission, has been good enough to show me a separate report drawn up by himself wherein he states that the question is divided into two points. The first is the levying of duty on goods borne by ships proceeding up the *Shat-el-Arab* and destined for Mohammerah direct. Bertram Effendi states that the information from Basrah shows conclusively that no such duties are being levied, but that as Her Majesty's Embassy still maintains that such is the case, it is advisable to instruct the Customs authorities again on the point, so that there may be no possible ground of complaint, which if such duties were levied, would be perfectly unjustifiable. The second point is the levying of duty on English coal landed in depôts at Basrah and re-exported to Mohammerah and the Karun River. Such goods now pay 8 per cent. whereas Her Majesty's Embassy maintains that they are goods in transit and should benefit by the drawback of 7 per cent. Bertram Effendi is of opinion that the contention of Her Majesty's Embassy is correct, but as it is difficult for the Ottoman Government to obtain from Mohammerah, trustworthy evidence that the coal is really intended for Mohammerah, he proposes that the Turkish Government should name an Ottoman Vice-Consul at that place who would be in a position to issue certificates that the coal had been disembarked and consumed in Persian territory, or that they should come to an arrangement with the Persian Government that one or two Turkish Customs employés should be placed at Mohammerah for the same purpose. Bertram Effendi states that it is not unusual for a Government to have a Customs officer beyond the frontier of an adjoining country, and such is the case at Zeberche in Servia, where there are Ottoman Customs authorities.

I pointed out to Bertram Effendi that he had only mentioned coals in his report, he replied that no goods but coal, as far as he was aware, were first taken to Basrah and returned down river to Mohammerah; other goods went direct to Mohammerah. Bertram Effendi makes a point in his report of limiting his remarks to goods intended for Mohammerah itself, for he states it has never yet been decided what lands on the left bank of the *Shat-el-Arab* property belong to Persia, as the Commission of delimitation never came to a definite conclusion as to which tribes in that neighbourhood were Arabs, and which were Persian tribes. This is a crucial point of the question for the Persian Government, for the Turkish Government will continue to raise difficulties with regard to goods which are not clearly and conclusively shown to be destined for Mohammerah itself or other regularly defined Persian territories."

Ibid (No. 344).

373. With reference to this memorandum Sir A. Nicolson observed:—

"As Your Lordship will perceive from Mr. Block's memorandum the Ottoman Government are not likely to raise any difficulties in regard to goods destined for Mohammerah, and it would seem to me that if they raise the question as to the adjoining lands, it will scarcely be within the competence of the Embassy delegates to discuss a matter of that nature. I would suggest that they should come to an arrangement as to Mohammerah, and leave the other question for subsequent consideration. The proposal to have an Ottoman Vice-Consul at Mohammerah for the purpose of delivering certificates seems to be one to which no objection need be taken."

374. Meanwhile the Political Resident had made a proposal that a gunboat should be sent to Fao to protect the interests of the British. In view, however, of the assurance communicated by Sir A. Nicolson, the Government of India did not think it necessary to take any action on the Resident's proposal (Foreign Department letter No. 1609-E., dated 14th September 1894, to the Resident).

Secret E., October 1894, Nos. 178-188.



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(vi) Turkish Quarantine arrangements on the Shat-el-Arab.

Interference of Turkish Quarantine authorities with passengers arriving by the mail steamer at Mohammerah, 1890.

375. Another weapon the Turks found to assert their pretensions on the Shat-el-Arab was quarantine restrictions.
Secret E., May 1891, Nos. 1-4.

376. The first notable act of interference with the navigation of mercantile ships on the Shat-el-Arab on this score was the interdiction to land passengers at Mohammerah imposed on British India Steam Navigation Company's steamers when they proceeded up the river calling at Mohammerah.

377. It appears that this restriction was imposed by the Turkish Government without the knowledge of the Board of Health or the Sanitary Inspector at Baghdad. Orders were soon after issued to the Medical Officer at Basrah to take steps to cause the interdiction to cease (Sir W. White's letter dated 6th January, to the British Minister at Teheran).

(vii) Proposed Turkish Quarantine at Fao.* 1891-94.

378. In 1891 the Turkish Government proposed to transfer the quarantine station for vessels entering the Euphrates from its then situation about three miles below the limits of the port of Basrah to the island of Fao. Protests were made by the British merchants against this change as likely to cause serious inconvenience.
External B., September 1892, Nos. 69-74.
See also Secret E., March 1895, Nos. 9-68 (Nos. 47-59).

379. Captain Trench, the British Consul at Basrah, after discussing the whole question in a memorandum, dated 11th June 1891, summed up his observations as follows:—

- "(1) Fao as a sanitary station for Basrah without Mohammerah as one too would be disastrous to Basrah trade, but would not prevent ships calling at Mohammerah.
- "(2) Fao as a station with Mohammerah a reciprocal one would be equally disastrous to Basrah, and possibly to Mohammerah of the future.
- "(3) Mohammerah as a reciprocal station with Basrah makes the quarantine complete, and in no way affects the Basrah trade or that of Mohammerah present or future.

"It has always appeared that the Ottoman power has resented the idea of the Shat-el-Arab being an open river to Basrah, and she has tried to gain an ascendancy over it by building a fort at Fao which since she sees now is objected to wishes to substitute for it a quarantine station, which would give her a certain command over the river and great power over the commerce of Mohammerah of the present and future. The chance of the rise of that port is jealously looked on by the Basrah Government, who even have put forward claims (verbally only) that Mohammerah is Ottoman soil, and so wish to charge the Ottoman import duty of 8 per cent. on goods for that river which has in some instances been done.

"At present much inconvenience is caused by the Turks levying blackmail at Fao from the native craft for Mohammerah. They have even taken tonnage dues as well as quarantine dues. During the date season when many native boats come up the river, there has always been rows over this extortion.

"In order to make the system a recognised principle, the Turks wish to have a quarantine station at Fao."

380. Colonel Talbot pointed out that it could not be denied that the Turkish Government had for long a legitimate ground of complaint against the continued breach by both Europeans and natives of its quarantine regulation. The system of quarantine existing at the time was regularly broken by passengers by ships calling at Mohammerah landing there and proceeding to Basrah by boat or overland, and the Persian Government had made no attempt to check the practice. Colonel Talbot therefore proposed:—

* Letter No. 58, dated 4th August 1902, to the Embassy.
Ibid (No. 48).

† Some after the opening of the telegraph office at Fao a quarantine station was established there, and attempts were made to stop vessels coming or going to Mohammerah.
Political A., December 1864, Nos. 266-267. But the attempt was not apparently carried very far.



"It seems desirable therefore to seek some way out of the difficulty, and I took advantage of Her Majesty's Consul, Basrah, being at Bushire a short time ago to suggest that the views of both the Turkish authorities and merchants might be met by the shipping agents refusing to grant passenger tickets to Mohammerah, while still landing mails and cargo there. This proposal has been accepted by the Agent of all the lines plying to Basrah, and will, I believe, be urged upon the Ottoman Government as a reasonable compromise. No doubt the few passengers for Persia who may wish to disembark at Mohammerah may be a little inconvenienced by being carried on to Basrah; but they will be no worse off than they were up to the last year, when first steamers made Mohammerah a port of call on the upward voyage, and the Karun trade, to aid which that arrangement was made, will not suffer.

"It is true that that arrangement was made partly to meet the wishes of the Persian Government, but the lines lying to Basrah, all of which fly the British flag, are under no promise to carry passengers to Mohammerah, so that no breach of contract can be alleged against their refusal, for the protection of their own interests, to do so in future. It is but a choice of evils, I fear, but the course suggested appears to involve the least of them, and I hope Your Excellency may be able to represent it in this light to the Persian Government."

381. Dr. Dickson, the British Delegate to the Board of Health at Constantinople, always opposed the proposal of the Turkish Government to locate the quarantine at Fao for these reasons:—

Secret E., October 1893, Nos. 767-779.

- (1) Fao would be ineffectual as a Turkish quarantine station because both banks of the Shat-el-Arab do not belong to Turkey, and it could not therefore control all the vessels that entered that stream.
- (2) The establishment of a Turkish quarantine station at Fao would cause great annoyance and expense to British ships trading with Basrah by compelling them to stop at Fao and undergo quarantine there before proceeding to Basrah or Mohammerah.
- (3) A quarantine station at Fao could not shut cholera out of Mesopotamia any more than to close one window of a house leaving the door and other windows open, would prevent the wind from getting into the house.

382. In place of Fao Dr. Dickson proposed to the Board of Health to select for its quarantine station some place above Hafar, the canal which connects the Karun with the Shat-el-Arab and where both banks of the river belong to Turkey. He was opposed to the compromise suggested by Colonel Talbot, for it would be objectionable as a quarantine measure; would tend to strengthen the pretensions of Turkey to sovereignty over the whole course of the Shat-el-Arab, and would ultimately lead to much greater quarantine vexation than those which existed at the time (letter to Sir F. A. Ford, dated 25th December 1892).

383. Lord Kimberley on being consulted expressed the opinion (letter to the Foreign Office, dated 7th June 1893).

Secret E., October 1893, Nos. 768-779.

"The proposal is one which should be discouraged by Her Majesty's Government for political and commercial reasons, as indicated in Captain Trench's Memorandum of the 11th June 1891. The subjection of the trade of the Persian port of Mohammerah to quarantine regulations, would not be justifiable on principles of international law without the assent and co-operation of the Persian Government and such assent is not likely to be obtained. The political pretensions of the Turkish authorities to the control of the navigation of the Shat-el-Arab and the jealousy of the position of Mohammerah make it especially inexpedient that they should under cover of quarantine regulations be enabled to interfere with the trade of the Persian port."

384. At the same time



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Turkish lazaret in the Shat-el-Arab could not be efficacious unless placed at a spot where both banks of the river belonged to Turkey, and that this spot could only be found somewhere between Hafar and Basrah (Dr. Dickson's letter, dated 2nd February 1894.)

386. Sir A. Nicolson thereupon made representations to the Porte, but the Foreign Minister, Said Pasha, did not seem disposed to receive the representations favourably. There was no doubt in Sir A. Nicolson's opinion that a lazaret at Fao would diminish the risks which were incurred by vessels communicating with the shore during their passage up the river, and thus contaminating the riparian districts (despatch to the Foreign Office, dated 7th February 1894).

387. His Majesty's Government instructed the British representatives at Tehran and Constantinople to continue to discourage these projects.

(viii) Sanitary posts in the Persian Gulf and Turkish Arabia proposed by the Paris Conference of 1894.

388. At an International Sanitary Conference held at Paris in 1894, it was resolved, among other measures, to establish certain sanitary posts in the Persian Gulf, and to give certain powers to the Sanitary Board at Constantinople which the Turks soon utilized to control the traffic on the Shat-el-Arab:—

ANNEXE III—III (ii) OF THE CONVENTION.

Sanitary posts to be established.

1. At Fao, or near this point, a large lazaretto on *terra firma*, with a complete sanitary establishment having under its control the sanitary posts in the Persian Gulf mentioned below.

2. A small lazaretto in one of the two islets, Ottoman Selhiye or Yilaniye, situated near Basrah, to supervise such individuals as may have evaded the visit to Fao.

3. Maintenance of the sanitary post in the Bay of Koweit.

4. Establishment of four sanitary posts in the Bay of Koweit.

5. Sanitary post at Menama, capital of the Bahrein Islands.

6. Sanitary post at Bander Abbas.

7. Sanitary post at Bander Bouchir.

8. Sanitary post at Mohammerah.

9. Sanitary post in the port of Gwador (Baluchistan).

10. Sanitary post in the port of Maskat (on the Oman Coast).

389. There were also made regulations, which would give occasion for vexatious interference with the British Indian commerce. The Foreign Office therefore refused to accept the arrangements proposed for the Persian Gulf.

390. The Government of India, who were asked to state their opinion after consulting the British officers and firms in the Gulf, expressed the following views in their Despatch No. 22 (Secret), dated 3rd January 1895:—

"For some time past a quarantine station has existed at Fao, and, as the information in our possession shows under cover of quarantine and customs regulations, Turkish officials are enabled to board Indian native craft bound to and coming from Mohammerah and to levy blackmail. We do not doubt that, if a lazaret were also established there, the extortions to which native craft are now subjected would be more freely practised, and probably extended to vessels of greater burthen so that the inconvenience and loss inflicted by delay at Fao might involve the loss of one of the fortnightly tides needed by large steamers in crossing the bar, and if in consequence it became necessary to tranship into lighters, the loading and unloading would entail heavy expenditure.

The objections we entertain to the proposals of the Conference are no less serious in view of the political considerations involved. The pretensions of the Porte to sovereignty over Bahrein, its claim to Mohammerah as evidenced by the levy of dues on its imports and exports, and the jealousy evinced by the Turkish Government of the position of Great Britain on the

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Persian Gulf, render it especially inexpedient that Turkish officials should be allowed, under the pretext of enforcing quarantine regulations, to interfere in the affairs of Arab tribes under the influence of Her Majesty's Government. It will be observed moreover from the letter cited in

From Major Hayes Sadler, dated 9th October 1894, in enclosure No. 3. the margin that Highness the Sultan of Maskat would object to sanitary posts at Gwadar and Maskat, and if this portion of the scheme were left unexecuted, the object with which the measures have been proposed would be defeated. Similar considerations apply to Fao. The position of this place at the mouth of the Shat-el-Arab would render these quarantine measures ineffective without the assent and co-operation of Persia. It would be contrary to the provision of the capitulations and of the treaty of Erzeroum for the sanitary establishment at Fao to control the movement of British and Persian ships bound for any place on the Persian side of the stream. Such control would amount to exercise of sovereignty over the entire Shat-el-Arab to the detriment of Persian rights and of our traffic with Basrah. Not improbably, as has been pointed out in the course of the correspondence, the assertion of such a claim is the real object of the Ottoman Government in its desire to establish a lazaret at Fao."

391. In spite of the British protests, a quarantine post was established at Fao by the Turkish Government in 1894.

(ix) (1) Blackmailing of British Indian Native craft by Turkish officers on the Shat el-Arab. (2) Quarantine restrictions. (3) Proposed appointment of a Consul at Fao, 1894-95.

392. When the date season commenced in 1894, we found that the Turkish officials having recourse to illegal detentions of Indian craft at Fao and to vexatious exactions from the month of August. There were four institutions at Fao, which, with or without authority of the Turkish Government, vied with one another in levying extortions from British vessels:—

- (1) The Quarantine.
- (2) The Customs.
- (3) The Tobacco Régie.
- (4) The Gunpowder.

393. The illegal practices of the Turkish officials at Fao are briefly described in Captain Beville's letter dated 12th October 1894:—

"Many vessels which arrive in the river are destined for Mohammerah, but it has always been the custom that on arrival at Fao the vessels are stopped and subjected to the Turkish quarantine regulations. Other officials taking advantage of this board the vessels and the crew have to pay for any tobacco or arms and ammunition that there may be on board for their own use. No receipts are given, and the payments made are simply bribes claimed by the officials under threats of seizure of the articles mentioned. In addition to this, it is also customary for the Customs authorities to detain a portion of the ship's equipments which is returned on the outward voyage, on production of documents relating to the cargo, but not before further bribes are paid.

394. Among others the following cases of illegal extortion were reported between August and October:—

"Nakoda Abdullah of Baghdad Harsingar, 150-C. of Karachi, bound for Mohammerah and arrived at Fao on 31st August 1894, was fined Rs. 7 for having a bottle of snuff on board. The snuff was also seized.

Nakoda Khudadad of *Mooltan-i-Karachi*, 478-C., owner Pitoosurdas of Karachi, bound for Basrah, arrived at Fao on 6th September 1894, was put in quarantine there and made to pay one rupee to Customs official and one to the Régie officer as "dasturi". His sail was also detained at Fao and he had also to pay one rupee "dasturi" at Dowasir.

Nakoda Ismail Ibrahim of *Kullianpussa*, Cutch, 4775-S., owner Junga Jooma Ismail, bound for Mohammerah, arrived at Fao on 9th September 1894, where he was put in 24 hours' quarantine and made to pay Rs. 7 as "dasturi" to Customs Régie and Gunpowder officials. His sail was also detained at Fao.

Nakoda Amco of the *Sollain* of Okhamandul, 1894-C., bound for Mohammerah in ballast but had 60 tins of fish oil belonging to owner for sail at Mohammerah, arrived at Fao on 12th October 1894, when he was put in quarantine for one day, and the Customs charged him duty of Rs. 40 on the fish oil.

Nakoda Haji Esa of Dinghy *Fathul Karim* of Karachi (certificate No. 8 of 1890), bound for Basrah, was on arrival at Fao put in quarantine, asked to pay "dasturi" Rs. 2 to Customs official which he did, was asked by Dowasir Customs official to give a package of charcoal, and he did as Nakoda Shadad did.



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Nakoda Allaraka of *Futley Salamat* of Cutch, 162-C., bound for Mohammerah with cargo, paid Rs. 17 quarantine fee at Fao, and was charged Rs. 4 at Fao and Rs. 2 at Dowasir by Customs official who gave no receipts.

Nakoda Yusuf of *Boodhi* of Cutch, 4700-S., bound for Mohammerah, paid Rs. 10 quarantine fee at Fao, and was charged Rs. 3 and Re. 1 at Fao and Dowasir by Customs officials, for which they gave no receipts.

395. It was reported that several vessels, which did not stop at Fao, were on their way boarded by the quarantine officers, subjected to vexatious detention and exaction. The Resident enquired of Dr. Lubiez, Sanitary Inspector of Baghdad; and was told there that in consequence of the representations of the British Embassy orders had been issued to the Quarantine officials at Fao not to interfere with vessels bound for Mohammerah.

396. Commenting on these facts Colonel Mockler in his letter No. 704, dated 6th December 1894, made the following remarks and suggestions:—

"If it be necessary from a Turkish point of view, in view of the possibility notwithstanding all the Turkish river police at present available of native craft after having loaded at one or other of the numerous date gardens on the Turkish side of the Shat-el-Arab, hoisting sail and leaving the Shat-el-Arab without paying any export duty whatever, it appears to me that it is at the place of loading that security should be taken not on entering the river which belongs equally to Persia as to Turkey and up to Basrah is open to all nations as the sea is; and I would very respectfully suggest, for Your Excellency's consideration, that an officer of the British Telegraph station at Fao might, perhaps, be usefully appointed Consular Agent there during the months of September, October and November (date season) to give Nakodas of British craft passing Fao general advice and assistance and to report at once any attempt to improperly control their movements or 'blackmail' them on any account whatever.

"Pay of such officer (which for three months named might I think be £5=about Rs. 90 per mensem) (in addition of course to his departmental salary) and two kavasses whose services would be, I think, necessary to him (at an aggregate sum of say £1½=about Rs. 27, viz., one at Rs. 15 and another Rs. 12 per mensem) might, perhaps, be allowed to be debited against the fees paid on deposit of ship's papers into the Consulate at Basrah by craft visiting the Shat-el-Arab. If Your Excellency approves of this idea, I will communicate on the subject with the Director of Persian Gulf Telegraphs, under whose jurisdiction the telegraph station at Fao is."

397. The Government of India approved of the proposed appointment of a British Consular Agent at Fao during the months of September, October and November in each year, for the purpose of protecting Indian subjects on the Shat-el-Arab from the illegal exactions levied on native craft by the local Turkish officials.

398. They were of opinion that this appointment was worth trying as a means of preventing the irregularities referred to, and they recommended for the favourable consideration of Her Majesty's Government the proposals made by the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia.

399. All the expenditure incurred in connection with the appointment was to be recouped, as suggested by Colonel Mockler, from the fees paid on deposit of ship's papers into the Consulate at Basrah by craft visiting the Shat-el-Arab and no charge would fall upon Indian revenues.

400. The Director-in-Chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department had no objection to an officer of the British Telegraph Station at Fao being appointed for this purpose. Her Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad was accordingly authorised to communicate with the Director-in-Chief with a view to his nominating an officer for the post from the British Telegraph Station at Fao.

401. In October 1894 guns which had been brought for protection on Shat-el-Arab were seized on British Indian vessels by the Turkish Police authorities at Fao and Basrah. It was alleged that the Police were not aware of the nationality of the vessels. In any case the arms were seized on suspicion, and the Police ought to have referred the matter to the Consulate where the documents to prove their nationality provided by the Indian Government are deposited.



402. As a precautionary measure against the Indian vessels giving any occasion to the Turkish officials to abuse their powers, the Consul at Basrah published the following notification in June 1895 :—

"British Indian sailing vessels visiting the Shat-el-Arab (Basrah river) should observe the following procedure :—

I.—They should fly their flag night and day from the time of entering the river till they have left it.

II.—They should provide themselves with bills-of-health granted by the competent authorities of the port whence they come indicating the vessel's destination.

III.—Vessels bound for Mohammerah are not subject to Ottoman sanitary service and customs regulations, and therefore they need not stop at Fao.

IV.—The quarantine officer at Fao when recovering quarantine tax from vessels bound for Basrah will accept one rupee for six piastres (kurush).

V.—Nakodas have not to pay any money to Turkish officials for which they do not get receipts, and they should at once report to the British Consul at Mohammerah or Basrah any irregularity or ill-treatment they may have experienced at the hands of Turkish officials.

VI.—Vessels bound for Basrah or other Turkish ports on the river will stop at Fao, and do quarantine is required before proceeding onward."

403. One important question raised in the correspondence noted above was as to the necessity for Indian vessels to take bills-of-health. From Captain Beville's reports, dated 12th October 1894, it appears that it was not customary for Indian sailing vessels to take out bills-of-health, and that the only document usually carried by them was a certificate of registry.

404. On this point Dr. Dickson pointed out that a standing order of the Ottoman Sanitary Service requires that vessels arriving at a Turkish port should be provided with a bill-of-health delivered by the territorial authorities of the port of departure and indicating the vessel's destination (Dr. Dickson's letter, dated 17th November 1894, to the Embassy).

405. Colonel Wilson, who was consulted by the Government of India, was of opinion that Dr. Dickson had "missed the point of the question at issue," such as being, "that vessels having no concern with any Turkish port have been subjected under cover of quarantine visitation to detention (in itself apparently *ultra vires* in regard to international right unless the sovereignty of the whole waterway of the Shat-el-Arab be conceded to the Porte) and to gross black-mailing in open defiance of all national rights."

406. Colonel Mockler thought that it would be distinctly advisable for vessels bound for a Persian port to provide themselves with the requisite bill-of-health, if they intended to touch at Fao and even if they possibly did not intend to do so, but he proposed that such vessels should not touch at Fao at all (letter to the Embassy, No. 328, dated 11th June 1895).

407. Dr. Dickson pointed out that he did not see how he missed the point at issue. Since Captain Beville had spoken in a general way as to Turkish quarantine extortions, without stating whether the vessels had touched at Fao or not. He observed :—

"Mr. Beville had complained in general terms of the vexatious conduct of the Turkish officials at Fao towards Indian sailing vessels that entered the *Shat-el-Arab* unprovided with bills-of-health. Had Mr. Beville brought a specific complaint, giving the name of the vessel, the precise nature and amount of the vexation inflicted on it, and the time when it occurred, I believe, redress might have been obtained. But these vessels, according to Mr. Beville's own statement, were not provided with any bills-of-health, and according to the Turkish officials they were considered on a par with piratical ships.

The next point for consideration is the sovereignty over the *Shat-el-Arab*. I have always opposed the pretensions of the Turkish Government to its exclusive sovereignty over the entire water-course of the Shat-el-Arab under a plea of establishing at Fao a lazaret similar to the one at Camaran in the Red Sea, and which it imagines will arrest the introduction of



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cholera from India into Mesopotamia and its propagation from the Turkish Asiatic provinces to Europe. In order, therefore, to prevent ships bound to Basrah from communicating with the shores of the Shat-el-Arab before undergoing their interrogatory at Basrah, the Constantinople Board of Health ordered that these vessels should take health guards at Fao, to watch that this rule was carried out. No objection was raised by Her Majesty's Government to the rule and it has been in force for many years.

Since efforts, however, are now being made to open a direct traffic between Mohammerah (a Persian ports on the Karun river, which empties itself to a large extent into the Shat-el-Arab) and British ports, the question arises whether the practice of shipping health guards at Fao ought to be maintained or discontinued. The late Sanitary Conference of Paris, instead of settling the question has perhaps increased its difficulties, and I know not when and how it will be arranged.

With regard to the notice issued by Her Majesty's Consul at Basrah and enclosed in Colonel Mockler's despatch of the 11th June 1895, I take the liberty of reminding Your Excellency that the bill-of-health required and accepted by the Ottoman Sanitary officers in the bill-of-health granted by the territorial Government of the port of departure of the ship and that the sanitary fees established by the International Commission to be levied throughout the Ottoman Empire are fixed in *Turkish piastres and paras*. The official tariff takes no cognisance whatever of *foreign coins*. It would therefore be an act of international discourtesy to order British subjects to pay them in any other coin than that established by mutual agreement."

(x)—Boarding of British Indian Vessels in search of arms, 1895-96.

408. On 3rd October 1895, the Consul at Basrah telegraphed to the Embassy:—
Secret E, May 1896, Nos. 316-338.

"British Indian Baghlas are invaded by Turkish soldiers under pretext of searching boat for arms. These are urgently required for self-defence. Wali has directed Commandant to inform me when he wishes to make such a search, but this has had no proper effect.

Ibid (No. 327).

On 9th January 1906, the Consul wired to the Embassy:—

"Master of British Indian vessel Fateh Salamat reports that Turkish soldiers boarded ship at Fao in search of arms, but induced leave arms by payment two rupees. Have protested Wali, who declines, in absence of special instructions from Constantinople to direct officials at Fao not to board and search British vessels, without previous intimation to Basrah Consulate."

409. Sir P. Currie made representations to the Porte in the matter, but without success.

410. In reporting these facts Sir P. Currie to the Foreign Office remarks (despatch No. 97, dated 2nd February 1896).
Ibid (No. 335).

"The grievance complained of in my notes appear to me to be well founded. The Porte do not deny that the Shat-el-Arab is infested by pirates and merely maintain that they are Persians. Vessels require arms to defend themselves against these marauders, and it would seem that the weapons confiscated by the Turkish authorities are in nearly all cases intended for this purpose and not for clandestine introduction into the Ottoman dominions; that the proceedings of the authorities are arbitrary and vexatious seems also proved by the fact that in some cases the officials of the Regie have illegally confiscated tobacco carried for the personal use of the ship's crew.

There can be no doubt that the Foreign Mission, Constantinople, have hitherto maintained, and the Turks have accepted the principle that foreign merchant ships the Ottoman waters are assimilated to foreign domiciles in Ottoman territory and cannot be boarded without the consent of their Consular Representatives. Details on this point will be found in Mr. Eliot's memorandum enclosed in Sir Arthur Nicolson's No. 52 to Lord Rosebery of January the 25th, 1894. I believe, however, that in a controversy which arose at Zanzibar as to our right of searching French dhows, Her Majesty's Government maintained that the term "domicile" cannot be laid to apply to vessels. It may therefore be inexpedient to insist on the contrary interpretation at Constantinople, and I have the honour to request Your Lordship's instructions as to the attitude I should adopt in replying to the Porte's note."

411. Referring then to the proposed appointment of a British Vice-Consul at Fao, he observed:—

"When this appointment is made it appears to me that I might properly inform the Porte, in view of the ill-treatment to which British India vessels are exposed when searched
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by the local authorities without the presence of a Consular Officer, *Her Majesty's Government* feel bound to require that the search should be made either at Fao or at Basrah where such officers are stationed."

412. In October 1895 Nakoda Elias of the *Sagalpasa*, No. 4901-S. of Mandvie, from Karachi, consigned to Haji Taber of Mohammerah, with a cargo of kerosine and charcoal, complain that he was compelled by the authorities at Fao to stop there. He told them he was bound for Mehammerah, but they compelled him to do quarantine charging him Rs. 15; the customs official detained two sails and one anchor which they would return on his bringing a certificate from Sheikh Mizal, that the cargo was landed at Mohammerah. The Customs official also made him pay Rs. 2. At Dovasir he was again ordered to stop and had to pay another Rs. 2 there. He had no bill-of-health from Karachi, and stated that he did not know that it was required.

413. The Consul at Basrah brought this case to the notice of the Vali and informed him that Turkish officials were not entitled to interfere with any foreign vessel proceeding up the Shat-el-Arab until she placed herself within exclusively Turkish jurisdiction either by touching at or communicating with the Turkish bank of the river or by passing the Khayan creek about three miles above Mohammerah on the Persian bank, where he understood the Persian territory ends. This proposition referred to vessels bound for Basrah as well as Mohammerah (Mr. Whyte's letter to the Vali, No. 942, dated 12th December 1895).

414. In forwarding copy of this letter to the Resident, Consul Whyte expressed as his opinion that "a Persian vessel proceeding to Mohammerah by the Shat-el-Arab, which does not touch at any point on the Turkish bank of the river and which does not on her voyage approach so close to that bank, as to give just cause for objection, is as much outside Turkish jurisdiction as she would be on the Persian Gulf." The same principle would apply to a British vessel. Colonel Mockler approved of Consul Whyte's communication to the Vali of his views "such as they are."

415. But suppose that the *only navigable channel in the Shat-el-Arab runs close to the Turkish bank*, does Turkish jurisdiction fall in? This is a point on which Colonel Mockler put the Consul at Basrah on his guard against committing himself to.

416. Then, as to vessels bound for Basrah, suppose Turkish officials insisted after their arrival at Basrah on their returning to Fao to undergo quarantine or observation?

417. The Consul at Basrah was asked for a report by Colonel Mockler on these points, but what the reply was does not appear from the records.

418. Sir P. Currie concurring with Consul Whyte, considered it quite inadmissible that British ships bound for a Persian port should be forced to pay dues to any Turkish administration on the Shat-el Arab.

419. The India Office expressed the opinion that "*until a British ship passes upstream beyond the Khayan creek, or until it touches any point on the right or western bank of the stream within Turkish territory, it cannot be properly subjected to interference whether on sanitary or any other grounds by Turkish officials.*"

420. And that as regards the Turkish claim to search vessels for arms, a search should be allowed only at Basrah or at Fao in the presence of a British Consular Officer" (India Office letter to the Foreign Office, dated 17th April 1896).

421. Under instructions of the Foreign Office a communication was then made to the Porte in this sense in May 1896 by the British Embassy (see Mr. Herbert's letter dated 27th May 1896, to the Foreign Office.



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422. Meanwhile the Porte had instructed Hamdi Pasha (Vali of Basrah) to disregard all British remonstrances and to direct his subordinates at the mouth of the Shat-el-Arab to continue to stop and inspect all vessels entering that river, whatever be their nationality and destination and although they might at no time come within Turkish jurisdiction (Captain Whyte's letter to the Resident at Baghdad, No. 320, dated 16th May 1896).

(xi) (1) Appointment of Consul at Fao; (2) despatch of man-of-war Fao; (3) their withdrawal, 1896-97.

423. As regards the proposed appointment of Consul at Fao, the Foreign Office found objections to the proposed method of remunerating him from Consular fees received on deposit of Shah's papers, from craft visiting the Shat-el-Arab. Her Majesty's Government decided therefore to assign an allowance of £30 a year to the post (Colonel Mockler's letter No. 68, dated 5th February 1896, with enclosures).

424. Mr. Mungavin was appointed Consular Agent at Fao by a "letter of authority" issued by the Political Resident (No. 413, dated 20th August 1896). But the Porte objected to the creation of a Consular appointment at the place, where only one English and one Turkish Telegraphic clerk reside.

425. As regards this objection Mr. Herbert suggested to Lord Salisbury (letter dated 11th September 1896) :—

"I venture to submit to Your Lordship that the only reply likely to produce any practical effects would be to state that Her Majesty's Government consider the presence of a Consular Officer at Fao desirable on account of the large number of craft under the British flag which require protection there or in the neighbourhood. If the Sublime Porte will not assent to this reasonable and conciliatory request, Her Majesty's Government will have to devise other means for affording the protection required, and will send a man-of-war to visit Fao and the Shat-el-Arab for this purpose."

426. With reference to this despatch Lord Salisbury telegraphed to Sir F. Currie on 11th September 1896 :—

"In the event of the Turkish Government refusing to recognize the appointment, I authorize Your Excellency to make the communication proposed by Mr. Herbert."

427. On 7th October Sir P. Currie received the following telegram from the Consul at Basrah :—

Consul-General, Baghdad, directs me to inform Your Excellency that British Vice-Consul at Mohammerah reports that Na Khoudas of British Indian sailing vessels bound for that place formerly complained on arrival that they had been intimidated and forced by Turkish authorities to put in at Fao, and that although they were not bound for Turkish Port, quarantine dues were exacted from them. I represented matter to Vali, who replied that he was directed by Porte to cause all sailing vessels without exception, entering river, to be stopped and examined, and that if Mudir of Fao had stopped British Indian vessels bound for Mohammerah, he had only obeyed his orders. In view of this reply, the delay of Porte in recognising Consular Agent at Fao and approval of my contention on question of Turkish jurisdiction in Shat-el-Arab, conveyed in Your Excellency's despatch to Consulate-General, Baghdad, dated 2nd March 1896, I have proceeded to Fao, where I await Your Excellency's instructions."

428. This telegram was repeated to the Foreign Office on 7th October 1896, and on the same day Sir P. Currie wired to the Foreign Office :—

"The moment seems to have come for despatching a ship to Fao. Acting on the authority conveyed in Your Lordship's telegram No. 191-I, addressed a note to the Porte on September 22nd saying that a man-of-war would be sent to Fao if Consular Agent was not recognized, but no reply has been received. If Your Lordship would authorize me to inform Porte that ship has been ordered to Fao, I might probably be able to settle the matter at once."

429. The *Lapwing* was accordingly ordered to Fao and this intelligence was communicated to Sir P. Currie. This ship arrived at Fao on the 23rd October 1896.



430. The Diary of the Resident in Persian Gulf ending with 21st November 1896 contained the following entry :

" November 8th.—The presence of Her Majesty's ship "Lapwing" at Fao is producing a most salutary influence in connection with Turkish interference with British Indian baghlahs, and the latter are for the first time aware that Turkish exactions at Fao are not recognized or permitted by the British Government."

431. Her Majesty's Government then decided to instruct Sir P. Currie to address a note to the Porte to the effect:—
Foreign Office letter to the India Office and reply dated 4th and 9th December 1894, respectively.

"That Her Majesty's Government will withdraw their demand for a Consular Agent at Fao on condition that the Porte state in writing that ships will be allowed to proceed direct to Mohammerah and Basrah without being stopped at Shat-el-Arab."
External A., May 1897, Nos. 32-42.

432. The following notes were then exchanged between the Porte and our Embassy:—

Note Verbale No. 106, Sublime Porte, le 20 Décembre 1896.

En réponse aux Notes Verbales que l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté Britannique a voulu lui adresser le 1 Juin dernier No. 52 le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères a l'honneur de l'informer sur une communication de Son Altesse le Grand Vézir que les Autorités Impériales du Vilayet de Bassorah ont reçu l'ordre d'effectuer désormais à Bassorah même les perquisitions qu'elles se trouvent dans le cas de faire à bord des navires anglais naviguant sur le Chatt-ul Arab.

Note verbale No. 148, dated the 2nd December 1896.

To the Sublime Porte.

Her Majesty's Embassy have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the Sublime Porte's *Note Verbale* No. 104 of 20th December, stating that the authorities of the Vilayet of Basrah have received directions that any search which it may be necessary to make on board British vessels navigating the Shat-el-Arab should take place at Basrah.

Her Majesty's Embassy take note of this communication, but it is well understood that British ships enjoy perfect liberty to proceed direct to Mohammerah (or any other port on Persian territory) and cannot be compelled under any pretext to stop at Fao on their way thither or to Basrah, unless they themselves desire it.

433. Sir P. Currie forwarded to the Foreign Office the following memorandum written by Captain Whyte at Constantinople when on his way to England:—
External A., June 1897, Nos. 23-30.

"In November 1896 I was informed in a despatch from the Consul-General, Baghdad, that the Sublime Porte while objecting to recognise the British Consular Agency at Fao had intimated to Her Majesty's Embassy that they had directed the Vali of Basrah to instruct the authorities at Fao to remain in future from stopping or otherwise interfering with British sailing vessels entering the Shat-el-Arab, and that such vessels were, when necessary, to be boarded and examined at Basrah only. The Sublime Porte had, I understood, urged that the demand of Her Majesty's Government for the recognition of a Consular Agent at Fao should in view of these orders, be withdrawn, and my opinion was called for by the Consul-General as to whether this request might be safely complied with. I replied in my despatch to the address of the Consul-General (marginally noted) (*sic*) that if the orders of the Porte were properly enforced, the presence of a British Consular Agent at Fao might, in my opinion, be dispensed with. I considered, however, that it should be made clear to the Porte that the unsatisfactory execution of their orders would lead to the renewal of the demand for the recognition of a Consular Agent and that they should be further invited to remove the Turkish Stationnaire (a wooden sailing vessel) armed with three cannon which is anchored at Dowasir about 14 miles below Mohammerah, and the object of whose presence can only be to menace and intimidate sailing craft to waters which are exclusively Turkish.

During my interview with His Excellency the Ambassador yesterday, I understood His Excellency to be of opinion that the Porte, if addressed in this sense, would decline to remove their vessel from Dowasir on the ground probably that her presence was necessary both for the prevention of piracy and of smuggling, and that a long and fruitless correspondence might ensue. His Excellency made the alternative proposal that my successor at Basrah should at the commencement of the date season (the season during which the Shat-el-Arab is visited by British sailing vessels) invite the Vali of Basrah to issue orders to the Commander of the Stationnaire to the effect that he was clearly to understand that the presence of the vessel at



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Dowasir was not intended to be a menace to sailing craft navigating the river and that he was to abstain from all interference with them. Should Major Fagan have to report that the Vali's assurances on the point were not satisfactory, the necessary steps for the protection of British sailing vessels would be taken by the Embassy.

434. Sir P. Currie thought that as the point raised by Captain Whyte was not mentioned on the first instance we could hardly insist on the removal of the

Stationnaire in question as a condition for the withdrawal of the British man-of-war from Fao, but he proposed that representations should be made to the Porte as described in the last paragraph of Captain Whyte's memorandum. Sir Philip saw therefore no necessity to defer the departure of the *Lapwing* from Fao (Despatch No. 181, dated 18th March 1897, to the Foreign Office).

435. Her Majesty's Government approved of the course suggested by Sir P. Currie (India Office letter to the Foreign Office, dated 7th April 1897).

435-A. Mr. Cumming was replaced by Mr. Mungavin, as Superintendent of the British Telegraph Station at Fao; but in view of the satisfactory assurances given by the Porte respecting the navigation of the Shat-el-Arab, it was decided not to appoint the latter as Consular Agent at Fao.

(xii). Plague in India and Quarantine arrangements in Turkish Arabia, 1897-98.

436. Plague having broken out at Bombay towards the close of the year 1896, we were informed by the Political Resident on 9th October by telegram that 21 days quarantine was imposed of Basrah against arrivals from Bombay.

Ibid (No. 97.)

The Secretary of State telegraphed on 10th January 1897 to us:—
Constantinople Board has recommended quarantine stations at Fao, and repulse from Basrah of all Indian vessels with plague cases on board until Fao lazaretto is ready. If you regard this measure as injurious, can you make an alternative proposal safeguarding Turkey from entrance of plague by Basrah route?

437. The views of Colonel Mockler were asked. In reply (telegram dated 25th January 1897) he referred to the previous correspondence on the subject of the quarantine at Fao, and added:—

"I regard present proposal as fresh attempt to establish a quarantine station at Fao which would be detrimental to British trade at Basrah and practically give Turkey command of the river.

A Turkish lazaretto at Fao would be futile, since a plague-infected vessel bound for Mohammerah is not obliged to stop at Fao, and one arriving at Basrah with plague on board if repulsed cannot be made to leave unless it be forcibly towed down the river, and must, if there be no lazaretto at Basrah, throw its dead into the river.

A lazaretto for safeguarding entry of plague into Turkish Arabia *via* Basrah can only effectively be established above Mohammerah where both banks belong (to) Turkey. Such might be placed on either bank or on islands in river, and Turkish authorities must with their river police prevent landing (of) passengers (on) Turkish banks between Fao and such lazaretto."

439. The Government of India wired the purport of this opinion to the Secretary of State and added:—

Ibid (No. 100.)

"Please see Secret Despatch 22-External, dated 30th January 1895. Lazaretto might be established above Mohammerah on either bank or on islands. We would strongly object to one at Fao."

440. On 21st January 1897, Sir P. Currie reported that the Board of Health at Constantinople at the suggestion of the British Delegate had made among others a proposal that all ships coming from India would be examined before entering the Persian Gulf, at a sanitary station to be chosen, commanding the entrance to the Gulf.

441. As to this proposal the India Office was of opinion that the temporary quarantine should be enforced at the mouth of the Gulf against plague infected parts only.

Ibid (No. 292.)

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442. It was also pointed out that if a quarantine station was established at Fao, another at the mouth of the Gulf would not be needed and would be a source of great annoyance to trade (India Office letter dated 25th January to the Foreign Office.)

Ibid (No. 234.)

"Venice proposals give free pratique at Basrah provided sanitary grounds received at Ormuz and no case plague for 10 days. Guards will prevent communication with shore during ten days. This would obviate detention Fao. Cleghorn recommends, what are your views? Please telegraph reply as quickly as possible."

Ibid (No. 235.)

443. On 25th February 1897 the Secretary of State telegraphed to the Viceroy:—

444. The reply of the Viceroy (telegram dated 27th February 1897) was:—

"I think proposals may be accepted, but Cleghorn must press that ten days be allowed to count from part of departure if medical officer on board and clean bill-of-health throughout."

445. For a history of the quarantine arrangements in Turkish Arabia, we might read with profit the report of Captain Forbes, Assistant Political Agent, Basrah (No. 1 (Confidential), dated 10th January 1898) and Colonel Lochs' remarks upon it (No. 42, dated 26th January 1898).

Secret E, May 1898, Nos. 10-16.

No. 42, dated British Residency, Baghdad, the 26th January 1899.

From—The Political Resident in Turkish Arabia,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Calcutta.

I have the honour very respectfully to submit, for the consideration of His Excellency the Governor-General in Council, a copy of a confidential letter No. 1, dated 10th instant, from Captain L. A. Forbes, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul and Assistant Political Agent at Basrah on the subject of quarantine at that port, and as the time is drawing near (March of the current year) when the signatories of the Venice Convention of 1897 must either ratify, annul or modify, the said Convention, I venture to supplement Captain Forbes' letter by the following remarks.

2. I have read Captain Forbes' letter with great interest, and I am of opinion that it fairly sets forth the history of the quarantine at Basrah since its establishment in October 1896. I have also frequently discussed the quarantine arrangements with the sanitary officials both at Basrah and Baghdad and the conclusions I have arrived at are:—

(a) That the quarantine regulations at Basrah on its present lines have from a sanitary point of view utterly failed, first on account of the impracticability of establishing a complete quarantine when there are such facilities for its evasion; secondly, owing to the corruption of the minor Turkish officials; thirdly, from the fact that it was never intended that it should succeed.

Money in the shape of Quarantine fees has been extorted from passengers and vessels but none has been applied to establishing a lazaret to accommodate persons, Europeans and native, undergoing quarantine. It is true that orders have issued for the construction of a proper lazaret but the funds are not forthcoming. Europeans who are least likely to convey infection and whose movements can be closely watched have been made to undergo rigorously the full term of quarantine whilst native passengers have been allowed to come and go without let or hindrance on payment of a small "douceur" to the Turkish soldiers who guard the frontier. While I write an order has been received from the International Board to the effect that arrivals by land from Mohammarah are to be repelled which only means more bribery.

(b) That great exertions are to be made by the Turkish authorities for the establishment of a quarantine station at Fao, not as a sanitary, but as a political, move.

At the Venice Conference the objections to making Fao a Quarantine Station were detailed at length and it is unnecessary for me to allude to them further except to add that with the corrupt Turkish Staff, Quarantine would be as easily evaded there as at Basrah. As regards the political questions, I need only refer to confidential correspondence forwarded under cover of your Endorsement No. 1207-E.A., dated 28th July 1897, which shows clearly how ready the Turks are to seize on any pretext to get a firmer grip on Fao and the supreme control of the mouth of the Shat-el-Arab. Quarantine, I am convinced, will be an admirable plea to further this end and once established there they will never relinquish their hold.

(c) That for the purposes of *bona fide* Quarantine no suggestion could be better than that put forward by the Venice Conference Delegates, namely, that it should be established at the island of Ormuz. There no evasion could take place and it would reduce the inconveniences of quarantine to trade and passengers to a minimum.



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3. In conclusion I would say that so persistent are the rumours that Quarantine has all along, and will be in future, used as a weapon by the Turks to strengthen their hold on Fao and by other nations to hamper the trade of the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia which is altogether British that I have felt it my duty to bring the matter to His Excellency's notice.

No. 1 (Confidential), dated 10th January 1898.

From—CAPTAIN L. A. FORBES, Assistant Political Agent, Basrah,
To—The Political Resident in Turkish Arabia.

I have the honour to make a brief confidential report on the subject of Quarantine, and the manner in which it has generally been carried out in the port of Basrah since its first imposition on the 9th October 1896, for the information of yourself and that of His Excellency the Ambassador if you should deem its contents of sufficient importance.

From the date above mentioned up to the present time many orders, sometimes with brief intervals between them, have been issued. At first 10 days' quarantine was imposed on all arrivals from India and the Persian ports of the Persian Gulf, while all passengers and merchandise arriving from Muhammarah were to be repelled. The latter part of his order was modified on the 8th January 1897 to 10 days' quarantine.

On the 14th January 1897 a Notification was received directing that ships arriving with suspicious cases of plague would be repelled pending the establishment of a lazarette at Fao. It was also notified that arrivals from Maskat and Bahrein would be subjected to 10 days' quarantine. The entry of Shiah pilgrims and corpses arriving from India was prohibited by a Notification received on 29th January 1897. This prohibition was extended to Persia on the 11th February 1897, while the period of time to be spent in quarantine at Basrah was increased to 15 days on arrivals from India.

In the beginning of July 1897 the period of quarantine was reduced to 5 days on arrivals from all Persian Gulf ports and Muhammarah and the prohibition against entering Basrah by land from Persia was removed. At the end of July a Notification was received directing the removal of quarantine against these ports and granting permission to the entry of pilgrims and corpses from Persia. But 15 days' quarantine was still maintained against India. However on the 5th August this period was reduced to 10 days which has been maintained up to the present time.

These constant and rapid changes are naturally very objectionable: they almost appear in some cases to be the result of caprice rather than of any consideration of circumstances or requirements to ensure the safety from plague of the Turkish Dominions, and in other cases it is difficult to refrain from drawing the inference that they have been prompted by reasons of a political or financial nature.

I may be permitted to cite an instance, among others, of an order in which the last mentioned reasons might, on the face of it, be regarded as mainly having aided in its publication.

When quarantine was wholly removed on arrivals from Muhammarah which is only 20 miles from Basrah the 15 days' quarantine against India was still maintained, no consideration apparently being given to the duration of the voyage from India to Basrah which is generally performed in 10 or 12 days by the mail steamers. Consequently all passengers for Basrah disembark now at Muhammarah and proceed up the river by boat or by land.

In the same connection I would here remark that although there is no quarantine against Muhammarah a fee of 10 piastres is still collected from every passenger on board the river steamer *Malamir* which plies between Ahwaz and Basrah and which obtains pratique immediately on arrival.

I refer to these instances only with the view of exhibiting how far quarantine in Basrah is employed for the sanitary purpose for which it is ostensibly employed, and how far in addition for other purposes.

Basrah is considered, and perhaps rightly, one of the most important ports as regards the prevention of the spread of infection into the Ottoman Dominions, and it is presumably for this reason that the measures for the prevention of plague adopted by the Venice Sanitary Conference of 1897 have not been deemed adequate for the purpose, and a long period of detention in quarantine is therefore ordered as a measure of special precaution.

But, it may be asked, of what use (except to collect fees and harass trade) is this precaution of ten or fifteen days' quarantine in Basrah, when any ship from an infected port, which has been ten days on the voyage and on which no case of plague has occurred, can land passengers at Muhammarah, only 20 miles distant, whence they are free to enter Basrah by land or by river.

Again, the inutilty of imposing so many days' quarantine at Basrah as a preventative of the importation of plague is manifest, if native sailing craft, which are far more likely to introduce plague than steamers, owing to the facility with which they can elude inspection



at ports of departure and in many other ways, enter the Shattul Arab and moor here, there and everywhere, waiting for a favourable breeze to carry them up to Muhammarah of Basrah.

The strongest reasons exist against the establishment of a quarantine station at Fao, at the mouth of the Shattul Arab, and the British Delegates at the Venice Sanitary Conference 1897 pointed out in detail the grave objections to such an arrangement. A reference to page 6 of their report to Lord Salisbury is invited.

During the date season of 1897 Indian sailing vessels were bailed at Fao by the Commander of the Turkish Guard-ship which was stationed there and the quarantine official at that port was pleased to give each vessel which was detained (some escaped detention by entering the river at night) a small yellow flag with directions to proceed up to Basrah. This course was strongly objected to and was eventually abandoned through representations made to Constantinople. The small yellow flag, so far as I have had opportunity to ascertain was thrown aside, and the vessels went to Muhammarah or wherever they wished. The pretext of bestowing a quarantine flag was apparently employed by the Turkish authorities to establish a right to hail and detain all vessels entering the Shattul Arab.

I would also desire to make a few remarks on the manner in which quarantine has been and is being carried out in Basrah. You are already aware from my predecessor's letter No. 455, dated the 7th June 1897 of the unsuitability and serious defects of the site, accommodation and sanitary arrangements of the lazaret in which persons undergoing quarantine are required to remain. Since the date of that letter nothing I may say has been done to improve the lazaret in any of these respects. I am given to understand that apparatus and appliances for disinfecting are primitive and unfit to cope with any emergency.

It would appear that segregation and hospital accommodation also are matters to which the officials of the Sanitary Board pay no attention and attach no importance, for the former is not attempted and the latter does exist. Instances might be given of fatal results ensuing in cases of persons undergoing quarantine while in a state of ill-health owing to defective and irrational arrangements and orders.

The trade up the Persian Gulf and up the Tigris is practically engrossed by England and India, a very small portion only being under any other flag, and it is the general opinion of the merchants that jealousy of this trade, both on the part of Turkey and perhaps one or two other nations, is at the bottom of the infliction of troublesome and unnecessary quarantine rules and fees, by means of their larger or more influential representation on the Sanitary Council.

There can be no doubt that the fees collected on ships according to tonnage or cargo and on passengers, produce a considerable income. In addition to these fees each ship has two sanitary guardians on board, and each cargo-boat stationed at each side and at each hold of a vessel which is loading or discharging cargo has one sanitary guardian. All these guardians have to be paid for separately.

The local expenditure to be met from this considerable revenue seems to be confined to the maintenance of a small Sanitary establishment. No expenses are incurred in providing proper accommodation for Europeans, Asiatics and others, for proper modern apparatus for disinfection and for proper hospital and medical arrangements. It would appear moreover that the Sanitary Board is a rich body.

The establishment of a sanitary station at Ormuz on the lines suggested by the Venice Sanitary Conference, 1897, would unquestionably be a great boon to British shipping and trade, which has suffered enormously from the present quarantine system with its needlessly long detention and excessive fees, besides insuring much more effectively against the spread of infection into Asiatic Turkey and thence into Europe.

I would request that this report may be treated as confidential to obviate any risk of still further difficulties being made to British shipping and the withdrawal of such a small facilities as exist at present and as can be afforded by the local quarantine officials without infringing the rules.

446. The Government of India in forwarding the above correspondence to the Secretary of State observed:—

"These papers indicate that the quarantine arrangements at Basrah have been worked not so much with a view to protection against plague as for political and financial purposes. The Assistant Political Agent states that the Turkish authorities are very desirous, for political reasons, to establish a quarantine station at Fao instead of following the arrangements prescribed by the Venice Convention, which contemplated at first quarantine station in or near the Straits of Ormuz and subsidiary stations up the Persian Gulf. As far as we are aware the Venice Convention has not been ratified by Turkey."

447. The Turkish Quarantine Officers at Fao proceeded to revive their former proceedings of detaining Indian vessels at Fao and subjecting them to quarantine exactly. Captain Forbes Consul at Basrah, addressed several strongly worded remonstrance to the Vali, but without effect.

External A., July 1898, Nos. 8-23.



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448. Under instructions then of Her Majesty's Government the following note was addressed by Sir P. Currie to the Porte, dated 9th March 1898 :--

Ibid (No. 20).

"Her Majesty's Embassy have received with regret a report from the British Consul-General at Baghdad, stating that the local Turkish authorities continue to illegally stop and detain British Indian vessels at or near Fao.

Her Majesty's Embassy have the honour to remind the Sublime Porte of the arrangements contained in the S. P. N. V. No. 104 of 30th December 1896, and the Embassy's reply No. 148 of 22nd December of the same year, in virtue of which British ships passing Fao and bound for Turkey can be searched at Basrah only and are in no case to be stopped at Fao or elsewhere on the Shat-el-Arab, while those bound for Persian territory have a right to proceed directly to their destination without being stopped anywhere by the Ottoman authorities.

It was on these conditions that Her Majesty's Embassy consented to waive their demand for the recognition of a British Consul at Fao, and if these conditions are not observed, it will be necessary to insist on the appointment of this Consular Officer and to order Her Majesty's Ships to take effective measures for the protection of British shipping.

Her Majesty's Embassy trust therefore that the Sublime Porte will send instructions to the Vali of Basrah to observe the arrangement of 1896, and thus prevent the recurrence of difficulties in the district placed under his charge."

449. The Resident at Baghdad was then instructed by the Embassy to report any fresh cases of illegal detention, or exactions at Fao. The native shipping season commenced shortly afterwards; but no cases of detention or extortion have been reported since then.

Secret E., September 1898, Nos. 25-30.


450. Such cases should be distinguished from cases of piracy on the Shat-el-Arab, which are treated in Chapter XV.

450-A. The Regulation drawn by the Paris Sanitary Convention, 1903, provide in Part II, Chapter I, Sections V and VII for two Sanitary establishments in the Persian Gulf, one at Ormuz and the other in the neighbourhood of Basrah.

External A., July 1905, Nos. 89-92

450-B. The attention of the Government of India has recently been called to the vexatious nature of the quarantine imposed by the Turkish Government as well as of the various hindrances which the British Indian commerce experiences in the Turkish ports of the Persian Gulf. So long, however, as the Ottoman Government does not subscribe to the Convention, the sections in question are likely to remain a dead-letter, like their predecessors. The Governments of Turkey and Persia have not agreed regarding the control of the Sanitary Station at Ormuz, and Great Britain has refused to accept it until the Sanitary Board of Health at Constantinople is re-constituted—a proposal which the Turkish Government has so far declined to discuss.

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CHAPTER XV.

Piracies on the Shat-el-Arab, 1888—1904.

451. A state of lawlessness has been prevailing at certain seasons in the Shat-el-Arab, where vessels engaged in conveying dates and other produce have repeatedly been attacked and robbed by piratical boats hailing from one side of the river or the other to the great discouragement and hindrance of lawful trade. A few typical cases are noted on the statements below. It has been found impossible hitherto to bring these outrages home to their perpetrators in almost all the cases; and the local chiefs, belonging to one bank of the river, have habitually ascribed the blame to those who exercise authority on the other. Neither the Ottoman nor the Persian authorities have been willing to accept any serious responsibility in the matter. The pirates have been pursuing their calling unmolested, and their victims have been powerless to obtain redress.

452. It is worthy of notice that while the Turkish Government is so earnest in claiming sovereign rights over the whole course of the river and has been hinting at its rights over tribes in the eastern bank of the river below Mohammerah, it has done little to fulfil its responsibilities on the river. While Persia is more anxious to bring Mohammerah under its revenue control and weaken its Sheikh, than to strengthen its hands for purposes of order and peace—



"ملخص شؤون الجزيرة العربية التركية. ١٨٠١-١٩٠٥" [١٤٩ ظ] (٣٨٨/٢٩٦)

Piracies reported on the Shat-el-Arab in 1888-90.

No.	Name of vessel, etc.	Date of piracy.	Place of piracy.	Residence of pirates.	CASUALTIES.		Property robbed.	Action taken.	Proceedings.
					Killed.	Wounded.			
1	2 Indian vessels of Set Iskandar	October 1888	Zaiyadaya, south of Basrah.	Zaiyadaya ...	3	2	Rs. 3,000	One Awadiya and his men employed on Sultan's property presented, but through the Sultan's Agent's influence Awadiya was released.	External A., November 1888, Nos. 77-81. External A., December 1888, Nos. 9-11. External A., December 1888, Nos. 110-161.
2	Butol Chatrapass, Kutchi vessel.	6th November 1889	Jazire Mohalla (Turkish side).	Pirates came Persian side, 20 in number.	1	4	All sails and moveable property and cash Rs. 253.	Sheikh of Mohammerah took measures to trace offenders, but no trace could be found.	External A., December 1889, Nos. 150-162.
3	Dowlapass, a British Indian vessel.	12th December 1889	Khasht, south of the last place.	Pirates (30) came from the Turkish side.	All moveables and cash 700 dollars.	Robbers not traced	External A., February 1890, Nos. 293-297. External A., March 1890, Nos. 26-29.
4	Baghla Butol Fly, a British Indian vessel.	13th December 1889	Near same place as above.	The pirates hailing from Turkish side made an unsuccessful attempt.	Offenders not traced. The Vali asserted the pirates were Persians, while the British Consul believed they were Turkish subjects.	External A., March 1890, Nos. 295-307.
5	Harsinger and Sukarpass of British subjects residing at Gwadar.	13th September 1890	Brian on Persian side.	The pirates came from Persian side, 40 in number.	2	3	All moveables and Rs. 800 cash.	There were two or three Turkish soldiers and clerks on board being conveyed to Basrah from Fao, who rendered no assistance against the robbers. The Vali of Basrah maintained they were Persians, and the Governor of Mohammerah, that they were Turkish subjects. The Vali of Basrah applied for extradition of certain persons suspected of complicity, but nothing came out of this.	External A., November 1890, Nos. 163-191. External A., December 1890, Nos. 212-244. External A., March 1891, Nos. 82-95. External A., July 1891, Nos. 98-106.

Part III.



"ملخص شؤون الجزيرة العربية التركية. ١٨٠١-١٩٠٥" [١٥٠.] [٣٨٨/٢٩٧]

Piracies reported in 1895-97.

No.	Name of vessel, etc.	Date of piracy.	Place of piracy.	Residence of pirates.	CASUALTIES.		Property robbed.	Action taken.	Proceedings.
					Killed.	Wounded.			
6	Harijpas of a Indian subject (Jammagar State).	19th September 1895.	Near Fao ...	Robbers supposed to belong to Nassir tribe on Persian side.	4	2	Rs. 3,400 ...	Mudir of Fao made enquiries. The Vah maintained that the pirates were from the Persian side. The offenders not traced and no retribution obtained.	External A., December 1895, Nos. 86-91. External A., March 1896, Nos. 92-100.
7	A Persian vessel of Delan ...	26th December 1896	Near Mohammerah on Persian side.	2	750 Krans ...	Offenders not traced ...	} External A., March 1897, Nos. 40-48.
8	A Kowsit boat ...	December 1896	Near Gushab, Persian side.	Offenders not traced ...	
9	Persian fishing boat ...	September 1897.	Near Fao ...	Persians	3	Moveables worth 1,000 Krans.	Four of the pirates captured by the Lawrence--were handed over to Persian authorities and punished.	External A., December 1897, Nos. 102-110. External A., February 1898, Nos. 92-103.
10	Kaliaupara an Indian vessel ...	1st December 1897	Saihan Point on Turkish side.	...	2	...	All moveables and cash Rs. 250.	The Turkish Police arrested a Persian, who was not implicated in the piracy for their own purpose.	Secret E., May 1898, Nos. 22-26. Secret E., June 1898, Nos. 14-17.

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"ملخص شؤون الجزيرة العربية التركية. ١٨٠١-١٩٠٥" [١٥٠ ظ] (٣٨٨/٢٩٨)

Piracies reported in 1901-04.

No.	Name of vessel, etc.	Date of piracy.	Place of piracy.	Residence of pirates.	CASUALTIES.		Property robbed.	Action taken.	Proceedings.
					Killed.	Wounded.			
11	Hussini, a Bahrain boat ...	27th January 1901	Off Maamer on Turkish side.	Supposed mostly to be Arabs led by one Khaleif residing at Fadhila in Turkish territory, so they are a branch of the Kaab Arabs.	All moveables and Rs. 1,800 in cash.	The Vali and Sheikh of Mohammerah corresponded with one another with a view to take necessary measures. The offenders not traced.	Secret E., May 1902, Nos. 8-9.
12	Yasemin, a British Indian vessel	4th November 1901	Near the buoy on the bar.				Cash and moveables		
13	Gunsha Fadarath, British Indian vessel.	27th December 1901	Do.				Moveables		
14	A Koweit boat called Hussini	27th May 1902	Off the Babyan island.	By Persian subjects ...	1	Several	31,100 Krans	Sheikh Mubarak went over to Mohammerah to press Sheikh Kasal, to trace the culprits and give compensation but apparently got nothing.	Secret E., November 1902, Nos. 168-169.
15	Fateh-el Khair, a Maskat boat owned by British Indians.	25th November 1902	Maamer on Turkish side.	Not known	500 dollars, 10 bags of rice, etc.	Secret E., March 1903, Nos. 89-90.
16	A Koweit-boat	3rd February 1903	Khor Musa	Supposed to be some Arabs under Yusuf bin Ibrahim of Dora.	4	1	4,500 Krans in cash and property valued 1,244 dollars.	Offenders not traced	Secret E., June 1903, Nos. 242-254.
17	Gunja Futeh-es-Salamat, a British Indian Karachi boat.	3rd February 1904	On the bar of the river.	Supposed to be Arabs partly from Gunbah (Persian side) and partly from Khor Hindian.	2	1	Rs. 250 in cash and 4 muzzle loaders, and dates, etc.	The pirates scuttled the ship and knocked holes in the boat. Offenders not traced.	Secret E., January 1904, Nos. 105-113.

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453. In all these cases, except the one in which an English ship captured the pirates who robbed some Persian fishermen (No. 7 in the statement), the Vali of Basrah sent the police to the scene of the robbery to make an investigation, trace the pirates and arrest them, while the Sheikh of Mohammerah (sometimes under instructions from the Shah's Government) did the same, but the offenders could not be traced. The blame was always thrown by one party on the tribes on the other side of the river.

454. We shall see now what proposals in these circumstances were made and adopted for the protection of the commerce on the river.

455. In January 1890, in a demi-official letter to the Resident at Baghdad, Captain Ravenshaw proposed that the Comet might be sent down to anchor

between Mohammerah and Fao for a short time, and that he might be allowed to tell the Vali that "I cannot allow the safety of Indian vessels and subjects to be endangered in this way, and as I cannot get satisfaction either from Turks or Persians, a British vessel will remain in these waters for better protection of Indian vessels."

456. The Political Resident, however, thought that there was no necessity for such strong measures. (Extract from the diary of the Political Resident for the week ending the 15th February 1890.)

457. In his letter No. 698, dated 11th December 1890, Colonel Tweedie referring to the piracy on the ships *Harsinger* and *Sukarpasa* discussed the whole situation and summed up his views as follows:—

"I.—It is very likely that owing to the reference which has in this case proceeded from the Government of India to the British Legation of Tehran, the Persian Government will stir itself for the better protection of the Shat-el-Arab.

II.—On the question demanding compensation from the Government like the Ottoman or Persian several points may deserve a thought. One is, the full measure of diplomatic representation under all circumstances necessary for the enforcement of demands of such a nature. Another is, with the mere unsupported statements, or testimony of Indian or other owners and complainants, and of Arab, Persian, and Osmanli witnesses or deponents, all alike untrustworthy, and with Persian responsibility on one side the river and Osmanli on the other, the finest possible room for evasion here presents itself to either Government with respect to such a claim. On the first occasion therefore of its being decided by competent authority that a case requiring us to press for compensation has arisen whether in view of the serious aspect of that one case itself, or of its being but in a series of other similar outrages indicating culpable apathy on the part of the Governments answerable, the question might come up whether such compensation should not be demanded from both those Governments equally apart from the raising of nice issues as to where the marauders came from.

III.—Meanwhile, if we but continue careful from time to time on occasion arising quietly to impress both the Ottoman and Persian Governments with the conviction that England's interests in the safety of the Shat-el-Arab trade route is not secondary to her interest in the Gulf of which it forms a continuation, and that if neither Government will discharge its protective functions towards the Shat in question, England will have to take the subject anew into consideration; it is only reasonable for us to anticipate that a task so well within the local, not to say, reserve, power, and resources of either Government, far more of the two Governments conjointly, will, allowing for occasional incidents, be well performed."

458. The Political Resident in conclusion proposed addressing the British Ambassador at Constantinople regarding the better protection of the Shat-el-Arab.

459. The Government of India saw no objection to the course. (Telegram No. 3809, dated 24th February 1891.)

Ibid (No. 96.)

460. Colonel Tweedie then addressed to the Embassy giving a narrative of the incidents (letter to the Government of India, No. 154, dated 13th March 1891),

External A., July 1891, Nos. 98-106.

with what result, it cannot be found.

461. In 1895-96 there was a repetition of piracies on the Shat-el-Arab. Among these the most serious was one committed against a ship, called *Haripasa*

External E., May 1896, Nos. 217-233.

belonging to a subject of the Jamnagar State.



462. The difficulty was on whom the blame should be fixed. It was supposed that both Persian and Turkish subjects combined in these piracies. There was little doubt that the Sheikh of Koweit knew well who the culprits were. Almost all the land in the vicinity of Fao was, as the British Consul at Basrah (Captain Whyte) reported, owned by the Sheikh of Koweit and his Mukhtar had five sons living at Gusba, a village on the Persian bank opposite Fao, where many of the pirates lived. The British Consul also thought that the Sheikh of Mohammerah was also equally informed. He therefore proposed that both the Governments, Persian and Turkish, should be asked to call upon these Sheikhs to produce the pirates and in the event of their failure to comply, to recover from them in equal shares the amount of indemnity which Government might decide to demand. Another proposal was made by the Consul-General, Baghdad (Mr. Mockler), that both the Persian and Turkish Governments should be called upon to appoint a joint Commission to investigate into the case of the piracy. A third proposal was to make the Sheikh of Koweit alone responsible, as the culprits were mainly traced to his territory or lands. The difficulty, however, was whether the British Government could deal with him directly. Since it was supposed that the Sheikh acknowledged the Porte as his suzerain. On the other hand, there was reason to believe that the Sheikh was in reality an independent potentate and only nominally subject to the Sultan, and Sir Philip Currie thought for this reason and for other reasons it would be impractical to call upon the Turkish Government to make the Sheikh of Koweit produce the pirates.

463. The Government of India in their despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 27, dated 24th February 1897, expressed the following opinion:—

"It appears to us that there might be advantage in fixing upon the Turkish Government the responsibility for the Sheikh of Koweit's actions. A state of affairs in which he can shelter himself under a nominal subjection to the Porte, while the Porte can disclaim at will any responsibility is in the last degree unsatisfactory."

464. The Secretary of State on 4th May asked the opinion of the Viceroy on Mr. Mockler's suggestion for demanding a joint Persian-Turkish Commission, and at the same time added:—

"Lord Salisbury also suggests, when opportunity presents itself, Resident might convey to Sheikh Koweit serious warning that his responsibility will be enforced if his subjects are not restrained in future from committing attacks upon British baghlas. Please instruct Resident if you agree."

465. The Viceroy telegraphed on 9th May that he saw no use in demanding of Persia that she should join in a Commission to find out who the pirates were, and that he was instructing the Resident as suggested. At the same time the following telegram was sent to the Resident:—

"I assume, you have not yet met Sheikh of Koweit. Her Majesty's Government wish when you meet him, you would convey to Sheikh serious warning that his responsibility will be enforced if his subjects are not restrained in future from committing attacks on British baghlas."

466. The proposal as to the joint Commission was ultimately dropped, especially as it was proposed by Lord George Hamilton that a British officer should have a seat on it, and there would be found many difficulties in the way of the appointment of such a mixed Commission.

467. The only thing done was to warn the Sheikh of Koweit. This was done by a personal visit of the Political Resident at Bushire. The results of this eventful visit are narrated in the *Précis of Koweit Affairs*.



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468. In his letter No. 40, dated 26th January 1898, Colonel Loch suggested the method followed among the Rajput states for placing upon the parties on both banks of the river a joint responsibility for any piratical attack occurring in the Shat-el-Arab.

Secret E., May 1898, Nos. 22-26.

469. The Government of India in writing to the Secretary of State (despatch No. 68, dated 5th May 1898) observed :—

"That the plan would be practicable we doubt. The circumstances of Native States in India are very different from those of the two countries in question. A decision of this question depends, however, upon the influence, which Her Majesty's Government can bring to bear upon the Persian and Turkish Governments; we can only submit the suggestion for consideration."

470. Sir P. Currie informed Colonel Loch that the suggestion made by him seemed in itself an excellent one, but that he had made no suggestion as to the practical steps to be taken for holding the tribes responsible (Despatch from Sir P. Currie to the Foreign Office, No. 204, dated 1st April 1898).

Secret E., June 1898, Nos. 14-17.

471. Colonel Loch then recommended that native boats should be made to carry some distinctive mark showing whether they were Turkish or Persian boats, and that the act of piracy, which could thus be more easily attributed to one bank or to the other of the river, should be made good by the tribes on the Turkish or by those on the Persian side as the case might be. He considered that Sheikh Khazal, Governor of the Persian bank, had it in his power to make the tribe residing there answerable for any outrage traced to that side of the river (Colonel Loch's despatch to the Embassy, No. 254, dated 6th June 1898).

Secret E., November 1898, Nos. 91-126.

472. Colonel Loch, however, did not make it clear, how the indemnity was to be recovered from the Persian Sheikh, or how the corresponding authority on the Turkish side of the river was to be made to pay. If no force were to be used, the only way of exacting reparation from the Riverian Chiefs would be to hold the Turkish and Persian Governments responsible. There would be little prospect of obtaining satisfaction in this way. The evidence resting on the distinctive marks on the boats, if even means could be found to bring the native craft under such control, would surely be disputed, and each side would continue to throw the responsibility upon the other.

Ibid (No. 96).

473. For these reasons Mr. M. de Bunsen, the British Chargé d'Affaires, Constantinople, thought that Colonel Loch's proposal impracticable (Mr. de Bunsen's despatch to the Foreign Office, dated 3rd July 1898).

474. The course finally adopted by Her Majesty's Government appears from the following extract of a note addressed by the British Embassy to the Porte, on 5th September 1898, while H. M. S. *Redbreast* was ordered to proceed to Basrah :—


Ibid (Nos. 122-126).

"After carefully considering the means by which, under these circumstances, free traffic may be re-established and confidence restored, Her Majesty's Government have been forced to the conclusion that the Riverian Chiefs, whether they reside on the Ottoman or Persian side, must be held responsible for piracies prepared and carried out along the banks over which they claim to exercise authority.

I am, therefore, instructed to direct Her Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Baghdad to take the necessary steps in order that the Sheikhs concerned may be informed that reparation will be exacted from them in future. Arrangements are being made for one of Her Majesty's ships to patrol the Shat-el-Arab during the date season, from August to November, to assist in suppressing and punishing acts of piracy, and to recover damages from the responsible Sheikhs. When it is found impossible to fix the responsibility on one side or the other of the river, the loss will be made to fall on both sides.

I am this day sending telegraphic instructions to Her Majesty's Consulate-General at Baghdad in the above sense, and I venture to hope that the Ottoman authorities will be

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directed to afford their friendly assistance with a view to facilitating, as far as lies in their power, the operations for the suppression of river piracy which have become inevitable in the absence of any other means of preserving tranquillity and recovering damages.

Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran has* made a similar communication to the Persian Government."

* This was done on 1st September.

475. The note was presented on 5th September by Mr. Marinitich to Tweifk Pasha, who on its perusal said that Turkish vessels also suffered from these piracies, which were perpetrated from the Persian shore, where anarchy prevailed, and that he had suggested to the Grand Vizier to cause one or two Turkish men-of-war to be despatched from Basrah to patrol the Shat-el-Arab.

476. On the 23rd September 1898 the British Ambassador telegraphed to the Resident:—

Secret E., February 1899, Nos. 15-33 (No. 17).

"Porte states that the Vali of Basrah has taken sufficient measures to prevent piracy in the Shat-el-Arab by sending armed force to both banks of the river under the Command of the Chief of the Gendarmerie at Basrah. I should be glad to learn by telegraph what has been actually done."

Ibid (No. 29).

477. It was then ascertained from Her Majesty's Consul at Basrah that—

"One hundred and two Gendarmes are distributed between thirteen different stations on the Turkish side of the river under the Command of the Chief of the Gendarmerie on this district: thirty native boats have been placed at their disposal to enable them to patrol the river. There are also two small armed vessels patrolling the river at different points."

478. It will be noticed that the Porte spoke of armed force having been sent to both banks of the river, while the Consul at Basrah reported that the Turkish force was distributed on the Turkish side only.

479. In his despatch No. 510, dated 28th September 1898, Sir N. O'Connor reported that Twe-fik Pasha, in informing him of the measures taken for preventing

Ibid (No. 20).

disturbances on the river, expressed his belief that they were sufficient for the attainment of the object in view without the assistance of a British gunboat. In replying Sir N. O'Connor expressed the belief that Her Majesty's Government would receive with satisfaction the intelligence of these active measures.

480. On 9th November 1898 Sir N. O'Connor wrote to say that he had learnt from the Resident at Baghdad of the active measures taken by the local

Ibid (No. 26).

authorities on the Persian side of the river for the prevention of piracy, but that the Resident feared that no measures taken by the local authorities were likely to be of much use if the British gunboats were removed. The Porte was at the same time very anxious to discover whether the British gunboats would be withdrawn.

481. The gunboat in Shat-el-Arab was ordered to be withdrawn by the Admiral, but the Consul at Basrah was anxious that she should remain till the end

Ibid (No. 30).

of the date season and Sir N. O'Connor was inclined "to get something out of the Ottoman Governments for withdrawal."—(Telegram dated 1st December 1898, from Sir N. O'Connor to the Foreign Office).

Ibid (No. 33).

482. The reply of the Foreign Office dated 10th December 1898 was—

"You can take what course you think best as regards making conditions for withdrawal of gunboat from Shat-el-Arab. The gunboat now leaving will be replaced."

483. We don't know what Sir N. O'Connor obtained for the withdrawal of the gunboat after the date season. Such measures as were taken in 1898 appear to have been repeated in 1899 by the

Secret E., November 1899, No. 90.

Secret E., October 1900, No. 174.

Turkish and Persian authorities, but a British gunboat was stationed in the Shat-el-Arab during the date season. (See Sir N. O'Connor's telegram dated 29th August 1899 and also Mr. Shipley's letter to the Embassy dated 28th August 1900.)



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484. Again in 1900 the Consul at Basrah asked for the presence of a gunboat in the Shat-el-Arab and the *Redbreast* was despatched. There were apparently no piracies of a notable character in the years 1898, 1899 and 1900. This fact was attributed to the presence of the British gunboats in the river during the date season.—(Mr. Shipley's letter dated 28th August 1900.)

485. In 1901 the Consul at Basrah asked for the despatch of gunboat as in the previous years. On the 31st August the Commander-in-Chief, East India, telegraphed to the Admiralty to say—

"*Redbreast* will be ready shortly for Shat-el-Arab if difficulties with Turkey permit her to proceed there."


486. But the gunboat does not appear to have been sent, and we had a repetition of piracies at the close of the year 1901. Colonel Kembell in his letter No. 31, dated 17th February 1902, reported that the Vali of Basrah had been in communication with the Sheikh Kazal, with a view to take joint action to hunt the pirates. It was supposed that the culprits resided at Faddaghiyeh and the Vali proposed to arrest them, while Sheikh Kazal was asked to arrest them if they escaped across the river. This the Sheikh promised to do. Colonel Kembell added—

"Mr. McDuell thinks that Sheikh Kazal does not countenance piracies as his predecessors did, which fact is known to the Arabs, and that his system of patrol has for that reason apparently put a stop to piracies in the river. The Sheikh, however, seems to think that, to prevent piracies at the bar, it is necessary for a gunboat to be stationed there during the date export season, as it is too far for his patrol bellums to be of any use."

487. As a matter of fact, no arrests were made and there was practically no co-operation whatever between the Vali and Sheikh Kazal, except correspondence. In these circumstances Colonel Kembell requested Captain Kemp, Commander and Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, to visit the Shat-el-Arab in his ship the *Sphinx* and ascertain and report about the piracies and the measures taken for tracing the pirates in the recent cases and for future protection of the river. Commander Kemp reported very unfavourably on these matters and made the following suggestions in his letter to the Commander-in-Chief dated 20th June 1902 :—

- (a) That a proper number of patrol boats should be kept constantly moving in the river, and that a sufficient number of efficient police posts should be maintained on the banks.
- (b) That proper measures should be taken to restrict the possession of arms and ammunition in the villages on the banks.
- (c) That on the receipt of news of a piracy having been committed, such villages and huts as may reasonably be expected to harbour stolen property should be searched.
- (d) That all craft on the river should be regularly registered and licensed, and that strict watch should be kept on their movements.
- (e) That an officer of sufficient rank should be placed at the head of the river police, who should be responsible for what happened on his side of the river.
- (f) That an understanding should be arrived at between the Persian and Turkish authorities to co-operate with each other in suppressing piracy, rather than making each other an excuse for doing nothing, as is their custom at present."

488. The Vali brought down a small steamer from the Tigris to patrol the Shat-el-Arab, but it broke down. In a *note verbale* dated 9th July the Porte denied that piratical attacks were frequent, but stated that two steamers would be sent to keep peace and prevent smuggling (Mr. de Bunsen's telegram to the Foreign Office, dated 12th July 1902).



489. In a *note verbale* dated 16th July 1902, addressed under approval of the

Ibid (Enclosure 1, Pro. No. 140).

Foreign Office to the Porte, satisfaction was expressed at the steps taken by the Turkish Government to prevent piracies on the Shat-el-Arab, and it was stated that the Commander of the *Sphinx* then in the neighbourhood would receive instructions to co-operate with the two Turkish vessels, while it was hoped that the Commanders of these vessels would receive similar instructions from the Turkish Government.

Ibid (No. 134).

490. As regards Persia the following instructions were sent to Mr. des Graz by the Foreign Office on 16th July 1902 :—

"Commander of British gunboat at Mohammerah reports that no effective steps are being taken either by the Turkish or Persian authorities for the suppression of piracy in the Shat-el-Arab.

We do not wish to give the Persian Government an excuse for interfering more than is necessary in the district below Mohammerah, where the Sheikh has more effective authority than the Shah. In these circumstances it will be best that you should—

- (1) instruct His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mohammerah to request the Sheikh to co-operate to the best of his ability with the British Naval officers;
- (2) call the attention of the Persian Foreign Minister to the State of Affairs on the river and request that the Sheikh may be ordered to give the British gunboat every possible assistance so as not to oblige us to keep her at Mohammerah longer than is necessary.

491. When the second part of the above message was communicated by

Secret E., November 1902, Nos. 105-144.

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran to Mushir-ed-Dowlah (Foreign Minister), he was desirous to know under what treaty or agreement His Majesty's Government was asking for the co-operation of the Persian Government to suppress piracy. No answer was given to this enquiry. (Mr. C. des Graz's despatch to the Foreign Office, dated 14th August 1902).

492. In October 1902 the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs made a

Secret E., June 1903, Nos. 242-254 (No. 242).

request that previous notice should be given of the arrival of British vessels of war in Persian waters. Further on 17th January 1903, Mushir-ed-Dowlah asked, with reference apparently to the recent encounter between pirates and the sailors of the *Lapwing*, that British ships should not take active measures against piracy within the territorial waters of Persia, or land armed men for this purpose on Persian soil.—(Sir A. Hardinge's despatch No. 15, dated 26th January 1903.)

493. In reply to this message, Sir A. Hardinge was authorised to state


Secret E., January 1904, Nos. 105-113 (Nos. 105 and 113, Enclosure No. 1.)

that the Commanders of His Majesty's ships, whilst they would always be careful to respect the sovereign rights of Persia and to co-operate with the local authorities, must, in the absence of any effective naval force of Persia, retain their freedom to take, at their discretion and on their responsibility, even within Persian territory, such measures for the repression of piracy as the urgency or gravity of any particular case might seem to them to warrant and that His Majesty's Government cannot undertake to issue any new orders to the Commanders of His Majesty's vessels, which could tend to restrict the efficiency of their action in maintaining the maritime peace of the Gulf, which has been secured by the past efforts of the British Navy.—(Lord Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge, dated 4th April 1903, and note addressed dated 25th April 1903.)

494. Mushir-ed-Dowlah then wrote Sir A. Hardinge on 24th October

Ibid (No. 118, Enclosure No. 2).

1903 that instructions might be given to British ships "that when they pursue pirates in the Persian waters and get near the Persian coast, the pursuit may be left in the hands of Persian authorities in order that the crew should not be obliged to use arms or enter Persian territory."



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495. After some correspondence, which need not be quoted here, Sir Secret E., June 1904, Nos. 500-523 (No. 520, A. Hardinge referred Mushir-ed-Dowlah to his note of 25th April 1903, from which it would be seen that Lord Lansdowne, while expressing the inability of His Majesty's Government to issue any new orders to His Majesty's vessels, which would restrict the efficiency of their action in maintaining the maritime peace of the Gulf, instructed him (Sir A. Hardinge) to assure the Shah's Government that their Commanders would always be careful to respect the sovereign rights of Persia.

496. In regard to the piracy against the British Indian vessel *Fateh-es-Salamat* (No. 17 in the statement), *Ibid*, No. 505. Colonel Kemball telegraphed on 9th March 1904 that the pirates were reported to have come from Abkatch in Khor Hindian and the stolen property was still there. He therefore proposed to send a gunboat for searching the place.

497. The Government of India in reporting this to the Secretary of State referred to Lord Lansdowne's despatch of 4th April 1903 to Sir A. Hardinge, and proposed to approve of the suggested action.—(Telegram dated 12th March 1904)

498. The Secretary of State telegraphed back on 15th March 1904 that instructions had been sent by the Admiralty to the *Lapwing* to proceed without delay to Khor Hindian and search the place. The *Lapwing* visited the place, but nothing could be traced.

499. Turning back now to the Turkish side, we find that on 21st October 1902 Lieutenant Armstrong, Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, reported that the Turkish authorities had two gunboats on the Shat-el-Arab—one, the *Kilid-el-Bahr*, had not moved from Basrah for months past, and the other, *Zohaf*, had been anchored to the southward of Dohasir Island and had not moved thence. The report stated that the *Zohaf* might do some little good by preventing piracies close to where she was anchored, but considering that a large armed expedition started from Dora only a few miles below where she was lying, her presence could not have much of a deterrent effect except in her immediate vicinity, and the Turkish guards on shore appeared equally unable to cope with the evil.


His Britannic Majesty's Embassy admitted that, apart from the expedition above mentioned, piracy, at the mouth of the Shat-el-Arab, diminished during the recent date exporting season, but they had good reason to suppose that this result was due to the activity of the two British war-ships in those waters, and not to the presence of the Turkish gunboats.

His Britannic Majesty's Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf was of opinion that the only method of effectually preventing piracy in the localities in question was the employment of armed steam-boats to patrol the river and bar at uncertain times, and kept fairly constantly on the move. It was by thus keeping his vessels moving, especially at night, that he believed he had been able to prevent piracies of late, but he pointed out that row boats cannot catch sailing dhows and bellums if there is any breeze, and that there are numerous stretches of banks round the mouths of the Shat-el-Arab and Bahmisher rivers, where sea-going ships cannot go, and where nothing, or very little, can be done to prevent piracy without the use of fairly large steam-boats. He suggested, therefore, that if the Turkish Government, instead of anchoring ships at fixed points, were to provide a few such steam-boats, piracy could be stopped with great ease.

500. The British Ambassador was directed by the Foreign Office to call the attention of the Porte to this matter and to the observations and suggestions of

Ibid (No. 248, Enclosure No. 1).

[S646FD]



the British Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf as above stated. This was accordingly done in a note dated 17th January 1903.

501. In a note dated March 14th, 1904, addressed to the Porte, Sir N. O'Connor called attention to the recent piracies, and added—
Secret E., June 1904, Nos. 500-523 (No. 518, Enclosure No. 2).

"It appears from the complaints which reach His Majesty's Consulate at Basrah that the pilfering of cargo from lighters at anchor at or in sight of that town is of constant occurrence, and shots are frequently exchanged at night between marauders and the private watchmen placed on board.

There is no regular river patrol and the Police seem unable either to protect the commerce of the port from these attacks or to trace and apprehend the perpetrators.

In bringing these facts to the knowledge of the Porte, His Majesty's Embassy request that effectual measures will be taken to remedy a condition of affairs, which is so detrimental to the commercial interests and dangerous to the personal safety of the trading community of Basrah, of which British and British-Indian subjects form so considerable a proportion, and they reserve for the moment the right to present such claims for compensation as may be due to British-Indian subjects for failure to protect them against such piratical and lawless attacks.

502. In 1904, the *Merlin* kept guard on the Shat-el-Arab from 19th August and was withdrawn in October (?). The *Redbreast* took its place subsequently, but was withdrawn on 24th November. The *Sphinx* was despatched in December at the pressing demand of Consul Monahan.

503. The Naval Commander-in-Chief wished to have an explanation why a gun-boat was called for so late as December. This was submitted by the Consul. The following statement is prepared from his report:—

Year.	Period for which gun-boats detained.	Number of British Indian vessels come for evading dates.
1897-98 ...	June to December 1897 ...	20
1898-99 ...	September to January 1899 (29th).
1899-00 ...	During date season (period not stated).
1900-01 ...	September to December 1900
1901-02 ...	(No gun-boat sent)
1902-03 ...	September to 31st December (1902).	30
1903-04
1904-05 ...	August to January ...	48 (2 in January 25 or 6 in December).



The above explanation showed that the season for loading boats on the Shat-el-Arab continued up to January and hence the justification for the call for a gun-boat so late as December.



504. Referring to this explanation Major Newmarch suggested that the best way to prevent as well as stop piracy in the Shat-el-Arab would be to station in it a flotilla of small launches, which could penetrate the unsurveyed creeks of either shore and to make them dependent on a parent ship near Basrah. This preventive and protective force could remain in the river from the end of August to the beginning of February or even a long period, if necessary.


505. No action has been taken on this proposal.

506. There were two piracies committed on the river in February—March 1905. In one a Koweit boat, which had been proceeding to Basrah for purchasing rice, was a little way before Basrah, set upon by pirates, the Nakhuda and one of the boat-men killed and the money they had with them robbed.

A Bahrein boat (būm), which had been proceeding up the river to Basrah, was attacked by some robbers, but the crew escaped.










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CHAPTER XVI.

Distribution of the Oudh Bequest at Kerbella, Najaf and Kathimain.


The Mahomedan royal family and aristocracy of Oudh were Shiabs, and before and at the annexation of Oudh there was a large exodus of Oudh Princes and Begums to Najaf and Kerbella, where there are the shrines of Ali and Hussain respectively. In the neighbourhood of these shrines there is many a tomb of these princes and princesses, not to speak of other Shiabs. For the maintenance of the shrines and the worship connected with them many a bequest has been made and of these one of the largest is that of Ghazi-ud-din, King of Oudh, arising out of what is called the Third Oudh Loan.

2. The loan, generally known as the Third Oudh Loan, was obtained by Lord Amherst from King Ghazi-ud-din Hyder at a time when the Burmese war had reduced the British Government to great financial straits. It was for a crore of rupees at 5 per cent. interest; and, as usual in the case of such loans, the interest was devoted in perpetuity to the payment of stipends to certain favourites of the reigning Prince. The Deed of Engagement between the British and Oudh Governments will be found at pp. of the second volume of Aitchison's *Treaties*. Under this engagement two of the King's wives, Nawab Mubarik Mahal and Sultan Mariam Begum, became pensioners of the British Government to the extent of Rupees 10,000 and Rupees 2,500 per mensem, respectively. The Begums were guaranteed the right of leaving by will one-third of their allowances to any one they pleased, but the remaining two-thirds of either allowance was to go to the shrines of Ali and Hussain at Najaf and Kerbella.

3. Both the Begums died, at different dates, in the year 1849; and from that time the Government of India became saddled with the responsibility of paying monthly to the two shrines Rupees 1,666-10-8 on account of the two-thirds of Mariam Begum's stipend, and Rupees 6,666-10-8 on account of the similar share in Mubarik Mahal's stipend, or, in the aggregate, Rupees 8,333-5-4. Sir Arnold Kemball, then Lieutenant Kemball, was Acting Political Agent at Baghdad during the temporary absence of Sir Henry Rawlinson. In December 1849 he raised the question how the obligation was to be practically fulfilled. From the antecedent history of Kerbella, and the known antipathy of the Shiah and Sunni sects, he argued that so considerable a sum as one lakh of rupees per annum could not be placed at the disposal of the holy shrines, without endangering the peace of the country, and he pointed out that, if troubles should arise, umbrage might be taken by the Turkish authorities at the disbursement of the money in question from the treasury of the Baghdad Agency. Upon this representation Lord Dalhousie's Government decided that the money should not be paid at Baghdad, but that the chief priests of Kerbella and Najaf should, through their private agents, draw bills on Bombay for the amount. The decision was duly reported to the Court of Directors, who, in reply, forwarded a communication received by them from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Lord Palmerston's view was that if, consistently with the Indian Government's obligations to the State of Oudh, the money could be remitted without passing through the hands of a British Agent, such an arrangement might with reference to political considerations, be preferable; but that if the Indian Government were precluded from any choice in the matter, the Political Agent would have to pay over the money as he received it to the designated priests.

4. Accordingly the system of payment by bills on Bombay held good until 1852. But in that year Sir Henry Rawlinson, who in the interval had resumed charge of the Baghdad Agency, re-opened the question. He declared that the circuitous and unusual mode of payment from Bombay had a clandestine and mysterious appearance, and so was more likely to give umbrage to the Porte than direct and open payment by the Political Agent at Baghdad. The only way, he thought, in which the Government of India could acquit itself of the obligation was to place the disbursement unreservedly in the hands of the Political Agent;

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"to authorise him to see, according to the principle observed at Lucknow in all cases of guaranteed pensions, that the money in question is expended agreeably to the intention of the royal donor, that is, in eleemosynary grants and religious attendance, and not in political excitement or military corruption; and to give the Political Agent a discretionary power in emergent cases to suspend payment altogether."

4. On this letter Lord Dalhousie noted as follows :—

"The Resident has no right to exercise any supervision at all. The money was left by will to these priests, and we have no power or control over it. I would not correspond through Colonel Rawlinson. I would ask the Court to ascertain distinctly which of the two courses is preferred by the Minister at Constantinople through Her Majesty's Foreign Secretary. It should be clearly pointed out that we have no right to control the money."

5. A despatch in this spirit was addressed to the Court, who, on the 17th August, replied by forwarding copy of a despatch from Colonel Rose, Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, in which that officer expressed entire concurrence in Sir H. Rawlinson's views, adding that it was necessary to the maintenance of good relations with Turkey to take the means of revolt and intrigue out of the hands of its sectarian opponents, the Shiah fanatics. Upon receipt of these instructions the Government of India cancelled the original arrangement, made the money payable openly from the Baghdad treasury, and authorised the Political Agent to exercise "a judicious supervision over the expenditure." These orders were issued on the 8th October 1852, and have continued in force ever since.

6. The Nawab Ikbal-ud-dowlah submitted in 1866 an application to the Secretary of State in which he complained that the money paid to the priests of the two shrines, instead of being devoted to the relief of indigent Indian pilgrims and devotees, was diverted to the benefit of the priests' own friends and relatives, Arabs and Persians, in affluent circumstances. He suggested as the justest course of all, that

"this alms should altogether be withheld from Arabia and be expended in India, especially in the province of Oudh, as being originally Oudh money; for which reason it ought to be disbursed there—nay, it should be restricted to the poor persons of the Royal family of Oudh."

7. In case, however, the Government of India should consider itself bound to carry out the obligation it undertook from King Ghazi-ud-din Hyder, he recommended as the next best arrangement, that the fund should be distributed over the following objects :—

1. The maintenance of poor Mujawurs resident at the shrines.
2. The relief of poor Indian pilgrims, with a preference to natives of Oudh.
3. The burial of pilgrims dying in Turkish Arabia, and the support of their widows and orphans.
4. The construction of rest-houses and hospitals at the places most resorted to by pilgrims.
5. The establishment of schools and orphanages for Indian children.
8. The machinery he suggested for giving effect to these plans was a committee composed of the most respectable resident Indians, who, under the absolute control of the Political Agent, should supervise the distribution of the money in fitting proportions for the several objects.

9. The Secretary of State forwarded the Nawab Ikbal-ud-dowlah's application to Sir A. Kemball, who submitted it to the Government of India with his observations. The Government of India addressed then the following

Political A., January 1868, Nos. 112-114.

Secretary of State (N. 102).



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2. As Her Majesty's Government has already obtained from Sir A. Kemball a narrative showing the origin of this obligation, and the arrangements which were successively ordered in 1850 and 1852 for giving it effect, we refrain from further reference to those points.

3. With regard to the existing method of distributing the money in question, we find that the amount is equally divided between Kurbullah and Nujjuff, and that, in either case, the chief Moojtahid, who has under him several sub-distributors, receives payment from the Political Agent. Sir A. Kemball further explains that, in order to keep at least the first stage of the distribution free from abuses, he takes receipts not only from the chief Moojtahids, but also from their respective sub-distributors. Great misappropriation, he admits, nevertheless goes on. "Nothing is assigned to the support, strictly speaking, of the shrines. The Moojtahids are virtually irresponsible; their own friends, relatives, and adherents are of course favoured, and, in any case, the recipients are, for the most part, in the enjoyment of independent means of subsistence; while Indian noblemen and a crowd of Indian devotees and pilgrims of all ranks exist on charity, and in a state of absolute destitution."

4. In reviewing the Nawab Ikbal-ud-Dowla's proposals, Sir A. Kemball rightly takes no notice of the idea that it is possible for the British Government to withdraw the money from Turkish Arabia and apply it to the benefit of the province of Oudh. But provided the deed of engagement presents no difficulty, and provided also he may have an assistant for the purpose, he would recommend the Nawab's proposals to be so far complied with, that the fund, either entirely or in great part, should be reserved for the benefit of Indian Moojtahids, and Moojawurs in really indigent circumstances.

5. The English text of the engagement, given at page 168, Volume 2, of Aitchison's Treaties, is as follows:—"One-half to be given to the "Nujjuff Ushruff, and the other half for Kurbullah, to the high priest and Mujawurs, or persons who have its charge, on the part of the said King, that His Majesty might thereby derive its benefits." But Sir A. Kemball argues that the words "or persons who have its charge" are an interpolation, not to be found in the Persian original of the document; that, consequently, the real beneficiaries of the trust are in general terms the Moojtahids and Moojawurs of either shrine, and not of necessity those *in charge*; and that therefore the Government of India might unobjectionably proceed, in their practical reading of the broad general expression, to confine the application of the fund to Indians exclusively.

6. On reference to the original Persian of the deed of engagement, the passage under notice may be translated as follows:—"Of the remainder, half will be paid for the Najaf

A Moojawur, we may explain, is a worshipper who settles at a shrine for religious purposes. and Moojawurs of those places, for ever, on behalf of the said King, so that His Majesty may secure the reward of piety." It is therefore the case, as stated by Sir Arnold Kemball, that the explanatory sentence "or persons who have its charge" does not occur in the Persian original.

7. But this circumstance does not bring us to the conclusion arrived at by Sir A. Kemball as to the practical interpretation which the Government of India may give to King Ghazi-ud-Din Hyder's wishes.

8. If His Majesty had desired that the fund should be exclusively devoted to the benefit of Indian priests, he certainly would have made specific provision to that effect. The absence of any such provision is a distinct bar to the Government taking such action as Sir A. Kemball advocates.

9. If the money is misapplied by the priests, the fault lies on them and on the deficient foresight of the diseased Ghazee-ood-Din Hyder; the British Government can have no responsibility at all in the matter. Ghazee-ood-Din Hyder, looking solely to his own spiritual welfare, and not to the temporal welfare either of pilgrims or of any one else, contracted with the British Government for the investment in perpetuity of certain funds as an endowment for the Sheeah Shrines at Kurbullah and Nujjuff, and he indicated "the Moojtahids and Moojawurs of those places" as the persons to whom the endowment should be payable. Therefore, so long as there may exist a class of persons recognizable as the Moojtahids and Moojawurs of Kurbullah and of Nujjuff, the Government of India, we consider, is bound to make payment to that class at either place, and could not modify or limit such mode of payment without betrayal of its trust.

10. The only considerations which could, in our opinion, be admissible to an equal bearing with the specific terms of the trust, would be the general welfare of humanity and the preservation of peace among nations. By Sir Henry Rawlinson's arrangement now in force, the Government of India not only fulfils the particular engagement it entered into with King Ghazee-ood-Din Hyder, but also satisfies its general political obligations towards allied nations by so checking the distribution of the fund as to prevent the Sheeah fanatics from embroiling Persia with Turkey. It therefore seems to us that the present arrangement, on grounds alike of justice and of expediency, ought to be strictly maintained; and that it is most undesirable to allow any opening to further discussion on a subject to which, for several reasons, it is not desirable to attract unnecessary attention.



11. There are some minor arguments which might be used in favour of letting things lie as they are. Were the Nawab Ikbal-ud-Dowla's proposals and Sir A. Kemball's recommendations to be carried out, the British Government would undoubtedly be lending itself to the promotion of the interests of the Mahomedan religion among the natives of India—a course directly opposed to all its recent policy;—and it would be encouraging the emigration of its subjects to Turkish Arabia—an object which politically cannot be regarded as expedient. Secondly, the fact that in the English counterpart of the Persian deed of engagement the words "or persons who have its charge" do occur by way of explanation, can hardly be overlooked so easily as Sir A. Kemball imagines; these words show what at the time was the real meaning of the two parties to the contract, and it would be unjustifiable in the British Government now suddenly to ignore that plain intention. Lastly, even if the deed contained no such explanatory sentence, a similar meaning might be easily deduced from the language used by the King in endowing, under the same instrument, an Imambarah at Lucknow, called the Imambarah-i-Nujjuff Ashroff, built on the model of the shrine in Turkish Arabia after which it is named. Immediately preceding the provision made for Nawab Mobarik Mahal, there is a clause in favour of this Imambarah to the following purport:—"To the persons attached to the new Imambarah, called Imambarah Nujjuff Ashroff, according to a separate detail, Rupees one thousand one hundred and thirty-seven ten annas and eight pies (Rupees 1,137-10-8). This sum will be paid for ever to the person who will be appointed to the charge of the Imambarah through the King, and its Anlah or officers will be kept or discharged at the pleasure of the Superintendent." There can be little doubt that the arrangement contemplated by the King for the great shrines in Turkish Arabia was the same as that which he laid down, with greater detail of language, for the miniature shrine raised by himself at Lucknow, viz., payment of the endowment to the Superintendent, and discretion left to the Superintendent to dispose of the amount according to the wishes of the founder. This is the arrangement actually in force at Lucknow with regard to this Imambarah; a Superintendent has been appointed, the money is regularly paid to him, and how he spends it is a question in which the Government takes no concern.

10. The Secretary of State replied:—

No. 199, dated 23rd November 1867.

From—The Secretary of State for India,

To—The Government of India.

I have considered in Council the letter of Your Excellency's Government in the Foreign Department, No. 131 of the 7th August 1867, conveying your opinion on the proposals of the Nawab Ikbal-ud-Dowla, modified by Sir Arnold Kemball, respecting the improper distribution of King Ghazee-ud-Din Hyder's assignments in favour of the Sheeah Shrines of Kurbullah in Turkish Arabia.

2. I concur with you that, with reference to the terms of the deed of 1825, it is not incumbent on the British Government to do more than pay the money regularly to the recipients specified in that deed, namely, the high priests in charge of the shrines; that such payment is a good and sufficient payment; and that the Government has not undertaken, and cannot now undertake, to control the ultimate distribution of the money by the Chief priest among the devotees who may frequent, or reside at, the places of pilgrimage in question.

11. The above opinion was upheld in 1876 (Secretary of State's Despatch

General A., March 1877, No. 17.
Internal A., June 1890, Nos. 37-43.
Internal A., August 1890, Nos. 96-116.
Internal A., September 1890, Nos. 60-62.
Internal A., September 1890, Nos. 117-120.

No. 124, dated 9th November 1876), and on later occasions when the Resident made proposals for supervising and otherwise interfering in the distribution of the

bequest, the orders of 1867 were again upheld.

12. But in 1890 several petitions poured in through the India Office complaining bitterly of the whole-sale diversion of the original trust for the aggrandizement of a few individuals.

Internal A., May 1891, Nos. 179-190.

We find also Mr. (now Lord) Curzon interesting himself in the matter. The Government of India then had to change their attitude and thought themselves bound to give effect in a reasonable manner to the trust reposed in it and to take steps for the proper administration of the endowment. A correct version of the agreement of 1885 was obtained and a translation made by Colonel H. S. Jarret, Secretary to the Board of Examiners. From this it appears that in the original Persian text of the Article V of the agreement, the bequest is made payable to "*Mujtahidan-i-Mujawiran*" of the shrines of Karbala and Najaf and not to the Mujtahidan-

* "Doctors of ecclesiastical Law" as Mr. Curzon put it. o-Mujawiran. The former means "Supreme theological* doctors who are continuous residents near the holy shrines."



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13. Our records are laden then with several disquisitions of our Political Officers on the question—Colonel Tweedie and Colonel Mockler among others, which do not err on the side of clearness. The abuses prevailing in the administration of the endowment appear to have been the following—

Internal A., May 1891, Nos. 179—190.
Internal A., February 1892, Nos. 57—66
Internal A., June 1892, Nos. 207—213.
Internal A., June 1894, Nos. 293—297.

14. The sum of Rs. 14,853-3-8 were paid quarterly to the Mujtahids who were permanent residents at Kerbella, and the same amount to the Mujtahids who were permanent residents at Najaf. These amounts were drawn quarterly and were shown in the accounts of the Treasury as paid to Syud Mahomed Bakir at Kerbella and Syud Mahomed Bahr-ul-Ulum at Najaf. They were really paid to the Residency Shroff, a Jew named Eliabu Ezekiel Danaus, who was the Agent or representative at Baghdad to the two above-named Mujtahids and there seemed reason to believe that these two Mujtahids had mortgaged those allowances or a large portion of them to the shroff as interest on the money which they borrowed from him whenever they had need. The shroff, however, always produced the receipts of the Mujtahids and that was regarded as sufficient.

15. Although these two Mujtahids were shown in the Treasury accounts as receiving Rs. 14,853-3-8 per quarter, they really only received in round numbers Rs. 9,850 per quarter, Rs. 5,000 per quarter having been diverted to Agha Mahomed Khan, known as the Native Agent at Kathimain, for distribution to poor Indians at that place and Rs. 5,000 per quarter having been similarly diverted to Mahomed Ibrahim Khan, our Consular Agent at Kerbella, for distribution to poor Indians there.

16. We cannot find that any instructions were ever issued to the Mujtahids regarding the mode or the objects of their distribution, but their distribution was several years ago found so unsatisfactory and untrustworthy that it was thought advisable to appoint a supervisor who should supervise these distributions. The supervisor, both for the Kerbella and Najaf, had for several years past been our Consular Agent at Kerbella, a British Indian subject named Mahomed Ibrahim Khan, a brother of the Agent at Kathimain, but, as a matter of fact, it was found that he did not supervise the distribution at all, that he was never present at it but left it all in the hands of one of his Munshis, who was himself a stipendiary of this trust fund.

17. Mahomed Ibrahim Khan signed his name in English on every page of the distribution account, but his signatures were put on each page of the account several days after the distribution, at which he was never present, had been completed.

18. The Mujtahids distributed the money that went to them among a number of their own relations and friends.

19. The distribution at Kathimain was made by Agha Mahomed Khan who was known as the Native Agent at Kathimain. He had no official position but was in many ways useful as a source of information and as an unofficial correspondent. He first undertook to perform his present duties several years ago and it was clearly understood that he was to receive no salary from any source. His first duty was to supervise the distribution of the Oudh Bequest at Kathimain. It was of course quite wrong that any of this money should have been diverted to Kathimain, a suburb about 5 miles from Baghdad and on the other side of the river, but it appears to have been done under the advice of Nawab Sir Ikbal-ud-Dowlah who seems to have had an overwhelming influence over some of the Resident.

20. As a matter of fact, the money was not distributed to the Mujtahids at all.



21. The principles in which the Government of India desired* to inform the administration of the endowment were briefly as follows :—

* Mr. Cunningham's semi-official letter, dated 22nd January 1892 (Internal A., February 1892, Nos. 57-57).
Foreign Department letter No. 2235-I., dated the 2nd June 1892 (Internal A., June 1894, Nos. 204-213).
Foreign Department letter No. 1195-I., dated the 11th April 1894 (Internal A., June 1894, Nos. 292-297).

- (1) That a list of Mujtahids who were permanent residents at Kerbella and Najaf should be prepared and revised from time to time, including any Mujtahid who may have been added to the number and striking off any who may have ceased to reside at those places or who may have ceased to deserve the title of Mujtahid.
- (2) To distribute the whole of the Bequest among the Mujtahids on this list either in equal shares or in such proportion as may hereafter be determined.
- (3) To stop the distribution at Kathimain.
- (4) To take no official cognizance of any distribution other than that (already indicated) among the Mujtahids.
- (5) To stop the payment from the Oudh Bequest of the Native Agent at Kathimain and his establishment and of the Consular Agent at Kerballa and his establishment.
- (6) To prevent the interference in future of these two men with the Oudh Bequest in any way.

22. Major Newmarch, Officiating Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, appears to have been the first officer who was able to tackle with the question thoroughly and in his letter No. 390, dated the 20th September 1902, submitted proposals for the administration of the endowment, which were in the main accepted by the Government of India. The tenour of his proposals and the decisions of the Government of India will be clear from a perusal of the Foreign Department letter No. 1577-E., dated the 13th July 1903 :—

In paragraph 16 and the following paragraphs of the above letter (letter under reply) you correctly stated the general view of the Government of India, which is, that the income of the Bequest should be distributed under the supervision of the Political Resident to a certain number of Mujtahids residing permanently at the shrines of Kerballa and Nejed, and that it is not a mere charitable grant for the benefit of the poor of these places. It is noticed with satisfaction that the distribution at Khadimain has entirely ceased, as this diversion of a portion of the funds of the Bequest was inconsistent with the declared policy of the Government of India and unjustifiable under the terms of the Bequest. The funds available should ultimately be distributed in equal shares, so far as this can be effected without undue hardship to Mujtahids who are permanent residents at Kerballa and Nejed, and no official cognizance will be taken of any distribution other than that to the Mujtahids themselves. Your provisional selections of Mujtahids is accepted by the Government of India, who agree that the difficulty of choosing a suitable person on a vacancy occurring may, in future, as a general rule, be met by obtaining the approval of the remaining recipients to the successor suggested, subject to the consent of the Political Resident, with whom the final appointment must always remain, and who will have the power of removing on sufficient grounds any Mujtahid from the list of recipients. The number of Mujtahids should probably not be less than ten or more than twenty at each place; the lower limit may, as suggested in paragraph 4 of your letter No. 315, dated the 17th June 1903, be observed for the present at Kerballa.

The conduct of Ibrahim Khan and of his brother, Agha Mahomed Khan, has disqualified them from representing the British Government and you should dispense with their service if you have not already done so; advising His Britannic Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople in regard to Ibrahim Khan. The necessary steps are being taken with regard to the appointments of Mirza Mahomed Hassan Mohsin as Vice-Consul charged with the general supervision of



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the working of the fund and of the interests of British subjects at Kerballa: a Native Agent appears to be no longer required at Kadhimain as the distribution there has ceased.

Subject to such arrangements as further experience may show to be desirable, the Residency shroff may, as you propose, be retained under closer control and may be granted a commission not exceeding one per cent. on monies remitted by him from Baghdad to Kerballa and Nejeff; this percentage will be debited to the Bequest.

In view of the terms of Article 3 of the Agreement of 1825, income-tax should not be levied on the Bequest. The necessary instructions will be issued to the Accounts Officer concerned.

In conclusion, I am to say that the Government of India appreciate the industry and thoroughness with which, in the face of considerable difficulties, you have treated this troublesome and complicated piece of work, and I am to congratulate you on the satisfactory results of your efforts."


22-A. A memorial was received in February 1905 by the Home Government, purporting to be signed by certain Mahomedan Seyyids, Sheikhs and others,

Secret E., August 1905, Nos. 193-199.

protesting against the action of Major Newmarch in changing the old established order of distribution.

On enquiry it was found that the memorial had been the work of a man named *Itemad-us-Sadar*, the Private Secretary and *factotum* of Seyyid Mahomed Bakir Tabatabas, the Mujtahid at Kerballa, who formerly received and distributed the whole of the Kerballa moiety of the Oudh Bequest, and that most of the signatures were not genuine.*

* See paragraphs 186-193 of Chapter III-A, pages 84-85, as regards the question of including Agha Sharabiani, the famous Persian Mujtahid, among the Mujtahids to receive a portion of the Oudh Bequest.






CHAPTER XVII.

Disposal of the pension and property of Nawab Taj Mahal of Oudh deceased at Kerbella.

23. To understand this complicated case we must bear in mind at outset the following pedigree:—



Taj Mahal was the wife of Nassir-ud-din Hyder, King of Oudh.

24. By the Treaty made with the King of Oudh in the year 1829 the English Government had bound themselves to pay to her and her heirs pension of Rs. 72,000 per annum.

25. Nassir-ud-din Hyder died in 1837 and after his death Taj Mahal would appear to have married one Kulb Hossein, by whom she had a daughter, Muzhara Begum. This Kulb Hossein died before Taj Mahal, and had left at his death among other property a "Kothee" at Cawnpur, some houses and gardens at Lucknow, and promissory notes to the value of Rs. 1,56,000 deposited in the Bank of Bombay.

26. Muzhara Begum was stated to have married in the first instance one Jaffir Hossein, a nephew of Kulb Hossein and the girl Kulsum Begum, who was one of the claimants to Taj Mahal's estate was said to be the offspring of this marriage. After the death of Jaffir Hossein, Muzhara Begum married his brother Mehndi Hossein. Muzhara Begum died before Taj Mahal; but whether before or after Kulb Hossein was not clear, probably before him.

27. Taj Mahal left Lucknow on the 19th of November 1859, and proceeded to Kerbella on a pilgrimage; but she remained there till her death in 1875, and had so far settled down there as to acquire some immovable property. Whether Kulb Hossein or Muzhara Begum went with her or whether either of them was then still alive, does not appear.

28. The pension payable to Taj Mahal, though under the 6th Article of the Treaty payable only in the British territory in India, was paid through the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia from the time Taj Mahal took up her abode there.

29. In the year 1875 Taj Mahal died at Kerbella and she left, besides the hereditary pension and whatever property she inherited from Kulb Hossein, the immovable property she had acquired at Kerbella, certain immovable property in Oudh, and certain movable property which she had with her in Turkish Arabia.

30. The right to succeed to her entire estate was claimed on the one hand by the girl Kulsum Begum, and on the other by one Ramzan Ali, who was the brother (whether the full-brother or the half-brother was not clear) of Taj Mahal. Both Kulsum Begum and Ramzan Ali were at Baghdad.

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31. The parties were Shiahhs and accordingly if the relationship to Taj Mahal as above described was made out, Kulsum Begum would have the prior claim.

32. Notwithstanding the fact that Ramzan Ali claimed to be heir to Taj Mahal as against Kulsum Begum, Colonel Nixon, Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, proceeded to appoint him as her guardian, as she was stated to be a minor. He further declared Ramzan Ali to be the heir, without taking into consideration the fact that the parties were Shiahhs. Colonel Nixon's blundering, in which he continued in spite of warnings of Government, resulted in endless litigation and led to an amount of correspondence, which is as voluminous as it is tedious reading, but worth being summarised, as a commentary on the confusion an obstinate officer can create, and as a warning for avoiding the pitfalls in any similar case in future.

33. On the appointment of Ramzan Ali, as guardian, by Colonel Nixon, Syud Mehndi Hossein, representing himself to be uncle and step-father of the minor, prayed to have the protection of the girl upon an order issued by the Civil Court of Lucknow appointing him the lawful guardian.

34. Mehndi Hossein's petition was returned to him, with its enclosures, for submission through the Chief Commissioner of Oudh.

35. Subsequently, Mehndi Hossein telegraphed that he had obtained letters of administration of the estate, and that he entertained fears of the safety of the life of Kulsum Begum, as Ramzan Ali, her guardian, was believed to be her enemy.

36. These particulars were communicated to Colonel Nixon, who was at the same time asked for a report on the case, Mehndi Hossein being informed to that effect.

37. The Political Agent replied that at the time Taj Mahal died, Mehndi Hossein was in India; Mehndi Hossein therefore could not be appointed guardian of the minor; that in fact he had "gravely misbehaved" at Baghdad. The minor was therefore made over to the custody of Ramzan Ali, where it was intended to let her remain unless Government order otherwise, or until the question of heirship was decided.

38. Colonel Nixon also denied that Ramzan Ali was inimical to Kulsum Begum; but it must be confessed that Ramzan Ali was himself aiming at the possession of the estate, and was said to have even gone so far as to dispute the legitimacy of the minor.

39. Mehndi Hossein again reported his fears in regard to the life of Kulsum Begum, and solicited that Government would take steps to put into execution the order of the Civil Court appointing him guardian.

Dated 17th May 1876.
" 18th " "

40. Later two telegrams were received in the Office.

In one, Sakeena Begum, the nurse of the minor, complained that Kulsum Begum was in the greatest peril from her being placed under the charge of her enemy.

In the other, Kulsum Begum made a complaint similar in effect to the above, but including ill-treatment, and prayed to be brought to India with her moveables.

41. The substance of this telegram was communicated to the Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, who reported that the statement of Kulsum Begum was untrue; that Ramzan Ali was a highly respectable old man, and that Mehndi Hossein and one Syud Abbas had made a disturbance and obtained charge of the minor.

No. 1077-G., dated 20th May 1876.
Telegram, dated 20th May 1876.



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42. In a later communication Colonel Nixon stated that he had had an interview with Kulsum Begum, and that she seemed to be quite ignorant of the nature of the telegram sent to Government, which most likely emanated from Mehndi Hossein.

No. 19, dated 20th May 1876.

43. Two more communications were received, one on 22nd and the other on 23rd May 1876, from Mehndi Hossein.

44. The former reported that Mehndi Hossein's right as trustee had been established by the Judge and the Judicial Commissioner of Lucknow, and that it was decided that a certificate should be granted to Mehndi Hossein at Baghdad; and Mehndi Hossein prayed for orders for the issue to him of the necessary document, or for the removal of the minor, who, he believed, was about to be married into an objectionable family, a circumstance which he desired might be prevented.

45. In the paper received on the 23rd May 1876, Mehndi Hossein stated, among other things, that Ramzan Ali was known as Taj Mahal's step-brother and bore no such relation to Kulsum Begum as to be appointed her guardian. It was also shown therein that the property to be inherited by Kulsum Begum

existed in different parts of India as well as at Baghdad. Such being the case, and, as the heir had never been in India, the action of the Civil Court at Lucknow in giving Mehndi Hossein a certificate of administration, appeared to be opposed to Section V of Act 40 of 1858, which runs as follows:—

"If the property be situated in more than one district, any such application" (that is, for the appointment of a fit person to take charge of the property and person of a minor) * * * shall be made to the Civil Court of the districts in which the minor has his residence."

46. It will however be seen from the concluding portion of Colonel Nixon's letter No. 19, dated 20th May 1876, that the Judicial Commissioner of Lucknow reversed the order of the Judge of that place, appointing Mehndi Hossein the guardian of Kulsum Begum.

47. In connection with the above point, the Chief Commissioner of Oudh was desired† to obtain some explanation from the Court at Lucknow as to the action taken by it, and to submit a report on the case.

† No. 1166-G., dated 1st June 1876, and enclosures.

48. In reply, the Officiating Junior Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Oudh communicates particulars of the case. Among them that—

"on the 13th July 1875, the Chief Commissioner received a telegram from the Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, announcing the death of Taj Mahal Saheba, widow of Nusseer-ud-din Hyder late King of Oudh, a Waseekadar of Rs. 6,000 per mensem, leaving a reputed grand-daughter who was minor, and requesting instructions regarding the grandchild and property.

"The Chief Commissioner informed the Political Agent that he had no power to give any order regarding the guardianship of the minor or the property of the deceased, and that only the claims to the waseeka pension could be decided by him.

"Colonel Nixon replied that under the provisions of an order‡ in Council, he was empowered to deal with the effects of the deceased lady, but that he did not wish to hand over any of her property to her brother Syud Ramzan Ali Khan, under whose guardianship he had placed the minor, until he was advised by the Chief Commissioner that he recognized him as her heir."

‡ Paragraph 206 of Political A., March 1874, No. 75.

"The Court shall endeavour to obtain as early as may be, notice of the death of every subject or protected person dying within the particular jurisdiction, whether resident or not, and all such information respecting his affairs as may serve to guide the Court with respect to the securing and administration of his property."

49. It is further stated in the letter from the Officiating Junior Secretary to the Chief Commissioner that Mehndi Hossein—

"having obtained a certificate of guardianship from the Civil Court in Lucknow, proceeded to Turkish Arabia for the purpose of taking possession of his step-daughter, but Colonel Nixon refused to let her go, and wrote to the Chief Commissioner complaining of what had happened.

"The Chief Commissioner submitted the case for the opinion of the Judicial Commissioner who replied that the action of the Civil Judge in granting the certificate was illegal, inasmuch as he had no jurisdiction, and a copy of his letter was sent to Colonel Nixon."



50. The Chief Commissioner was at the same time of opinion that it was natural--

"that the nearer relations of Kulsum Begum should be dissatisfied with an arrangement which places her in charge of a person, who cannot be expected to take any action with regard to her claim to the property of the deceased pensioner, and who as urged by her relatives has an interest in her death."

51. With reference to the report of Colonel Nixon, No. 45, dated 11th April 1876, that officer was asked to furnish a fuller narrative of the dispute in regard to guardianship, and of his proceedings connected therewith, to be accompanied by an explanation of the statement made by him that Mehndi Hossein had "gravely misbehaved" at Baghdad. He was further desired to satisfy himself by personal enquiry that the minor and her property were in safe hands. In continuation of these orders the Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, was furnished

No. 1155-G., dated 1st June 1876.

No. 1452-G., dated 8th July 1876.

No. 41, dated 7th August 1876.

" 43, " 2nd " "

52. Colonel Nixon sent the narrative and explanation asked for.

53. He stated that on the death of Taj Mahal Begum, he had written to the Chief Commissioner of Oudh, informing him of the circumstance and asking him for instructions, but those instructions were not furnished, as the Chief Commissioner considered he had not the power to give them, so far as they concerned the guardianship.

54. Colonel Nixon at first desired to place the minor under the guardianship of Nawab* Ikbal-ud-dowlah, the cousin of the late King of Oudh, who was the husband of Taj Mahal; but the Nawab declined the charge of Kulsum Begum whom he considered spurious.

Paragraph 22 of the letters Nos. 41 and 43, dated 7th and 2nd August 1876.

55. It is also stated by Colonel Nixon that--

"Mehndi Hossein * * * was turned away from the service of Taj Mahal Begum for running away with another man's wife; so I should not, under any circumstances, have considered him a fit guardian; he has since been instrumental in getting up two false telegrams: one in regard to the fact that it was intended to marry the girl to some person * * *, and a second one to Government that the minor Kulsum Nissa Begum's life was in danger."

56. Besides this, the man was in Lucknow when Taj Mahal died, and did not appear in Baghdad until six months later. Colonel Nixon, therefore, as a last resource, made over Kulsum Begum to the care of Ramzan Ali who was the brother of the deceased.

Nos. 41 and 43, dated 7th August 1876, and 2nd idem, paragraph 17.

57. In respect to heirship Colonel Nixon wrote that--

"Ramzan Ali Khan had proved his claim before this Court to be the nearest heir of the late Taj Mahal Begum, and that the depositions of the chief members of the family of the late Padishah, Shah of Oudh, had recognized him as her legitimate heir;" that Ramzan Ali Khan

Nos. 41 and 43, dated 7th August 1876, and 2nd idem, paragraph 23.

being the brother of the late Taj Mahal Begum would ordinarily, under Mahomedan law, inherit before any one else; in fact by Almerie Ramsey's "Chart of family inheritance according to orthodox Mahomedan law," the husband inherits first, secondly the father, thirdly the grandfather, and fourthly the brother; "that

Paragraph 5 of Colonel Nixon's letter No. 44, dated 14th August 1876.

Ramzan Ali Khan bears his claim to inherit under the Treaty as the brother of the late Taj Mahal Begum, and in no way rests his claim on the life or right of the minor Kulsum Nissa, whom he regards as having no claim to his deceased sister's property; his rights as a brother * * can hardly be ignored, and he was recognized as the brother of the deceased Taj Mahal Begum by the late King of Oudh, Nusseer-ud-din Hyder, himself during his life time;" that

Paragraph 7 of the above.

Kulsum Nissa died during Taj Mahal Begum's lifetime, several years ago;" and the Political Agent considers that "this fact alone will

* See Chapter XVIII about Nawab Ikbal-ud-Dowlah.



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render the minor's claim somewhat equivocal, and will have to be discussed under the curious Mahomedan law of Mahjoob-ool-Irus."

58. With respect to the statement of the Officiating Junior Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Oudh—

Letter No. 118, dated 20th June 1876, paragraph 8.

"that the name of the Kulsum Begum only appears in the list of heirs filed in the Waseeka Office by the deceased lady,"

the Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, pointed out that had such a document been framed it would have been submitted through his office to the Chief Commissioner, as he "has ordinarily to sign every life certificate and verify the seal or signature of every pensioner in Turkish Arabia;" and he hoped that the list referred to, if unverified, may not be accepted as valid by the Chief Commissioner of Oudh, and desired that it might be sent to him. He also awaits orders as to whether the minor should be transferred.

59. Colonel Nixon enclosed in his letter, translation of a petition from Ramzan Ali, in which the latter brings to notice that when Nussir-ud-deen Hyder died, Taj Mahal had no child by him; that Mehndi Hossein had put forward a forged and false Hibbanameh to the effect, that Kulsum Nissa Begum was the heir of Taj Mahal; that Taj Mahal did not know how to write or read, and her seal was in the hands of others; that the said Hibbanameh was not authenticated by the seal and signature of the British Resident at Baghdad according to custom and rule.

60. Ramzan Ali further stated that he had always been in attendance on the deceased; and that if such a document were prepared by her, he would have been aware of its existence; that the property of the deceased was bequeathed to her by her husband for her benefit and for that of her relations; and that he (Ramzan Ali) as her brother was the lawful heir.

61. The Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, reported that Ramzan Ali had made several applications for money for the support of the minor, himself, and dependants; and solicited that Government might pass an order for Rupees 2,000 being paid monthly to Ramzan Ali, pending a decision on the question of the guardianship of the minor.

62. It might be remarked that Colonel Nixon in his letter No. 44, dated 14th August 1876, took exception to the style in which the letter from the Officiating Junior Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Oudh, No. 118, dated 20th June 1876, was written.

63. Meanwhile the Chief Commissioner, Oudh, had recommended that the option allowed by the Treaty of capitalizing the pension should be accepted, and that the principal sum, which would amount to Rupees 14,40,000, should be paid to the person who might prove to be the rightful heir. In this view the Government of India concurred; but a difficulty arose as to the course to be pursued pending settlement of the question of succession. The Advocate-General was consulted. He advised that interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum must be paid until the Government was discharged by payment of the principal as provided in Article 3 of the Treaty of 1829. As both claimants were beyond the jurisdiction of the Indian Courts, no proceedings could be taken to pay the principal money into court. The best course to be adopted was, to serve notices on the claimants, taking care not to admit their title, informing them that the Government had resolved to pay off, under Article 4 of the Agreement, the principal sum proportionate to the pension of Rupees 6,000 monthly, calculated upon a rate of 5 per cent. interest on the amount capitalized. The claimants were to be referred to a Court of Justice for decision of all questions regarding the right to inherit from the deceased lady; and finally they were to be warned of the risk of having the interest payable barred by limitation, unless proceedings were taken without delay. The Government could not escape paying 5 per cent. interest by investing the money in Govern-

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ment securities; and moreover, if such investment were made, Government would be constituting themselves trustees for the heirs of the deceased lady, and thus assuming a position open to objection.

64. The Chief Commissioner of Oudh was directed to proceed in accordance with this opinion, and in due course a suit was brought by Begum Kulsumnissa, through Syuds Mehndi Hossein and Sadiq Hossein, against Ramzan Ali Khan, Taj Mahal's brother, to establish her right to succeed to Taj Mahal's pension. On the 26th October 1876 the Civil Judge of Lucknow passed a decree in Kulsumnissa's favour declaring her to be the grand-daughter and heir, according to the Shiah law, of the deceased Taj Mahal; but as an appeal was immediately preferred against this decision, the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia was instructed to take no action upon it beyond providing for the security of the property.

65. In May 1877 the Chief Commissioner of Oudh reported that Begum Kulsumnissa's claim had been upheld by the Appellate Court, but that, as a

General A., April 1879, Nos. 89-125.

further appeal might be preferred to the Privy Council, he requested instructions as to the payment of the capitalized value of the pension, and suggested that the amount should be invested in the Begum's name and deposited in the Treasury. After some further correspondence, including urgent petitions from Begum Kulsumnissa herself, the Government of India again consulted the Advocate-General. Mr. Paul advised, and the Standing Counsel, Mr. J. D. Bell, concurred in his opinion, that as the decision of the Lucknow Court was not final, and as an appeal might still be preferred to the Privy Council, it was inexpedient for the Government of India to take any step in the interval. They were unable to suggest any course by which the Government could be freed from payment of interest at the rate of 5 per cent. on the capital sum, and until the disputed heirship had been finally settled, it would not be safe to part with the principal. Mr. Bell, the Standing Counsel, on being separately consulted, pointed out that the suit must still be considered pending, as an appeal was still possible; that the Government were not in a position to bring an interpleader suit, and that the money due from Government could not consequently be paid into Court.

66. In consequence of these opinions, the Government of India were compelled to issue orders for the suspension of all payments to Begum Kulsumnissa until

General A., April 1879, Nos. 17-18.

such time as her right should be finally established. At the same time inquiry was made whether any further appeal had been instituted, and it was ascertained that up to the 22nd February 1878 no appeal had been preferred, but that special applications for the further consideration of the case might still be laid before the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, if good grounds for doing so were discovered. As the decisions hitherto passed were concurrent, the appeal would lie to the Privy Council, and might be admitted after expiry of the period of limitation. A further reference to the Chief Commissioner of Oudh showed that no appeal had been preferred up to the middle of April 1878, and the Advocate-General was again asked to advise whether it would be safe for Government to pay to Kulsumnissa the capitalized value of her grand-mother's pension, together with the interest at 5 per cent. due thereon. Mr. Paul observed that in the interval since his last opinion the defendant in the suit, Ramzan Ali, had died, but that his representatives were said to be disposed to appeal. Although the ordinary term for preferring an appeal had passed, one might be allowed on good and sufficient cause being shown. He advised that it would be imprudent for Government to part with the principal and interest of Taj Mahal's pension, and suggested that inquiry should be made as to the course which Ramzan Ali's representatives intended to pursue. These inquiries were instituted, and elicited the fact that in the month of August 1878 Syud Ahmad Hossein, the only son of Ramzan Ali, had informed the Wasika Officer at Lucknow that his intention was to proceed with the case, but he had not yet made up his mind whether he would apply to the Judicial Commissioner or the Privy Council. In the absence of Mr. Paul the result of these inquiries



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was communicated to the Standing Counsel, who earnestly recommended a further delay until it was certain that no appeal would be preferred. Mr. Bell wrote—

"Although two years have now elapsed since the judgment of the Appellate Court was given I do not think that it would be wise, in the face of the information given by the Wasika Officer, to pay over the money, even if the lady be of full age. The absence of the party from India, and the difficulties the son might show he had to contend with, might induce the Privy Council to grant leave to appeal; and I am not sufficiently satisfied with the judgments to say that, if leave to appeal were granted, a reversal to at any rate the extent of ordering a remand might not be the consequence."

67 In February 1879 the Advocate-General was informed that an application had been made to the Commissioner of Lucknow for a review of judgment, which had been rejected, and that the defendant's representatives were said to be taking legal advice. Mr. Paul still held that the Government of India could not safely pay any money to Kulsumnissa.


68. Kulsum Begum tried now to raise loans on the security of her title to the estate of the deceased Taj Mahal. She was said to have taken an advance of Rs. 45,000 from one Mohsi Hakam Eliahu of Baghdad. The Political Agent thereupon under orders from Government notified that they would undertake no responsibility from any such advance. Kulsum Begum thereupon appealed to Government and solicited that they would either order her debts to be cleared off or define her rights. The Political Agent was then told by Government to inform her that they were unable to pay her any further sums from Taj Mahal's estate until her title had been conclusively established by final court of appeal and that no arrangements for her care could be made until she came to Lucknow and placed herself under the protection of the Chief Commissioner. The Political Agent was also told to use every endeavour to prevent Kulsum Begum from contracting an imprudent marriage or incurring debts. (Telegram dated 14th June 1878.)

69. In April 1879 Colonel Nixon reported that Kulsum Begum preferred to reside in Arabia, now that her rival Ramzan Ali had died. She feared also that she would be subjected to undue influence to marry a person against her wishes, if she went to India. Government informed the Political Agent to inform her that they did not wish to press the matter further and that they considered they had discharged in full their duty towards her.

70. In May 1879 Kulsum Begum announced her intention to marry her first cousin Syud Askar Hossein, to whom she had been long betrothed. Government saw no objection to this marriage, which it was understood Colonel Nixon did not consider imprudent. The marriage took place on 5th June 1879.

71. The *Courier d'Orient* of the 27th January 1879 made certain allegations of misappropriation of several ornaments belonging to the late Taj Mahal by one Ahmed Aga, Native Agent of the Residency, said to be an Indian Nawab and appointed by Colonel Nixon to look after the deceased's property. Nawab Ikbāl-ud-Dowla was also said to be implicated in the affair. It was alleged that the Ahmed Aga broke the seals of the boxes in which the valuables were placed and despatched all of them less some of the best which he appropriated to himself, to the Consul-General at Baghdad. Colonel Nixon's report was called for.

72. Ahmed Aga was prosecuted and tried. But the result of his trial is not known.





CHAPTER XVIII.

Pension of Nawab Ikbāl-ud-Dowla.

73. Nawab Ikbāl-ud-Dowla was the only surviving son of the Nawab Shums-ud-Dowla, who was the second son of Saadut Ali Khan, Nawab Vizier of Oudh.

74. On a petition presented by Nawab Ikbāl-ud-Dowla in January 1835, the Government of India wrote to the Resident at Lucknow, saying that—

"this branch of the Lucknow family possesses a peculiar claim to the exertion of our good offices in their behalf; and it is requested that, after making the necessary references, you will use your influence with the King* to obtain for the family a pension of similar amount to that which His Majesty offered to their late mother of Rs. 2,400 per mensem."

75. The King replied to the Resident's solicitations in the following terms:—

"As it has always been my wish to provide for all the members of my family, I have granted to the descendants of the late Nawab Shums-ud-Dowla (for whom no provision had been made) the sum of Lucknow Sicca Rs. 2,500 to be paid by the English monthly from the 1st March 1835, and continued during the lifetime of each pensioner according to the list† which will be sent hereafter.

† "Nore.—There is no list on record, but the allowances were, it is believed, for three sons at Rs. 625 each ...	Rs. 1,875
Two daughters, at Rs. 312-8 each ...	" 625
Total ...	" 2,500

76. In 1859 the Government of India raised the pension of Nawab Ikbāl-ud-Dowla from Rs. 625 to Rs. 1,250 per mensem on account of "the aid" (pecuniary) "he afforded during the Persian war and the hearty good-will he displayed to our cause."

77. In October 1865, in reply to a despatch‡ from the Secretary of State, forwarding a memorial from Ikbāl-ud-Dowla, the Government of India submitted§ a full report|| from the Chief Commissioner, Oudh, upon the circumstances stated in the Nawab's representation, and said—

"we are of opinion that the claims of the Nawab have been fairly met, inasmuch as the pension of which he was in receipt was doubled for his services during the Persian war. Should, however, Her Majesty's Government think otherwise, we are willing to raise the pension from Rs. 1,250 to Rs. 1,500 per mensem for his life, subject to reconsideration at the death of the Nawab."

78. The Secretary of State replied:—

"The Nawab Ikbāl-ud-Dowla has been waiting in England for more than a year, expecting some final decision upon his case, and is now very desirous of returning to his usual place of residence in Baghdad. I have felt, therefore, the necessity of taking his case into consideration upon its own merits, on a review of all its circumstances as stated by the Nawab himself and in the report of the Junior Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Oudh. The Nawab is now advanced in years and has no children. Though only the third son of Nawab Shums-ud-Dowla, he has always been put forward as the head of the family and the representative of its claims. * * * * * The Nawab has added to the claim upon the British Government for services rendered during the Persian war * * * * * by the display of conspicuous loyalty during the time of the sepoy mutinies and of the insurrection in Oudh, in which so many members of his family were seriously compromised. In consideration of these circumstances, I have, with the concurrence of the Council of India, resolved to fix the future stipend of the Nawab at the amount conceded by the King Nasser-ud-Deen Hyder to this branch of the family, viz., Rs. 2,500 per mensem, payable for his life only. I have authorized its disbursement from the date of the Governor-General's last recommendation,¶ and to be paid from the Treasury of the Political Agent

¶ 21st October 1835.

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in Turkish Arabia, in the same manner as the stipend he now enjoys have hitherto been drawn by him from that treasury."

79. In July last the Secretary of State forwarded copy of a letter from Nawab Ikbāl-ud-Dowlaḥ, soliciting some increase to his allowance of Rs. 2,500 per mensem, and stated :—

Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 72 (Political), dated 12th July 1877.

"Under all the circumstances of the case, taking into consideration the Nawab's history his very advanced age, the peculiar position which he holds at Baghdad, and the Political advantage which may accrue to the Indian Government from the presence there of a distinguished Native Prince who has always been a firm supporter of British interests, I have decided, after deliberation in Council, to sanction the grant to Ikbāl-ud-Dowlaḥ of an additional allowance of Rs. 500 a month, with effect from the 1st instant (July). The Nawab having been informed accordingly, I have to request that the necessary instructions in the matter may be sent to the Political Agent at Baghdad at an early date."

80. A copy of the Secretary of State's letter was forwarded to the Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, and to the Chief Commissioner, Oudh, and Financial Department, for information.

No. 2010-12-P., dated 17th August 1877.

Enfacement for payment of interest on a Government Promissory-note of Nawab Ikbāl-ud-Dowlaḥ from the Baghdad Treasury, 1884-1885.

81. In 1884 a request was made by the Agra Bank, Limited, Calcutta, on behalf of Nawab Ikbāl-ud-Dowlaḥ to have certain Government Promissory-notes, aggregating Rs. 1,00,000, enfaced for payment of the interest from the Resident's Treasury at Baghdad. According to a ruling in the Finance Department, interest on Government Promissory-notes is payable only at Government Treasuries in India, so that unless there was special political reason, the Nawab's request could not be entertained, Mr. Plowden was asked to state whether there was any such reason. He reported that presuming there could be no possible audit objection as he had interpreted the Civil Account Code Regulation on the point, he had already promised the Nawab to comply with his request, though there was no special political reason for granting the favour. In reply Mr. Plowden was told (Foreign Department letter No. 2916-E., dated 18th November 1884) that the Regulation in question did not apply to Baghdad, and that the Government of India would not allow without special orders enfacements for payments of interest on Government Promissory-notes at the Treasuries of Zanzibar, Maskat, Bushire, Tehran and Baghdad.

82. In the circumstances, however, mentioned by Mr. Plowden, Government authorized the Political Resident at Baghdad to pay the Nawab the interest upon the specified Promissory-notes as long as the Nawab held them. This would avoid the difficulty which might arise if the Nawab were to dispose of his notes and we should not thus become liable to maintain the effacement to Baghdad in favour of persons to whom there is no occasion to grant such a special privilege.

83. In 1885, when the Nawab wished to ensure the continued payment from the Baghdad Treasury after his death, of the interest of the Government paper in which he had invested, he asked that he might be allowed to invest the money in the Resident's name as trustee for the disbursement of the income towards the expenses of his tomb. The Financial Department having objected to this course on the ground that it would in effect make the Resident the Nawab's trustee, Sir Ikbāl-ud-Dowlaḥ was informed by this Department, through Colonel Tweedie, that the Resident could not accept the trust. The reasons for the refusal, however, were not explained; neither were any financial rules referred to, which prevented the sanction being given though in the

External A., July 1885, No. 62.



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notes it was clearly pointed out that there were no such rules. Sir Ikbald-Dowlah accepted the refusal at once, and made an alternative suggestion, as follows :—

External A., October 1885, Nos. 86-89.

"I would therefore wish the amount in question held, after my death, at the disposal of the person appointed by me as my trustee or executor under my will, the interest being paid to him as during my life it is paid to me; while the expenses and maintenance of my tomb are carried out under the combined consultation and supervision of Resident for time being and of my executor."

84. The decision of Government on this application was that the payment of the interest at Baghdad was a special, personal, concession in favour of the Nawab which the Government of India could not undertake to continue after his death. There would however be no difficulty in having the securities deposited in any bank in India, which the trustee or executor under the Nawab's will might select, and in withdrawing the interest, when realized, by selling bills on the bank. With this exception, the Government of India approved the arrangement proposed by the Nawab. (Foreign Department letter No. 1441-F., dated 16th September 1885).

85. The Nawab died 21st December 1887 at Kathimain, 5 miles from Baghdad, a Shiaah sacred town and a favourite residence of the deceased. He left a will behind, in which Colonel Tweedie rightly remarked there runs a vein of eccentricity. The Nawab imagines himself "Royalty,"—a King of Oudh in all the glories of the old dynasty when in power, directs the British Ambassador at Constantinople to recover certain balances from the Ottoman Bank and appoints the Political Resident at Baghdad executor of his trust with certain other residents of Baghdad.

86. The will is written entirely in the Nawab's own handwriting, and consists of paragraphs each separately attested relating to his various and frequently repeated behests.

87. Briefly, it enjoins the following conditions :—


- (1) that all the Nawab's immoveable and moveable property valuables, excepting books and house furniture, should be turned into cash, and the proceeds reserved for the up-keep of his tomb and the house in which it is situated, for ever afterwards;
- (2) that the executor of this trust should be the Resident in the Turkish Gulf, with the advice and co-operation of certain other persons named, *e.g.* :—

- (a) Abul Hassan his trusted manager of the household and estate; Khider, son of the above, and after him one of his capable and sensible descendants, as long as the family contains a worthy representative; and
- (b)* Nawab Mahomed Hassan Khan supposed to be a member of the Karnatic family and honorary Residency Agent at Kadhimain with Agha Mahomed and his brothers, sons of Mahomed Hassan Khan; and
- (c) Mahomed Taki Khan, brother of Mahomed Hassan Khan and honorary Residency Agent at Kerballa.

88. Colonel Tweedie asked the Government of India orders on two points:—first—"May the Resident accept the trust imposed, and take the responsibilities of becoming chief executor?" Secondly, if the first is decided in the affirmative—"How is the will to be dealt with as regards the laws of probate and execution?"

89. The question of the Political Resident acting as executor of the trust has a long history of its own. Sir Henry Rawlinson reported in his letter No. 34 of the 28th October 1847, that the Nawab had called upon him and said he was anxious to make a will, whereby his whole estate, with the exception

* See genealogical table in Chapter IV (ix) page .



of a life annuity to his wife, legacies to some of his old servants, and the bequest of certain household property at Baghdad for the maintenance of his own and his son's tomb, would be transferred after his death, in trust to the Resident at Lucknow, for the benefit of his male relatives in that city, and he added that he wished to deposit the will in the Resident's office and to appoint the officer in charge of Political Agency of Turkish Arabia at the time of his decease, as his official executor.

90. Sir Henry Rawlinson enclosed a letter from the Nawab to the Governor-General in which not one word was said about his Lucknow relatives. After relating the death of his only son he said—

"As I have no other issue to inherit my property which I have in this country and in India, and since I cannot place confidence in the people of the present time, and more especially of this country, and further as human life is precarious, I deem it prudent for me to execute a will and entrust it to the British Resident at Baghdad at a proper time, that he may, after my death, in the capacity of my attorney and executor, act up to the instructions which may be therein contained with respect to my property."

91. In this department letter No. 479 of the 25th February 1848, the original draft ran as follows:—

"I have.....enclosure from Nawab Ikbal-ud-Dowlah to the address of the Governor-General, soliciting that you may be appointed as (his) official executor."

"His" was struck out and the following words added:—

"Of a will which he is desirous of making, whereby the greater portion of his estate will be transferred, after his death, in trust to the Resident at Lucknow for the benefit of his relatives in that city."

The letter went on to say that under "the special circumstances of the case" the Nawab's requests would be complied with and the Resident was authorised to take charge of the will.

It was tolerably clear that the authority was given on the understanding that the bulk of the Nawab's property in *Arabia* would be transferred in trust to the Resident at Lucknow for the benefit of his male relatives in that city.

92. The Nawab appears to have deposited his will with the Resident in 1875, and after this he had it attested by the Residency Surgeon and Messrs. Blockley and Clarke in January 1883.

93. We noted above the orders passed by the Government of India—refusing to comply with the Nawab's request to allow the Resident to be a trustee for the fund intended for the maintenance of his tomb. These orders were apparently passed without having the orders of 1848 put up before them by the Secretariat (see notes in Internal A., June 1888, Nos. 216-240).

94. The Government of India seems to have been disposed to consider favourably the deceased Nawab's claims for their interest in his affairs, but the will was bristling with difficulties. The bequests were valid only to the extent of one-third of the property left by the deceased, and many of them were invalid in themselves, under the Mahomedan Law. Setting aside the legal difficulties, the Government of India thought that *it would be very inconvenient for a British Official in a foreign country to be the responsible manager of such a trust as is contemplated by the will.*

94a. Further the Advocate General was consulted and the following were then the instructions communicated to the Political Resident in Foreign Department letter No. 3072-L, dated 28th July 1888.

"You will observe that it is open to question whether the Political Resident is appointed executor under the will, but even supposing such an interpretation possible, it would be necessary, inasmuch as the Resident for the time being is not a corporation, that the duties of executor should be performed by the Political Resident at the time of the Nawab's death in his personal and not in his official capacity. When the Nawab in the year 1843 asked that he might be allowed to deposit his will in the Residency Office and to appoint the Political Agent at the time of his decease to be his official executor, the Government of India agreed to sanction the request on the understanding that the greater portion of his estate would be transferred after his death in trust to the Resident at Lucknow for the benefit of his relatives in that city. But in the present will widely different arrangements are made for the disposal of



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the estate. Moreover, the terms of the will are so obscure that it would be impossible to deal with the estate under it without the construction of the will by a Court of Justice. Under the circumstances, and considering that the Testator has left heirs who are fully competent to protect their own interests the Government of India has decided that it is not desirable to allow the Political Resident to undertake the administration of the estate.

You should therefore inform the heirs of the deceased that as the Government of India has decided that the Political Resident cannot under any circumstances be allowed to act as executor, they are at liberty to take such steps as they may be advised with respect to the administration of the estate, subject to the terms of the will of which a certified copy should be forwarded for their information.

I am further to invite your attention to the 21st section of the Ottoman Order in Council of the 12th December 1873, and to remark that it is apparently desirable that you should now formally renounce probate."

94-B. Meanwhile the Residency Consular Court had taken custody of the estate, and taken measures to administer it by appointing a receiver, etc.
Internal A., June 1888, Nos. 216-240. (No. 217.)

94-C. In February 1889 we find that Messrs. Harriss and Simmons, Attorney at Calcutta, informing Colonel Tweedie that a suit had been filed in the High Court of Calcutta praying that the alleged will of the deceased might be declared invalid and inoperative, for a declaration that he died intestate, etc. The parties to this suit were:—

Yamin-ud-Dowlah, Nawab Abid Ali Mirza, Mubarak-ud-Dowlah, Nawab Jafir Ali Khan, Nawab Hasan Ara Begum, Nawab Rowshan Ara Begum, Nawab Ahmad Ala Khan, Nawab Peari Begum Saheba, Nawab Begum Jan Saheba, Nawab Begum, *alias* Jana Begum. *Plaintiffs*.—Claiming to be sole heirs and next-of-kin of the late Nawab.

Versus.

The Secretary of State in Council and others who are mentioned in the will (see para. 88 above).

95. Meanwhile the Turkish authorities were interesting themselves in the estate of the late Nawab and were very solicitous about its administration. They evidently wished to take into their custody the property. Colonel Tweedie was of opinion "that if the heirs of the late Nawab once let his property or its money proceeds pass out of British into Osmanli custody they may consider it gone from them for ever and as little worth going to law about as if it were situated in the moon."

96. Under the Turkish law, immoveable property left by a deceased person would escheat to the State, if he has left no heirs or no will is proved within a certain time. Such a contingency was an undesirable one in this case. The Baghdad Land Department, however, was strenuously moving to have the Nawab's landed property placed in its custody and administration. But under section 207 of the Ottoman Order-in-Council, pending the litigation that was going on, for the time being, it had fallen under the jurisdiction of His Britannic Majesty's Supreme Consular Court, Constantinople.

97. In 1890 an application for probate of the Nawab's will was filed in His Britannic Majesty's Supreme Court at Constantinople. The parties to this application were:—

Plaintiffs, all of Baghdad, by Edwin Pears.	{	Nawab Kezir Mahomed Hassan.	{	Sons of Nawab Mirza Hussein Khan.
		Nawab Aga Mahomed Khan.		
		Nawab Mahomed Haji Khan.		
		Nawab Mahomed Ibrahim Khan.		
		Nawab Mahomed Tacki Khan		
		Nawab Mahomed Husein Khan.		

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Intervening by Lewis Francismizzi.

Sheikh Mahomed Tacki Shoostroy of Kadhiain.

Defendants by Demosthenes Gregory Cuppa.

The heirs (the plaintiffs in the suit in the Calcutta High Court).

98. Eventually the Executors

Internal A., June 1893, Nos. 20-58.

and the aforesaid nine compromised their dispute by agreement of 1891: the nine to get two-thirds of the whole property and the executors to get the other one-third. Administrators were appointed to apportion the share of the executors and that of the heirs. In the apportionment the Residency with its gardens and stables fell into the two-thirds belonging to the heirs. The executors got their one-third of the personalty under the agreement of 1891; but in order to fulfil the Ottoman law their share of the realty had first to be entered in the names of the heirs, and then retransferred to the executors. Consequently, as was to be expected when once the realty

External A., June 1894, Nos. 95-107. (No. 97.)

was all got in the names of the heirs, they with one accord refused to complete the further necessary transfer. Wherefore to coerce them the shares in the personalty of six heirs (which had not been paid over to them) was sequestered until they should carry out their compromise agreement. Meanwhile Nawab Aga Mahomed Khan, our agent at Kathimain, offered a sum of Rs. 1,93,200 to the heirs for their two-thirds share of the realty. Four of the nine heirs on reconsideration agreed to effect the transfer of the one-third to the executors and simultaneously agreed to the sale of their shares in the remaining two-thirds to the Nawab. On this their shares in the personalty were released from sequestration. Two of the other five heirs also offered to carry out the transfer to the executors, and sell their own interest to the Nawab (Colonel Mockler's letter No. 126, dated 5th March 1894, to the Government of India).

99. On the Consular Court at Constantinople establishing its jurisdiction to deal with the case, the Advocate General gave it as his opinion that the Government of India should not further interfere in the matter. In pursuance of the advice the Government of India have refrained from any further interference in the conduct of affairs of the estate, but have been kept informed of the progress of events.

100. It appears that by the end of May 1896, all the heirs had complied with the stipulations of the agreement of 1891, so that nothing remained unsettled between the executors and heirs concerning the estate of the deceased.

101. The death of Agha Mahomed Khan (in 1904?), one of the principal

External A., February 1905, Nos. 118-119.

trustees of the Trust Estates, disclosed an unsatisfactory state of things. He had purchased estates (including the British Residency) in his own name by means of trust funds. The heirs of Agha Mahomed claimed from the Resident certain title deeds connected with the trust deposited at the Resident. This he was given permission to do by the British Ambassador subject to certain conditions. (Telegram 24th January 1905.)



CHAPTER XIX.

Endowment of an Indian Nawab for the repair and extension of the Hussainia Canal.

101-A. There are two canals in the Kerbella Kaimakamlik, which owe their existence to a great extent, if not wholly, to the benefactions of Indians. One is the Hindia canal connecting the Euphrates with the sea of Najaf, reconstructed by an Indian Shiah lady, hence called Hindia. The other is the Hussainia Canal connecting the Euphrates with the Kerbella town, which was repaired and extended at the cost of an Indian Nawab of Sind. The origin and history of the endowment made for this purpose is interesting, showing, as it does, how much interest the British authorities took in the affair and as instance of how much Indian wealth has been invested in Turkish Arabia, in useful works, besides in mere religious or charitable bequests, rendering our relationship with Turkish Arabia especially peculiar. No apology is therefore needed for going into some details of the origin of the endowment.

101-B. In a letter received on the 14th March 1836, by Sir Robert Grant, Governor of Bombay, from His Highness Mir Nassir Khan of Sind, he stated that two of his Agents, named Syad Mehdi Shah and Haji Saleh, were proceeding to Kerbella *via* Bombay, for the purpose of repairing a canal at that place. With the view of accomplishing this object His Highness Mir Nassir Khan forwarded to Aga Mahomed Rahim Shiraji, a Persian Merchant in Bombay, bills of exchange to the amount of 20,000 Company's rupees and requested that the money when recovered might be deposited with Colonel Taylor, Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, in order that that Officer might make the necessary advances from time to time to the two persons above named. This sum having been subsequently deposited in the Hon'ble Company's Treasury at Bombay by Aga Mahomed Rahim Sheraji, the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, was, on the 8th July 1837, directed to draw thereon for the same, for the purpose above mentioned.

101-C. In a letter, dated 20th April 1838, Sir Henry Pottinger, Governor General's Agent for the affairs of Sind, stated that His Highness Mir Nassir Khan had received communications from the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, the Pasha of Baghdad and his own people at that place, to the effect that the Canal at Kerbella would cost one lac of rupees and that His Highness accordingly proposed sending Rs. 50,000, in addition to the sum of Rs. 20,000 which His Highness had already remitted to Bombay for this purpose. With his letter, dated the 22nd June 1838, Sir Henry Pottinger forwarded to Government thirty-six Hundis aggregating Rs. 50,000 which amount was subsequently recovered by the Sub-Treasurer and deposited in the Hon'ble Company's Treasury at Bombay for the purpose of being appropriated towards the prosecution of the repair of the canal at Kerbella.

101-D. On the 5th March 1839, Sir Henry Pottinger reported to Government that His Highness Mir Nassir Khan had applied to him for credit on the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, to the extent of 50,000 Company's rupees which his Agents stated would be required in addition to the 20,000 and 50,000 rupees already remitted by His Highness to complete the repair of the canal. Sir Henry Pottinger at the same time stated that the money would be repaid by His Highness into the Treasury of the Resident in Sind, at the rate of exchange he had established for local currencies.

101-E. Accordingly on the 15th April 1839, orders were issued by Government to the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia to make the necessary advance of the additional sum of 50,000 rupees above alluded to, towards the prosecution of the repairs of the canals.

101-F. Under date the 28th January 1840, Sir Henry Pottinger brought to the notice of Government that the sum of Rs. 50,000 above referred to had not up to the 12th of that month been paid into the Hon'ble Company's Treasury at Hyderabad. Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, who subsequently assumed charge of the Political Agency in Lower Sind, submitted to Government on

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the 27th February 1840, copy of a letter to his address from Lieutenant Whitelock, Assistant Political Agent in Lower Sind, stating with reference to the orders issued to him by Colonel Outram to call upon His Highness Mir Nassir Khan to repay the sum of Rs. 50,000 above alluded to, that he (Lieutenant Whitelock) had received on the 9th January 1840, the amount of a bill drawn on the Resident in Sind in His Highness' favor by Lieutenant Parr, Acting Sub-Assistant Commissary-General, for Company's Rs. 31,310-3-0 and that His Highness stated that the balance (Rs. 18,682-13-0) might be deducted from the amount due to him for grain which it appears had been purchased at Subzulcote by Sir Alexander Burnes for the Commissariat Department of the Army of the Indus.

101-G. With a letter, dated the 28th March 1840, Lieutenant-Colonel Outram forwarded to Government copy of the following communication he had addressed on the 26th of the same month, to the Secretary in attendance on the Right Hon'ble the Governor General of India, accounting for the delay in adjusting the balance due by His Highness Mir Nassir Khan.

"I have the honor to inform you that when Lieutenant Whitelock called upon His Highness Meer Nusseer Khan (in January last) to repay the sum of fifty thousand rupees advanced to his Agents by the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, he paid into the Hyderabad Treasury the sum of thirty-one thousand, three hundred and seventeen rupees and annas three, being the amount for grain purchased by the Bombay Commissariat Officers at the mouth of the Indus, and told that officer that he could deduct the balance from the amount due for grain purchased at Subzulcote, and for which he requested an early payment might be made as already upwards of twelve months had elapsed.

"All the time, His Highness said that he possessed receipts for the quantity of grain delivered, and since, has continually sent evasive answers when called upon to produce them, for until the nature of them was known, no settlement could be made.

"On receiving a message 3 days ago that His Highness was not quite certain that he had ever received any such documents, or if he had, that it had been mislaid, or lost, I examined the records for every information on the subject, and from the accompanying correspondence (as per margin) it appears that Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. Barnes omitted either to draw upon the Treasury for the amount of the price of the grain in favor of Meer Nusseer Khan or to write to the Resident in Sind to settle for it, and in the absence of any such authority, I am induced to solicit His Lordship's sanction to my paying His Highness the price of the grain at the then (December 1838) market rate at Subzulcote, for he denies having agreed to receive the sum of eighty rupees per Khurwar, as stated in Lieutenant Leckie's letter dated the 26th December 1838.

"In the meantime, I shall endeavour to ascertain from the grain-dealers at Subzulcote, the price of wheat in December 1838, also the rate at which the Bengal Commissariat Officers purchased it in that neighbourhood."

101-H. No further communications from the authorities in Sind appear to have reached this Government on the subject of the adjustment of the balance above referred to.

101-I. In reply to repeated references made to him by Government on the subject, Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, forwarded on the 1st July 1842, the following account of all sums advanced by him from time to time to the Agent at that place of His Highness Mir Nassir Khan on account of the repair of the canal at Kerbella:—



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"Account of advances made from the British Residency at Bagdad to Seyyed Mehdee Tabatabair, the Agent of His Highness Meer Nusseer Khan of Sind, as follows:—

		A.	Rs. A. P.
1837 October	31st	By amount of advances made Mahomed Shah Karans 41,162½ @ 168 to 100 By rupees	2,4501 4 0
		B.	
1840 April	5th	By amount of advances made in four different times amounting to Karans 50,000 @ 185½ to 100 By rupees	26,954 3 0
		C.	
November	26th	By amount of advance made in two different times Karans 34,400 @ 185½ to 100 By rupees	18,544 3 0
		By Rupees	69,999 10 0
		D.	
1842 June	20th	By amount of advance made by bills 76,000 Karans @ 190 to 100 C's Rupees	40,000 0 0
		C's. Rupees	1,09,999 10 0

British Residency, Bagdad, 1st July 1842.

E. E.



(Signed) R. TAYLOR, *Lieut.-Colonel,*
"Political Agent, Turkish Arabia".


101-J. Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor was from time to time authorized by Government to make advances for the Canal at Kerbella to the extent of Rs. 1,20,000 and from the above account it would appear that he advanced altogether to the Agent of His Highness Mir Nassir Khan the sum of Rs. 1,09,999-10-0 which would leave a balance of Rs. 10,000-6-0. From the information that the records of the Political Department supply, it appears that Government had only received from His Highness Mir Nassir Khan the sum of Rs. 1,01,317-3-0, so deducting from this amount the sum advanced by the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, *viz.*, Rs. 1,09,999-10-0, a balance of Rs. 8,682-7-0 remained to be recovered from Mir Nassir Khan.

101-K. The account appears to have been adjusted afterwards and the balance due paid by Nassir Khan.

101-L. The endowment does not, however, appear to have been put to full use for many years, for we find Colonel Kemball reporting his despatch to Embassy, No. 28, dated 5th August 1863:—

"A third project which is at present engaging His Excellency's attention is the repair and extension of the canal called Husseinieh, which proceeds from the Euphrates and little above the Hindiah to Kerbella, with the view of ensuring a constant supply of water at all seasons to that town. For this object a sum of money, about 2,000 purses, has been assigned by an Indian Nawab, since dead, and His Excellency has deputed the Egyptian-trained Engineers on his staff to make an estimate of the work and report upon the best mode of carrying it into effect."





CHAPTER XX.

Outrages against British subjects.

(i) Plunder of the mail steamer "Cashmere" at Basrah, 1872-73

102. In 1872, the mail steamer *Cashmere* of the British India Steam Navigation Company was boarded by a large number of daring robbers while at Basrah; and one of the crew, a fireman, was murdered, six others and the chief officer were injured, and property and cash of the value of Rs. 42,000 were carried away. There were several gangs of these robbers, one led by Jassim-el-Khalaf, another by Mahomed-el-Haij.

103. Thirty of the robbers were captured by the Turkish Police at Basrah itself, consisting of Lohsashees, Bahreinese, Montefik Arabs, Sidees, and residents of the islands near Basrah. Some effected their escape to Felaheea in Arabistan and took refuge among the Kaab Arab, whose chief was Sheikh Lufti. The most powerful chief in Arabistan at the time was Haji Jaber, the Mohasien chief of Mohammerah, and it was thought that through his influence the robbers that had escaped to Felaheea could be easily captured. Representations were therefore made to the Shah's Government at Teheran with a view to get orders issued to Haji Jaber to secure the capture of the robbers, which the Sadr Azem promised. Nine of the pirates were delivered, but four more were at large and no proper measures were taken at first for their capture.

104. The Political Agent in Turkish Arabia reported that on the 13th August he received a telegram from Mr. Robertson at Basrah to the effect that Haji Jaber had not received stringent orders from Teheran, or such as would authorize him to take up arms against the robbers who had taken refuge at Felaheea, and that he immediately addressed the following telegram dated 13th August, to Her Majesty's Mission at Teheran:—

"Beg you will obtain from Sadr Azem stringent orders to Prince Governor of Arabistan and Haji Jaber Khan to march against Felaheea, unless Lufti at once delivers to the latter the robbers now under his protection."

105. On the 16th August Colonel Herbert received a telegram directed to Haji Jaber by the Sadr Azem. This telegram is in French, but its English version is subjoined:—


"You have delivered the nine pirates. There remain besides according to the English four others. Communicate to Prince Anoushirwan Mirza this formal order, and let him take the most efficacious measures in consequence to force Sheikh Lufti to surrender the pirates immediately, and above all the plundered property which may be found with them. Let the Prince neglect no means to cause this order to be executed without delay."

106. Mr. Robertson was directed to take immediate action on this telegram in personal communication with Haji Jaber. Haji Jaber lost no time in forwarding a copy of the telegram to Prince Governor Anoushirwan Mirza, and another copy to Sheikh Lufti at Felaheea. Riouf Pasha meantime caused two small steamers to be procured from Basrah, and requested the Sheikh of Koweit to co-operate in preventing the escape of the robbers either by crossing the river at Felaheea or the Persian Gulf.

107. The reply of Sheikh Lufti to Haji Jaber was that there were neither robbers nor plunder at Felaheea, and that he had gone to wait on the Prince Governor at Howeyzah. It was hoped that the Prince would detain Sheikh Lufti as hostage until the surrender of the robbers known to have taken refuge with him.

108. Colonel Herbert stated that the arrest of Mahomed-el-Haij at Sook-es-Sheeoookh had led to the arrest at Basrah of another man with whom a small portion of the plundered property was found, and that Nasir Pasha is in search of Jassim-el-Khalaf and his band.

109. Foreign Department letter No. 2433-G., dated the 6th of December 1872, informed Colonel Herbert that his proceedings in respect to the measures
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PART IV.

which he had adopted to compel the Chief of Felaheea to give up the robbers who plundered the *Cashmere* were approved.

110. With his letter to Earl Granville, dated 18th September 1872, Mr. Thomson, *Chargé d'Affaires* at Teheran, sent on a copy of a telegraphic correspondence which had ensued between himself and Colonel Herbert on the subject of the robbers in hiding at Felaheea. Colonel Herbert stated that no action had been taken in obedience to the Sadr Azem's orders, that Jaber had not force to act alone; that Prince Anoushirwan was without influence or power, and he requested that Mr. Thomson would obtain the issue of definite orders in the matter to Prince Hamza Mirza, Governor-General of Persian Arabia. And four days after [9th September] he said that Sheikh Lufti, the Felaheea Chief, had gone to Prince Hamza Mirza, and he feared that the Chief might win the Prince over.

111. To this Mr. Thomson replied that the Persian Government had made arrangements for the immediate departure of a special Mohissil to the Prince Governor at Khoremad, and that the Mohissil before returning to Teheran was to see that the pirates then at Felaheea (two in number) were secured with the plundered property and handed over to the Turkish authorities.

112. Colonel Herbert's letter No. 44 of the 25th of September showed that his fear that Sheikh Lufti would bribe Prince Hamza Mirza was only too well founded, for on the 19th of September Mr. Robertson, the British Agent at Basrah, reported that the Chief had returned from his visit to the Prince, who had presented him with a belt, and that he (the Chief) was taking no steps to surrender the robbers.

113. Colonel Herbert lost no time in communicating this fact to Mr. Thomson, with an expression of his hope that the Persian authorities would not be allowed to trifle with British interests.

114. And immediately afterwards, in consequence of information which he had received, he telegraphed to Mr. Thomson :—

"Vice-Consul, Basrah, states it is commonly reported, though proof probably impossible that Sheikh Lufti in his late visit to Khoremad took 25,000 krans to present to Prince Governor. I deem it expedient to bring this to Your Excellency's notice, as it would account for belt given. Consul adds, he hears on 10th instant pirates at Felaheea under surveillance."

115. All experience of the proceedings of the Persian authorities led Colonel Herbert to believe that it was only natural that Sheikh Lufti should bribe Prince Hamza Mirza, and that it would be reported by the latter that none of the robbers or plunder were, or had been, at Felaheea, though their presence there could not be doubted.

116. On this point Colonel Herbert wrote thus :—

"It will be very much to be regretted, and a blow to our reputation in this country, if we fail to obtain the surrender of these criminals and their plunder."

117. The letter from Mr. Thomson to Earl Granville, No. 70, dated 14th October 1872, forwarded a copy of Colonel Herbert's representations in the matter of the suspected bribery, and it further showed that Colonel Herbert suggested that a competent Gholam should be attached to the Mohessil with orders to communicate with the Vice-Consul at Basrah. To this Mr. Thomson replied that instructions had been issued by himself and the Sadr Azem to the Prince Hamza Mirza, and that he did not think it would be advisable to send a Gholam, as the Persian authorities might consider themselves to some extent released from responsibility in the matter were an Agent from the Mission employed. Colonel Herbert concurred in the opinion, and as he was about to leave Baghdad he asked Mr. Thomson to place himself in communication with Mr. Robertson. Shortly afterwards Mr. Thomson sent the following message to the Agent at Basrah :—

"Haji Hashem Khan, the Mohessil sent from Teheran to secure the apprehension of pirates, ought shortly to reach Felaheea. Pray communicate with him, and inform me by telegraph if any further orders are required to enable him to discharge the duty with which he is entrusted."



CHAPTER XIX.

118. In his letter to Earl Granville, Mr. Thomson writes :—

"I have the honor to report that a special Agent, named Haji Hashem Khan, an *employé* of the Persian Foreign Office, has lately been despatched from Teheran with stringent orders from the Sadr Azem to the Hishmut-ood-dowlah, Prince Governor of Arabistan, for the apprehension of the remaining pirates still at Felaheea and for the recovery of the property plundered from the Mail Steamer *Cashmere* at Busrah.

"This Agent has orders to go on if necessary to Felaheea, where he will place himself in communication with Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Busrah, and I trust no further delay will now be allowed to take place in compelling Sheik Lufti to surrender the pirates to whom he has for some time extended his protection."

119. A letter was then addressed by the Government of India to Colonel Herbert, thanking him for what he had already done, encouraging him to proceed, and hoping he would not allow his efforts to be damped by the delays and evasions through which the repeated orders of the Persian Government for the arrest and surrender of the offenders still at Felaheea and the recovery of the plundered property were defeated by the local officials.

120. Mr. Thomson was asked what results had attended the deputation of the Agent to Felaheea, and he was told that the Government of India confidently expected that the Persian Government would give effect to their repeated orders, and not allow them to be defeated and set at naught.

Suggestion of the Government of India that the Turkish authorities should be moved to compensate the sufferers.

121. The Government of India, in its despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 16, dated the 22nd of July 1872, which reported the circumstances of the attack on the *Cashmere*, suggested that Earl Granville should be asked to move the Turkish Government to keep its local authorities active in their endeavours to capture the pirates, and further suggested that steps should be taken to procure compensation to the family of the man who was killed and to the men who were wounded.

122. The communication from the Secretary in the Secret and Political Department, No. 117, dated the 11th of October last, gave cover to a letter from the Foreign Office, which pointed out that the efforts of the Turkish Government for the apprehension of the pirates had not been ineffectual, as proved by the capture of the marauders and the recovery of some of the specie.

123. With regard, however, to the question of compensating the injured persons, Lord Granville after consulting the Law officers, expressed an opinion that it would not be right to ask either the Persian or the Turkish Government to make compensation for acts of murder and robbery done by lawless depredators, for the reason that Her Majesty's Government would not hold themselves liable to compensate foreigners, or their relatives, for the misdeeds of British malefactors.

124. The Secretary of State was informed by the Government of India that although this was perfectly true as regards ordinary crimes and offences, still the circumstances of the attack upon a British steam-vessel when lying at anchor in a Turkish harbour and under the guns of a Turkish war-vessel were so exceptional and unprecedented as to render special consideration necessary, and if not, to justify the demand of compensation as a right, at least to warrant Government in laying the case before the Turkish Government with a view to generous and liberal consideration being extended to the wounded men and the family of the man who was killed (Despatch No. 6, dated 31st January 1873).

Complaints regarding the delay in the restitution of the plundered property.

125. On the 30th of July last, Messrs. Gray, Paul Co., Agents for the British India Steam Navigation Company at Bushire, addressed Colonel Pelly in view to

Proceedings, General A., September 1872, No. 63.



obtaining definite information as to when the holders of Bills of Lading for the specie that had been robbed by the pirates might expect to receive compensation for their losses from the Turkish Government.

126. The Agents in making this application observed :—

"The arrest of a few men out of so large and evidently well organized a gang, the recovery of less than one-third of the *actual specie* seized, and escape from prison of some of the principle persons implicated cannot, we consider, be viewed, after the lapse of so long a time, as a satisfactory position of the case, nor does it manifest that energy and desire to meet the ends of justice on the part of the Turkish officials which we were at first led to hope for."

127. Colonel Pelly sent on the above representation to Colonel Herbert, with an intimation that he would be glad to receive the particulars asked for by Messrs. Paul, Gray & Co., Colonel

Ibid, No. 64.

Dated 16th August 1872.

Herbert's reply was to the effect that the shippers of specie should make their application to the Agents of the British India Steam Navigation Company at the port of shipment in accordance with the terms of the Bill of Lading; that the Company would of course know what answer to give, and would for its own sake, he presumed, act liberally; and that the Turkish Government had nothing to say to individual shippers. Colonel Herbert further alluded to the strenuous exertions made by himself and others concerned for the recovery of the property, and observed, with reference thereto, that the remarks of Messrs. Paul, Gray & Co., as quoted above, were extremely discouraging.

128. Colonel Herbert's letter was forwarded by Colonel Pelly to Messrs. Paul, Gray & Co., who at once paid a just tribute to the endeavours made both by Colonel Herbert and Mr. Robertson, admitting that had it not been for them the Turkish officials would in all probability have taken little or no trouble in the matter. They then proceeded to say :—

"The clause in Bill of Lading to which Her Majesty's Political Agent refers does not apply to an act of piracy, from which, on reference to that document, it will be seen by a preceding clause the Company are free from all liability.

"Nor do we consider it to be a case that has any call on the private generosity of the Company.

"It is satisfactory to learn Colonel Herbert 'hopes in due course' to receive the amount plundered, and will immediately make it over to the Agents.

* * * * *

"It is certainly desirable that the parties interested should be informed what period the term 'due course' implies. Whether or not the Turkish Government have admitted liability, or if they have given assurances to Her Majesty's representative that the injuries of sufferers by the practical attack would be fully redressed."

129. In his letter to Riouf Pasha, the Governor-General of Baghdad, of 24th September last, Colonel Herbert alluded to a verbal acknowledgment made to him by His Excellency, to the effect that the Turkish Government was responsible for the losses occasioned by the piratical attack, and in estimating those losses to be—

	Rs.	A.	P.
On account of specie	42,050	0	0
On account of property of officers and crew	5,552	6	5
Total	47,602	6	5

he expressed a hope that the Governor-General of Baghdad would, in consideration of the lapse of time that had occurred, and was still likely to occur, before the whole of the pirates could be arrested and the specie be recovered, order the immediate payment to the Baghdad Treasury, for transmission to the British India Steam Navigation Company, of the whole amount, reimbursing the Turkish Government from the sum which might hereafter be recovered. (See for final action taken in this matter paragraphs 155-56.)



Chapter XX.

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Difficulty of apprehending the robbers of the "Cashmere."

Haji Hashim Khan, the Mohessil from Teheran, reached Baghdad in November 1872, but was not got off to Basrah till the 4th December. On the 15th he left that place with Mr. Robertson to meet Hamza Mirza, Prince Governor of Persian Arabistan, and they all three went together to Felaheea.

There Prince Hamza Mirza at once arrested Sheikh Lufti and made him over to Haji Hashim Khan: the enquiry into the Sheikh's conduct was commenced on December 27th in the presence of Mr. Robertson and the Turkish Agents.

On receiving this news Colonel Herbert warned Mr. Robertson that this would be the beginning of their difficulty, and that it would need all his care and the Turkish Agents' to prevent abuse in the enquiry. On 20th December Mr. Robertson telegraphed to Colonel Herbert:—

"Please have Prince Hamza Mirza peremptorily ordered to arrest and deliver *Cashmere* pirates in Persian Arabistan, and not to leave Felaheea until they are delivered. Felaheea hot-bed of intrigue. Sadr Azem's last telegram to Prince Hamza should be cancelled, and Prince instructed to act as required by Turkish Agents and self. He is opposed to us and will do nothing unless constrained."

Colonel Herbert sent a copy of this telegram to Teheran.

In a letter of Mr. Robertson's, dated 8th November, to Colonel Herbert, the former stated that Hamza Mirza was said to be strongly opposed to the surrender of the robbers and plunder, professedly for the reason that there was no obligation on Persia to surrender them in the absence of an extradition Treaty with Turkey; but really, said Mr. Robertson, because much of the money received from Sheikh Lufti was *Cashmere* plunder. Haji Jaber Khan was said to be at enmity with Sheikh Lufti, and the latter unpopular with his tribe, but supported by Prince Hamza Mirza with 200 soldiers. A large number of robbers were infesting the neighbourhood of Felaheea.

Prince Hamza Mirza, accompanied by Sheikh Lufti [who was not then under arrest, if he ever had been], had an interview with Mr. Robertson on 23rd December when the former promised to do his utmost, but made a statement with reference to the steps he had taken at Haweza, which was afterwards found to be untrue.

Mr. Robertson and the Turkish Agents held a meeting on the 27th December, wrote the former,

"ostensibly for purpose of proving Sheikh Lufti's culpability in harbouring the pirates and taking their plunder, but really in order to obtain from him, before witnesses, some information as to where the pirates are now to be found. He avowed nothing, but admitted that he knew a good deal. Of his having harboured the pirates, taken their plunder and given it to Prince Hamza Mirza there can be no doubt, but these facts would be exceedingly difficult, the last impossible to prove, and their proof would not lead to the capture of the pirates, which is, I imagine, the principal object in view. Prince Hamza wishes to reinstate Lufti, Sheikh of the Felaheea. If he does so, and sends him, supported by troops, to capture the pirates, the Prince being meanwhile detained here by the order, which I have requested, and which, I trust, will soon arrive from Teheran, the pirates will doubtless be produced."

On being pressed to state definitely the steps he meant to take for the apprehension of the pirates, the prince named the officer whom he had addressed for the purpose. Lufti had been reinstated as Sheikh of Felaheea, and proceeded to Darel Moolla to arrest pirates. Prince Hamza Mirza wished to leave for Felaheea (not to be confounded with Felaheea), but was ordered by telegram from the Sadr Azem at Teheran to arrest any pirates still at Felaheea before leaving Mohammerah.

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130. On 11th January he quitted Felaheea for Ahwaz, leaving the matter in the hands of the Mohessil, but on the 12th the Sadr Azem telegraphed to him that he himself was to effect the capture of the culprits and the plunder before he took his departure. The Prince had on the 11th reported to the Sadr Azem the whereabouts of seven pirates, and also his intention to go to Felaheea. Colonel Herbert has encouraged Mr. Robertson to redouble his efforts, promising to bring them to notice of Government.

131. Agreeably to orders from Constantinople, Reouf Pasha ordered the Muteserif at Basrah to hand over to the Agents of the British India Steam Navigation Company the recovered specie said to amount to Rs. 20,872. Under similar orders the prisoners, now 36, were to be tried at Baghdad, it was proposed by the Governor-General himself in the presence of Colonel Herbert, who would endeavour to have those convicted sent to Basrah for punishment on the scene of their crime.

Apprehension of more robbers of the "Cashmere;" question of demanding compensation from the Ottoman Government."

132. On the 20th January 1873 Mr. Robertson wrote that Sheikh Lufti had been appointed Governor of the Felaheea, and had proceeded to Darel Moolla to secure three of the pirates.

From Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, No. 6, dated 12th February 1873.
From Mr. Thomson, Teheran, to Lord Granville, No. 8, dated 29th January 1873.
General A., April 1873, Nos. 23-36.

133. Prince Hamza Mirza refused to recognize the Turkish Agents officially, as they held no letters of recommendation from their Government, and declined further communication with them. Mr. Robertson's remonstrances proved fruitless, as the Prince had been annoyed by a refusal of the *Comet* for his conveyance.

134. Colonel Herbert suggested to Riouf Pasha to telegraph to the Turkish Minister, i.e., at Teheran, for the recognition of the Turkish Agents, and the necessary orders were eventually sent to Hamza Mirza by the Sadr Azem.

135. Three pirates were caught and delivered to the Mohessil, and only four known *Cashmere* pirates were at large [one of them said to be dead].

136. Mr. Robertson telegraphed on the 10th February from Felaheea that he had got 11,947 Krans of the *Cashmere* plunder, and hoped for the remainder at Felaheea in a few days, that he was well supported by the Shahzada, but the missing pirates were not there apparently.

137. It was determined with the sanction of the Porte not to try the prisoners at Baghdad but at Basrah, from whence the finding and sentences would be transmitted *via* Baghdad to Constantinople for sanction.

138. An attempt of six pirates to escape from prison had probably caused Riouf Pasha to desire the speedy trial of the whole number.

139. Colonel Herbert's letter of 12th March enclosed Mr. Robertson's

General A., July 1873, Nos. 44-76.
From Political Agent, Turkish Arabia,
No. 12, dated 12th March 1873.
" 17, " 10th April "
" 18, " 23rd " "
From Assistant Secretary, Political and Secret
Department, No. 57, dated 16th April 1873.
Ditto " 26, " 16th May "
From Her Majesty's Minister, Teheran, dated 2nd
April 1873.

	Krans.
* From Sheikh Lufti Khan	... 5,011
" " Dowd-ibn Saaber	... 7,087½
" " Mahomed-el-Paris	... 3,322½
" Haleil family (on deposit)	... 5,200
Total	... 20,621½

report of his visit to the Felaheea from the end of January to the end of February, upon which was recovered from the Chaab Sheikhs plunder amounting to 20,631 Krans as per margin.* This was obtained not without difficulty, as Haji Hashim Khan, the special Mohessil sent from Teheran, acted in an injudicious and extremely irritating manner in dealing with the Felaheea Sheikhs.

140. Prince Hamza Mirza proposed to deposit with Mr. Robertson—pending reference on the subject to his Government, and the British and Turkish Minis-



Chapter XX.

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ters at Teheran—money from his Treasury equivalent to the plunder said to be with the Haleil family, the owners of Ahteib, their slave and one of the pirates; Ahteib (*alias* Hatab) is dead, and the evidence is conflicting whether his share of the plunder reached his owners or not (they resisted his capture in August last).

141. Colonel Herbert has addressed the *Chargé d'Affaires* at Teheran, and expressed a hope that he would consider the evidence regarding the 5,200 Krans taken from the Haleil family as the portion of plunder appertaining to Ahteib to be such as to warrant Mr. Thomson's interposition in favour of its being retained

* No. 9, dated 8th March.

as a portion of the specie plundered. Colonel Herbert addressed* Riouf Pasha, the Governor-General, Baghdad, telling him that all the known pirates had been arrested with the exception of four (two of them untraced, one recently killed, a fourth still sought for), and that the total amount recovered was Rs. 28,915, of which Rs. 9,782 was obtained in Turkish territory and Rs. 19,133 from Persian. The sum of Rs. 20,872 formerly reported as recovered only realized Rs. 20,296 (the rate of exchange varying) when paid over by Riouf Pasha's orders to the British India Steam Navigation Company at Basrah on 29th January.

142. Riouf Pasha then† ordered the Mutesarif of Basrah to pay to the Agents of the British India Steam Navigation Company the Rs. 20,631 realized, less the Krans 5,200, or about Rs. 2,080 deposit, *i.e.*, 15,431 Krans or about Rs. 6,539.

† 24th February.

143. Colonel Herbert wrote to Riouf Pasha that all that appeared possible having been accomplished he hoped authority would be obtained from the Porte to make good the balance, which could only be calculated accurately on the day of payment. At the same time he repeated a hope that the Ottoman Government would order the payment of fitting compensation to the family of the murdered fireman, Ismail Khan, and the 13 wounded persons; he also acknowledged appropriately the exertions of the Turkish authorities.

144. The 15,431 Krans realized Rs. 6,729-15-0, and a further sum of Rs. 4,320-10-0 had been recovered by the Turkish authorities; total recovered and paid to the Agents was Rs. 31,347-6-0, leaving a balance of Rs. 10,702-10-0. The trial of the prisoners resulted in capital sentence on 9, life imprisonment for 4, imprisonment for three years on 2, and for two years on 1, sentence on one deferred: all the sentences await confirmation by the Porte.

145. Colonel Herbert brought to the notice of the Government of India the names of those to whom he was indebted—Riouf Pasha, Mr. R. F. Thomson, Prince Hamza Mirza, Haji Jaber Khan (Persian Governor of Mohammerah), Syud Abdul Rahman Eifendi (Nakib of Basrah), Nasir Pasha (Sheikh of the Montefik tribe), and Kassim Zohair Chelebi (President of the Mercantile Mujlis), and proposed that to the last four certain presents should be given in addition as some tangible proof of His Excellency's appreciation of their goodwill.

146. As a mark of approval for Mr. Robertson's unwearying exertion and tact in obtaining information and carrying out instructions, Mr. Herbert proposed a change in his title from British Agent (a name given to a native of the country where he serves) to that of Assistant Political Agent, a change entailing no extra cost, and one which would enable the post to be filled by an officer from India (the post is also Her Majesty's Vice-Consulate), and would greatly strengthen the hands of the officers.

147. The Government of India in July 1872 suggested to the Secretary of State that the Turkish authorities should be moved to compensate the sufferers by the attack on the *Cashmere* and that the Secretary of State was again addressed on the 31st January. Upon receipt of this last despatch from the Government of India, the Secretary of State invited the attention of Lord Granville to the



opinion therein expressed, His Grace concurring in it, and adding that the expediency of the course proposed by the Government of India was heightened by the fact that the Turkish Government was believed to have already recovered a considerable amount of the plundered property.

148. Lord Granville again referred the matter to the Crown Law Officers, who still adhered to their opinion that Her Majesty's Government could not properly address any official or diplomatic request to the Government of the Porte for compensation, and that any application of such a nature to the Porte on the part of Her Majesty's Government would make a dangerous or at least an inconvenient precedent.

149. The Government of India then wrote to the Resident (No. 1554-G., dated 17th July 1873)—

I am directed to acknowledge receipt of your letters noted in the margin, on the subject of the recovery of the property plundered from the *Cashmere*, and punishment of the pirates.

No. 12, dated 12th March 1873.	
" 17, " 10th April "	
" 18, " 23rd " "	

With reference to your letter No. 9, dated 8th March 1873, to the Governor-General of Baghdad, repeating your hope that the Ottoman Government would be pleased to order the payment of such compensation as might appear fitting to the family of the murdered fireman, Ismail Khan, and the thirteen wounded persons, I am instructed to forward, for your information, copy of a correspondence between the Secretary of State for India and the Foreign Office, from which you will see that Her Majesty's Government do not consider it advisable to make this demand on the Porte.

In the first of your letters under reply you submit to the special notice of His Excellency the Viceroy the names of those who have co-operated with you in the matter of the piracy of the *Cashmere*. His Excellency in Council desires that you will convey to Rionf Pasha the acknowledgments of the Government of India for the efforts he has made to recover the plunder, and bring the offenders to justice. You are also authorized to convey to Haji Juber Khan, Nasir Pasha, Syed Abdul Rahman Effendi, and Hossein Zohair Chelebi, the thanks of His Excellency in Council in fitting terms. Your proposal to give these four persons certain presents is also sanctioned, provided His Excellency Rionf Pasha has no objection; but you should first state the cost that it is proposed to incur for the articles to be presented.*

With regard to Mr. Robertson, His Excellency in Council appreciates the zeal and intelligence which have marked his exertions from first to last. His Excellency in Council approves the designation you suggest for Mr. Robertson, on the understanding that it entails no extra cost on Government, and is not made the foundation for a claim to additional pay. The change in his designation has been gazetted, and a copy of the Notification is enclosed for your information.

150. His Excellency in Council is pleased to sanction the payment of Rs. 2,141 on account of the expenses incurred by the British Agent at Basrah and other officers in connection with the piracy of the *Cashmere*.

151. On 6th August 1873 Colonel Herbert reported the arrest of two more of the *Cashmere* pirates, one of whom, Jasim-el-Khalaf, said to have been the actual leader of the attack on the steamer. The Governor-General, Baghdad, promised they would be tried with all expedition. He asked for early reply to his letters in which he desired that satisfaction of His Excellency in Council with the conduct of the Persian officials might be expressed. This was done in our No. 1554-G., dated 17th July last.

152. On 26th July Colonel Herbert asked Redif Pasha, the Governor-General, to apply to the Porte for permission to make good the balance* of the amount of specie and property plundered. He also submitted to Redif Pasha claims for compensation as follow:—To the family of Ismail Khan, the murdered fireman, rupees 1,000. To Mr. Bradford, the Clerk, for injuries, etc., £200. To Mr. L. Mackenzie, Chief Engineer, for wrist wounded, £25.

153. Redif Pasha replied that most of the property had been recovered and most of the offenders punished, and that Colonel Herbert's letter would be forwarded to the Porte.

154. Colonel Herbert again wrote that of the plundered property the amount recovered from Persia was nearly double that recovered from Turkish territory.

*Note.—The following presents were given under sanction of the Government of India (No. 163-G., dated 23rd January 1874):—

General A., February 1874, Nos. 1-7.

A double poled tent to Nasir Pasha.
A six-oared cutter to Haji Jabira.
A gold watch with chain to Abdul Rahman.



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155. Colonel Herbert sent this correspondence to Sir H. Elliott with the observation that it denoted a desire to avoid payment of the balance of the plunder and of the compensation required. He, therefore, solicited Sir H. Elliott's aid in counteracting any such intention.

156. Government had very recently referred * Colonel Herbert to previous orders, in which he was informed that Her Majesty's Government did not consider it advisable to demand from the Ottoman Government compensation for the family of the murdered fireman and the persons wounded in the attack on the *Cashmere*.

* No. 2090-G., dated 17th September 1873.

(ii) Robbery of Officers of the European Telegraph Department between Basrah and Fao, 1880.

157. On the 3rd January 1880, the Superintendent of the English Telegraph Station at Fao, with two others, on their way by boat from Basrah to Fao were attacked and robbed by Arabs, said to belong to the Persian side of the river.

158. Mr. Robertson in consequence, in view of the question of extradition sure to arise, sent Dr. Bowman to take charge at Basrah. This the Government of India approved, and they called for an early report.

159. On the 6th January, the same day as he reported by telegram, Mr. Robertson also wrote sending copies of various telegrams. It appears that the robbery took place twelve miles from Basrah, the party being attacked while asleep by eight Arabs, beaten and wounded, and their property stolen. One of the boatmen stated that he could swear that the leader of the gang of robbers was Bukhakh bin Sabhan, one of the Muhaysen tribe, of which Haji Jabir Khan of Mohammerah was the Sheikh. This man had been accused of robbery and murder before, but had cleared himself; he is known, however, to live partly by plunder.

160. Mr. Robertson telegraphed both to the Vali of Basrah, Zabit Pasha, and to Haji Jabir Khan of Mohammerah, asking them to assist in the capture of the robbers.

161. Dr. Bowman visited the Vali of Basrah, who expressed his extreme regret at the occurrence, and his determination to use every endeavour to trace and arrest the perpetrators of the outrage.


162. From a list furnished by Mr. Huskinson of the property stolen, it appeared that, including cash, property to the value of rupees 1,070 was carried off; cash being rupees 84.

163. Haji Jabir Khan wrote in reply to Mr. Robertson's telegram, denying that Bukhakh was implicated in the robbery, stating that he was away on the Karun river, and when he came back should be removed from his place, as he would get the credit of the robbery whether guilty or not.

164. Dr. Bowman wrote to Haji Jabir Khan, pointing out that the immediate arrest of the robbers was most important, and asking him to co-operate. He replied that Bukhakh, not being a ringleader in the offence, should not be arrested. Mr. Robertson consequently requested Dr. Bowman to go to Mohammerah, confront Bukhakh with the witnesses who accuse him of complicity, and "if, after hearing what is to be said on both sides, you consider Bukhakh guilty, pressure must be put on Haji Jabir."

165. Mr. Robertson telegraphed, on 1st February, that all the stolen property, except some rupees, had been recovered by Sheikh Mizal, the second son of Haji Jabir.

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166. Dr. Bowman proceeded to Mohammerah to investigate into the case, but Bukhakh had fled to the marshes. His implication in the robbery was clearly proved, and the Government of India directed that a fine of \$150 should be recovered from his family. This was recovered by Sheikh Jabir Khan and paid to the Political Assistant at Basrah. Mr. Robertson had insisted upon Bukhakh being arrested and imprisoned, but the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, thought that his surrender and exile would satisfy the requirements of the case. The Government of India concurred in this opinion, but stated that as the Political Assistant at Basrah had insisted on his imprisonment, it did not seem desirable that the demand should be formally waived. It was, however, left to the Political Resident's discretion to order the release of Bukhakh on condition of his being exiled as soon after his capture as might be thought desirable (Foreign Department letter No. 3735-E. P., dated 23rd December 1880).

167. All the property stolen was recovered and restored to their owners. Of the fine recovered, one-half was ordered to be distributed among two of the three Telegraph clerks who had suffered, or disposed of according to the discretion of the Political Agent (Foreign Department letter No. 3421-E. P., dated 21st October 1880.)

(iii) Attack by Arabs on the S. S. Khalifah on the River Tigris in 1880.

168. On 12th July 1880, the following report was telegraphed to the Government of India by the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia :—

"Baghdad, 11th. Euphrates Company's steamer *Khalifah* arrived here to-day. Reports having been attacked near Ezra's tomb on morning of 8th instant by Arabs, who kept up incessant fire on her for half hour, but failed in attempts to board. A quartermaster and one passenger killed and Captain Clements wounded. Attack was desperate and quite unprecedented as regards English steamers. No provocation had been given and cause of hostility is unknown."

Political A., September 1880, Nos. 229-32.

This was repeated to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

169. The Resident followed up his telegram with a complete account of the affair.

It appears that, while the *Khalifah* was passing down the river with Her Majesty's Indian mails, a light general cargo and about 80 passengers, a number of Arabs suddenly appeared from the long grass on the banks near a place called Seayfor, a few miles from Ezra's tomb, and opened a brisk fire on the steamer, which they maintained for 40 minutes, pursuing the ship and endeavouring to board her. She was preserved, however, from the disaster of falling into their hands by the courage and steadiness of the Commander, Captain Clements, and the Chief Engineer, Mr. Cole, who, though left almost entirely to themselves, stuck vigorously to their posts and eventually succeeded in escaping the assailants. The Arabs, on finding it fruitless to pursue her further, retreated, and the vessel was not molested again.

The quartermaster and one passenger were killed and the Captain and Chief Engineer wounded.

170. The reports showed no clear reason for the affray; but intelligence of affairs in that locality, which had been previously received, indicated that the whole of Southern Mesopotamia was in a state of disorder, and that the Montefik Arabs were in open rebellion against the Turks and each other. It was surmised that they had some grievances which they were determined to make known and obtain some remedy for, and that they believed an attack on a British steamer would be the most expeditious way of ventilating them.



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171. The people concerned in the attack were said to belong to the Al Bu Muhammad tribe under Sheikh Seyhood, who inhabit the marshes on the right bank of the Tigris a little above Gurnah, the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates. Colonel Miles remarked in his report that—

"during the number of years the Tigris has been navigated by English steamers, no sign of real hostility on the part of the Arabs, so far as I can learn, has ever been shewn against us, and the cause of their present attitude remains an open question."

He added that the other mail steamer *Blosse Lynch*, which passed down the river shortly after the *Khalifah* was not molested.

172. The Vali of Baghdad, on receiving the information, took measures to protect the river and pursue the offenders, and a guard of 30 soldiers was placed on board the *Khalifah* when she returned from Baghdad to Basrah the next day.

173. The sanction of Her Majesty's Government was obtained to despatch a gun-boat to Basrah owing to reports of the unsettled state of the country in that neighbourhood, and orders were given accordingly.

174. On the occurrence being made known to Her Majesty's Government, they instructed the Ambassador at Constantinople to—

"represent matter at once to Porte, that instructions may be sent for enquiry and punishment of offenders."

175. Mr. Goschen replied that soldiers had proceeded to the scene of the attack to arrest the guilty and restore tranquility as speedily as possible, and that a boat belonging to a Turkish Company, with soldiers and cannon, were cruising the river to maintain order. Further that orders had been sent to the Vali of Baghdad on the subject.

176. But Basrah still remained in a disturbed state, and local hostilities were on the increase. Trade was said to have been paralysed by the disordered state of affairs. The Consul-General at Baghdad took every opportunity of pressing on the Ottoman authorities the necessity for prompt measures for the protection of British lives and property; but their responses to his demands were on the whole very unsatisfactory. They certainly made repeated promises, but neglected to properly carry them out. Indeed their remissness went so far as to signify that, instead of pursuing the culprits with a view of capturing them they (the Turks) were intentionally allowing the chief conspirators to escape.

177. On the 21st August 1880 the Consul at Basrah reported that—
"at the instance of Mutasserif of Amara, Sheikh Wadi, Syad's elder brother, and Sheikh Yessur, his cousin, sent a force of Arabs some days ago to capture Sayad at Abu Shadar, where he has been residing since the attack on the *Khalifah*. Abu Shadar is an island in the great marsh of Southern Mesopotamia. It is said to be covered with ancient ruins, and can only be approached or left by a single creek, which traverses the impenetrable forest reeds by which it is surrounded, and has one mouth at Sharefah on the Tigris and another at Kase Ibn Khayyun on the Euphrates, nearly opposite Medina. Sayad succeeded in repulsing the force sent to capture him with nine killed and twenty wounded, and was still, by latest accounts, at Abu Shadar. The two mouths of the creek are now guarded by the Turkish steamer *Bussorah* on the Tigris and the *Rasafa* on the Euphrates. The Mutasserif of Basara is in the latter, and has at his disposal 400 regular infantry and the Beni Sud Arabs. If the latter act in good faith, it seems probable that Sayad must soon be captured."

178. This was confirmed by a report, dated 1st September 1880, from the Consul-General at Baghdad to Constantinople, but the number killed was given as seven instead of nine. He also said that Sayad's loss had not been so great, and that he had re-occupied his stronghold after the departure of his brother and cousin. A further attack was made afterwards by the troops under Saleh Bey, the Mutasserif of Amarah. Sayad did not encounter the assault, but fled, and his stronghold was destroyed. With regard to this, Colonel Miles said—

"there are indications that the Turkish authorities are beginning to despair of being able to capture and punish this Sheikh, and they will very soon, if allowed to do so, withdraw the troops and relax their efforts entirely. I trust respectfully I shall have the favor of Your Excellency's support in pressing this matter to a satisfactory conclusion."



179. Meantime the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company solicited Her Majesty's Government to move the Porte to afford reparation for what had been done, and they hinted that the Turks had probably been a party to the attack. They observed that, unless the instigators of the outrage were promptly punished, other attacks on the steamers would be imminent, and they said that their Agent at Baghdad had been instructed to give formal notice to the Vali of their intention to put in a claim for compensation. Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte did not omit to press on the Ottoman authorities the right of England to demand active operations on the former's part in pursuing and capturing the perpetrators, and pointed out that, unless this were done, the safe navigation of the river could not be assured.

180. Repeated report came in, however, of the unsatisfactory manner in which the proceedings against Sheikh Seyhud had been directed, and the Consul-General at Baghdad continued to urge the need of more stringent measures. Meanwhile a report was current that one Haji Mutair, one of the party who had attacked the *Khalifah*, had been apprehended, and Colonel Miles lost no time in requesting the Vali to inform him what punishment would be inflicted on the man, and what accounts he had given of the circumstance.

181. The Vali replied that the news of the man's capture was correct, and that he had been interrogated and would be sent before the Criminal Branch Court of the Istinaf, where due punishment would be awarded. He remarked that prompt steps had been taken for the capture of Sayad and the security of the Tigris; but that if the Sheikh escaped to Persia, as others had done, there would be great difficulty and delay in capturing him.

182. But the Vali was believed to be timid and disinclined to authorise any coercive measures, preferring to let matters take their course, while the country through which the Tigris traverses, was by no means in a tranquil state. Indeed another disturbance occurred on the banks adjacent to the spot where the *Khalifah* had been surprised, which, though no harm was done to any steamer, shewed how unsafe the locality was. It seems that, while the S.S. *Blosse Lynch* was passing down the Tigris, some scuffling was observed amongst a crowd of Arabs collected on the banks. The steamer was accompanied by its escort, which the Commander ordered to prepare for action, but no assault was necessary, as the Arabs seemed only to be engaged in some internal quarrel.

183. Subsequently the Turkish authorities decided to withdraw the escort steamer which they had provided for the Tigris; but the Consul-General begged the Vali to issue stringent orders for its retention.

184. On the 8th February 1881 a report of another disturbance in the Montefik country was made by the Consul at Basrah in the following memorandum :—

"A fight has occurred between the Hassaweas and Myadah of Sook-el-Shiook between whom there is a chronic feud. The Acting Mutasserif at Naseriyah has reported this to the Wali of Baghdad as a serious matter from which further disturbances may easily arise. Fali Pasha has reported the affair as of no importance, and states that he has sent his son, Thami Bey, to Sook-el-Shiook to maintain order. The Wali has, however, despatched two battalions of troops to Naseriyah by the steamer *Mousil*. They left yesterday, and will proceed from Kut-el-Amarah by the Shat al Hay. There is a bad feeling between the soldiery and the Montefik, in consequence of the occurrence of last year, and acts of oppression by the troops and resistance from the Arabs may be expected. * * * * * In despatching troops to the Montefik at present, the Wali has acted without consulting the Council, and the measure is regarded as rash and ill-advised under existing circumstances."

185. To revert to the case of the *Khalifah*, the next report was that sentence of death had been passed on Haji Mutair for his share in the attack, and it was declared by the Porte that orders had been repeated to the Vali of Baghdad to continue measures for the arrest and



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punishment of others concerned in the affray. The Porte, however, said that the accounts received by them of the events connected with the affair differed from the information furnished to Her Majesty's Embassy; but on Mr. Goschen referring the statement to the Consul-General at Baghdad, he repudiated the charge of having furnished incorrect accounts, and Her Majesty's Ambassador referred the matter again to the Porte with an earnest request that immediate steps should be taken to capture and punish the authors of the outrage in question.

186. This was in October 1881, but nothing further in the capture of the offenders was accomplished by the Turks; and in his despatch of 4th* April 1883, regarding the disturbed state of the country through which the Tigris runs, and the anticipated attack on one of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company's steamers by Arabs, the Resident said that—

"Haji Mootair, though sentenced to death so long ago as February 1881, * * * has not yet been executed."

He added—

"Another thing I believe to be equally certain is that Sheikh Seyhood so far from being a fugitive beyond the Ottoman border, still holds his ground in the marshy district near Amarah, and that the local Government, instead of coercion, think now only of conciliation towards him. Last February, it is said, he was offered by the Governor of Amarah a profitable farm, or holding, on condition of his appearing personally. This he was too distrustful to do, and it is understood, though I cannot of course verify the statement, that the holding was given to his son. * * *"

187. The Turks, however, in reply to a *note verbale* from Her Majesty's Ambassador, denied that Seyhood was in full enjoyment of his liberty and property, but that he was being vigorously pursued by the local authorities who were confident that his capture would be speedily effected; further, that the execution of Haji Mutair, Seyhood's accomplice, would be duly carried out as soon as the Court of Appeal at Constantinople shall have pronounced its decision.

188. Her Majesty's Ambassador had also called attention to the insecurity of navigation on the Tigris, and remonstrated against the discontinuance of the practice of escorting British steamers; but the Vali of Baghdad's report had maintained—

"that the safety of the river leaves nothing to be desired; that, moreover, guard-houses are being built on the most important points on the river; and that until they are completed, British steamers will continue to be provided with the usual escort."

189. The next report of the matter showed that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had addressed a note to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the 18th April last, stating, with reference to some representations made by the latter, that orders had been issued for the discovery and punishment of the people who attacked the *Khalifa*. A reference is made to a telegram from Colonel Tweedie, which apparently stated that Turkish Arabia was insecure and asked for a British man-of-war.

190. The Minister insinuated that this statement was deliberately wrong; that nothing of importance had occurred; and that the Turkish Government would take their own measures for ensuring the safety of everybody.

191. Briefly stated, the history of the case is that in 1880 a British steamer was attacked by Arabs in Turkish dominions, when two British subjects were killed and two Turkish subjects wounded, and that no proper reparation was afforded; one of the offenders was sentenced to death, but was not executed.

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192. The following extract from the Diary of the Political Resident, Turkish Arabia, for week ending 28th April 1883, will be read with interest:—

* * * * *

"The disturbances, forming subject of this office letter No. 39 of 4th instant, and its enclosure, still thicken round Amarah on the left bank of the Tigris. The authorities of the Wilaiat may not find it easy to restore order; but they are doing their best to protect our mail steamers by sending strong guards of soldiers with every steamer as deck passengers. It would not, in the circumstances, have been thought advisable to press the local Government too hard in connection with the attack on the *Khalifah* steamer in July 1880, had it not been that in the Milne murder case, where certainly no political difficulties have stood in the way, the most marked apathy and maladministration have from first to last occurred touching the bringing of the murderer or murderers to justice."

* * * * *

(iv) Murder of Mr. Milne, an Englishman at Baghdad, 1881.

193. There had been recently several outrages against British subjects in Turkish Arabia: the robbery of the British Telegraph Office at Fao, and murder of a British Indian subject in 1878, the attack on a British Indian baggalow on the Shat-el-Arab in 1879, the firing on the British Steamer *Khalifah* in 1880. In all these cases the culprits had escaped, and the British Government had been unable to get any satisfaction from the Turkish Government for the outrages. In 1881, an inoffensive Englishman Mr. Milne, was murdered in one of the most respectful streets of Baghdad, and the murderer and his employer escaped being punished and were even protected by the Turkish authorities at Baghdad.

194. The facts of the case are:—James Milne once employed as a Mechanical Engineer on Messrs. Lynch's steamers, was carrying on business as a General Engineer at Baghdad. On 6th January 1880, he was stabbed on a street in Baghdad.

Secret, 8 January 1881, Nos. 42-46.
Secret, 8 January 1881, Nos. 159-167.

195. There had been much jealousy between Milne and an influential Baghdadee Mahomed Saleh on account of Milne's having married a Christian prostitute (Farida), and Mahomed Saleh had been heard to threaten revenge.

196. On the night of the murder Mr. Plowden wrote to the Governor-General, requesting that effective measures might be taken for the discovery, arrest, and punishment of all persons implicated.

197. Next day, 7th January, Mr. Plowden telegraphed the fact to Constantinople, and requested issue of strict orders by Porte to the Governor-General to enforce vigorous measures without fear or favor.

198. On 8th and 9th Mr. Plowden enquired into the case and collected evidence. The only material evidence which he seems to have obtained was to the effect that Mahomed Saleh's servant, Ahmed, had been at deceased's house the day of the murder, and had doubtless ascertained his proposed movements.

199. Mrs. Milne and her servant (who was with Milne at the time of his murder) were "most reluctant to say anything which might possibly connect Mahomed Saleh with the crime." But Mrs. Milne having expressed her fear of Mahomed Saleh and her wish for protection was sent by Mr. Plowden on board the *Comet*.

200. On 9th January Mr. Plowden telegraphed to the Foreign Office, asking for the appointment of a Special Commission with two European members. He stated "our action is being keenly scrutinised," and alluded to the case of a chuprassie who had been frightened by Mahomed Saleh and had to leave Baghdad.



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201. On 10th January Mr. Plowden again wrote to the Governor-General; he asked for copies of the depositions taken up to date: he recorded an "emphatic protest" against Mahomed Saleh's supposed release on bail and "demanded" his arrest.

202. On 11th January the Governor-General replied: he ignored both requests and asserted that prompt and vigorous measures were being taken. He also asked that the Agency Dragoman should be sent to Court to watch the case.

Again, the same day, the Governor-General asked that Mrs. Milne, "accompanied by an officer," might be sent to Court to give evidence. But Mr. Plowden did not comply.

203. On 12th January Mr. Plowden again wrote to the Governor-General saying that he had learnt that Mahomed Saleh had not been arrested or had been released, as he had supposed—

"Although my requests were stated in plain and unmistakable language I observe with profound surprise and regret that Your Excellency's letter passes them over without any the smallest notice."

He again asked for copies of the depositions, and "demands" the "immediate" arrest of Mahomed Saleh.

204. The same day (12th January) he telegraphed to the Foreign Office that even Englishmen were afraid to give evidence against Mahomed Saleh. Although Mr. Plowden had demanded an early reply to his letter of 12th, none was sent on 13th.

205. On 14th January Mr. Plowden conferred with his French and Russian colleagues; they concurred with him as to a Mixed Commission and telegraphed to their respective Governments to that effect.

206. The same day the Governor-General replied to Mr. Plowden's letter of 12th to the effect that Mahomed Saleh could not be arrested without proof, and Mr. Plowden's action in refusing to allow Mrs. Milne to give evidence prevented the proof being forthcoming. His Excellency complained that the Agency Dragoman had been ordered not to sign the depositions—in short, that Mr. Plowden was obstructive. And he hoped Mr. Plowden would admit that his protest regarding the non-arrest of Mahomed Saleh was "incompatible with justice and propriety."

207. On 16th January Mr. Plowden replied that if sufficient evidence against Mahomed Saleh was not forthcoming, it was because the action of the police had been "perfunctory and inefficient in the highest degree"—that the police were under the control of the Governor-General, and consequently a "very grave responsibility" rested on His Excellency.

208. At first sight it would seem as if there was on the part of Mr. Plowden a want of political sagacity in the management of this affair. The crime was not political, and in ordinary circumstances it would have been wise to have avoided giving it the political importance which it had assumed. Mr. Plowden's refusing to allow Mrs. Milne to give evidence and his instructions to his Dragomans not to sign the depositions appeared to be a mistake.

209. Mr. Plowden justified his actions by the peculiar circumstances of the régime that existed at the time at Baghdad. There was absolutely no prospect of foreigners obtaining justice in its Law Courts or the Turkish Police doing anything to secure the perpetrators of the worst crimes. The fact that the culprits in the recent outrages against the British were still at large fully corroborated this assumption. Mr. Plowden was supported in all his proceedings by the other Foreign Consuls.

210. Mrs. Milne was afterwards taken to the Turkish Criminal Court to give evidence and Mahomed Saleh was arrested. Both he and his servant Ahmed were duly tried, but the former was acquitted for want of sufficient evidence to prove his



complicity and the latter convicted and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment. It is needless to say that the prosecution backed by the wealth and influence of Mahomed Saleh did its utmost to defeat the ends of justice—rather than endeavour to assist the Court in getting true evidence.

Mr. Plowden's letter No. 32, dated 4th April 1881, to the Embassy. *Ibid* No. 321.

211. At the strong representation of Lord Dufferin at Constantinople, a revisional application was made to the Court of Appeal with the result that the proceedings of the Baghdad Court were quashed and a retrial ordered. The Court, however, came to the conclusion that under the circumstances before them, they could not reconcile it with justice or with dictates of their conscience that Ahmed should be put to death, their view being that Ahmed and Mahomed Saleh stood exonerated." The prisoners were then released on bail (judgment, dated 19th June 1882.)

Secret, July 1882, Nos. 159—167.

212. Endeavours were then made by Lord Dufferin to get the Baghdad Court's decision quashed by the Appellate Court, with the result that the case was transferred to the Criminal Court at Diarbekr for retrial. The proceedings ended again without a conviction.

Secret E., November 1882, Nos. 127—128.
Secret E., December 1882, Nos. 223—225.
Secret E., June 1883, Nos. 255—266.
Secret E., August 1883, Nos. 44—51.

213. In the Diary of the Resident ending 31st December 1886, a reference was made to a rumour that Mahomed Saleh and his servant Ahmed had been arrested and released on bail prior to a third trial at Aleppo.

Secret E., March 1887, No. 45.

214. This rumour was afterwards confirmed. The proceedings of the Diarbekr Court were quashed by the Court of appeal and the accused were ordered to be produced before the Aleppo Court. The proceedings here ended in a fiasco as before.

External A., April 1888, Nos. 120-133.
External B., June 1888, Nos. 302-303.

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Murder of Jemadar Ghulam Din of the detachment at Baghdad of the 125th (Napier's) Rifles, and murders committed by Lance Naik Abdul Karim, 1904.

215. On 30th January 1904, Major Newmarch telegraphed to us that the Officer Commanding the detachment at Baghdad had been missing, having no doubt been murdered, and at the Consul-General's suggestion a reward of Rs. 300 was sanctioned for recovery of his body or evidence leading to detection (telegram dated 6th February 1904).

Secret E., August 1904, Nos. 511—586.

216. On 11th February, Lance-Naik Abdul Karim gave information to Major Newmarch, which enabled him and the Turkish authorities to trace the deceased's body to a Khan across the river hired by Mr. D'Arcy of the Persian Oil Company. The body had fourteen dagger wounds. From the Lance Naik's information and other enquiries made, there was sufficient ground for suspecting three non-commissioned officers and nine men having been implicated in the murder.

217. The motive for this foul murder was found firstly in the jealousy of the Jemadar, who had been promoted from a Naik in another regiment (9th Bombay Infantry) to a Jemadar in the 125th Bombay Infantry, to which the guard at Baghdad at the time belonged. Secondly, the Jemadar was a strict disciplinarian and was therefore unpopular in the detachment (Major Newmarch's No. 195-14, dated 4th March).

218. The exact circumstances under which the murder took place were very obscure, as on account of the conspiracy in the detachment, it was difficult to get at the facts. The theory of the Turkish police, supported by what Major Newmarch supposed to be false evidence, was that the Jemadar was murdered in the lines by the sepoys; that a certain Afghan named Akram or Akram Khan was present at the murder, having been invited to dinner by the sepoys beforehand; that after murdering the Jemadar the sepoys wrapped



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him up in either a gunny bag, or a blanket, or a red quilt (each of the three witnesses produced by the Turkish police named different covering); that two sepoy—whose identification by the said witnesses was more than doubtful—carried the parcel (the said witnesses did not speak of it as the corpse, probably to lessen the degree of their complicity) to the river bank where another sepoy had engaged a Goofa circular coracle used on the Tigris) belonging to one Abbas to a landing-place about a quarter of a mile below the lines of the sepoy; where it was met by two other sepoy; that these four sepoy then took the parcel to a Khan into which they bribed Abdullah, the watchman of the Khan, to admit it and that the sepoy then buried the parcel in the Khan, while Akram (who did not come in the Goofa) stood over Abdullah with a knife and a pistol lest he should interfere or see too much. This briefly is the outline of the story told by the three witnesses, Abdullah, Akram, and Abbas, the Goofachi, produced by the Turkish police. The story was, in Major Newmarch's opinion, preposterous: it blazed with contradictions, incongruities and improbabilities, and Akram at any rate has told the Resident that his version of it was not only false but entirely without foundation, told because the police beat him until he confessed something. Akram said he identified those sepoy whom the police told him to identify and Abbas Goofachi said he identified those sepoy whom Akram told him to identify.

218. Major Newmarch's theory of the crime was that the Jamadar's murder had long been contemplated not only by the detachment at Baghdad, but by others at the head-quarters of the regiment, that advantage was taken of the Resident's temporary absence from Baghdad to commit the crime; that the Jamadar was enticed from the lines by the said Abdullah, who told him that he could provide him with a lovely woman in his Khan: the Khan was rented by Mr. D'Arcy of the Persian Oil Concession, and at the time of the murder was unoccupied except by Abdullah, who was the watchman of the Khan; that the Jamadar fell into the trap and on entering a dark room in the Khan was murdered by Abdullah who was probably assisted by Akram and Abbas, the Goofachi, that these three men then buried him in the Khan with his lantern where he was found and that they were paid for their work by a subscription among the sepoy of the detachment here. The evidence was far from complete, but there was, the Resident thought, much in support of the latter's theory.

219. As a result of the discovery of the body of the Jamadar, through the information given by Lance-Naik Abdul Karim, the latter was driven to save himself, as he imagined he could, from the vengeance of his guilty comrades to seek to murder those who are supposed to have threatened him. So on the 18th February, Lance-Naik Abdul Karim ran amock, shot dead three sepoy (Nadir Khan, Gaiba Khan and Lance-Naik Alum Khan); and two of the Kavasses, one of whom was a Kandahari and the other a border Pathan. He then got on the roof of the lines and threatened to shoot any one, who came near him, Major Newmarch and Captain Cox then approached him from a neighbouring roof and had him arrested.

220. There was little doubt that nearly the whole, if not the whole, of the detachment had been implicated in the Jamadar's murder, and no other course was left to Major Newmarch than to disband the whole force. He therefore handed over 12 of the men accused of the murder and complicity in it, and Abdul Karim for temporary custody to the Turkish authorities, and confined the rest to the lines and placed them under a Turkish guard for their protection, which the Wali was, at the Consul-General's request, pleased to furnish a Turkish police guard also guarded the Consulate.

221. Major Newmarch was of opinion that the whole of the Indian guard should be relieved by some other regiment. At the same time he feared that the Turks might make the recent occurrence ground for urging the withdrawal of the guard (telegram dated 18th February).

Ibid. No. 517.

His Majesty's Ambassador, on the other hand, anticipated difficulty with the Porte about despatch of a new Indian guard, especially if they had to undergo quarantine at Basrah and suggested that matters would be facilitated if they were transhipped to the *Comet* at sea (telegram dated 6th

Ibid. Nos. 533, 534 and 535.

March). The relieving detachment from the 120th Infantry under Captain

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Fisher had sailed for Baghdad in the S.S. *Kapurtala* on 26th February, and Major Newmarch was instructed to arrange if possible for their transshipment to the *Comet* (telegram dated 9th March).

222. As to the trial of the offenders, the British Ambassador in his telegram to the Viceroy, dated 22nd February, pointed out that the men should be tried by either the (1) Supreme Consular Court at Baghdad or (2) the High Court of Bombay or (3) by court-martial in India. The Government of India preferred that the trial should take place before the Supreme Consular Court at Baghdad (telegram to the Ambassador, dated 29th February).

223. The Turkish authorities would certainly desire to try the cases, but the British Ambassador warned the Consul-General that "we cannot have the right of the Turkish Courts to try these cases." The Turkish authorities seemed, however, to be anxious to detain for trial by their courts the prisoners handed over to them for temporary custody, though at first no objection was raised to give them up. Major Newmarch and Captain Cox visited the Vali on 22nd February, and obtained permission to release one of them without any difficulty. "As to the others," Major Newmarch told the Vali: "I may release some more in a few days, and in any case I will take them again under my custody as soon as the relieving detachment arrives." The Vali said "of course" and did not demur in any way to this. On the 23rd of February the Consul-General applied to the Vali for copies of the statements taken down by the police in the enquiry. This request appears to have been referred by the Vali to the Procureur General of the Court of Appeal, and the latter on a telegraphic reference made to the Minister of Justice at Constantinople was advised that as one of the suspected persons, named Abbas, who transported the corpse in his goofa is a Turkish subject, the enquiry in the case and the trial of all the accused including the British Indian sepoys should take place before the Turkish Courts. On the 2nd March the Vali refused to send any of the sepoys in his custody before the Consul-General on the ground that the matter had gone out of his hands and lay with the Court of Justice.

224. The difficulty was apparently removed by the British Ambassador after representation to the Porte. A preliminary enquiry had been ordered by Mr. G. B. Piggott, Judge of the Supreme Consular Court, to be held by the Consul-General under the Ottoman Order in Council following strictly the procedure laid down in the Rules of the Court Nos. 41-52. As a result of this enquiry, Lance-Naik Abdul Karim (the man who had run amock) was committed for trial by the Supreme Consular Court, and tried, convicted and sentenced to death by that Court under article 46 of the Order in Council (Mr. Piggott's letter to the Embassy, dated 19th April). The prisoner was removed to Bombay.

225. As to the murder of the Jemadar the evidence was so conflicting and meagre that Major Newmarch discharged all the accused.

226. The detachment of 125th Infantry left Baghdad under charge of Captain Fisher on 23rd April (telegram dated 23rd April 1904).

227. The two Pathans Abdullah and Akram, who were implicated in the murder, were deported to Bombay and under a warrant issued by the Bombay Government in accordance with the Foreigners Act (III of 1864) transported across the southern border of Afghanistan (Major Newmarch's telegram, dated 21st April 1904, and Foreign Department letter to the Bombay Government, No. 1384-E.A., dated 29th April 1904).

228. The Consul-General called upon the Officer Commanding the *Comet* to furnish a guard to guard the prisoners above referred at the British Residency. This request was complied with, but the Director of the Indian Marine on writing to the Government of India, Marine Department (No. 2555, dated 30th April 1904), observed that the duty was not such as should properly devolve on the ship's crew, and that the action of the Resident was illegal,




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inasmuch as the crew of the *Comet* is neither enrolled under the Indian Marine Act nor subject to the Indian Articles of War, and that had it been necessary to use force the Officer Commanding the *Comet* might have been involved in serious consequences. He therefore asks that the Political Resident be instructed to desist from such action in future. It was further explained (No. 592, dated 7th July 1904) that the Resident pressed for the men on the ground that it was an urgent public duty, adding that he would accept all responsibility.

229. The Government of India (Marine Department) stated in reply (No. 592, dated 7th July 1904) :—

In reply, I am to observe the Government of India are advised that the action of the Resident was not illegal, and the matter was one for him to deal with purely from the stand point of expediency. As he considered that he could not trust the prisoners to a guard of their brother soldiers, it was incumbent upon him to take any steps he considered necessary in reason and good faith for their safe custody. He was competent therefore to require for that purpose the aid of any officer or man serving under the Government of India, and the fact that the lascars were not subject to the Marine Act or Articles of War does not alter the position. The Government of India therefore consider it unnecessary to issue any instructions to restrict the Resident from employing lascars as a guard in future. The Resident must be the sole judge of the expediency of such a measure, and the propriety of any similar action taken by him in reason and good faith cannot be questioned. In these circumstances the responsibility for any untoward circumstance arising from the employment of lascars would rest with the Resident.





APPENDIX A.

Memorandum on the Kaab tribe and Mohammerah by Sir H. Rawlinson, dated 6th January 1844.

ABSTRACT OF MEMORANDUM.

Dependency of the Chaab tribe.

Early history of the tribe.
Originally Turkish subjects.
Migration to Guban.
Continued dependence upon Turkey.
Cross into the Persian Territory.
Condition of the tribe under Sheikh Salman virtually independent.
Persia and Turkey fail in attempts to reduce them.
Founding of Fellahiah in Persian Territory.
Opening of political connexion with Persia.
Turkey maintains her claim.
Relations between Turkey and the Chaab during the last century.
Indicative of anything but dependence.
Acts of violence and hostility on the part of the Chaab.
Sheikh Tamir alone shows a disposition to court protection.
Comparison with the above of the connexion during the same period of Chaab with Persia.
A pecuniary liability attaches to the tribe but undefined in its nature and extent.
Dependency on Persia for a long period shown to have been only partial.
Latterly control of Persia has been complete.
Present state of the question of dependency.

Right of Territory.

Boundaries of the two empires, Irak-i-Arab and Khurzistan.
Basis of geographical distinction between these provinces.
Practical application of it in marking the old line of frontier.
Rendered fluctuating and perplexed from the changes in the courses of the rivers.
Difficulty of verifying the principle in modern times.
Instance of departure from it in reference to lands of Guban.
Means available for proving the territorial right of Turkey to lands on the Shat-el-Arab, independently of mere geographical precedent.
Mohammerah included in these lands and in possession of Turkey until within the last few years.
Former dependency of Mohammerah on Bussora geographically correct.
At present owing to changes in the course of the river it belongs geographically to Khurzistan.
Sketch of the frontier as it should be drawn on conformity with the basis of the old distinction between Irak-i-Arab and Khurzistan.
Gives to Turkey all the lands on the Shat-el-Arab and to Persia Mohammerah.

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Modern History of Mohammerah.

Building of the two forts of Mohammerah and of Koot-el-Sheikh.

Heir to the Chiefship of Chaab stationed at Koot-el-Sheikh.

This place a *bonâ fide* dependency of Fellahiah.

Chief of Mohammerah endeavour to be dependent of Chaab.

Mohammerah ruined by Ali Pasha.

Hajee Jaaber, the Chief, throws himself at the protection of Persia.

Sheikh Thamir of Fellahiah declares his dependency on Turkey.

Persia establishes her authority over both Mohammerah and Chaab.

Blood feud between the Chiefs of Mohammerah and Fellahiah.

Temporary occupation of Mohammerah by Persian troops at Sheikh Jaaber's requisition.

Officer continues to reside there on the part of the Persian Government.

Present appearance of Mohammerah.

State of trade.

Hitherto a free port.

Probability of losing this advantage on the settlement of the dispute at present pending.

Sheikh Jaaber's bitter hostility to Sheikh Thamir, a consideration of consequence in adjusting the frontier.

Enumeration of the lands and villages at present in dispute between Persia and Turkey.



MEMORANDUM.

Dependency of the Chaab Tribe.

There appear to be two separate questions involved in the dispute at present pending between the Governments of Persia and Turkey on the subject of Mohammerah. The one is the dependency of the tribe of Chaab. The other the right of territory to certain lands, upon which portions of the tribe have settled.

In discussing the question of the dependency of the Chaab, it will not be necessary to follow throughout with any sustained minuteness the history and movements of the tribe. The events which afford arguments to support the claims of either Government to their allegiance alone require to be particularized.

A skeleton outline connecting these events together will suffice for the remainder of their history.

It is not questioned then by Persia, but that at the period of the conclusion of the treaty between Sultan Moorad and Shah Tahmasp, the Chaab were *bona fide* subjects of the Turkish Government, for they are known at that time, and even long subsequently, to have dwelt in the marshes at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates, and like all the neighbouring Arab tribes, to have paid to the Government of Bussorah a tribute named the *Meeri Kalameyah* for the right of pasturing their buffaloes upon Turkish lands.

The question of dependency becomes first open to dispute, when, about the year A. D. 1683, the Chaab, owing to a season of unusual drought, deserted the marshes of Wasit, and migrated to the southward, fixing their abodes in the tract of country, which at that time formed the delta of the Karoon. It is contended by Persia that as the lands which the Chaab now occupied were situated within the territorial limits of Khuzistan, the tribe must be held, in virtue of their immigration, to have transferred their allegiance to the Persian crown. Turkey, on the contrary, affirms that neither were the lands, upon which the tribe settled within the Persian territory, nor supposing this point to be conceded, could the Chaab have suddenly denationalised themselves by merely crossing the frontier. She further shows that practically the dependency of the tribe upon Bussorah remained after the immigration precisely the same as before that event; for the same amount of *Meeri Kalameyah* was paid by the Chaab to the Turkish Government for pasturage on the banks of the Guban, as had been exacted for their old lands in the Wasit marshes, and the annual dress of investiture from Bussorah was continued to the Sheikh without any reference to his change of residence.

Putting aside for the present the question of territorial right to the lands upon which the Chaab settled, it is clear to me that on their first immigration to the district of Guban, and for 50 or 60 years afterwards the tribe were regarded as Turkish subjects. Their numbers were too small and their country too poor to attract much attention, but in those essential points which are considered by the Arabs to prove dependency, the payment of the *Meeri Kalameyah* and the annual receipt of a robe of office, it is certain that the Sheikh of the Chaab, as late as the year A. D. 1740, continued, as was to be expected, a dependent of the Government of Bussorah. The only connection, indeed, of the tribe with Persia up to this time was that they made certain annual presents of horses, butter, etc., etc., to the Afshar Chief of Doorak on account of fees for pasturage on the immediate bank of the Guban branch of the Karoon, the lands in that quarter having been previous to their immigration in possession of effects of the Afshar tribe, who as the Chaab advanced fell back and rejoined their brethren on the Jerrahi.



Between the years A. D. 1740 and 1750 further changes took place in the location of the Chaab involving to a certain extent their political dependency. Hitherto the Sheikh had resided in the town of Guban situated on the left bank of the eastern branch of the Karoon, and the chief strength of the tribe was concentrated in that vicinity, but about the year 1745 the course of the

Cross into the Persian territory.

Guban river became obstructed. The Karoon poured its waters through the Bamisheer and Haffar channels, and the lands along the old or eastern bed of the river were thrown almost entirely out of cultivation. It thus became necessary for the tribe to seek new habitations and while detached parties, accordingly, settled along the Haffar and on the borders of the Shat-el-Arab employed as *Fellahs* by the Turkish proprietors of the lands, the main body of the Chaab, under their famous leader Sheikh Salman, crossed over from the Guban to the Jerrahi river, dispossessed the Afshars of the town of Doorak and its dependent territory, and obtained a permanent footing in a country to which the right of Persia was unquestioned.

The political condition of the Chaab now underwent a rapid and remarkable change. They had always enjoyed an element of strength in their common

Condition of the tribe under Sheikh Salman.

attachment to the person of their hereditary chief, and as they had also during their residence in Guban increased greatly in numbers, it only required that the individual at their head should be possessed of skill and vigor, sufficient to profit by the direction of their combined energies, to ensure their elevation from the condition of unknown buffalo feeders, into something like a real substantive power. Sheikh Salman was admirably fitted to the purpose; endowed with every quality becoming his high station he availed himself to the utmost of the attachment of his followers, both to aggrandize himself and to promote their prosperity, and after a long life and an exposure to many vicissitudes, he may be said to have ultimately succeeded in procuring

Virtually independent.

for his tribe the virtual enjoyment of independence. It was one of his earliest cares, after consolidating the power of the Chaab upon the Jerrahi, to re-establish his ancestral capital of Guban, and for this purpose he threw a dam across the Karoon at the point of its bifurcation, and thus forcing a part of the waters into the old channel, restored fertility to the deserted lands at the same time he pursued on all sides a systematic course of territorial encroachment. His acquisitions from Persia, extended to the Hindian river and northward along the Karoon to the vicinity of Bandlikir, while from the Governments of Baghdad and Bussorah, partly by intimidation and partly by bribery, he obtained for his tribe possession of the island of Abadan of the territory of Dowasir on the right bank of the Shat-el-Arab, and also of a tract of country of north of the Haffar canal and along the course of the Shat-el-Arab, comprising the districts of Mohammedrah, Haffar and Tamar.

It is not to be supposed that this creation of a formidable and almost independent power on the shores of the

Persia and Turkey fail in attempts to reduce them.

Persian Gulf was viewed with indifference by either Persia or Turkey. Various attempts were made by either Government to reduce Sheikh Salman to obedience; but as their mutual jealousies prevented them from acting in concert, their success was of a very partial nature. Kerim Khan in A. D. 1757 failed entirely in an attempt to penetrate to Guban, and in 1765 he only so far succeeded as temporarily to overrun the country. He never received homage from Sheikh Salman and after his withdrawal, the Chaab resumed possession of their lands entirely regardless of his authority. Turkey, on the other hand, during the plenitude of Sheikh Salman's power, would have been glad without a contest to have waived her claim to supremacy over the Chaab; but she was obliged in order to preserve the independence of Bussorah, to attempt the recovery from her rebellious subjects, of the districts which they had seized on the right bank of the Shat-el-Arab. An action took place, accordingly, in the latter end of the year 1765 between the Chaab and Turkish fleets off the mouth of the Haffar canal. Fortune again favored Sheikh Salman and although the hostilities on this occasion had in their origin an exclusive reference to the attempted



expulsion of the Chaab from Dowasir, *the emancipation of the tribe from any further political dependency upon Bussorah may be regarded as the actual and legitimate issue of the contest.*

Another circumstance, which at this time tended to complete the withdrawal of the Chaab from the control of Turkey was the removal of the residence of the Sheikh from the Guban to the Jerrahi. It occurred in the following manner. Kerim Khan, to weaken and distress his adversary, had destroyed the famous dam which divided the waters of the Karoon, and the channel of the Guban had thus a second time become almost dry. When Sheikh Salman accordingly returned after the withdrawal of the Persians and found his capital in ruins and the lands around it deprived of the means of irrigation, he had to make his election between again undergoing the labor and expense of constructing a dam, subject at any moment to destruction by any enemy possessed of superior forces in the field, and permanently fixing his residence in a more favorable situation, when the water should be his protection rather than his ruin. He adopted the latter course and founded Fellahiah.

The founding of Fellahiah being one of the great epochs in Chaab history it may be interesting to observe the general political appearance which the tribe exhibited at that period. About four-fifths of the extent of country occupied by the Chaab was unquestionably Persian territory and the liability of the tribe to pay to the Persian Crown the revenues of these lands, if that power were in a condition to assert its rights, does not appear ever to have been questioned.

When the Chaab indeed first came in contact with the Persian Afshars and dispossessed them of their lands on the Jerrahi, Sheik Salman for a short time continued to pay to the Walee of Howeizah the same amount of revenue, which had been realized from the former occupants. Kerim Khan's first invasion also was undertaken in consequence of the stoppage of this payment of revenue and the Sheikh actually disbursed a considerable sum to him on his withdrawal. The second Persian invasion it is true was rather a campaign undertaken for the reduction of a rebellious province, than a mere expedition to levy tribute, but the negotiations which were carried on between Sheikh Salman and the Persian monarch during the progress of hostilities had a general reference to the amount of assessment (or *mahyat*) to be imposed upon the tribe. It was never contended, in fact, but that the Chaab were liable to the Persian Crown for the rent of the lands which they cultivated on the Jerrahi, the Hindian and the upper part of the course of the Karoon, and I infer from the increased connection which is observable between the Persian Government and the Chaab, subsequently to the foundation of Fellahiah, that the distinction between this liability for the payment of rent as tenants of the soil and of a fixed tribute as subjects, was gradually lost sight of; and that the Chaab residing for the most part in the Persian territory governed by a Chief whose capital of Fellahiah was within the well established frontier of the province of Fars, and subjected almost yearly to demands for revenue from the Persian Crown, came to be regarded as Turkish colonists who had emigrated to the Persian territory and by a continued residence of many years had naturalized themselves as Persian subjects.

The arguments of the Turkish Government in favor of its uninterrupted claim to the allegiance of the Chaab are simply these, that it had never made any formal renunciation of its rights; that the Chaab, notwithstanding the removal of the seat of Government to Fellahiah, continued to hold lands upon the Haffar and Shat-el-Arab, subject to Bussorah, and even to pay the revenues of these lands to the Governor of that city: that the *Meer-i-Kalamiyah* formerly payable by the tribe was merely withheld because the district of Guban, to which it particularly referred, had become desert, and that a robe of office was frequently also furnished to the Sheikh of Chaab, long after his settlement on the Jerrahi, in accordance with the old fashion of annual investiture.

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To me, I confess, it appears that at the time of Sheikh Salman's decease and ever since, the Chaab have been virtually independent of Bussorah and that the notion of the indefeasibility of their allegiance to Turkey is an invention of late years, brought forward as a counterpoise to the claims of Persia upon Mohammerah. A rapid sketch of the relations between Chaab and Bussorah during the last century will be necessary at the same time to show the grounds upon which this view is adopted.

There has never been, then, any question in the country, but that the lands watered by the Shat-el-Arab, through its entire course, are dependent upon Bussorah. An unbroken claim of evidence may be brought to prove this, from the time of the building of Bussorah to the present day. When the Chaab, accordingly, interfered with these lands, they either acted as conquerors in open defiance of all rights, or they obtained patents from the Government, granting them a farm of the property, subject to the public liabilities; or when the lands were exempt from taxation in virtue of free grants to individuals from the Sublime Porte, they dealt directly with the proprietors, sometimes acting as tenants and receiving the regulated share of produce (one-fourth) for the labor of cultivation, sometimes buying the free hold right to the property: but more usually taking forcible possession without any respect to the previous tenures.

None of the various relations however which the Chaab thus bore to the Bussorah Government, as occupants of the banks of the Shat-el-Arab, appear to me to indicate their national dependency. On the contrary, as they have continued almost uninterruptedly to pay to the Government of Bussorah the rent of the lands of Haffar and Tamar above Mohammerah, which they obtained by a grant from Sooleman Pasha of Baghdad, while they have long ceased all other payments, the presumption is that they have considered themselves liable on that account only, and that they must have thus regarded themselves in the light of foreigners holding Turkish lands either in farm or by right of occupancy.

The political connexion moreover which has subsisted between Chaab and Bussorah, since the death of Sheikh Salman, to times comparatively modern, so far from being one of protection and dependency has been marked by open and almost constant hostility. Thus Sheikh Barkat, the nephew and successor of the great chief, seized from the Turkish proprietors the extensive and fertile district of Boojidee between Tamar and Haffar, and bestowed it upon the Bawee Arabs into which tribe he had married.

His son, Ghadhban, again took possession of the entire left bank of the Shat-el-Arab as far up as Gardelan and even colonized with the Chaab, the right bank of the river from the sea to within 10 miles of Bussorah. He might have taken possession of the town of Bussorah itself; but he dreaded the too great extension of his territory, and eventually he deemed it his safer policy to withdraw altogether from the right bank of the Shat-el-Arab, and to concentrate his forces between the Shat and the Jerrahi.

Sheikh Ghais,* the son of Ghadhban, who succeeded to the chiefship on the death of his uncle, Sheikh Mahomed, the brother of that chief, restored, it is true, the ancient limits of the Chaab territory, as established by Sheikh Salman, retaining possession of nothing higher up the Shat-el-Arab than the district of Tamar; but he was influenced in this withdrawal rather by a disinclination to come in collision with the growing power of the Muntefik tribe, and by the necessity of preparation against Persia, than by any respect for the rights or deference to the wishes of the Turkish Government; at the same time or shortly afterwards he built a fort upon either side of the Haffar canal, with the view, as it is stated, of protecting his frontier against the Muntefik, and he

* See genealogical table on page 1, from which it appears that Ghais (or Gheyth) was a descendant of Sheikh Salman, not a son of Ghadhban.



entrusted the defence of the post to his confidential servant, Meerdow. It was a place of no consequence at first, but under the rule of Hajee Jaaber, the son of Meerdow, its favourable situation attracted commerce, and it rapidly rose into eminence as the mercantile town of Mohammerah.


Sheikh Thamir, the younger brother and successor of Sheikh Ghais, has cultivated during the last 30 years a more friendly connexion with the Turkish Government than any of his predecessors, for he appears to have been fully sensible of the advantage of an uncertain dependency in deterring Persia from attempting to increase the extent, or to systematize the character of her interference in the affairs of the Chaab tribe, without accordingly in any essential point admitting the authority of Bussorah, he has frequently made presents of money and horses to the Turkish Governor, independently of the rent of the lands on the Shat-el-Arab, and he has been gratified to receive occasionally, from the Moosselim a *khelaat* or dress of honour.

The first direct exercise of the power of Turkey in the affairs of the Chaab, however, in modern times, was the attack on Mohammerah by Ali Pasha in A. D. 1837, and his subsequent appointment of Sheikh Abdool Razaq to the Government of the tribe in the place of Sheikh Thamir. To justify this measure, the old assertion of the right of Turkey to the allegiance of the Chaab has been revived, and it remains a "quæstio vexata" to the present day. But if the Chaab have thus become virtually independent of Turkey, it may be inferred that they must, to the same extent, have become virtually dependent upon Persia, and it is necessary therefore for the verification of this point, that the preceding sketch of their relations with Turkey, since the death of Sheikh Salman, should be compared with the nature and progress of the connexion of the tribe during the same period with Persia.

Kerim Khan then withdrew his forces without coming to any definite arrangement with the Chaab Sheikh, regarding the liabilities of the tribe and during the wars between the Zend and Kajar dynasties which broke out shortly after the establishment of Fellahiah as the capital of the Chaab, the matter of course escaped discussion.

From the commencement of the reign of Agha Mahomed Khan the *Peeshkush* of the Chaab seems indeed to have been reckoned by the Government of Fars, as a part of the annual income of the province, and to have been demanded accordingly; but still there was great irregularity in the payment, and a still greater uncertainty as to the amount of the liability. As far as I can discover, the annual tribute was calculated by the Persian Government at about 4,000 tomans, such being the aggregate amount at which the former Afshar occupants of the banks of the Jerrahi had been assessed, but the sum realized did not, it is said, on an average, exceed one-fourth of this true or assumed liability. In the time of Fattah Ali Shah the first attempt was made to exact a regular and as far as it went a defined payment, the annual salary of Hassan Khan, one of the chief officers of the Shiraz Court, amounting to 1,000 tomans, being drawn by *berrat* upon the Chief of Fellahiah. But it does not by any means appear that this was considered by Persia as a full acquittance of the liabilities of the Chaab, or that it was ever settled upon what particular account the sum was levied. On the contrary independently of Hassan Khan's salary, a year rarely passed without presents of horses and money to a considerable amount being made by the Chaab Sheikh to the Governor of Shiraz and when Mahomed Ali Mirza in 1818 marched against Fellahiah, he demanded and received 13,000 tomans from Sheikh Thamir on account, as it was alleged, of accumulated arrears of revenue.

Persia, nevertheless, can hardly, I think, substantiate a legal claim to the dependency of the Chaab by the precedents of this period. She certainly in practice was more closely connected than Turkey



with the country; but her relation to the Chaab at the same time bore the character of *intimidation on the one hand and of concession on the other, rather than of the assertion and fulfilment of the acknowledged rights of a superior Government: no attempt was ever made by Persia to assess the lands, to appoint a Governor of the tribe, to levy troops for the defence of the state, or in fact to exercise any of the legitimate functions of sovereignty.* She was content on ordinary occasions to accept of a *Peeshkush*, which the Chaab now assert to have been in lieu of the rent of the Persian lands in their possession, and when she had adequate means at her disposal she violently extorted as much as the Chaab had the means of paying.

Since the reign of the present Shah it must be admitted that the proceedings of Persia in regard to Chaab have been conducted in a manner more clearly to establish and to realize a right of sovereignty. She has displaced and appointed Governors, exacted hostages, garrisoned Chaab towns with Persian troops, levied an annual revenue, and latterly she has undertaken to assess the lands according to the value of the produce in the same manner as is customary in other parts of the empire. But whether these acts may be considered to have legalized the former partial and undefined dependency, or whether they are to be regarded as mere aggravations of trespass upon Turkish rights can only be decided by determining to what extent a claim to allegiance may exist "*de jure*" after it has ceased "*de facto*."

I have heard the claim of Turkey to the lands of Guban frequently insisted on as a strong ground in favour of her right to the dependency of the Chaab; but it appears to me that an undue consequence has been attached to this point. That the Chaab were Turkish subjects at the period of Sultan Murad's treaty with Shah Tahmasp, which in its definition of the territorial right of either Government is supposed to be still in force is unquestioned. That the tribe has been virtually independent of Bussorah for the last century is equally a matter of notoriety. How then does it affect the present question of dependency whether intermediately between these periods the tribe resided in Persian or Turkish territory.


Right of territory.

I now proceed to examine the right of territory respectively possessed by Turkey and Persia to the countries at the embouchures of the Euphrates and at Karoon.

The treaties of 1822 and 1746 refer back to the convention between Sultan Murad and Shah Tahmasp for the definition of the territorial limits of the two Empires, and unfortunately I have never been able to obtain a copy of that document. I have understood, however, that a broad geographical distinction is alone contained in it, between the possessions of Persia and Turkey in their conterminous southern territory by the attribution of Khuzistan to the former power and of Irak-i-Arab to the latter; and in an age when maps and surveys were unknown it appears to me, I confess, that this is the only territorial division that could have been conveniently adopted.

I shall assume therefore that the question of right is thus correctly stated and endeavour in consequence to fix the true geographical limits of the two provinces.

The rule of appropriation from the time of authentic history appears, then to have been simply this; that the lands deriving water from the Tigris and Euphrates belonged to Irak-i-Arab, while the country along the banks of the Karoon, or deriving water from the Karoon, was within the limits of Khuzistan, nothing perhaps could be more simple in principle than this distribution: but nothing could be more fluctuating and perplexed than it has proved in practice, owing to the numerous changes in the courses of the rivers.



Thus in the earliest ages the Bamishir was, I believe, one of the true channels of the Karoon, but when the science of geography revived under the enlightened rule of the Caliphs of Baghdad and an attempt was made to fix the demarkation of the various provinces of the Empire, it is quite certain from the united authorities of all authors, that the Karoon joining with the Jerrahi in a large marsh near the site of the modern city of Guban, disembogued into the sea in a delta about the Khur-i-Moosa. There is no trace in the early Arab geography.

Practical application of it in marking the old line of frontier. ers of any connection between the Karoon and Bamishir. On the contrary, in the maps of Jeghani, which date from the 4th century of Islam, the line dividing Khuzistan and Irak-i-Arab is drawn from the sea coast, midway between the mouth of the Bamishir and the Khur-i-Moosa and is prolonged in a north-western direction, parallel to the course of the Shat and Tigris, and at a sufficient distance from these rivers to shut out from Khuzistan all the lands upon their banks deriving water from them, as high as the 32 degree of latitude.

At this period, as is expressly stated by numerous authors, the Bamishir river was the left branch of the Euphrates, and the lands receiving water from it were consequently included in Irak-i-Arab.

About the 6th century of the Hejra we find the first notice of the dis-embogued from the Karoon into the Bamishir, but it is worthy of remark that the latter river was not the less considered the eastern exit of the Euphrates, from which I infer that the water must have run from the Shat through the Haffar into the Bamishir instead of as at present from the Karoon through the Haffar into the Thal. Of course, under such circumstances, the country along the Karoon to the point of its junction with the Bamishir would alone be gained by Khuzistan that along the Haffar and the Bamishir, "drinking" the water of the Euphrates, would continue to belong to Bussorah.


But by degree the waters of the Karoon appear to have altogether deserted the eastern branch, and then it must have been, that the whole body of the river, flowing into the Bamishir, not merely filled that bed exclusively with its own stream, but forced its way also into the Shat, through the Haffar canal, and thus effected an important change in the limits of the Persian Empire; for, according to the old distribution, the lands along the Haffar and the Bamishir, would, under such circumstances, become subordinate to Khuzistan. If, indeed, we follow the original principle of allotment, we must admit that when Sheikh Salman threw his dam across the Karoon to replenish the Guban river he restored the lands of the Haffar and Bamishir to Turkey, for the pressure of the water of the Karoon being diminished, the Euphrates doubtless resumed its former course, and again, when Kerim Khan destroyed the dam, he must have recovered these lands for Persia, as the force of the Karoon concentrated in one stream would now prevail over the Euphrates, and appropriate to itself, the channels of the Bamishir and Haffar.

We have, I confess, in modern times, very little proof of the practical working of this distribution; for the science of geography has been almost extinct in the east, since the age of the Chenghizian Kings. Up to that period, certainly the towns near the Persian Gulf, which are mentioned in oriental authors, as dependent on Bussorah and on Khuzistan, are those respectively watered by the Euphrates and the Karoon, but shortly before the rise of the Suffavean dynasty, the town of Guban is reported in the country, to have been founded by emigrants from Bussorah, near the site of the ancient Hasn Mehdi, and to have been placed under the protection of the Government of the former city, which must have thereby extended its political frontier, far beyond its proper geographical limits.

A line of Princes reigned in this province it is said for 120 years, dignified by the name of Pashas, and the authority of the *Jehan nama*, a Turkish work of this period, is brought forward to show, that these Pashas of Guban were subordinate to the Government of Bussorah. As far as I can ascertain, the

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Pashas of Guban were actually in power at the period of Sultan Morad's treaty with Shah Tahmasp in A. D. 1639, but whether their dependence upon Bussorah was really of such a nature, as to entitle the territory, over which they ruled, to be considered an integral part of Irak-i-Arab, in opposition to all geographical precedent, or whether their connexion with the parent Government, was of the same loose and undefined character as that of the Chaab, who succeeded them, is a point which I have not been able to resolve, and, indeed, as the district of Guban has now become a desert, and has thus lost

Enams available for proving the territorial right of Turkey, to lands upon the Shat-el-Arab, independently of mere geographical precedent.

all territorial value, it is of no great consequence to determine its original dependency. Of far more importance is it to the question of frontier at present pending, to find, that from the earliest establishment of Turkish rule in Mesopotamia, that is from the commencement of the 16th century, the dependence upon Bussorah, and consequently upon Turkey of the lands on the left bank of the Shat-el-Arab, from the sea as far as Girdelan, has been acknowledged and recorded; the famous Sultan Salim, in about A. D. 1512 having conferred the lands in question in free grant upon four holy men of Bussorah, Sheikh Abdool Salam, Sheikh Ahmed-el-Refahee, Sheikh Habeeb-Ullah, and Sheikh Ibrahim Rodhein, and a great part of the original patents passed under the Sultan's seal, being as it is affirmed still in existence. That three years elapsed from the date of Sultan Murad's treaty with Shah Tahmasp before the Turkish authority was fairly and permanently established in Bussorah is not I think of any material consequence. The present right of Turkey to the town, according to that treaty, as a dependency of Baghdad and a part of Irak-i-Arab has never been subject of dispute, and if the claim to Bussorah be conceded, the right to all the lands dependent upon it will follow as a matter of course.

Now the land upon which the town of Mohammerah was subsequently built was unquestionably one of these dependencies. It was specified, indeed, as I understand in one of Sultan Salim's grants.


It continued in the hands of the descendants of the original grantees for above two centuries, it was then resumed by the Bussorah Government on some trivial pretext with many other lands in the vicinity; and it was subsequently farmed together with the lands of Haffir and Tamar by Suleiman Pasha of Baghdad, as I have previously stated, to the Chaab Chief, Sheikh Salman. Turkey is thus able to show her practical exercise of supremacy over the lands of Mohammerah for a consecutive series of above 250 years. But this is not all, so incontestable were her rights considered to be, that the Chaab, long after they had become virtually independent of Bussorah, continued to pay the rent or land tax instituted by Suleiman Pasha for the districts of Tamar, Haffar and Mohammerah. Three hundred tons of dates are indeed still yearly handed over to the officers of the Bussorah Government as the share of produce of the two former farms, and it is only since the forcible occupation of the town of Mohammerah by the Persian troops, that the payment of the annual land tax of 500 Karoosh (about £ 40) for the ground upon which the town is built, has been discontinued.

That Turkey is unable in the same conclusive way to prove the acknowledgment of her claim to the remainder of the territory stretching down along the Shat from Mohammerah to the sea, is owing merely to the lands in this quarter having been exempt from taxation, agreeably to Sultan Salim's patent, when the Chaab violently wrested them from the possession of the descendants of Sheikh Abdool Salim, the original grantee.

But although the question of the political dependency of Mohammerah and the adjoining territory may be thus considered as a mere matter of argument, to be proved almost to demonstration in favour of Turkey the geographical appropriation of the lands, is by no means so easily disposed of.

When Sultan Salim bestowed the grounds of Haffar and Mohammerah upon Sheikh Ahmed-el-Refahee, they were doubtless strictly dependent upon Bussorah, for the Karoon river still flowed in the Guban bed and the Haffar Canal upon which the lands were situated was thus

Former dependency of Mohammerah upon Bussorah geographically correct.



still a channel for the water of the Euphrates. When Sheikh Salman also obtained the lands from Suleiman Pasha they were in the same condition; for his dam across, the Karoon had again checked the force of the western branch of the river and the Euphrates accordingly again disembogued a part of its water by the Bamishir channel, irrigating Haffar and Mohammerah as it passed them. But since the last destruction of the dam of the Karoon and

At present owing to changes in the course of the river, it belongs geographically to Khuzistan. accordingly from a period long anterior to the foundation of the present town of Mohammerah, it must be evident that according to the old basis of distribution, the lands being watered by the Karoon, which has a second time appropriated to its own stream the bed of the Haffar, must belong geographically to Persia.

I know not upon what grounds Persia claims the left bank of the Shat-el-Arab, unless, indeed, it be that the lands were at one time occupied by the Chaab, whom she regards as her subjects. The right of Turkey politically and geographically to all the country which is dependent for its cultivation on the water of the Shat-el-Arab, is, I think, unquestionable.

The frontier between the two Empires ought to be defined, according to geographical precedent, by a line drawn lengthways through the island of Abadan from the sea on its southern side to its north-western point and then from the angle on the right bank of the Haffar canal formed by the junction of that stream with the Shat-el-Arab midway between the two rivers to the desert from whence it would run up, along the old boundary parallel to the river, and at a distance of some six or seven miles from its banks passing between two ruined landmarks called the Kooshk-i-Ujum and

These landmarks are in the desert about 7 miles north by east of Bussorah. Kooshk-i-Bussorah and proceeding on to the village of the Sowaib upon the Kerkha. Above this point the determination of the line if contested, would be attended with great difficulty, for the whole of the country, inhabited at present by the Beni Lam is within the geographical limits of Khuzistan, while on the other hand, at the time of Sultan Murad's treaty, Howeizah is said to have paid tribute to Bussorah, but fortunately these questions are not subject of dispute.

The line which I have thus marked in accordance with what appears to be strict geographical propriety, has a due regard, I think, to the claims both of Turkey and Persia. Turkey, indeed, on the grounds of the alleged dependency upon Bussorah of the Pashas of Guban, claims the dry bed of the eastern branch of the Karoon, as her boundary in that direction, and she desires to draw a line from the point of division of that channel from the Karoon, where the ruins are still to be seen of the Sheikh Salman's dam, directly across to the landmarks of Kooshk-i-Ujum and Kooshk-i-Bussorah. The entire tract, however, between the old Guban river and the immediate vicinity of the banks of the Shat-el-Arab is a desert and hardly worth disputing. The only valuable professions which she would lose in confining herself to the frontier which I have traced, would be the lands along both banks of the Haffar canal where the double town of Mohammerah is now situated, but to these lands she cannot advance any valid geographical claim, and for many years they have been practically lost to her.

Modern History of Mohammerah.

I propose to conclude my memorandum with a few observations on the modern history of Mohammerah.

The town as I have stated, was built in about A. D. 1812, by Meerdow and his son Hajee Yooosooof, according to the orders of Sheikh Ghais, at the time when the Chaab, withdrew before the Montefik from the left bank of the Shat. The original construction was a mere petty fort in either side of the Haffar canal, which at this point is about 150 yards across.

Building of the two forts of Mohammerah and Koot-el-Sheikh.




Hajee Yooossoof from the commencement resided in the fort on the northern bank of Haffar, and as he very early evinced a disposition (relying on the strength of his situation) to disregard the authority of the Sheikh of Fellahiah, the next heir to the Chiefship of the tribe, was usually stationed in the fort on the southern bank of the canal to hold him in check, and to administer the Chaab affairs upon this, their western frontier. During the life-time of Sheikh Ghais, his brother Mobashir thus acted as his deputy on the Haffar, and when Mobashir subsequently ruled at Fellahiah, the third brother Thamir succeeded to the command of Mohammerah. Thamir in the same way on his elevation to the Chiefship of the tribe, placed his nephew Faris at Mohammerah, and since Faris has been transferred to Fellahiah, his brothers Hashim and Mahomed have successively been stationed on the Haffar. The fort on the southern bank of the river, although a part of the original Mohammerah, has thus received the name "*par excellence*" of Koot-el-Sheikh, or "the Sheikh cattle," while that on the northern bank has alone to the present day retained its old designation. The Koot-el-Sheikh being directly subordinate to Fellahiah has followed in all its changes or modifications the political dependency of the tribe of Chaab, but the Chiefs residing in the fort of Mohammerah have sometimes acted without reference to the supreme Sheikh, and as it is this northern fort that has been the great object of contention between Turkey and Persia, it is necessary to trace its fortunes with some care.

Hajee Jaabir succeeded his brother Hajee Yooossoof in the government of the fort of Mohammerah about 25 years ago. As the son of a slave of the Chaab Sheikh and at the head of a small, Chaab colony, he could not of course pretend openly to assert his independence of the authority of Fellahiah. On several occasions, indeed, he furnished his share of the Chaab levy to enable the Sheikh of the tribe to meet the demands of Persia, and he also sent men to Sheikh Thamir's assistance when Fellahiah was threatened by a hostile force, but still these proofs of allegiance appear to have been but partially and reluctantly given. He settled directly with the Government of Bussorah for the land rent of the town of Mohammerah, and he made occasional presents to the Persian Governors of Dez-fool and Howeizah, unknown to the Chief of Fellahiah showing as I think that his jealousy of the Chaab Sheikh was only equalled by his fears of Persia and Turkey. His real object no doubt was independence, and he was quite content to be permitted its enjoyment without any effective declaration of his views.

Mohammerah, however, swelling from a petty fort into a considerable town had between the years 1830 and 1837, risen into so much consequence, as an emporium of trade, that it attracted general attention, and Sheikh Jaabir's anomalous position began of course to be submitted to enquiry. Ali Pasha of Baghdad desirous of protecting Bussorah from any further injury to its revenue, considering Sheikh Jabir in no other light than as a servant of the Chaab, and believing that the land on which Mohammerah was built was unequivocally Turkish property, marched accordingly against the place in A. D. 1837, took it by assault and plundered all the merchandise that had been stored in its warehouses. Having levelled the walls of Mohammerah, carried off the guns and left the place defenceless, he followed up his success as I have before mentioned by a demonstration against Fellahiah, which compelled Sheikh Thamir to fly to Koweit, and placed the dependency of the Chaab tribe altogether in his hands. Jaabir in the meantime had fled to Bushire, and had endeavoured to interest the Government of Shiraz in his behalf, urging with some plausibility (though as it appears now for the first time) that as Mohammerah was watered by the Karoon, it must be regarded as Persian property, but his solicitations were inopportune and accordingly were fruitless, and he was thus obliged to return to his dismantled town and rely on his own resources for further protection. About the same time the Turkish troops being withdrawn to Baghdad, Sheikh

Mohammerah ruined by Ali Pasha.

Hajee Jaabir, the Chief throws himself on the protection of Persia.




Thamir also returned from Koweit, and having displaced Sheikh Abdul Razaq, who had been left in the Government of Fellabiah by the Turks, he signed for his own personal ends a convention with the Pasha of Baghdad, securing himself in occupation of the Sheikh-Ship, and pledging the allegiance of his tribe to Bussorah. But Sheikh Jaabir, who could not so easily forgive the destruction of his flourishing town by the Turks, refused to be bound by this convention. He now asserted and maintained his independence of Thamir and threatened if interfered with to call in the protection of the Persians. I believe that the direct political connexion between Mohammerah and Persia dates no further back than Hajee Jaabir's visit to Bushire in 1837, and how much of cordiality or even of practical dependency there was in the connexion which was thus formed, may be comprehended from the fact that when four years afterwards the Moetimed-ed-Dowlah for the first time visited Mohammerah at the head of a Persian army with a view of marching on Fellabiah from the southward (its only vulnerable point of attack) Hajee Jaabir was afraid to trust himself in the hands of his acknowledged Chief, but again fled to Koweit leaving his nephew Hajee Mahomed to act as his deputy with the so-called friendly Persian army. Mohammerah in the meantime had been rebuilt and had recovered much of its former consequence, so that the Moetimed-ed-Dowlah seeing at once the advisability of retaining his hold upon this place, determined to leave an officer to reside on the part of the Persian Government with Sheikh Jaabir, whose absence he affected to consider a matter no moment and subsequent events have tended most singularly to promote the accomplishment of the ends he had in view in making this arrangement.

Hajee Jaabir, having returned to Mohammerah after the withdrawal of the Moetimed-el-Dowlah, sent his nephew Hajee Mahomed to Fellabiah to concert measures, as it is said, with Sheikh Faris who had been placed in the Chaab Government by the Persians to the exclusion of his uncle Thamir, for their mutual support and protection in the event of a second Persian invasion. This young man shortly after his arrival was shot by the Chaab Sheikh, as a rebel to his Chief, and a traitor to his tribe. The flames of the strife broke out again of course, more fiercely than ever between the two Chaab families. Hashim, the brother of Faris, and Governor of Koot-el-Sheikh, made an attempt to cross the Haffar and drive Jaabir out of Mohammerah, and the latter Chief was thus obliged for his own protection, to put in execution his long threatened requisition for the presence of a Persian garrison. A detachment of troops from Dez-fool accordingly occupied the town of Mohammerah in the spring of 1843, and remained there until a few months back, when Jaabir relieved from his fear of attack from Koot-el-Sheikh contrived, by showing the difficulty of their subsistence to dispense with their further services. But the Persian officer with a small escort continues to reside in Mohammerah as the representative of his Government, and Sheikh Jaabir, whose fears are now thoroughly aroused as well by the experience the Persians have had of the accessibility of Mohammerah as by the invitation of his enemy Sheikh Thamir to Erozerom acts towards him not certainly with any real good will but still in a manner calculated to avoid the possible forfeiture of his claim to the protection of Persia on occasion of necessity, and at the same time to deprecate the displeasure or hostility of that Government.

The present fort of Mohammerah which has been rebuilt since Ali Pasha's visit in 1837 is a "quadrangular" enclosure of about 350 yards by 300. The mud wall which surrounds it, is of the most ordinary description, and it is entirely destitute of artillery. It possesses only one caravanserai for the accommodation of the merchants, the other buildings contained in the enclosure are the rude huts, composed of mud and reeds, which form the ordinary habitation of the Arabs.

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There were 12 boats anchored in the creek when I visited the place which, had lately disembarked their cargoes. A Turkish brig of war lies off the Haffar's canal, with the avowed object of preventing the boats which enter the Shat-el-Arab laden with Indian goods, from turning into that channel, but the obstructions is easily evaded. The boats bound for Mohammerah now either sail up the Bamishir river, instead of the Shat or if they draw too much water to admit of their passing the bar at the mouth of the former river, they land their cargoes on the island of Abadan, a few miles below the mouth of the Haffar canal, and then passing the Turkish guardship empty, the anchor off Mohammerah and bring their goods across by land.

Mohammerah has thriven being a free port, and it has owed this advantage to the uncertainty of its dependency. If Turkish authority were acknowledged, the import duties would of course be put at once on a par with those of Bussorah. If, on the other hand, the power of Persia were sufficiently established to disregard conciliation, I imagine that an attempt would be made to institute a tariff similar to that in operation at Bushire and Bunder Abbas. Mohammerah would in either event assuredly decline, for in Arab estimation it has no natural advantages that I am aware of superior to those of Bussorah. Sheikh Jaabir no doubt is sensible of this, and his anxiety for the prosperity of his town is thus equally interested with his own personal ambition in protracting a settlement of the question. His predominant feeling, however, at present is hostility to Sheikh Thamir, and his family, and as blood has now been shed between them, it will be in vain, I think, to look for permanency in any arrangement that shall make Mohammerah subordinate to Chaab, or even shall include the two divisions of the tribe under the same Government.

I have only to observe in conclusion that there are present independent of the island of Abadan 12 places inhabited by the Chaab north of the Haffar canal, which are in dispute between Persia and Turkey, of these, Mohammerah and Hoozan belong to Sheikh Jaabir and are at present dependent upon Persia that power however deriving no pecuniary benefit from them at all commensurate with the value of her protection Boojidee and Kootal Nawasir pay their revenues to the Bawa Arabs, who consider themselves subjects of the Persian crown, either as dependents upon Dezful upon Howeizah or upon Fellahiah.

An Tamar El Jadeed, Khomeisah, Shakhoora, Nabr Toossoof, Darband. El Khagin and El Haffar are under the immediate surveillance of the Chief of Koot-el-Sheikh, acting as the deputy of the Sheikh of Fellahiah, and are subject to the payment of 300 tons of dates yearly for land rent to the Government of Bussorah.

With the exception of occasional presents from Sheikh Jaabir, the Persian crown derives no revenue whatever either in money in kind, or in military attendance from any of these disputed lands, and it can therefore be of little consequence to her, that the line of frontier which I have traced in a previous paragraph, while it secures to her, Koot-el-Sheikh on the southern, and Mohammerah and Haffar on the northern side of the canal, restores to Turkey all the other lands both in the island of Abadan and on the banks of the Shat-el-Arab above Haffar, which are cultivated by the Chaab.

BAGHDAD RESIDENCY ;
The 6th January 1844. }
S646FD

(Sd.) H. RAWLINSON,
Political Agent, Turkish Arabia.



APPENDIX B.

Correspondence about the Kerbela Massacre, 1843, between the Foreign Office, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, the Envoy at Teheran and Lieutenant-Colonel Farrant.*

CONSTANTINOPLE;

18th March, 1843.

To the Earl of Aberdeen, K. T., &c., &c., &c.

No. 56.

My Lord,

I mentioned in a former despatch that I had requested Lieutenant-Colonel Farrant to proceed to Baghdad, conceiving that his presence there in the unfortunate circumstances occasioned by Negib Pasha's conduct, might not only contribute to elucidate the truth, but to check the further progress of mischief. Subsequent intelligence has confirmed in my apprehension the expediency of that measure, and I am therefore happy to inform Your Lordship that Colonel Farrant, who had arrived meanwhile at Erzerum, was to set out for Baghdad about ten days ago, and that I have sent a Jatai with instructions to meet him in that city. The extraordinary silence of Her Majesty's Consul, who wrote to congratulate Negib Pasha on the assault of Kerbela two days before he last wrote to me on the 16th of January, and did not apprise me of his having taken so marked a step, is an additional reason for wishing to have an intelligent and trustworthy officer on the spot. The copies inclosed herewith of the Instructions, which I have addressed to him will inform Your Lordship more particularly of the objects to which I have directed his attention.

I have furnished him with letters of introduction. A copy of the letter, which I have addressed in this view to the Pasha himself accompanies this despatch. It was forwarded before the Porte had consented to appoint a Commissioner. Monsieur de Bouteneff has authorized Colonel Farrant to act on behalf of the Russian Embassy also, and a copy of His Excellency's letter is inclosed herewith.

The Turkish Commissioner is Namik Pasha, who has long been well known in Europe. He speaks the French language fluently, and is free from the religious prejudices of his country. The Porte could hardly have made a more judicious choice.

I have, &c.,

(Sd). STRATFORD CANNING.

CONSTANTINOPLE;

February 24th, 1843.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Farrant, &c., &c., &c.


SIR,

Presuming as well from your letter as from the last despatches addressed to me by Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil, that you will probably proceed to Erzerum as soon as the Persian Plenipotentiary is sufficiently recovered to resume his journey, I write to you at that place.

After what has recently happened at Kerbela, the temporary presence of an English officer at Baghdad may be of essential service, in checking any further operations contemplated by Negib Pasha, or at all events in affording to the Persian Court a proof of Her Majesty's anxiety to protect its interests, when unfairly or unseasonably assailed and of our readiness to concur in obtaining a just satisfaction for any unwarranted injury inflicted upon them. Your connection with the British Legation in Persia, and your long established oriental experience would seem to make you out as peculiarly qualified for such a service, the due performance of which would greatly conduce in my opinion to the success of the pending negotiations. It was expressly with a view to that object that in pursuance of instructions from England, Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil decided on placing your services at the disposal of this Embassy and under his sanction, thus implied, I do not hesitate to request that you will charge yourself with the execution of the proposed duty.

The amount of my information as to the late proceedings and future intentions of the Pasha of Bagdad, is, that he attacked and took Kerbela by assault, that the sacred buildings so greatly venerated by the Persians were injured by his soldiers; that a massacre of the inhabitants, including many Persians, some of Royal birth, took place, and that measures were in operation to carry also by force the other Holy Places in that neighbourhood, and by intrigues with the important tribe of Chaab and its Chief to facilitate the recovery of Mahamara.

* Printed from copy obtained from the Foreign Office, London, and sent to Simla by the India Office.



That portion of this information which relates to Mohammerah is conjectural; and with respect to the massacre at Kerbela, though stated circumstantially in a Report transmitted to me by Her Majesty's Consul at Damascus it is not mentioned to me by Colonel Taylor, who wrote, however, immediately after the capture of the place, and, to all appearance, upon the exclusive statement of the Pasha.

The Porte denies that the Pasha acted in pursuance of instructions from Constantinople, but the Pasha in one of his communications to Colonel Taylor, appears to have adopted his measures under a different impression.

The object of your journey to Baghdad under these circumstances are to assist in dissuading the Pasha from prosecuting any designs offensive to Persia during the negotiations at Erzerum to enforce, by a decided expression of my opinion, as representing that of Her Majesty's Government, His Excellency's complete obedience to the instructions of the Porte which I am assured by Sarino Effendi have been issued in conformity with my advice, and to ascertain, with the assistance of Colonel Taylor, the true state of things on the spot, both as to what may be justly complained of by Persia, and what may be further in contemplation on the part of Negib Pasha.

I am not yet informed of the impression made at the Court of Tehran by the storm of Kerbela and the slaughter if it be true, of so many of its Persian inhabitants, but should those lead to the adoption of any violent resolution, notwithstanding the exertions of Count Medem and Colonel Sheil, your presence at Baghdad may also afford the means of preventing or arresting the commission of any hostile acts on the side of Persia and enable the English and Russian Commissioners at Erzerum to keep the negotiation alive.

Your intercourse with Negib Pasha may also afford you an opportunity of removing any danger of collision to be apprehended on the frontier of Sulimaniah in consequence of the advance of the Turkish troops, and the reinforcement sent to Aidelan. The Pasha of the former district, as you know, is in dependence on the Vizir commanding at Baghdad.

Being pressed for time by the departure of the Stamboul and anxious not to lose the interval of a whole week I confine myself for the present to this hurried outline of my views in requesting your services on this occasion. A more complete instruction shall be addressed for you to Baghdad under cover to Her Majesty's Consul.

In the meantime I send you herewith a travelling Firman and a letter of introduction in your favour from the Grand Vizir to Negib Pasha.

I have, &c.,

(Sd.) STRATFORD CANNING

CONSTANTINOPLE;

March 9th, 1843.


To Lieutenant-Colonel Farrant, etc., etc., etc., Baghdad.

Sir,

Since I wrote to you on the 24th ultimo I have received the notification of your arrival at Erzerum and reckoning therefore on the probability of your having proceeded to Baghdad, now address you these agreeably to my original intention.

I lament to state that the last advices from Teheran have unhappily confirmed the reported massacre at Kerbela. Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil in writing to Lord Aberdeen, and Count Medem, in addressing Monsieur de Bouteneff, describes in vivid terms the deep feelings of sorrow and indignation excited in Persia by the intelligence of that catastrophe. The accompanying copies of two official reports, addressed by the Persian Agent at Baghdad to Hadjee Meerza Aghassee and communicated by His Excellency's order to Count Medem and Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil, will apprise you of the circumstances, which have produced so painful an impression on the Count, and as far as they were known publicly upon the people of Persia. To soften that impression and to dissuade the Shah from giving way to any sudden ebullition of resentment were the object for which both the British and Russian representatives employed their strenuous efforts. The degree of success which attended their benevolent exertions has unfortunately left but too much room for a recurrence to measures of angry demonstration, and perhaps eventually of menace and hostility. An order for the collection of troops appeared to be the only measure actually decided upon; but it was thought probable that reinforcements would be sent to Tabrez and Hamaden.

No pains have been spared by Monsieur de Bouteneff and myself to impress upon the Porte the propriety and indeed the indispensable justice of making full atonement for the horrors perpetrated at Kerbela. Our joint representations have been hitherto met by the Turkish Minister with an utter unqualified denial of the fact; and it is therefore more than ever requisite to institute an inquiry on the spot. For this purpose I have proposed that a Turkish Commissary should be de-patched to Baghdad with instructions to co-operate with you, and I do not despair of engaging the Porte to adopt so useful a measure, but as the weekly steam packet for Samsoon and Trebizond sets out to-morrow, I am unwilling to lose a whole week in waiting for a contingency, which may not be ultimately realized.



Having thus explained the circumstances under which I address you, it remains for me to request that immediately on the receipt of this despatch, you will exert yourself to collect information as to the correctness of the Persian statements, and to ascertain from the most authentic sources in what respects they agree with, or differ from the facts, as they really occurred. In some particulars, and emphatically in the number of victims it is probable that no small exaggeration has been used. But whatever may be the case in that respect, the plain unvariated truth will be the sole object of your researches. You will find no difficulty in communicating with those who from local or personal knowledge may be best qualified to furnish the desired information.

Her Majesty's Consul to whom I write upon the subject will, doubtless afford you all the assistance in his power. I have already sent you a letter of recommendation from the Grand Vizir to Nejib Pasha. I transmit to you herewith a letter, by which the Russian Envoy requests and authorizes you to act on his part in the sense of this instruction, and for the same object, to which I have directed your attention. So distinguished a mark of confidence, will, I am sure be duly appreciated by you; and it is almost needless for me to add that on this occasion, as in all that relates to the negotiating at Erzeroom, His Excellency manifests on behalf of his Court the same pacific views, which are entertained by the British Government. Whatever reports you may address to me under this instruction I shall consider as intended for his information no less than for my own.

The present despatch will be conveyed to you by an express Tatar, formerly in the service of this Embassy. By him you will transmit to me the result of your inquiries, remaining yourself at Bagdad or in its vicinity for a further communication from me. Your presence in that quarter during the period of exasperation, which is to be expected may contribute powerfully to restrain the spirit of fanaticism on one side and that of retaliation on the other. Such knowledge of the joint and pacific views, which animate the mediating powers, as may be derived from you by the authorities of either side can hardly fail to promote the cause of peace. To the Porte as well as to the Persian Government your mission affords both the means of obtaining intelligence free from exaggeration, and an additional motive on the part of the latter to look for redress to the party negotiating rather than to any rash measure of violence and revenge.

It will be desirable for you to inform Colonel Shiell and Captain Williams of the result of your inquiries as to the events at Kerbela, and the subsequent proceedings of the Pasha towards the subjects of His Persian Majesty. The Persian Agent will, no doubt, afford you suitable opportunity of communicating with Teheran, and the Tatar will convey your despatch for Captain Williams to the Vice-Consul at Samsoon.

I have &c.,

(Sd.) STRATFORD CANNING.

CONSTANTINOPLE,

June 16th, 1843.

To the Right Honourable the Earl of Aberdeen, K.T., etc., etc., etc.

No. 128.

MY LORD,


I have the honour to enclose herewith for the information of Her Majesty's Government a copy of the Report addressed to me by Lieutenant-Colonel Farrant respecting the late transactions at Kerbela. I add the copy of another Despatch from that officer, relating to a fresh aggression which had taken place between the Turkish and Persian frontier Tribes near Sulimanieh, and the orders sent from Bagdad to prevent any further occasion of complaint on that side.

With respect to Kerbela Your Lordship will perceive that although the inhuman outrages perpetrated by the Turkish troops at the time of the assault, are confirmed as to the leading points, the number of the slaughtered, the extent of the mischief, particularly as to the lives and properties of the Persians, the conduct of Negib Pasha, and the degree of provocation are now presented in a light which varies considerably from our first impressions. The proceedings of the Pasha in particular appear to have been far less culpable than the reports of the Persian Agent and the French Consul had induced us to believe.

Namik Pasha, who returned from Bagdad several days ago, is engaged in preparing his report. I have not seen him since his return, but I understand that he disculpates the Pasha of Bagdad entirely, and maintains, as the result of his enquiries at Kerbela, that the loss of life did not extend beyond a hundred and fifty Persians, and rather more than two hundred others.

This view of the matter and the positive opinion, which he has adopted in favour of the Sultan's claim to Zohb and Mohammarah, will not diminish our difficulties with Persia, or increase our means of obtaining an adequate atonement from the Porte. The language, though as yet unofficial, of Mcuntaz Effendi bears me out in this apprehension.

[S646FD]



What little conversation I have had with the Russian Envoy on this subject induces me to think that Colonel Farrant's report has made the same impression on both of us. On the whole we inclined to the opinion that without requiring the punishment or disgrace of Negib Pasha we may advise his removal to another Government, on the grounds of expediency and conciliation; and that if Sadullah Pasha, who commanded the besieging army who sanctioned the pillage of the town, and who did not interfere for more than two hours to stop the massacre, were brought before a Court Martial, or tried by the Supreme Council, we should obtain as much as circumstances permit for the satisfaction of the Court of Persia.

The whole question is full of embarrassment, and I look with anxiety to the next advices from Colonel Shiel.

I have &c.,

(Sd.) STRATFORD CANNING.

BAGDAD,

May 16th, 1843.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable Sir Stratford Canning G.C.B., &c., &c., &c.

No. 9.

SIR,

I have the honour to report to Your Excellency that His Excellency Negib Pasha sent yesterday to inform me that he had just received letters from Ahmed Pasha and Suleimanieh stating that Mahomed Beg of the tribes of Jâf (They are under the Pasha of Suleimanieh) notwithstanding all the orders he has given to the Tribet on the frontier to keep quiet, had dared to proceed over the frontier, and plundered some tribes there. Ahmed Pasha on hearing this instantly despatched troops to seize Mahomed Beg and to secure the plunder.

His Excellency the Pasha was extremely angry on receiving this news, and instantly wrote off to Suleimanieh the most peremptory orders to seize Mahomed Beg and send him to Bagdad, and that the Pasha must see the plundered property restored to its rightful owners. I shall address a letter to the Pasha of Suleimanieh, and also one to the Wali of Senna, telling them how necessary it is to keep their Kurds in order and I have agreed with the Persian Consul to send a confidential servant of his with these letters immediately to Suleimanieh, and to see that Ahmed Pasha restores the plundered property to its owners.

I shall without delay despatch a foot messenger to Colonel Shiel informing him of the true version of this affair in case exaggerated reports should reach His Majesty the Shah.

I have &c.,

(Sd.) F. FARRANT, Lieutenant-Colonel.

BAGDAD,


May 15th, 1843.

* To His Excellency the Right Honourable Sir Stratford Canning, G.C.B., &c., &c., &c.

SIR,

Your Excellency may have learned that the town of Kerbella had for many years nearly thrown off the authority of the Sultan, which had become invested in the hands of a lawless set of people called Yaramas (vagabonds) who aided by the influential people of the place and by the Priests, did all in their power to keep up this opposition to the Government, and to excite as much as possible their hatred to the "Soonies." Two or three Governors who had been placed there by former Pashas of Bagdad, had been murdered by the inhabitants. Daoud Pasha sent a large force to reduce the place to obedience, and after a siege of eleven months was obliged to withdraw it, and contented himself with receiving annually a certain sum of money. Ali Pasha who succeeded him wishes to perform a pilgrimage to the shrines of the Saints, but the people of Kerbella refused to allow him to enter the town and without attempting to reduce them to obedience contented himself with receiving money, and appointed Seid Wahab, a man of good family, who was closely connected with the Yaramas, Governor and relinquished himself all control over the town.

*NOTE.—The peculiar punctuation and arrangement of sentences in this report or rather copy of it, have been retained.



These Yaramus from the want of a proper government gradually raised themselves into power and completely got possession of the place, they issued their orders and governed at their will, and lived chiefly by plundering the inhabitants and pilgrims: the atrocities committed by them are well known to all who have visited Kerbella.

There were several Chiefs among them. The principal was Sayd Ibrahim Zafrani. Of Persian-Arab origin his father was from Bacoba and married at Kerbella an Arab woman—he was of low birth and sold saffron. His son Sayd Ibrahim was for many years extremely poor, and being of loose habits joined the Yaramas, and brought himself into notice by killing one of their Chiefs, and gradually raised himself into the position he held by daring and intrigue and distributing freely amongst his followers any plunder he might obtain—he was considered by all the Chief. Meerza Sauleh was the next in power; he is of Persian origin and most of his followers were Persians. Mohamed Ali Khan, a Persian from Parz, had also much power, he was styled Boolooh, he had one hundred and fifty followers—Persians. There were several other Chiefs, but they were of minor importance. These Yaramas went about constantly armed levying contributions and took by force what they could not obtain by good will; frequent disputes regarding their rights broke out amongst them, which often ended in bloodshed and murder; at times the greatest confusion reigned; the inhabitants lived in constant dread of these men. They got possession of lands in the neighbourhood, and have best houses in the town; every pilgrim for the time he resided at Kerbella, put himself under the protection of one of these Chiefs and paid him by presents or otherwise to secure his protection against the other Yaramas; the inhabitants likewise found it necessary for their security to attach themselves to one of the Chiefs. Sayd Ibrahim Safrani had the most followers and was greatly feared. These Yaramas whose numbers I have been told did not exceed two thousand, or two thousand five hundred, were chiefly composed of the dregs of the people, Arabs, Persians, murderers and robbers who had fled their country. Every criminal was sure to find protection there. Sayd Wahab, nominal Governor, a man of influence and good family, was born at Kerbella. He brought forward (*sic*) and closely connected himself with Sayd Ibrahim, finding him a man of no talent and great daring, he pretended to the Pashas that the Yaramas would not allow him to carry their orders into execution, while on the other hand through the means of Sayd Ibrahim he supported the Yaramas, occasionally giving them money and allowing Sayd Ibrahim to assume a sort of authority in the town; likewise to check the influence of the Persian Party, consisting of Meerza Sauleh and Mohamed Ali Han Boloosh of which he was afraid, he conveyed a certain sum annually to the Pasha whilst the remainder of the revenues were plundered by him. The most friendly intercourse was kept up with the populous tribes of Arabs outside with whom Sayd Ibrahim had great influence, these Arabs are in rebellion against the Sultan and of the Sheeah faith and willingly give their assistance when required.

It appears hardly to be credited that so small a body of men should be able to exercise such oppression towards the inhabitants of so populous a town, three fourths of which were Persian or of Persian origin containing sometimes a population of eighty thousand souls, but such was the case. The Mollahs found it for their interest to succumb to the authority of the Yaramas, to keep out Soonee Governors, and the Chief Priests Hazez Sayd Ransem Reshty and Sayd Ibrahim Kazvini between whom a great hatred and jealousy existed and still exists, each striving to obtain the chief station possessed no power, although much respected by the inhabitants and pilgrims—each had a party of Yaramas to support his pretensions. Sayd Ibrahim Zafrani with his powerful party attached himself to Hazez Sayd Ransem and Meerza Sauleh supported Sayd Ibrahim Kazvini and any proposition made by the one party was sure to be rejected by the other—occasionally the most violent quarrels took place and the two chief Priests to maintain their positions connected themselves more closely with the Yaramas whose authority increased daily. This state of things had gone on for more than twenty years. Kerbella had become an independent town and its population which was mostly Persian emigrants, or of Persian origin considered that the Pashas were not able, or that the Sultan did not wish to establish his authority there; occasionally the greatest horrors were committed by these Yaramas, and the most respectable people have informed me that no town could have exceeded Kerbella in debauchery and villainy of every sort.

The town of Kerbella is situated about four hours distance from the right bank of the Euphrates on the confines of the Syrian Desert south south-west of Bagdad about fifty five miles distant, and is about 1½ miles in circumference surrounded by a brick wall about 24 feet high with 29 bastions, each of which is capable of containing one gun—it contains three thousand four hundred houses of a very superior description; the houses closely crowded together approach within three yards of the wall, the streets are very narrow, the tops of the houses are surrounded by a brick parapet and can be fired from without exposure, it has six gates, three of which are very small. The tomb of Imaum Hoossein is a fine building, and stands nearly in the centre of the town, that of this brother Abbas in the South-East quarter, about two hundred and fifty yards from the Nujef Gate. The town is surrounded by gardens which approach close to the walls, leaving only a small footpath. The gardens are filled with huge date-trees, intersected with numerous ditches, and extend to some distance from the town, which is not perceptible until you close under the walls. Its strength consists in its situation, but it appeared to me that a few good troops ought to be able to take it in a short time. The houses mostly belong to Persians who have left their country and that settled there for generations; many of the rich men in Persia have houses and land there, that in time of need they may have a safe place of refuge, or wishing in their old age to retire to



a place held in such veneration by them. The population varies from ten thousand to twenty thousand and eighty thousand, it is always fluctuating, and I was informed that during the time the pilgrims arrive, the streets are almost impassable. The houses are mostly divided into several small courts, occasionally one hundred persons are crowded into one of these houses which to outward appearance could with difficulty contain half that number. The poorer pilgrims take up their abode in the Courts of the Mosques. The working classes at Kerbella, *viz.*, bakers, small shopkeepers, day labourers, etc., were (*sic*) all Persians.

Kerbella was supposed to contain much treasure, but Sayd Wahab, the Governor, who had charge of the two Mosques, is said to have plundered much property belonging to them, the Arab tribes in the neighbourhood conveyed their plunder to that town in time of trouble, in short Kerbella although a place of sanctity was the abode of every criminal, and the Yaramas supported by the holy men, did as they deemed fit and defied the authority of the Government.

His Excellency Negib Pasha on taking charge of his Pashalik found affairs in this state. On the twenty-third of October, about forty days after his arrival in Bagdad, His Excellency left for Mossaib on the Euphrates about twenty miles from Kerbella; where Zaadollah Pasha Seraskier had proceeded with some troops and pitched his camp, for the nominal purpose of digging a canal to carry back the water, which now escapes from that river into the Hoor (Marsh), into its original bed. The great object I have been told in recovering this marsh was to drive out of it large tribes of Arabs called Mardans, who are in rebellion against the Government and who occupy small Islands in it, their chief occupation is growing rice and feeding buffaloes, they are all robbers.

Many reports about this time were in circulation that the Pasha intended marching on Kerbella. The Chief Priest Hagee Sayd Kansem Resty, wrote to the Persian Consul, that many Persians were daily coming to him for advice and begged him to go to the Pasha's camp, or write to him to know his intentions. At this time also some letters passed between the Pasha and the Persian Consul relative to the Yaramas oppressing the Persians at Kerbella, but not regarding the Pasha's advance on that place. Many Persian families were daily leaving the place for Bagdad.

The Pasha being in want of provisions for his troops sent to Kerbella to command a certain quantity at the same time intimating his intention to visit the shrines of the saints. In answer to his demand for provisions they sent him a small quantity saying they could provide no more, and informed him if he wished to visit the shrines of the Saints, he might come with four or five attendants, but that they would not allow any troops to enter the town. On receiving this reply, perceiving the tone of the people, he determined to re-establish the authority of the Sultan in Kerbella, but if the inhabitants did not become submissive to his Government, he should order the place to be taken by force, and felt after the reply he had received, he could not now recede from his intention without great danger to his authority in his Pashalic. The news of the Pasha's intentions soon spread abroad, but before commencing operations, on the 18th of November, he addressed a letter to the Persian Consul and also to the British and French Consuls detailing his reasons, and requested the former to advise and command all Persian subjects to leave Kerbella, he prevented also a large body of Pilgrims, who had just arrived from Persia from proceeding, informing them of his reasons for so doing.

The inhabitants of Kerbella held many meetings, and it was unanimously agreed, that they would not allow the Pasha's troops to enter the town; they would give him money, and began to take measures for defending it. The Yaramas and chief influential people, seeing that many respectable Persian families were leaving daily tried to persuade them to remain, reminding them of their religion, and the time Daoud Pasha in vain attempted to besiege them, many poor families who were settled at Kerbella would not leave the little property they possessed, and had not the means of procuring transport, also; seeing that some of the families of the Persian Royal Family remained, did not believe the Pasha was serious in his intentions of attacking the place, and if he did, that he would not succeed.

The Persian Consul in reply to the Pasha begged him to postpone his intended attack, that if the town was taken by assault many innocent people (Persian subjects) would suffer, who at present were unable to come away, that he was newly arrived in his Pashalic, that by persuasion and giving time the inhabitants of Kerbella would be brought to obedience, that if he would delay his expedition for four or six months, to give the Persians time to arrange their affairs, he would proceed to Kerbella and bring the Persians away, and arrange everything for him.

Three days before receiving the Pasha's letter, the Consul asserts he wrote privately to the Chief Priests Hagee Seid Ranssem saying "we hear the Pasha will move on Kerbella and if he is determined will certainly come, he is not an Ali Pasha, tell the Persians they had better come out". Official letter he again wrote to the Chief Priest of the Pasha's fixed determination and requested him to tell all the Persians to quit the town, this letter he sent by a confidential person, but it appears it never reached, as the Chief Priest declares he never wrote to him, although he requested him to come to Kerbella.

The Pasha would not listen to the propositions of the Consul. His Royal Highness the Zili-Sultan, son of the late King of Persia a refugee accompanied by Hagee Said Ranssem



Chief Priest, Seid Wahab Governor of Kerbella, Seid Hopanee and Seid Nusserovla all influential people of Kerbella came to the Pasha's Camp at Mosseib and remained four days. The Pasha told them he did not wish to injure the people, that Kerbella was in rebellion and belonged to the Sultan, that if they would allow him to place three hundred soldiers in the town, the Yeramus with their families should be allowed to leave it without molestation, but if opposed he would certainly attack the place. They answered we will give money, we will obey but the Yeramus and Chief people will never agree to the soldiers entering Kerbella. The Pasha then said "Let Seid Ibrahim Zafrance, Chief of the Yeramus come to me." Seid Waleh answered, that he would not come but if the Pasha would give him ten days delay, that he would kill him. They all returned to Kerbella, but chiefs refused to agree to the Pasha's terms, and determined to defend the place, guns were placed in the bastions. The Pasha in the meantime sent to Bagdad for more troops. Shortly after this, His Royal Highness, the Zil-i-Sultan and Chief Priest Hagee Seid Ransem wrote to the Pasha, that if he would send Hagee Abdul Rahman Hansheem a native of Bagdad, to Kerbella, they would settle everything for him, he arrived, the chiefs of Yeramus and all the influential people assembled at the house of the Chief Priest, a long debate ensued, at last they agreed, and sealed a paper that five hundred soldiers should be allowed to enter the town. Hagee Abdul Rahman then proposed that the chiefs should go out to Mossaib, and visit the Pasha, and that he would remain in the town as a hostage for their security, they would not agree to this, a violent discussion took place, the Hagee was threatened and abused, from fear left the assembly and quitted the town; the paper was destroyed. The Chief Priest then entreated them all to listen to him and at last persuaded them to agree to the Pasha's terms; he wrote to the Pasha that they had all consented that he might place five hundred soldiers in the town, viz., one hundred at one of the gates, and the rest at a carvansarai in the town, also that they would give hostages. The Pasha would not consent to their terms being afraid of treachery.

The Pasha told the Chief Priest and His Royal Highness the Zil-i-Sultan before leaving his camp, to warn all Persians to separate themselves from the Yeramus (and gave the Prince a paper to that effect) that if they could not leave the town, they should retire altogether to one quarter of it, or else with their families and property seek protection in the courts of the tombs of Hoossein and Abbas, for he was determined to proceed to extremities if the Kerbella is refused to submit to his orders. Up to this time many thousand Persian families had left the town; with the exception of a few of the refugee Persian Princes, who considered themselves secure, the greater part of those who remained were poor shopkeepers and labourers settled in the place who could not move their families for the want of carriage, or runaway criminals from Persia who joined the Yeramus—some Pilgrims also remained. The price of carriage had become very high and scarcely procurable, much property during this time was conveyed to Nujif. Thirty one days had now elapsed since the Persian Consul received intimation from the Pasha of his intentions.

His Excellency Negib Pasha learning that preparations for defence were going on, and that Arabs were flocking into Kerbella despatched the Seraskier Zaadollah Pasha with three regiments of Infantry one Regiment of Cavalry and twenty guns to that place where he arrived on the 19th December, he was also accompanied by some friendly Arabs; and pitched his camp about 1/2 miles South East of the town outside the Gardens; whilst the soldiers were employed pitching their tents they were fired at from the Gardens. The Seraskier placed his guns in position but did not commence operations.

Seid Ibrahim Zafrance and other Chiefs seeing that troops had arrived went to Hagee Seid Ransem Chief Priest and his Royal Highness Zil-i-Sultan and asked their advice, they both most earnestly recommended them to be obedient, and surrender to the Pasha's orders as he was sure to take the place. They would not listen, all said they would fight, that they were afraid if the troops entered the town, they would be killed. His Royal Highness the Zil-i-Sultan accompanied by Hagee Seid Ransem went out to the Seraskier's camp and proposed that he should withdraw his army to Mossaib, leaving five hundred men in camp, that after the main body had arrived at Mossaib, they would allow the five hundred men to enter the town, that all hostilities should cease, that the families of Seid Ibrahim Zafrance, Meerza Saulet, Chiefs of Yeramus, and some others should be given over to the Pasha as hostages, that the Yeramus with their families should leave the town without molestation, after which the army might return to Kerbella. It is said the Seraskier agreed to this proposal, and sent off to the Pasha at Mossaib to say what he had done. The inhabitants of Kerbella accompanied by a body of Arabs went outside the walls, the Arabs performed the Honsen (war dance) firing off their guns—no fighting took place that day.

His Royal Highness the Zil-i-Sultan and Hagee Seid Ransem returned to the town and communicated to the chiefs what they had proposed, the most violent discussions took place, at last they agreed to send out hostages to the Seraskier's Camp; the families of Seid Ibrahim Chief of the Yeramus and of Meerza Saulet with some others were to accompany His Royal Highness the Zil-i-Sultan on the following day. Meerza Saulet refused to send his family at last he agreed to accompany the Prince himself, he asked the Prince what security they had that he was true, the Prince answered I leave my family and that of my brother in your hands.

[S646FD]



In the afternoon on the 21st or 22nd of December, His Royal Highness the Zil-i-Sultan with his brothers Ali Naakjee Meerza and Imaum Wurde Meerza, with the families of Seid Ibrahim and some others accompanied by Meerza Saulet Yeramus, went to the Seraskier's camp, they were well received. Meerza Saulet was introduced to the Seraskier as a most respectable person, son of a former Chief Priest, after sitting some time, he took his leave, and invited the Seraskier to breakfast with him in the town next day.

Soliman Meerza a refugee Prince came in from the Pasha's Camp at Mossaib, and report says the Pasha had refused to agree to the terms made by the Seraskier, to allow the main body of the army to retire. The Prince was very active, abusing the people of Kerbella and urging the Seraskier to attack the place instantly. The Seraskier next morning found out that Meerza Saulet had escaped through his hands, also that the hostages were not complete, that some of the women sent out were not the wives of the people represented. An artillery officer Ibrahim Aga was sent into the town with some message, but chiefly to spy what was going on—on his approach large bodies of Arabs and inhabitants came out of the Gardens and followed him to the gate, they asked the news he answered "Peace". Here a great crowd had assembled, on a sudden some people on the walls cried out, we are betrayed, that the Seraskier had drawn up his troops, and was advancing on the town, the alarm soon spread a large body of the Arabs and inhabitants collected, marched down and attacked the Seraskier, the soldiers were driven in from their guns which fell into the hands of the enemy, the most severe fighting continued many hours, and several on both sides were killed, the soldiers rallied and recovered the limbers of the guns, about sunset the inhabitants of Kerbella retired, having overset the guns they could not carry away into a ditch, in the night they were recovered by the soldiers. From what I have learnt the cause of this sudden attack on the Seraskier was this he wished to take possession of some favourable positions near his camp, and the people of town seeing the troops in motion imagined he was going to attack. The artillery officer was instantly seized and abused, he was taken to the house of the Chief Priest who protected him.

His Royal Highness the Zil-i-Sultan observing that the army was in movement remonstrated with the Seraskier, and requested to be allowed to convey the hostages back to the town, and to return to his family, he was refused and the Seraskier was extremely rude to him. The Prince and his brothers were sent to the Pasha's camp at Mossaib and from thence to Bagdad. The hostages were also sent into Bagdad and well treated.

Every precaution was now taken by the chief people of Kerbella, they began to oppress the people, employed the Persians in casting shot and placed four guns in the bastions facing the Seraskier's camp, and also several wall pieces, which were in charge of Persians commanded by different Chiefs of Yeramus. Mahmed Ali Khan, Belooch, had charge of a gate and a bastion, he had more than one hundred followers mostly Persians, they fought outside the walls—Abotaslub a Persian of Inshaphan had also charge of a bastion—he had been in Kerbella three or four years and had forty followers Persians. A Persian artillery man Futtoola, who had deserted from the Persian army and entered the Turkish service from which he deserted, and became the servant of His Royal Highness Zil-i-Sultan, was one who directed these guns, he was taken after the siege and blown away from a mortar. The gates of the town were in charge of different Chiefs, all were left open with the exception of the two nearest the Seraskier's Camp. After this the Persian declare they were not allowed to leave the town. The fact is no carriage was procurable—some Persians I heard attempted to get to Nujif but the Arabs outside stripped them. Fighting took place daily in the gardens the Turkish artillery fired without effect, the shots generally passed over the town. The Seraskier it is said had orders to fire over the town and frighten the people, this appears probable as during the siege which lasted 23 days no body was injured and the town scarcely touched from the fire of the Artillery. About the 1st January the Persian Consul accompanied by the Chief Priest Seid Ibrahim Kazveene arrived in Nejib Pasha's Camp at Mossaib from Bagdad. The army had now been eleven days before Kerbella, much fighting had taken place, and many on both sides had been killed. The Consul again urged the Pasha to give time, that the Persians in the town could not leave, carriage was not procurable, the Yeramus also would not allow them to come out. His Excellency told the Persian Consul to go to Kerbella and desire the Persians to leave and not to aid the rebels, that if they could not get carriage he would send camels and mules to assist them; he said: I will pardon the people of Kerbella all they have done, they have even dared to attack the Seraskier and have killed many of my soldiers, but I will pardon all if they will give up the town to me, he then wrote and sealed a paper to that effect, adding that the Yeramus might go out from the opposite side of the town without molestation. This paper he gave to Seid Ibrahim Kazveene Chief Priest who despatched it by Mollah Kheliel to Kerbella with the promise of the Pasha's pardon. The inhabitants answered we will allow two hundred men in the town, and some soldiers at one of the gates, but that Kerbella should remain in their hands. The Pasha on receiving this answer was very angry seeing they were determined to resist him, he told the Consul he should continue the siege—the Consul again informed the Pasha that the Yeramus would not allow the Persian to leave, and urged him to give time. The Pasha would not agree to this. The Consul and Chief Priest returned to Bagdad; they had been four or five days in the Pasha's Camp. The Chief Priest in Kerbella Hajee Seid Ranssem it is said (he told me also the same thing) wrote to the Persian Consul and Seid Ibrahim Kazveene begging the former to come to Kerbella, that this presence was necessary, it was the hour of danger. This letter was received by them after they had quitted the Pasha's Camp about two hours. Rumours in the town are very prevalent that the Shah of



Persia was sending an army of twenty thousand men to their assistance, which gave great confidence to the Persians inside. Persians have informed me that they heard these reports, and many believed them; also they have most positively assured me that their Consul never wrote or communicated with them, and on hearing he had returned to Bagdad, did not consider there was any danger. The Consul asserts he wrote to the Chief Priest Hajee Seid Ranssem, which the latter most positively denies. It is to be regretted that finding the Pasha was determined to act, he did not communicate with the Persians, but I do not feel at all certain that they would have listened to his advice, the war had now become a religious war and all felt confident the place would not be taken. The Pasha told me that letters were intercepted addressed by the Arabs to the people of Kerbella, telling them to hold out, that twelve thousand men were coming to their assistance, and would attack the Pasha's camp.

The siege had now lasted many days fighting and negotiating daily. the Seraskier finding his guns made no impression, and the guns on the bastion and wall pieces giving him much annoyance, took up a new line of attack by the Nujif road a short distance east of his former position. From this he entered the gardens and fought his way step by step for several days. The troops during this time underwent great fatigue; they had to cut a road through a grove of date trees about one hundred yards wide for the distance of a quarter of a mile. The trees were cut down mostly during the night by the Arabs who accompanied the army assisted by the soldiers, until they reached the tomb of Ibn Humsah, which was in possession of the Yeramus, here severe fighting took place, the troops at last drove them out. At this place the Seraskier established his main battery of four guns about three hundred and fifty yards from the wall of the town, which he constructed from the wall surrounding the tomb. The trees between the battery and the town were smashed by the shot. The camp remained in its former position. The inhabitants getting short of shot, the brass railing which surrounds the outer part of the tomb of Abbas was taken and cast into balls and shot; and the Persian shopkeepers were forced to provide any materials they had for that purpose. The walls were daily crowded by the inhabitants who vented the grossest abuse on the Sultan, and cursed the soldiers and their religion, the chief people of Kerbella doing all in their power to excite the religious feelings of the Sheeahs against the Soonies. The Mollahs also were most active, I have been told, as they could not fight, they repaired any damages the wall might receive, they prayed also in the Mosques encouraging and exciting the people telling them it was a religious war. It is a well known fact that Seid Seid, (he has charge of the Mosque of Abbas, and has much influence in Kerbella) when all had nearly agreed to the Pasha's proposition, got up in the assembly, and dashing his turban on the ground, exclaimed, "do you call yourselves Sheeahs, and talk of giving up the town, and your wives to the infidels outside." The Chief Priest Hajee Seid Ranssem did all in his power to prevent hostilities, he preached against their proceedings, he was abused and threatened, they would not listen to him. This I have heard from many people who were at Kerbella. At this time all were unanimous in defending the place.

The position of the Seraskier had now become very perilous. The Euphrates had risen the bridge of boats was carried away, and no provisions had for many days arrived from Bagdad. The men were fatigued and dispirited from exposure to the cold and damp, half rations were only served out, and many desertions took place. In this state of affairs the Seraskier called a council of war of his officers and it was resolved that the place should be taken by assault; up to this time the fire of the artillery had been very slack, and the walls of the town had sustained no damage. On the 11th January, Ferik Koord Mahomet Pasha arrived at the Seraskier's camp, accompanied by a Monsieur de Thevenin a French officer in the Turkish service, a vigorous fire was kept up on the town, and on the 12th the Ferik reported the breach practicable. Alwan an Arab was despatched to the town with a flag of truce, and the Seraskier's last proposals. The Chiefs met him at the gate, and a long and violent debate ensued. They had all agreed to the terms proposed, when Meerza Sauleh, Yeramus, got up and drew his swords, and dashing his turban on the ground, swore by the Prophet that as they had gone so far they could not recede, but must now put their trust in God and the Prophet. The meeting dispersed, Alwan Arab returned to the Seraskier, hostilities commenced, and after sunset the batteries ceased firing. The cold this night was excessive.

Upwards of eight thousand Arabs were in the town, being Sheeahs had arrived to assist the inhabitants, it was there red (*sic*) finding themselves not well treated, being badly supplied with food, powder and ball, they got discontented, and the night (*sic*). The Chiefs got alarmed and pacified them, they were distributed amongst the chiefs and people, food was seized and prepared for them. The firing in the batteries having ceased, the inhabitants fancied there was no immediate danger and the Arabs instead of returning to their posts remained in the houses, where they had been distributed that night.

The Seraskier immediately made his arrangements to carry the place by assault. The storming party was divided into three divisions commanded by Tahir Beg of the Moosul Brigade; one division was ordered to hold the breach; (the breach was about fifty yards wide) the second division to rush along the wall inside the Nujif gate, a distance of sixty or seventy yards, to open it, and let in the main body of troops, whilst the third division consisting of artillery men were to get possession of the guns in the nearest bastions, and turn them against the town. Tahir Beg, finding that the soldiers did not much relish the task they had before them promised if they gained the breach, they might do as they pleased when they entered the town. The Seraskier also promised one hundred piastres for every Yeramus head.



Before daylight on the 18th January the storming party moved from camp accompanied by the main body which halted at the battery. A soldier advanced and clambered up the breach; observing that the guards had left their posts, and the few who remained were asleep at the bottom of the wall round a fire, he returned to the Seraskier and reported what he had seen.

The storming party was then ordered to move forward. The Artillery covering their advance by throwing shot and shell into the town as fast as possible. It was now daylight. The soldiers had nearly gained the breach without opposition, when the alarm spread that the troops were in the town; the Arabs and inhabitants awaking from their sleep rushed to the breach, severe fighting took place and many soldiers were killed. The Arabs at last retreated, and fired from the neighbouring houses. The soldiers having gained the breach pushed along the wall inside and opened the gate, a messenger was quickly despatched by Tahir Beg to the Seraskier, informing him of his success, who immediately moved forward the main body and entered the Nujif gate. The troops were quickly formed along the wall, and two divisions marched off right and left inside the walls to get possession of the gates, and a third division was ordered to move through the centre of the town, being fired at occasionally from the tops of the houses as they passed along, and many soldiers dropping off into the different streets in search of plunder. The Seraskier mounted the wall near the Nujif gate, and took up his position in a bastion, when the troops had moved forward he began to say his prayers. It was now past sunrise. On the first news of the troops having entered the town Seid Ibrahim accompanied by two hundred Yermus and Arabs fled by the Hoor gate of which he had the key, Seid Wahab Meerza Sauleh, and Mahomed Ali Khan remained, the two latter were made prisoners. Seid Wahab escaped during the night. The Yermus had sent away their families some days before. The inhabitants alarmed at the arrival of the troops fled in all directions mixing themselves with the Arabs and Yermus, rush was made towards the Khaimaga gate, the crowd on arriving there found it shut, and the soldiers advancing on them, the Arabs fired, the soldiers instantly returned the fire, men, women and children were knocked down and crushed to death, some shot; the dense mob then moved towards the Hoor gate, the soldiers following them up and skirmishing with the Arabs, on their arrival at this gate which is very narrow, being only nine feet wide, they found half of the gate jammed, the crush here was awful. The two divisions met and a severe fight took place between the soldiers and the Arab women and children suffering dreadfully. The crowd at last broke, some rushed back into the town to seek shelter in the mosques others flung themselves over the walls and were dashed to pieces, whilst others sought shelter in the houses of His Royal Highness the Zil-i-Sultan, and chief Priest Hajee Said Kansem, the latter shewed me a court in his house where sixty persons (men, women and children) were crushed or suffocated to death flying from the fury of the soldiers. The cavalry outside the gardens cut up many trying to escape.

The division advancing through the town followed up a party of Arabs who took refuge in the mosque of Abbas, on arriving at the gate they found it shut, and were received by a volley from a neighbouring house belonging to Allee Wurdee Khan, this checked the soldiers, they rallied and forced the gate; the Arabs or Yermus inside fired at them, some shots also were fired from the minarets and three soldiers killed (the Turks say fifteen). The troops now became exasperated, and poured in volleys amongst the dense crowd, a tremendous rush took place to get away from their fire, men, women and children were knocked down, some killed by the bullets, others being trampled on or crushed to death. The soldiers finding the crowd retreating, dashed in amongst them cutting away in every direction, sparing neither age nor sex. The women in vain implored for mercy, they were thrown down and many were robbed, some soldiers penetrated the harm of the temple, where they say some Yermus had secreted. * These men most probably were wounded and themselves, eight* men were slaughtered clinging to the silver railing which surrounds the Saints, Tomb, and two persons are said to have been murdered on the grave of the Saint, the cloth which covers it was saturated with blood.

The court and harem of this Mosque were crowded with men, women and children, many of whom had retired there some days previous, with their little property, it having been pointed out to them as a place of security by the Chief Priest in obedience to the Pasha's request. On the first alarm, many of the chief inhabitants who had opposed the troops to the last and some Arabs, flung down their arms, and sought refuge in this place. The court and building were crowded to suffocation. The troops had become quite mad, all discipline was at an end. The officers finding the men would not obey their orders had returned to the Seraskier. The gate of the temple which enters the Bazaar, I was informed, was blocked up with the bodies of all ages and sexes, but mostly children, who had been trodden to death; the soldiers did not hesitate to kill when the slightest opposition was made, they plundered the women of their ornaments, many of the dead bodies were burning and bed covers had been flung over them to consume them the faster.

About one hour or one hour and a half to noon, the Seraskier arrived at the temple of Hoossein. A messenger had been sent to him with the news that the soldiers were committing the greatest horrors, more than two hours had elapsed since the troops had entered the town, he descended from the bastion, mounted his horse, and accompanied by his officers rode up to the gate, and was just in time to save it from sharing the same fate as the temple of



Abbas, and killed with his own hand two or three soldiers who dared to disobey his orders; he called out "Pardon, Pardon". From this time the slaughter ceased, the soldiers dispersing in all directions in search of plunder (the soldiers in camp also left their duty and joined their comrades in plundering the town). Nearly every house in the town was entered and plundered, with the exception of the houses of His Royal Highness the Zil-i-Sultan, and Chief Priest Hajee Seid Kansem, the Seraskier, on entering, sent a guard to protect them; some Arabs also came in with the troops and plundered; the women's apartments were all forced open, and what the women did not give up voluntarily was taken from them by force; some deaths took place in the houses—in them some soldiers are said to have been found killed. Many Persians had conveyed their property to the houses of the Persian princes, thinking their houses (*etc*) being guests of the Turkish Government would be respected, they met however with the same treatment, in many cases the soldiers threatened to murder the servants, if they did not discover where the jewels and money were hidden, all bedding, carpets, etc., were carried off the soldiers forcing the owners or servants to carry them to camp. The Seraskier had after his arrival at the temple of Hossein, given orders to cease plundering and many were stopped at the gates—the property was afterwards collected in the court of the temples of Hossein and Abbas for the rightful owners to claim, many told me when they went there to look for their property, they found only a few old bed covers, and worn out carpets, all had been carried away or stolen. The weather at this time was exceedingly cold, and the sufferings of many who had been robbed of their all, must have been dreadful. The Yermas Chiefs told me that they saw much plundered property in Mardan which had been brought there by Persians who had gone to the Governor and claimed it as their own. It is also stated that many of the Mardan Arabs before leaving the town on the approach of the troops plundered the inhabitants. Before the Seraskier had proclaimed pardon some poor creatures who were forced to carry out their property for the soldiers, on arriving outside the town were stripped of everything and afterwards decapitated, their heads taken to the Seraskier's cashier in the Battery to claim the promised reward, at last he refused to give the soldiers any more money for heads not before some twenty poor creatures had suffered. The Seraskier now exerted himself to get the soldiers out of the town to stop the plundering which the Persians declare continued nearly until sunset, when the soldiers worn out with fatigue, and satiated with plunder, became obedient to their officers, and returned to camp. The slaughter continued two hours, almost every person the soldiers met in the streets they killed luckily few persons ventured to leave the Mosques or their houses.

No Prince of the Royal blood nor any Persian of rank were killed, the sufferers were all of the poorer classes, small shopkeepers and labourers also a few learned men.

The wife of Prince Holakoo Mirza was severely wounded by a soldier, she is closely connected with the Shah of Persia being a daughter of the late Hoosein Ali Meerza, Prince Governor of Fars. A soldier of the irregulars entered her apartments and seized her child which he threatened to kill if she did not give up her property, being a courageous woman she ran forward, and seized him by the beard and spat in his face, her servants rushed in to attack the miscreant, in retiring she fell, the soldier fired, the ball bared two of her ribs and lodged in her arm, the child was saved by a black nurse who ran off with it. The Secretary of Seid Ibrahim Kasveeneh, Chief Priest, Seid Mahomed Ali was seized by the soldiers and forced to carry outside the walls some plunder for them. He stated who he was, but it was of no avail, on arriving outside the gate they cut off his head, and took it to the Cashier of the Seraskier Pasha, for a reward. He was a young man much respected. An eyewitness, a European informed me he saw three soldiers covered with blood who had their pockets full of ears going to claim a reward and from the same person I learnt that he saw some soldiers amusing themselves in placing a number of headless bodies in position, and then setting fire to them—the son of Prince Ali Nakjee Meerza (son of the late Shah of Persia) Nusseroola Meerza informed me that after his father had left the town with his brother His Royal Highness the Zil-i-Sultan, finding the last day that some of the shots reached his father's house, he removed his father's family consisting of twenty persons to the house of his uncle Imanum Wurdee Meerza which was close to the mosque of Abbas, many Persian families had assembled there with their property thinking it would be secure. The soldiers broke into the house. The young Prince remonstrated with them (it is said he opposed force) and told them he belonged to the Royal Family of Persia, the soldiers insisted on entering and wounded the Prince slightly—three servants and one black woman were killed—they went into the Haram and commanded the women collected there to give up their property, one of the ladies whom I called on at Kerbelah, told me they were all so alarmed and that they took off their jewels and hung them towards the soldiers, one of them observing she still kept her ear-rings demanded them and approached to help himself, after completely sacking the house they retired. The house of Alee Wurdee Khan, an uncle of the present Shah was also entered by the soldiers, this house was defended by the Arabs. The Khan jumped into a well to save his life, one of his servants went and informed the Seraskier who immediately sent some men to his relief. The Khan was taken to the Seraskier Pasha nearly dead with cold who sent him into the Harem of Hoosein for safety. Why the Khan did not leave the town before the siege is a mystery, it is said he was very active in advising the Persians to remain in the town.

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It is well known to all that the influential people of Kerbela, as well as the Yeramas defended the place to the last, and now they do not deny the fact and finding the town was in possession of the troops hid themselves in the Mosques having flung down their arms (this accounts for the number of arms found in the Courts of the Mosques), they now accuse the Yeramas, whom they upheld, of occasioning all the mischief, most of these men are of Persian origin and have a deadly hatred against the Soonies and their Government. The Mollahs also excited the religious feelings of the people making them believe it was a common cause a religious war. A Persian Seyd who was present stated to me that many of the Persians fought or gave assistance, that he amongst many did not leave the place thinking it would not be taken and rumours were spread that the Shah was sending a large force to assist them. He also stated that those Persians who were unfitted or refused to bear arms, were obliged to give money and supply anything necessary for the fighting men, likewise they considered themselves safe as their Consul did not come to order them away. Hajee Seyd Kansem Reshtee Chief Priest they all agree to the very last entreated them to listen to the Pasha, but without avail. He shewed great courage on the occasion, as he had all the Chiefs Yeramas and Mollahs against him.

The amount of killed has been greatly exaggerated. I have taken the greatest pains to arrive at a just calculation but without success. The Persians at first during the excited state of their feelings stated the loss of life from twenty to thirty thousand. They counted every soul killed as a Persian subject, many no doubt were originally of Persian origin, but on the other hand they will not allow that the Persians who fought such as Meerza Sauleh, Mahomed Ali Khan Belooch as several others with their followers who are mostly born Persians to be reckoned as Persian subjects having fled from Persia. Since my arrival I have found their feelings calmer on the subject of the numbers killed. At Kerbellah I strictly inspected the places, and made many inquiries where the slaughter took place, the streets are so narrow that a few bodies would at a short distance easily deceive the eye, and appear a large number. I have collected information from Persians and questioned others who were on the spot, and who buried the dead, one Persian account gave six hundred bodies altogether in the Court of the Mosque of Abbas and the Bazaar leading to the Chief Priest's house, the other account from a person of Kerbela who superintended burying the dead in the Court of Mosque of Abbas only, gave one hundred and seventy. Most of the bodies were stripped naked, many also burnt. I feel perfectly convinced that taking everything into consideration the loss of life in the town itself from the fire of the soldiers, suffocation and murdered did not exceed three thousand, many of these were Arabs. From what I have learnt making a wide calculation the total number killed, both inside and outside the town did not exceed five thousand, which is a fearful number; in making this statement to Your Excellency I do not assert it as the true number, for I have not been fortunate enough in my enquiries to find a Persian or any person who was present capable of furnishing me with a true account and how many of the killed were Persians? In questioning Persians who pretend to have great information on the subject, on asking them how many bodies they saw, and if they had counted them, they invariably answered I saw Arabs Persians Kerbellas of all sexes lying in heaps together. I have repeatedly asked them, have you lost any of your friends, relations, acquaintances or people you knew only by sight. With few exceptions they answered in the negative. I have also applied to the Persian Consul, if he can furnish me with any information regarding the number of Persians killed, but he was unable. I asked him how he could state to his Government that twenty-two thousand had been killed; he said he had heard so from different people who had arrived from Kerbela. I was most particular in my inquiries regarding the number of Indians killed. No subjects of Great Britain but three Indians (Seyds) natives of Lucknow were slain in the Court of Abbas. They also reported that twenty or thirty people of the Punjab and Cashmere had been at Kerbela, but they could not say if they had left or had been killed. It has also been stated that a number of Russian subjects from Erivan, Shirwan, etc., had suffered, only two subjects of Russia were in Kerbela when I visited it, and although I pressed them to come and see me, they declined, saying they had no information to give. On the departure of His Excellency Namik Pacha for Kerbela I gave him a list of the names of people said to have been killed, as sent to me by Court Medem from Tehran, some of the people in that list had settled at Kerbela for years but they could not say if they had left or had been killed except a Mollah Ali who had been killed. Some of the names were totally unknown to them. It must also be recollected that thousands of Persians had left and had been leaving Kerbela before the Pacha's intentions were publicly known and it has been stated to me by the inhabitants of Kerbela, that at the time of the siege the whole population of the place (including eight thousand Arab Mardans) did not exceed thirty thousand. Seid Wabab, the Governor, told me he thought about twenty thousand and of which not more than six thousand were Persians.

On my late visit to Kerbela I was surprised after the accounts that had been spread abroad to find the town in such good order. The Minarets of the Tombs of the Saints are slightly damaged in a few places, which convinced me as they stand so exposed, that the artillery had orders to avoid them expressly. I was very anxious to visit the inside of the temples having heard that one of them was damaged, but the people who had charge would not permit me, and even at first objected to allow me to enter the Courts. I could have got permission from the Governor of the town, but seeing their feelings on the subject, I did not press it.



It has been said also that many Persian women were taken to camp and distributed amongst the soldiers, and after three days were returned to their homes. I received the following account from an Artilleryman a Persian in the Turkish service who had charge of the women when brought to camp. He is a Sheah; he stated that about fifty women mostly of the poorer classes and upwards of one hundred black slave girls and a few men were brought to the battery. The women were put into a separate tent and the black slave girls and the men (the latter he said, the soldiers would have decapitated, only the Seraskier had ordered no more money to be given for heads) were placed apart—about three hours afterwards Mollah Ali, native of Bagdad, came to the Battery and took the women back to town, the slaves were kept, but those since claimed have been given up. I questioned some Persians on this subject; they said they had heard such reports. Mollah Ali most positively denies that the women were taken to camp which was a quarter of a mile from the Battery, nor would the officers have allowed it. I have likewise had no complaints from the Persians on this subject.

The loss on the side of the Turks was about four hundred killed and two hundred wounded many of whom have since died,—the Doctor informed me that their wounds had the appearance of being made with poisoned balls. At the breach and near it they lost 50 men. The conduct of the officers after the siege was very unbecoming allowing the troops to turn the Court of the Mosque into a Barrack Yard, horses and mules were picked in different parts, the soldiers playing native music and singing loose songs to the horror of the Sheahs. Very little of the property of the Temple of Abbas was plundered, part of a gold chain and a silver padlock belonging to the silver door which enters the Harem are missing, the door itself has the marks of several musket balls on it. Some flags and one or two carpets are also missing, these I have heard will be returned. The valuable property belonging to the Mosque was in a separate apartment, and was under charge of Seid Wahab who is said to have plundered much of it. A Persian sword was shewn to me here said to have been stolen from the Mosque of Abbas. It was a common Kasveen blade, the inscription it bore had the appearance of having been newly engraved on it. The valuable swords said to have been carried off belonged to the fighting people of the town, who on entering the Harem flung down their arms, which after the siege were collected by the troops.

The Tomb of Hoossein was not plundered or entered by the soldiers.

Many Persians have come to me stating they have lost much property in Kerballa, especially the Persian Refugee Princes, put forth large claims, but all have great difficulty in proving the amount they declare to have lost. It is a fact that many Jews left this soon after the siege, and the price of gold which before the siege, was at 14 Keroons, fell when the place was taken to 9 Keroons. The Seraskier Zaadoollah Pasha is reported to have carried off much plunder with him, how far that may be true I cannot say, but he was known to have made large purchases before leaving this.

After the siege the dead remained in the streets two days, several had naptha flung over and were consumed—a few were devoured by the town dogs. His Excellency Negib Pasha having sent to the Governor Tehir Beg that he should visit the tombs of the Saints in a few days, he ordered the people to bury them immediately threatening to burn those bodies which remained unburied, holes were dug in the streets near Mosques and four or five bodies were flung together into them. The usual Mahomedan Burial ceremonies being omitted. His Excellency Negib Pasha arrived a few days afterwards and (I understand) the inhabitants sealed a paper which was presented to him stating the loss of life had been trifling. This paper was sealed by many who had been most zealous in defending the town. I asked them how they could seal such a paper knowing it to be false, they said they did not read it, and did not know what they were sealing. All the dead bodies outside the town were flung into empty wells.

It is the custom also to bury the dead in the streets at Kerballa—the whole town is consecrated ground.

The principal cause of the late affair at Kerballa may be ascribed to the chiefs of that place who supported the Yaramas in their opposition to the Government and in the time of danger withdrew from the contest and left the innocent and helpless to the fury of the soldiers. Much religious excitement prevailed, when one party shewed the slightest appearance of yielding to the Pasha's orders, some Chief of the other party stepped forward reminding them of their faith, and asked if they wished to become the slaves of the Soones. The Priests did all in their power to excite the people to fight, telling them that God was on their side, that death was better than the rule of a Soonee, and through their encouragement the people appeared daily on the walls cursing the Soonees, their prophet, and the Sultan, and lavishing all the abuse they could invent. The Sheahs will never forget that the Soones overcame them in the late contest, the most deadly hatred exists between them, and many returned to Persia filled with false impressions of the number killed, circulating everywhere the most exaggerated reports to excite the religious feelings of the people, counting every Sheah who had been killed as Persian subject—as a Persian remarked to me, that he considered the death of one Sheah by a Soonee, the same as if ten Sheahs had been killed. The French Consul-General informed me that during the siege of Kerballa some Persians came to him and requested his advice to know if they should proceed to Kerballa to help the Sheahs as it was a religious War.



The settlement of the question of Kerbella will hereafter be one of great difficulty, on it will greatly depend the tranquillity of this Pachalic situated as it is in the centre of an immense Sheeah population. In conversing with the inhabitants although they pretended to rejoice at the expulsion of the Yaramas, I could plainly perceive that they felt great dislike to submit to the Government, especially the Persians, who almost considered the town as belonging to themselves, they complain of the great precipitation shown by the Pacha, that if he had given more time everything would have been arranged without bloodshed, according to his wishes, whilst the Pacha feels assured they only wanted to gain time to collect a greater force to attack him and accuses the Persians of assisting the rebels against him, that he gave them notice of his intentions 30 days before the place was invested. It is to be regretted that the Persian Consul did not shew more vigour, his presence even on the day of the assault might have been of the greatest use—many Persians do not hesitate to say that he was afraid to go to Kerbella, others give as a reason for their not leaving that whilst their Consul remained at Baghdad there could be no danger.

His Excellency Namik Pasha to whom I have translated most of my report assures me that the charge made against the soldiers of setting fire to the dead and dying is untrue. The Persians most positively asserted it to me, but the soldiers deny the charge, those bodies that were burnt were ignited by the wadding from the muskets. The most positive orders were issued by His Excellency Negib Pasha to the Seraskier which were read in Camp to all the officers assembled that if the assault took place they should avoid as much as possible the shedding of blood, to be merciful and spare the innocent.

A great many of the Chiefs of Yaramas, Seid Ibrahim Zuffanee, Seid Wahab and others have come in and given themselves up to the Pasha who has pardoned them at my request, also some of the Chiefs of Kerbella, who were present at the siege have arrived, I have questioned them in private at my own house, and their report of the late affair nearly corresponds with what I have stated to Your Excellency. They almost positively declare that after the siege commenced it was common cause, that every body capable of bearing arms fought, whether Arab or Persian. They deny that they prevented the Persians from leaving the town, that four of the gates were left open, that many left during the siege, and caravans went during that time to Nujif, that the guns were served by Persians who volunteered, many of those who remained were in the pay of the Chiefs of Kerbella as cultivators, and that almost every respectable Persian had left the town before the siege began. They all acknowledge that His Excellency Negib Pasha made them several offers of pardon both before and after the siege began (this also the Persians who were in Kerbella have allowed to me) but they refused, thinking that he never would take the place, and the letters he sent, being addressed to Hajee Seid Bansein, the Chief Priest, Meerza Sauleh Yaramas and his party opposed any attempts to make peace. At the request of His Excellency Namik Pasha I afterwards attended at his house when these men were examined, they spoke very freely, and confirmed many things I had heard before.

I do not think from what the Persians have told me that after operations were commenced they were allowed to leave the town and I believe they were much oppressed by the Yaramas. A Persian explained the case to me as follows:—"That those who had property there did not like to leave, as in case the Pasha did not succeed in his attack, their property would have been confiscated by the Yaramas, and they would not have been allowed to return, so they considered it better to remain, and always consoled themselves that things would end as in the time of former Pashas, some took arms to prevent the Yaramas making them work and demanding money from them—and it was the common talk amongst the people seeing the siege lasted so long that the Pasha with such a small force would never be able to take the place. The inhabitants of Kerbella also, who declared to me they did not assist since their names have been given up, now declare that all capable of bearing arms fought, whether Arab or Persian.

I have inquired into the report that some Persians were sent to Baghdad and killed by the Pashas orders—the men killed whether Persians or Arabs were Yaramas, and actually taken during hostilities but I have been told from good authority that no Persians were amongst them.

In sending so small a force to Kerbella, it appears to me that His Excellency Negib Pasha placed his Government in a very dangerous position and if the siege had lasted two days longer—I doubt much if he would have succeeded and in case of a reverse the whole force and even the Pasha himself at Mossaib would have saved themselves with difficulty. I must candidly confess from what I have learned that His Excellency does not appear to have exhibited during the siege any of those sanguinary feelings which have been attributed to him. He is quick in temper but his word as far as I have seen is to be depended on, and I have not found that he has thrown any obstacles in my way of gaining information.

I have endeavoured in obedience to Your Excellency's instructions to lay before Your Excellency a plain statement of affairs from the commencement as nearly as they occurred, which I have compiled from different accounts mostly furnished me by Persians and the inhabitants of Kerbella. I have experienced the greatest difficulty and labour from the very contradictory evidence offered, and checking the exaggeration of the Persians under their excited feelings. Since my arrival at Baghdad I have used every endeavour to collect information (my house has been constantly filled with all classes of Persians) to enable Your Excellency to form an opinion of the affair as it really took place.



Colonel Taylor has afforded me every information in his power, and I am much indebted to him for the kind assistance he has given me.

The latest accounts from Kerbela state the town to be perfectly quiet and its population daily increasing. Colonel Taylor has forwarded to Your Excellency translations of letters regarding that place. I have the honour to inclose a translation of a letter sealed by His Excellency Negib Pasha which was given to me by one of the Persian Princes Imatun Wurdee Meerza.

I have, etc.,

(Sd.) F. FARRANT, Lieutenant-Colonel.

BUYUKDERY,

To the Earl of Aberdeen, K.T., etc., etc., etc.

September 17th, 1843.

No. 200.

MY LORD,

I am happy to inform Your Lordship that the affair of Kerbala, in so far as this Government is concerned, is finally, and I trust it may be said, satisfactorily concluded.

In explanation of the terms of the arrangement, as well as of the considerations which have prevailed with Monsieur de Titon and myself to accept them, I submit to Your Lordship copies of my correspondence with Lieutenant-Colonel Shiel and the Commissioners at Erzeroom, together with the Dragoman's reports, and also translations of the letters addressed to Hadjee Meerza Aghassee by the Grand Vizier and to the Dragoman of the Porte by Rifaat Pasha.

I have, etc.,

(Sd.) STRATFORD CANNING.

BUYUKDERY;

September 8th, 1843.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Shiel, etc., etc., etc.

SIR,

I had hoped to have it in my power to send you by to-day's packet a letter from the Grand Vizier to Hadjee Meerza Aghassee, and another document respecting the unfortunate catastrophe of Kerbela; but the papers in question are still with the Sultan, and I can only state more distinctly than heretofore the leading points which, after much discussion, constitute the amount of reparation which the Porte consents to give, and which I agree with the Russian Envoy in accepting and transmitting to Persia as a definitive settlement of the whole affair.

I trust that our view of this vexatious matter will be adopted by yourself and Count Medem. It is founded on the statement of facts presented by Lieutenant-Colonel Farrant under the circumstances of local investigation with which you are fully acquainted and we have no hesitation in declaring our settled opinion that the Court of Persia ought to be satisfied with the result which we have obtained. It is true that our first suggestion included the removal of Negib Pasha to another Government, but as we did not feel ourselves warranted in resting that proposal upon other grounds than those of the Porte's own benefit, and the interests of the pending negotiation, we could not with propriety or consistency make it the object of a peremptory demand.

The terms, to which we have finally consented, are these:—

1. That the Porte shall address a letter to the Prime Minister of Persia and communicate a copy of it to the representatives of the mediating powers.
2. That a suitable sum of money shall be applied by His Highness the Sultan to the relief of the sufferers at Kerbela.
3. That the Porte shall expressly declare her disapproval of the late expedition against Kerbela, her regret at the occurrence, as unauthorized and unreasonable, and, more especially, her sorrow for the effusion of blood which ensued.
4. That Negib Pasha shall be ordered to repair the shrines at Kerbela, to administer his province with equity, to protect the Persian subjects there, and particularly the pilgrims from



Persia, and, finally, to undertake nothing that can bring upon him the displeasure of the Sultan.

5. That Negib Pasha shall be threatened with dismissal in case of any future misconduct; and

6. That all these points shall be announced to us in writing by means of an Instruction addressed by Rifaat Pasha to the Dragoman of the Porte, and deposited in copy with us.

I shall avail myself of the earliest opportunity to forward to Teheran both the Grand Vizier's letter and the last-mentioned document; and Monsieur de Titou, who writes to Count Medem in the sense of this despatch, unites with me in relying upon your joint exertions for the complete acceptance of this arrangement by the Court of Persia.

I have, etc.,

(Sd.) STRATFORD CANNING.



